Women's Activism and Feminist Agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua

Jennifer Leigh Disney

Women's Activism and Feminist Agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua

Women's Activism and Feminist Agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua

Jennifer Leigh Disney

Jennifer Leigh Disney is Associate Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University.

2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1

Contents

List of Maps and Tables

Preface

What is new about women's organizations and women's gender interests within socialist revolutionary movements being subsumed by and deemed secondary to male revolutionary leaders and class analysis? Unfortunately, not much. But for scholar-activists trying to understand what has gone wrong in contemporary emancipatory struggles for social change, a detailed account of the theories and practices of such struggles from the perspectives of the women and men directly involved, with all the contradictions, assertions, triumphs, and unintended consequences contained therein, provides not only a tribute to and recognition of those who have struggled before, but also a roadmap of what to adopt and what to try to avoid for future social justice theorizing and organizing. Too often, scholars working within a "First World" context work from the presumption that citizens of the "Third World" are "practitioners," while theory is reserved for "First World" academicians. What motivated me to take this project on was the belief that the theories and practices of Third World women have a lot to teach to First World feminist theorists and social justice scholars and activists. What propelled me to finish this project were the amazing women I met and the compelling and courageous stories they told me. It is to them and for them that I dedicate this book, for the richness of my work lies in the voices of the women and men who shared their lives with me, and it is for them and their struggles that I rely so heavily on their personal accounts and hope to do their stories justice.

It is often difficult to make a contribution to any one particular field of area studies. What I set out to do was truly *comparative* feminist studies of women's experiences organizing within and autonomously from Marxist-Leninist revolutionary frameworks in two different regions of the world, where political history and political culture were quite different. What I find particularly compelling is that despite these differences, women's experiences during the male-led revolutions were actually quite similar. However, some unique differences emerged in women's tactics and strategies of how and where to organize in Nicaragua as compared to Mozambique, and from these differences come some interesting contributions to comparative intersectional feminisms. Thus, the newness of this analysis emerges from the comparative experience of women in Mozambique and Nicaragua, both in terms of the similar difficulties faced by women in such contemporary socialist revolutions and the dissimilar tactics and strategies adopted by women to assert a gendered analysis into such struggles, as well as the application to what feminist theorists and practitioners around the world can learn from these experiences today.

In the very early stages of conducting historical research from secondary sources on the revolutions in Mozambique and Nicaragua, I decided that I wanted to travel to both countries to talk to women who had been involved in the revolutionary struggles directly about what *was* and *was not* accomplished for women within the emancipatory frameworks male leaders created in each context. As a result, I learned a great deal about the process of women's organizing and the strategies adopted both during and after the revolutionary periods. The story I am telling is a story of feminist agency: a transformation from mobilization to participation to organization. As such, I have relied heavily on personal interview data because I want the stories, struggles, feelings, and concerns of women to be paramount. Women's voices have too often been silenced in accounts of political and revolutionary change.

Methodology

I conducted field research in Mozambique in July–August 1999 and June-July 2004, and in Nicaragua in January–February 2000 and March 2005. I conducted a total of one hundred forty-six in-depth, qualitative, open-ended interviews (seventy-three interviews in each country) with women and men who were active in the revolutionary struggles, who have been leaders and members of the parties (FSLN and Frelimo) and the national-level women's organizations (AMNLAE and OMM), as well as women who have left the parties and women's organizations to become leaders of autonomous women's organizations and other nongovernmental organizations that have emerged in each country during the 1990s (see Appendix for a categorized list of interviewees). In Mozambique, I traveled to each of the three regions

of the country—Nampula in the North, Beira in the Center, and Maputo in the South—interviewing women from both patrilineal and matrilineal societies. In Nicaragua, I conducted interviews in Managua, Leòn, Granada, and Matagalpa. I used a snowball sampling technique, making initial contacts for my interviews through scholars and activists of each country in the United States, followed by outreach on the ground in each country of revolutionary leaders, party leaders and members, women's organizational leaders and members, members of parliament, and directors and members of autonomous women's organizations and nongovernmental organizations in the capital cities of Maputo and Managua and other major urban areas in each country. Interviews were conducted in English, Spanish, or Portuguese, based upon the preference of the interviewee, and were assisted by translators in each country. I owe a huge debt to the men and women who worked with me to translate and communicate across linguistic divides: Sandra Manuel, Selcia Lumbala, Elizabeth Lunstrum, Federico Rostrán, and Montserrat Fernandez. All of the interviews were recorded to ensure accuracy.

Acknowledgments

More goes into the writing of a book than can possibly be conveyed, especially when it begins as a dissertation. I have to first thank my mom and dad. Thanks to my mom, Lila, for constantly telling me that I could be and do anything in the world that I wanted to be and do, and for providing me with the material, emotional, and intellectual support to do so. Thanks to my dad, Don, for instilling in me an intellectual curiosity to ask questions and seek answers, and for proving to me that a household can be based on equality and a man can be a feminist. Thanks also to my two older sisters, Steph and Deb, my earliest mentors, who gave me models of achievement, moments of laughter, and more material support than I can ever repay. They also taught me what "sisterhood" could be like, so I knew how to find it as I established friendships with caring, strong, powerful women throughout my life. My brothers-in-law, Nick and Kevin, and nephews and niece, Chris, Lindsay, Bobby, and Lukas, have kept me grounded so that I always remember the important things in life: love, laughter, support, care, and connection.

My mentor from Western Maryland/McDaniel College, Christianna Nichols Leahy, is an International Human Rights expert who turned me on to Mozambique. She was the country expert for Amnesty International for Lusophone Africa. My last year of college she was reading Catherine MacKinnon's *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* and thought I might like it. My love for the intersection of Marxism and feminism was born. I knew at that moment that socialist-feminist theories would be my passion

for some time to come. Thank you, Christianna, for everything you taught me about the world and for lighting a fire in me that burns bright to this day.

I had the opportunity to work with an amazingly supportive dissertation committee and network of scholar-activists at The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York (CUNY): Irving Leonard Markovitz, Frances Fox Piven, Hester Eisenstein, Ken Erickson, Kathy Jones, Joyce Gelb, Sibyl Schwarzenbach, Joan Tronto, and W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe. Thank you, Lenny, Fran, and Hester, for modeling for me what a scholar-activist can do and be in the world. Moreover, it was at CUNY that I met a group of Feminist Sisters (WKWA) who for years have given me the emotional support and intellectual strength to carry on. Special thanks to Susanna Jones, Jocelyn Boryczka, Dorinda Tetens, Effie Senn MacLaughlin, Tracy Steffy, Ronni Michelle Greenwood, and Dot Benz. I couldn't have done it without you!

After graduating from CUNY, I made a new home for myself at Winthrop University, where I have also found a special group of colleagues and friends with whom to work. Thank you to Ginger Williams, Alice Burmeister, Ishita Ghosh, Dave Pretty, Jo Koster, AJ Angulo, Gerry and Karen Derksen, and the incredible Department of Political Science: Adolphus Belk, Tim Boylan, Scott Huffmon, Mike Lipscomb, Karen Kedrowski, Steve Smith, Chris Van Aller, and Melford Wilson. I also met a wonderful group of students at Winthrop, like Catherine Luepkes, Kristina Kent, Hollie Blake, Ashley Dozier, Porsche Hill, and Nakia Israel, whose activism and commitment to social justice continue to inspire me. During one of my course discussions on underdevelopment in Central America and Southern Africa, Nakia raised her hand and told me about a community in York County, South Carolina, in which people were living in dilapidated housing, without indoor plumbing, bathrooms, or showers. Thanks to Nakia, and founder Donna Berry, I became affiliated with the amazing Blackmon Road Community (BRC) and 501 (c) 3 community resource center *A Place for Hope* (APFH), struggling to achieve a resident-centered model of community development. My BRC/APFH family continues to inspire me to fight gender, race, and class-based inequalities in all of the communities of the world, including my own.

Winthrop University is extremely supportive of student engagement and innovative pedagogy. In the fall of 2006, I had the unique opportunity to teach my book manuscript as an undergraduate honors symposium, in which the students in the course provided critical feedback to each chapter and to the book as a whole. The final version of this book has been made dramatically better as a result of the comments I received from Christina Williams, Kristen Thomas, Brooke Rash, Nikia Cummings, Lauren Bohn, and Meredith Besecker. My students' comments echoed those of two blind reviewers from Temple University Press, to whom I also owe a great intellectual debt. Their detailed comments to the manuscript inspired an extremely rewarding revision process, which produced a much stronger final product.

List of Acronyms

ADOCA   Associação das Donas de Casa
             Association of Housewives

AICAJÚ   Associação dos Indústriais de Cajú
             Cashew Industry Association

AIM   Agencia de Informação de Moçambique
             Mozambique Information Agency

AMMCJ   Associação Moçambicana das Mulheres de Carreira Jurídica
             Association of Women in Judicial Careers

AMNLAE   Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses "Luisa Amanda Espinoza"
             Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women

AMODER   Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento Rural
             Mozambican Association for Rural Development

AMPRONAC   Asociación de Mujeres ante la Problemática Nacional
             Association of Women Confronting the National Problem

AMRU   Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Mulher Rural
             Mozambican National Association for Rural Women's Development

ATC   Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo
             Rural Workers Association

CAPRI   Centro de Apoyo a Programas y Proyectos
             Support Center for Programs and Projects

CENADE	Centro de Acción y Apoyo al Desarrollo Rural Center for Action and Support of Rural Development
CENIDH	Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights
CFJJ	Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária Center for Legal and Judicial Training
CIERA	Centro de Investigaciónes y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria Center for Agrarian Reform
CIPRES	Centro para la Promoción, la Investigación, y el Desarrollo Rural y Social Center for Rural and Social Promotion, Research and Development
CNF	Comité Nacional Feminista National Feminist Committee
CONAPRO	Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones de Profesionales National Confederation of Professional Organizations
CST	Central Sandinista de Trabajadores Sandinista Workers Federation
FIDEG	Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global International Foundation for the Global Economic Challenge
Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique Mozambique Liberation Front
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional de Nicaragua Sandinista National Liberation Front

MBEU	Associação para Promoção do Desenvolvimento Economico e
	    Socio-cultural da Mulher
	Association for the Promotion of Women's Economic and
	    Socio-cultural Development

MNR	Mozambican National Resistance
MRS	Movimiento Renovador Sandinista Sandinista Renovation Movement
MULEIDE	Mulher, Lei e Desenvolvimento Women, Law and Development
NUMAC	O Núcleo da Mulher Acadêmica Women's Academic Nucleus
OJM	Organização da Juventude Moçambicana Organization of Mozambican Youth
OMM	Organização da Mulher Moçambicana Organization of Mozambican Women

ONUMOZ   Operação das Naçâs Unidas para Moçambique
UN Operation in Mozambique

Renamo   Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
Mozambican National Resistance

Renamo-UE   Renamo Electoral Union

SI MUJER   Servicios Integrales para la Mujer
Yes, Woman—Integrated Services for Women

UEM   Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
Eduardo Mondlane University

UNAG   Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos
National Union of Farmers and Ranchers

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

UNO   Unión Nacional de Oposición
National Union of Opposition

WLSA   Women and Law in Southern Africa

WLSAMOZ   Women and Law in Southern Africa—Mozambique

Map 1. Country Map of Mozambique. *(Source: CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook./geos.mz.html)*

Map 2. Country Map of Nicaragua. *(Source: CIA World Factbook, https://www .cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook./geos.mz.html)*

1

"Women Must Occupy and Give Themselves the Place They Deserve"

*Women's Activism and Feminist Agency
in Mozambique and Nicaragua*

> *Many women in the countryside challenge the way things are without using the word "gender," without ever studying women and men. In Moeda, they ask, "What do you do in the morning and the afternoon?" Women realize, "Nobody gives water to me. I'm tired of giving water to others."*
>
> —Terezinha da Silva, Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária, Former Director of Faculty of Social Sciences, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), President of the Board of Forum Mulher,
> Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/23/99

> *Sometimes I went out of the house, and my husband came home and could not find me. I knew he was going to get mad! We discovered independence. We recognized we were women, and we had rights also. We are different feminists. For me, it is about human respect. Men have to respect and understand without abuse. Women must occupy and give themselves the place they deserve. There are rights women have in the home.*
>
> —Esperanza Cruz de Cabrera, Comité de Madres de Héroes y Mártires, Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/31/00

Introduction

Terezinha da Silva and Esperanza Cruz de Cabrera highlight two important aspects of women's activism and feminist agency: (1) gendered participation in productive and reproductive labor continues to play a defining role in the relations of power and inequality between women and men; and (2) the process of women's mobilization, participation, and organization in political activism is often a transformative experience for women in both the public and private spheres of life, shaping their own relationships to and understandings of feminism. Through her work as a scholar-activist in Mozambique, Terezinha da Silva recognized that women's resistance often emerges without any direct identification with feminism or the study of gender. Through her work with the Mothers of

Heroes and Martyrs in Nicaragua, Esperanza Cruz de Cabrera discovered what she considers a different kind of feminism based on human respect. Together, these women, and the movements in which they have participated, are making critical contributions to the theories and practices of women's organizing, challenging notions of feminist agency in the process.

This book tells the story of women's transformation from women's activism to feminist agency in revolutionary and postrevolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua.[1] It explores the extent to which women were able to mobilize within national liberation movements and integrate a feminist analysis into the vision and practice of social change of revolutionary movements seeking to overturn political, social, and economic structures and claiming to establish an emancipatory vision of society. The book also explores the impact such mobilization had on the state, society, and women's organizing. Essentially, women's activism in the revolutionary periods in both countries, characterized by the mobilization of women by male-led revolutionary state parties, was transformed into feminist agency in the contemporary postrevolutionary periods, characterized by the organization of women into autonomous organizations in civil society. It is this process of women's transformation from mobilization to organization that is the subject of this book.

Mozambique and Nicaragua provide a unique opportunity for comparison. In both countries, guerrilla movements committed to implementing a socialist agenda were successful in seizing state power. In 1974, after fighting a ten-year war of liberation from Portuguese colonization, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique [Frelimo]) became the government of an independent Mozambique. In 1979, the United Opposition, led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional de Nicaragua (National Liberation Front of Nicaragua [FSLN]), defeated the forty-six-year U.S.-supported dictatorship of the Somoza dynasty. In addition, both countries experienced revolutionary "civil" wars driven by foreign-supported counterinsurgency forces (Renamo, Contras) attempting to destabilize their socialist experiments. With the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, and the decision of Frelimo to adopt a Western-style capitalist democracy in 1992, the socialist agendas in both countries were overturned for neoliberal multiparty democracies. However, the electoral victories of Frelimo in 1994, 1999, and 2004, in contrast to the electoral defeats of the FSLN in 1990, 1996, and again in 2001, provide very different postrevolutionary contexts for the development of autonomous women's movements in each country. Moreover, the recent reelection of the Sandinistas back into power in Nicaragua in 2006 makes this an exciting time to evaluate the changing nature of the party, and the changing nature of women in relation to the party, in contemporary Nicaragua.

What has the situation been like for women in Mozambique and Nicaragua? Were the concerns of women incorporated into the Frelimo and Sandinista agendas? What was the relationship in Mozambique and Nicaragua between

the goals of the socialist transformation of society and the liberation of women? Have women organized autonomous feminist movements on their own behalf in the postrevolutionary periods in either country? Do women need to organize autonomously in order to articulate their interests into the vision and practice of social change, or can women successfully integrate a feminist analysis into other existing social change organizations? What impact has democratization had in both countries? What kinds of women's organizing is taking place in civil society today? How is feminism being constructed in Mozambique and Nicaragua? These are the questions I attempt to answer in this book.

Argument of the Book

My research reveals that while women were mobilized by the revolutionary parties in each country, Frelimo in Mozambique and the FSLN in Nicaragua, a gendered analysis of women's oppression was absent from the theories and practices of the revolutionary struggle, particularly with regard to the economic, cultural, and personal intersections of production and reproduction. This absence was due to the origin, mobilization strategies, and theories adopted by Frelimo and the FSLN, and subsequently by the national-level women's organizations in each country: the Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Organization of Mozambican Women [OMM]) in Mozambique, and the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses, "Luisa Amanda Espinoza" (Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women [AMNLAE]) in Nicaragua.

The theories of women's emancipation were flawed, and the organizing practices did not allow women the autonomy to develop a gendered or feminist analysis of their own oppression. Although the women's organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua were active and participatory, they lacked both the ideological autonomy to theorize women's oppression and the organizational autonomy to make their own decisions. In particular, the parties and women's organizations wanted to integrate women into the fields of defense and production, thus circumscribing their understanding of women's emancipation. Women's emancipation within the reproductive sphere of the family (including family farming, unpaid domestic and caregiving labor, reproductive autonomy, freedom from domestic violence, and freedom from gendered cultural attitudes and expectations of appropriate behavior for women and men) was not adequately addressed by either revolution. Frelimo, the OMM, the Sandinistas, and AMNLAE each adopted a strictly class-based analysis of oppression generally, and of women's oppression in particular; this analysis offered little or no conceptualization of the productive power of the reproductive sphere of labor, of sociocultural forms of oppression, or of the connections between the needs of women and the goals of the revolution.

A comparative examination of the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods in both countries reveals that women have gone from being mobilized

by the revolutionary state parties in power for the purpose of achieving the socialist/nationalist goals of Frelimo and the FSLN, to organizing themselves for feminist political change, to varying degrees, within both countries today. This has varied in each case to a large extent because of the degree of ideological and organizational autonomy achieved by women and the nature of the party politics. In Nicaragua, many more spaces for women's organizing emerged during the 1980s than in Mozambique because of the multidimensional organizing strategies adopted by Nicaraguan women. As a result, not only did autonomy struggles begin much earlier, but the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990 created an environment conducive to autonomous organizing separate from the party, in contrast to the electoral victory of Frelimo in 1994.

Despite the fact that the organizing strategies adopted by women in Mozambique and Nicaragua during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods have been different, the conceptions of feminism emerging in both countries are remarkably similar. The contemporary constructions of feminism emerging in both countries, and, I would argue, in much of the developing world,[2] challenge the equality/difference, practical/strategic, and economics/sex-violence-culture divides that exist in many Western feminist discourses.[3] As a result, they offer critical insights for the direction of future feminist theorizing and organizing.

Why Study Women and Revolution in the Developing World?

The recent wave of democratization and the alleged triumph of capitalism that have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as in various countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, make this an opportune time to explore the extent to which political and economic transformations that claim to be emancipatory—whether socialist, capitalist, or liberal democratic—have produced greater freedom and equality for all citizens involved.

Although more countries than ever before have adopted democratic electoral systems and neoliberal capitalist economic systems, economic inequality throughout the world is increasing. The gap between rich and poor is widening both within and between advanced industrial societies and the developing countries of the periphery. In 2002, in a study conducted for the World Bank, economist Branko Milanovic found that 84 percent of the world receives only 16 percent of its income.[4] According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 20 percent of the world's people in the countries with the highest incomes account for 86 percent of total private consumption expenditures, whereas the poorest 20 percent account for only 1.3 percent of total consumption.[5] Half of the world's population (2.8 billion people) lives on less than two dollars a day, and 1.2 billion people live on less than one dollar a

day.[6] Over a billion people around the world are deprived of basic consumption needs; the average African household consumes 20 percent *less* than it did 25 years ago.[7] Meanwhile, economic development for rural women in the developing context continues to mean that women assume the quadruple burden of unpaid subsistence agriculture/family farming, paid agricultural labor on farming cooperatives, child-rearing and the reproduction of social relationships, and all of the unpaid domestic labor of the household, including food preparation, water retrieval, and household maintenance. The 1995 Human Development Report, which focused specifically on *Gender and Human Development,* estimated that in addition to the officially estimated $23 trillion of global output, $16 trillion of unpaid and underpaid work is performed around the world, $11 trillion of which is the unpaid, invisible work of women.[8]

These conditions make a socialist critique of capitalism relevant, an economic critique of democracy necessary, and a feminist critique of both democracy and economic development—both the Marxist and the capitalist variants—urgent. Much of the classic literature on democracy defines democracy as universal (i.e., male) suffrage, revealing the gendered nature of the discourse of democracy.[9] There is also an extensive literature that addresses the gendered nature of the discourse and practice of development.[10] Both capitalist and socialist paths toward development have focused on increasing women's activity in the public sphere of paid labor, without acknowledging the productive value of, or offering to restructure, women's unpaid activity in the private sphere of "reproductive labor."

This book aims to: (1) provide an understanding of the nature of women's activism, women's organizing, and women's movements in a global context; (2) describe how feminism and feminist agency are being constituted in two cross-regional countries in the developing world; and (3) discuss how this knowledge can inform global feminist theorizing. Specifically, this book explores gendered constructions of work, production, reproduction, development, democracy, and movements for emancipatory change by collecting and analyzing empirical evidence of the status, organizing conditions, and struggles of women in the political, military, economic, and sociocultural spheres of life during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua. It is my contention that focusing on the interconnections between the "private, reproductive" sphere of the family and the "public, productive" sphere of the state, civil society, and the market within developing countries provides a unique vantage point through which we can construct an emancipatory vision of a new society, precisely *because* these interconnections highlight the intersections of gender, race, and class-based oppressions. Examining women's oppression from the perspectives of women located at the intersections of gender, race, class, and postcolonial-based oppressions within developing countries experiencing economic dependency and counterinsurgency will provide not only a heightened understanding of

the problems suffered by women globally but also a unique perspective with which to articulate a theory and practice of a movement to eliminate all forms of oppression.

Why Compare Mozambique and Nicaragua?

Mozambique and Nicaragua provide a unique, cross-regional, cross-cultural comparison for examining the ability of women to mobilize *as women* and develop a feminist agenda within the context of revolutionary movements fighting for social change. In both countries, anti-imperialist national liberation movements fought to implement a self-identified emancipatory agenda within the context of colonization, dependency, and counterinsurgency directed by foreign powers. While one may not have expected the socialist revolutions occurring in Russia in 1917, China in 1949, and Cuba in 1959 to integrate a feminist analysis of women's oppression into their revolutionary struggles, it seems reasonable to expect that revolutions occurring in the 1970s and 1980s would be more likely to do so, as feminist ideas had become part of the global public discourse, as evidenced by international meetings on the status of women (Mexico City, 1975; Copenhagen, 1980; Nairobi, 1985). Furthermore, both countries adopted multiparty capitalist democracies in the 1990s and have seen a tremendous increase in autonomous women's organizing in the ensuing decades. As a result, the two countries provide the basis for comparing the conditions for, and consequences of revolution, democratization, and feminism on women's organizing efforts in the contemporary period.

Basic Demographics

Both Mozambique and Nicaragua have experienced colonization, dependency, exploitation, mass deprivation, nationalism, popular resistance, socialist-inspired revolution, foreign-funded counterinsurgency, and, today, neoliberal multiparty capitalist democracy.

Mozambique and Nicaragua are small, dependent, "peripheral" countries that have been incorporated into the world economy as producers of raw commodities. Both have predominantly agricultural, export-led economies that have relied heavily upon the traditional exports of cashews, sugar, and cotton (Mozambique) and cotton and coffee (Nicaragua). Mozambique exported $2.381 billion and imported $2.649 billion in 2006. Nicaragua exported $1.978 billion and imported $3.422 billion that same year.[11] Each country has an unfavorable balance of trade, with Nicaragua's import-to-export ratio even lower than that of Mozambique. In early 2004, Nicaragua qualified for $4.5 billion in foreign debt reduction under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and in November 2006 the country received

TABLE 1.1.   BASIC POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

	MOZAMBIQUE	NICARAGUA
Total population	20.5 million	5.5 million
Urban population	34.5%	59.0%
Share of income richest 10%	39.4%	33.8%
Share of income poorest 10%	2.1%	2.2%
Population living below $2 a day	74.1%	79.9%
Population living below poverty	69.4%	47.9%
Population undernourished	44.0%	27.0%
Population with improved water	43.0%	79.0%
Population with improved sanitation	32.0%	47.0%
Total fertility/births per woman	5.5	3.0

Source: Human Development Report, 2007/2008.

over $800 million in debt relief from the Inter-American Development Bank.[12] The country still maintains $3.7 billion in external debt. Mozambique also received debt relief through the IMF's HIPC initiative and Enhanced HIPC initiatives and currently has $2.4 billion in external debt.[13] Labor force participation in Mozambique in 2006 was estimated at 81 percent agriculture, 13 percent services, and 6 percent industry, while in Nicaragua 52 percent of the population was employed in services, 29 percent in agriculture, and 19 percent in industry.[14] Both countries have struggled with poverty and underdevelopment and remain among the poorest countries in their regions (see Table 1.1).

In 2007, Mozambique had a total population of 20.5 million people, while Nicaragua had a total population of 5.5 million people. Income disparity within each country is virtually the same, with the richest 10 percent controlling 39.4 percent and 33.8 percent and the poorest 10 percent controlling 2.1 percent and 2.2 percent in Mozambique and Nicaragua, respectively. Large portions of each population live below poverty: about 70 percent in Mozambique and 50 percent in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan population is more urbanized at almost 60 percent, while 65 percent of Mozambicans live in rural communities. Both countries have a young population. In Mozambique, 44.7 percent of the population is between the ages of 0 and 14, compared to 35.5 percent in Nicaragua.[15] Of the Mozambican population, 52.5 percent is between the ages of 15 and 64, with 61.3 percent in the same age group in Nicaragua. Only 2.8 percent in Mozambique and 3.2 percent in Nicaragua is 65 years old or older. The age of the population, younger in Mozambique, reflects low life expectancies, high fertility rates, low standards of living, and years of war.

Human Development Statistics and Gender

The Human Development Index (HDI), a statistic created by the UN Development Programme and designed to assess and compare basic indicators

of human development across countries internationally, is a simple average of three other indicators: longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, measured by a combination of adult literacy and the combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment ratio; and standard of living, measured by adjusted real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) uses the same indicators as the HDI but breaks down the results to reveal any disparities between women and men. HDIs and GDIs range between 0 and 1, with 0 being the lowest possible index and 1 being the highest. In 2007, HDIs and GDIs were calculated for 193 countries.

How do Mozambique and Nicaragua compare in terms of economic and social development? Mozambique has an HDI of 0.384, an HDI rank of 172, a GDI of 0.373, and a GDI rank of 149. Nicaragua has an HDI of 0.710, an HDI rank of 110, a GDI of 0.696, and a GDI rank of 98. How each of the indicators breaks down gives a rough estimate of the disparity between the two countries (see Table 1.2).

Obviously, there are vast disparities in human development between Mozambique and Nicaragua: a thirty-year difference in life expectancy, almost a 40 percent difference in adult literacy, a 20 percent difference in total primary, secondary, and tertiary educational enrollment, and a $2,400 difference in purchasing parity per capita. These differences in economic, social, and human development have affected the struggle for women's liberation in both countries. In comparison to Mozambique, in Nicaragua there is a much stronger infrastructure upon which to build a foundation for women's movements. The

TABLE 1.2.   SELECTED 2007/2008 UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN AND GENDER DEVELOPMENT REPORT INDICATORS[16]

	MOZAMBIQUE	NICARAGUA
HDI rank	172	110
HDI value	0.384	0.710
Life expectancy at birth	42.8 years	71.9 years
Women	43.6 years	75.0 years
Men	42.0 years	69.0 years
Adult literacy	38.7%	76.7%
Women	25.0%	76.6%
Men	54.8%	76.8%
Combined educational enrollment	52.9%	70.6%
Women	48.0%	72.0%
Men	58.0%	70.0%
GDP per capita	$1,242	$3,674
EEI, Women	$1,115	$1,773
EEI, Men	$1,378	$5,577
% Women in Parliament	34.8%	18.5%
GDI rank	149	98
GDI value	0.373	0.696

Source: Human Development Report, 2007/2008.

"massification" of education, the access to, and impact of, global discourses on gender equality and women's rights, and the opportunities for women's transnational communication and organization all seem to have had an impact on the degree of emergence of feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua.

Mozambique has a 99.66 percent indigenous African population, including Shangaan in the South, and Macua and Maconde in the North. It was never a typical settler colony, with the Portuguese investing very little in infrastructure. Most of the Portuguese who were there fled after the coup in Portugal in 1974 and subsequent Mozambican independence in 1975. Nicaragua, in contrast, experienced a much longer history of settler colonization, and has a 69 percent mestizo population. Officially independent from Spain since 1821, Nicaragua has suffered at the hands of U.S. neocolonialism and military involvement for more than 150 years. It is impossible to discuss the contemporary context of women's activism and feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua without first understanding the Mozambican and Nicaraguan experience with colonization, imperialism, and underdevelopment.

Portuguese Colonial Legacy in Mozambique

Mozambique was colonized by the Portuguese, who first arrived in Southern Africa in 1498. The Portuguese began to settle and trade along the Mozambican coast in the sixteenth century, and by the seventeenth century they "competed with Arabs for the trade in slaves, gold, and ivory."[16] To increase Portuguese colonial influence in the interior of the country, the Portuguese king granted *prazos*, large landed estates in the lower Zambesi Valley of Mozambique, to women *prazeros* provided they married Portuguese men: "Prazo ownership was designed to be kept in the female line for three generations in an attempt to bring Portuguese men in to settle the land; after that the land was supposed to revert to the king."[17] As the Portuguese colonial state increased in power after the establishment of European colonial boundaries at the Berlin Conference in 1884, it succeeded in suppressing the resistance of African peoples, particularly the Macondes in the North and the Tsonga in the South, and eliminating the autonomy achieved by the Afro-Portuguese prazeros.[18]

Through the purchase of twenty-five-year, renewable land concessions, three large companies controlled by foreign investors (the Mozambique Company, the Niassa Company, and the Zambezi Company) established Mozambique's twentieth-century export-led colonial economy based on cash crop production, forced cultivation, and settler farms of sugar, tea, tobacco, cashew, rice, maize, groundnuts, cassava, potatoes, copra, sisal, and cotton.[19] The forced labor of cotton reached its height from 1938 to 1961, when almost one million peasants, the majority of whom were women, were legally required to plant cotton: "Despite the fact that most cotton growers in Mozambique were women, colonial authorities assumed 'real' producers to be male, just

as they understood 'real' work to exclude a wide range of essential tasks they dismissed as women's 'domestic chores.'"[20]

Despite claims to the contrary, Portuguese colonization was characterized by two racialized, hierarchical systems of economic, political, and cultural exploitation: (1) *chibalo,* a system of forced labor based on coerced recruitment or contract with private companies or the state in which Mozambicans were forced to use their most arable land for the cultivation of rice, sisal, and cotton, sometimes at gunpoint, for the nascent textile industry in Portugal; and (2) the *assimilado* system, wherein those Black Mozambicans who could prove themselves assimilated enough into Portuguese culture through their ability to speak and write the language, style of dress, cooking, and so forth, could achieve higher political status, more human rights, and greater economic opportunities. The assimilado system was a racist system that defined both progress and humanity as moving from that which was African to that which was European. Only 1 percent of Mozambicans ever achieved the assimilado identity. Writing in 1969, national liberation leader Eduardo Mondlane[21] eloquently summarized the consistent nature of Portuguese colonialism from the late nineteenth century to his leadership of, and participation in, the war for national liberation:

> Thus, in the years between 1890 and 1910, the main characteristics of Portuguese colonialism were established: a centralized net of authoritarian administration; the alliance with the Catholic Church; the use of companies, frequently foreign, to exploit natural resources; the concession system; forced labour, and the extensive export of workers to South Africa. There have inevitably been minor changes; but in its essence, the system today is the same.[22]

There are many structural similarities between the Portuguese colonization of Africa and Spanish colonialism in the Americas, including: a centralized, authoritarian, colonial state; close ties between the colonial state and the Catholic Church; and the exploitation of the indigenous peoples and natural resources through a racialized forced labor system and an agrarian export-led economy.

Spanish Colonial and U.S. Neocolonial Legacies in Nicaragua

The Spanish colonial project was initiated after eight centuries (711–1492) of religious civil war, conquest, and reconquest against Muslim Arabs. This period has been identified as one of "militant Christianity linked to an expansive state, an emphasis on military values and valour—especially individual

heroism and radically centralized political institutions."[23] Many Latin American scholars have attributed the fundamental aspects of Spanish colonialism in the Americas to these Iberian roots:

> As the cause of Christ was advanced in Spain by force of arms, the profession of arms acquired more respectability and legitimacy. It was the defender of the nation and of the faith, and received special recognition for its role through the *fuero militar*, a separate legal code exempting the military from the jurisdiction of civil courts. The special status accorded the military in most of Latin America reflects this heritage.[24]

The first Spanish conquistador, Gil González de Ávila, arrived in Nicaragua in 1522, naming the country after one of the indigenous agricultural peoples, the *Nicarao*.[25] For the next three hundred years, Spanish colonization established an export-oriented economy based upon the Indian slave trade and the commodities of hides, grain, cacao, and indigo.[26] It is estimated that the indigenous population of Nicaragua was decimated from one million to around ten thousand during the first six decades of Spanish colonial rule, with five hundred thousand Indians sold in the slave trade between 1527 and 1548.[27]

Spanish colonization was characterized by exploitation, Christianization, and militarism. Operating under the auspices of the Spanish crown-church-state, the *conquistador* was a military entrepreneur who sought fame, fortune, honor, wealth, and the capture, conversion, and control of the "natives." Many attribute the development of the Latin American *caudillo*, the personalistic, patriarchal leader who often uses his military prowess to appeal to the people, to the legacy of the conquistador. The *encomienda* system was a harsh system of indigenous labor in which Indians were forced to work on lands divided among the colonizers, ensuring their place at the bottom of the racialized hierarchy of the colonial period: (1) *peninsulares*, Spanish colonizers directly from Spain; (2) *creoles*, Spanish born in the Americas; (3) *mestizos*, those born of Spanish and indigenous parentage; (4) *indios*, the indigenous peoples of the the Americas. While Spanish and Portuguese colonization share the characteristics of export-led agricultural exploitation and racialized, hierarchical, socio-cultural oppression, it is the decimation of the indigenous population and the creation of a new ethnic class, the mestizo, that distinguishes the Spanish colonization of the Americas. This explains why Thomas Walker describes the people of contemporary Nicaragua as "relatively homogenous and culturally integrated. There are no major racial, ethnic, linguistic, or religious divisions. Practically all Nicaraguans are Catholic, speak Spanish, and share a common cultural heritage."[28] However, there have been political, economic, ethnic, linguistic,

and geographic divisions within Nicaragua, beginning in the colonial period and continuing well into independence.

In 1522, the conquistador Hernández de Córdoba founded the colonial cities of Granada and Léon, whose economic and social elites would come to represent two political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, respectively, who would engage in a series of civil wars that would define the early independence period from 1821 to 1857. Moreover, the "privately organized and financed invasions," or filibusters—first by British, then by American, privateers—occurred several times during the colonial and independence periods, revealing a heightened sense of foreign interest in Nicaragua beyond the Spanish, particularly for an interoceanic canal, that would define the postindependence period well into the twentieth century.[29] The British first arrived on the Miskito Coast of Nicaragua in 1633 and went on to effectively control the eastern half of the country until 1894.[30] The political links the British established with the indigenous population of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, the Miskitos, secured British dominance in the Caribbean and effectively prevented both Madrid and Managua from establishing a unified, independent Nicaragua for more than 200 years.[31]

U.S. influence in Nicaragua came first in the form of Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt, who financed the Nicaraguan Conservatives through his "transport service from the Caribbean along the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua overland to the Pacific—the quickest and cheapest way to travel from the U.S. East Coast to California."[32] In 1855, American filibuster William Walker contracted with the Liberals to help them defeat the Conservatives in a civil war, only then to declare himself commander of the Nicaraguan Army and "elect" himself president.[33] These imperialist actions united Conservatives from throughout Central America, whose troops captured and killed Walker in Honduras with the help of the British Marines.[34] With the imperialist Walker, the Liberal alliance discredited Central American Liberal movements and secured Conservative political power in Nicaragua for three decades. Moreover, the actions of Americans, with diplomatic recognition from the American government, laid the foundation for U.S.–Nicaraguan relations for years to come: "The spectacle of Walker and Vanderbilt, two Americans, struggling for mastery over a supposedly independent Nicaragua aroused bitter antagonisms which later action by the United States would intensify."[35]

In 1893, a Liberal revolt brought dictator José Santos Zelaya to the presidency, whose commitment to Central American integration and refusal to grant the United States canal-building rights through Nicaragua led the U.S. government to send troops to Bluefields in 1909 to support the Conservative overthrow of Santos Zelaya under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[36] When Santos Zelaya resigned, U.S. Marines were sent again to Nicaragua to fight side by side with Conservatives in 1912 to quell the Liberal

rebellion of Benjamin Zeledon.[37] This time, the U.S. Marines stayed: "In the twentieth century, the United States government imposed its dominion over Nicaragua, first by direct armed intervention (from 1912–1925 and from 1926–1933) and later through the client dictatorships of the Somoza family (from 1936–1979)."[38]

During the second U.S. Marine occupation, the United States intervened politically to broker a peace treaty, The Peace of Tipitapa, between the Liberals and Conservatives, which awarded Liberal General Moncada with the Nicaraguan presidency in return for the cessation of hostilities.[39] The treaty was acceptable to everyone except Augusto Cesar Sandino, a passionate Nicaraguan nationalist and anti-imperialist who led a six-year guerrilla war against the U.S. Marines: "On July 1, 1927, Sandino issued his political manifesto in which he denounced Moncada as a traitor and pledged to drive the Americans from his homeland."[40] In 1933, the Hoover administration removed the U.S. Marines, leaving an organized, trained, and armed new military force, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (National Guard of Nicaragua), under the leadership of an English-speaking Nicaraguan, Anastasio Somoza García, who was nicknamed "El Yanqui" for his pro-American stance.[41] Tension between the Guard and Sandino and his followers led to an invitation to Managua to rework the 1933 Peace Agreement. After a farewell dinner for Sandino and his staff on February 21, 1934, with President Sacasa, "Sandino and his party were intercepted by the Guard who took him and two of his generals to an airfield and killed them."[42] From 1936 to 1979, the Somoza family dynasty ruled Nicaragua like its own private *finca* (ranch), in large part through its control of the National Guard and the support of the United States, until the political descendents of Sandino, the Sandinistas, led the revolutionary insurrection that was as much nationalist and anti-imperialist as it was antidictatorial and socialist.

History of Revolution and Counterinsurgency in Mozambique and Nicaragua: Frelimo, Renamo, the Sandinistas, and the Contras

In 1961, "frustrated with the lack of nationalism" of the pro-Soviet Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), "several young Marxists split from the PSN" and founded the Sandinista National Liberation Front (i.e, FSLN), which, after years of guerrilla activities, organizing among the masses, and fighting an eighteen-month war of liberation, defeated Somoza's army and came to power in 1979.[43] Nicaraguan revolutionary leaders characterized their revolution as "a popular, democratic, and anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle" based on "a political project of national unity and an economic project of a mixed economy."[44] In 1962 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, three anticolonial

groups united under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane and formed the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo). Frelimo's focus during the ten-year war of national liberation was unity, people power, and class struggle, identifying Mozambique as a nation of workers united by the exploitation of colonial capitalism.[45] Revolutionary socialism and Marxism-Leninism emerged from this ideological origin, the experiences in the liberated zones, and the concern that "a black bourgeoisie, if left unchecked, could co-opt and ultimately destroy the revolution."[46] An anti-imperialist revolutionary regime in Central America, and a Black African revolutionary regime in white supremacist Southern Africa, both inspired by Marxism during the cold war, aroused the animosity of the United States and South Africa. As a result, both countries suffered massive destruction and unspeakable human tragedy due to "civil" wars initiated by counterinsurgency forces (Renamo in Mozambique, Contras in Nicaragua) that were created, funded, and supported by foreign governments to destroy their socialist experiments.[47]

The sixteen-year postindependence war in Mozambique from 1977 to 1992 must be understood within the context of the minority white supremacist apartheid regimes ruling Southern Africa, and the cold war. The Mozambican National Resistance (MNR)[48] was created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977 as a counterinsurgency force designed to destablilize the Marxist-Leninist Frelimo regime that had begun supporting and granting refuge to Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting for majority rule in Rhodesia. The first MNR recruits were disgruntled Portuguese, former members of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) and elite Black units of the Portuguese colonial forces (many of whom had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence) and dissidents from Frelimo, including Andre Matsangaissa and Afonso Dhlakama, "who had been expelled for corruption or had left because of unfulfilled personal ambitions," respectively.[49] Some rural Mozambicans were later drawn into Renamo out of opposition for Frelimo collectivization policies, reeducation camps, and modernist hostility toward traditional power and belief systems. With the achievement of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980, "South Africa took over sponsorship of Renamo and dramatically augmented its military capacity."[50]

By 1982, Renamo had destroyed 840 schools, 12 health clinics, 24 maternity clinics, 174 health posts, and 900 shops.[51] In 1987, the Renamo massacre in Inhambane province killed 424 civilians, including pregnant women, children, and other patients in the town's health clinic.[52] Human Rights Watch has documented the particularly brutal tactics of Renamo, including cutting off ears, noses, lips, and sexual organs as well as instituting forced conscription of child soldiers.[53] The human, economic, and infrastructural costs of the proxy war devastated the people of Mozambique: between 1980 and 1988, UNICEF estimated that 494,000 children under the age of five died from war-related causes; 1,800 schools were destroyed and 978 rural health clinics,

almost half of the clinics in the country, were destroyed or were forced to close because of Renamo attacks; and a UN study estimated $15 billion in losses.[54] Women suffer uniquely in times of war, not just as victims of murder, but as survivors of torture, violence, kidnapping, rape, forced marriage, and sexual abuse in refugee camps.[55] Kathleen Sheldon cites a study of 110 women in a refugee camp in Zambia in which 87 had been the victim of at least one attack or violent episode, 44 percent of whom had witnessed a murder.[56] More than 5 million Mozambicans, "mainly women and children, who had fled to safety on the outskirts of cities and towns, or in neighboring countries" returned home in 1992 after the war had ended.[57] Alice Dinerman summarizes the dramatic events that shaped the postwar context in Mozambique and transformed Renamo from a terrorist organization into a political party:

> The war took one million lives, devastated the country's economy, brutalized the population and left most people destitute. On one side stood the government, dominated by Frelimo, the ruling party which had won Mozambique its independence from Portugal in 1975. On the other was Renamo, a proxy army created and used by the dying white supremacist regimes of the region to destabilize Mozambique. The war produced no clear victor and an internationally-brokered peace deal guaranteed Renamo, widely recognized as the main perpetrator of wartime atrocities, a place in Mozambique's post-war political system.[58]

The signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992 and subsequent successful implementation of the UN mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to facilitate the process of demobilization and multiparty elections are a true testament to the power of peace and the hope of consolidated democracy in the region and in the world.[59]

The counterinsurgency in Nicaragua also must be understood within the context of the cold war, specifically the Reagan Doctrine, which provided support for the low-intensity conflict of anticommunist "freedom fighters." On January 19, 1979, the day of the triumph of the Sandinista revolution, " a DC-8 jet, disguised with Red Cross insignia, landed in Managua to evacuate commanders of the Nicaraguan National Guard, a force the United States had created more than fifty years before. Over the next few days, U.S. operatives airlifted remnants of Anastasio Somoza's praetorian army to Miami from where they could reorganize to renew their fight against the Sandinistas in the future."[60] On January 23, 1981, three days after his presidential inauguration, Reagan escalated the war against the Sandinistas, stopping all aid and loans approved by Congress for Nicaragua under the Carter administration.[61] By the end of 1981, "the Reagan administration, acting primarily through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to unite, train and arm" the

ex–National Guardsmen, who were engaging in robberies, assassinations, and attacks along the Honduran–Nicaraguan border.[62] By early 1984, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force), better known as the Contras, had grown to a counterinsurgency force of between eight and ten thousand troops and had received $64 million in support from the U.S. government.[63] On November 25, 1986, it was announced that a $10 to $30 million Iranian arms payment had been laundered through Swiss bank accounts to illegally and covertly fund the Contra war against the will of Congress, revealing the lengths to which the U.S. executive branch was willing to go to interfere in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua.[64]

The Contra war cost tens of thousands of Nicaraguan lives. Death reports range from 30,000 from 1980 to 1989 to 46,000 between 1982 and 1987, according to competing official statistics.[65] As Thomas Walker points out, using the lower of the two figures, a loss of 30,000 people within a population of 3.3 million represents 0.9 percent of the population, the equivalent of 2.25 million people from the United States during the same time span.[66] The aggregate effect on the Nicaraguan gross national product of the economic damage caused to the productive forces in the country, the losses due to the financial blockade, and the added costs for defense and security are estimated at $9,087 million.[67]

It is evident that had South Africa and the United States *not* intervened in the domestic politics of these two revolutionary regimes, many more Mozambicans and Nicaraguans would be alive today to celebrate and to contest their policies. However, the question remains: despite the tragedies caused by external military interferences, how have the internal attitudes and decisions of Frelimo and FSLN betrayed their own socialist visions, especially for women? In the words of Sofía Montenegro, prominent Nicaraguan feminist theorist and activist, "One of the tools of feminism is to question, to challenge ideas. This is so important for a revolution! We must re-invent the politics, re-name reality, return it to the people, understand ourselves. Many people say we lost the revolution because of the American War. This would have been paradise. But what about the endogenous reasons?"[68] It is within this devastating context of colonialism, underdevelopment, and counterinsurgency that I explore both the achievements made by and for women within the Frelimo and Sandinista revolutions as well as the limitations of a revolutionary reorganization of society because of the framing of the revolutions and the subsequent unwillingness to challenge multiple forms of oppression, particularly those occurring in the sociocultural sphere of civil society and the private sphere of the family. I do not focus on the question of the overall "success" of the revolutions, as Margaret Randall did when she asserted that it was the unwillingness of twentieth-century revolutionary parties to alter their vision to include all groups in society, particularly by developing a feminist agenda, that led to their failure, although this assertion will emerge quite often in my

interviews.[69] Rather, my concern is the relative success of the revolutionary movements in addressing the needs and concerns of *women*. I also want to assess these revolutions against an emancipatory ideal type, based on the notion that a revolutionary movement will not be fully emancipatory—and therefore should not claim to be—unless it attempts to fight oppression in all its manifestations and to achieve the democratization of not only the state and the market but also civil society and the family.

The achievements of these revolutions cannot be understated, particularly in the areas of health, education, and access to basic economic resources for populations that dictatorial and colonial authorities have denied the basic right to rule and govern themselves for centuries. However, it is necessary to understand that the greatest limitation of both of these revolutions was their inability (or unwillingness) to translate such public, political, and economic gains in the productive sphere of the state and the market into private political, economic, and cultural gains in the reproductive sphere of home and family. What is perhaps most striking is the fact that two countries, on two different continents, with very different cultural histories, produced such similar stories about women's experiences within Marxist-Leninist revolutions. It is my contention that postrevolutionary societies will remain as unequal as nonrevolutionary societies as long as the sexual division of labor and the secondary status of women in the sphere of home and family remain unchallenged. Moreover, I contend that the literatures of women and development, global feminisms, and feminist theory not only need to better inform one another, but also need to place women's feminist agency in the developing world at the center of their discourses in order to remain more empirically relevant and theoretically useful to the majority of the world's women.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 2, "Feminist Contestations and Commonalities across First World/Third World, African, and Latin American Divides," places my analysis of women's activism and feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua in the context of the theoretical debates between First World and Third World feminisms, with focus on the contributions made by socialist, African, Latin American, and global feminisms. It argues that using intersectionality as a theory and a method of study not only produces the most inclusive way to approach, analyze, and understand comparative feminisms but also provides a normative framework for the creation of an anti-oppression politics.

Chapter 3, "The Birth of Revolutionary Women's Organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua," provides a history of the women's organizations in each of these countries, the OMM in Mozambique and AMNLAE in Nicaragua, examining both the theories and practices adopted by the two women's organizations in relation to the state parties in each country, Frelimo and the FSLN,

respectively. To shape the history, the theories of women's emancipation adopted by Frelimo and the FSLN, and by directive, the OMM and AMNLAE, will be briefly examined, highlighting the distinctions made between *Marxist* production and *feminist* reproduction. I discuss the relationship between the OMM and Frelimo and AMNLAE and the FSLN in great detail, arguing that both women's organizations lacked the ideological and organizational autonomy to develop a gendered or feminist analysis of women's oppression.

Chapter 4, "Autonomy Struggles Emerge in Mozambique and Nicaragua," focuses on the struggle for ideological and organizational autonomy that emerged between the women's organizations and the parties and within the organizations themselves. Both the OMM and AMNLAE experienced similar organizational identity and autonomy struggles throughout the 1980s but emerged from the 1990s in quite different forms, due to the nature of the organizing strategies adopted and the party politics. In Nicaragua during the 1980s, many more spaces for women's organizing emerged than in Mozambique because of the multidimensional organizing strategies adopted by Nicaraguan women. Not only did autonomy struggles begin much earlier in Nicaragua, but the *electoral defeat* of the Sandinistas in 1989 created an environment conducive for women's autonomous organizing, in contrast to the *electoral victory* of Frelimo in 1994.

Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to measure the "value added" of a socialist revolutionary analysis for women by providing an assessment of the policy impact of Frelimo, the FSLN, the OMM, and AMNLAE on women in Mozambique and Nicaragua in the areas of women's conditions, equality, status, and rights in the political, economic, social, cultural, and familial spheres of life. Chapter 5, "Political Participation, Legal Reforms, and Cultural Constraints," examines the areas of politics, the law, culture, and the family, and Chapter 6, "Military Participation, Economic Production, and Gendered Reproduction," examines the areas of military participation, economic production and reproduction, and gendered participation in paid and unpaid labor. Particular attention is paid to regional differences as well as to the distinction between matrilineal and patrilineal societies in Mozambique. Generally speaking, in both countries, the greatest advancements have been in the political sphere in terms of women's participation in public office and guarantees of basic civil rights, while the weakest achievements remain in the spheres of economics, culture, and the family. Whereas the economic limitations of women in both countries have both exogenous and endogenous causes, the limitations for women in the spheres of culture and the family are primarily endogenous.

Chapter 7, "Democratization and Civil Society in Mozambique and Nicaragua," examines the complicated changes that each country has undergone in the period of political democratization. The concepts of democracy, democratization, and civil society will be discussed critically, examining what changes have taken place in each country in the postrevolutionary period. In this

chapter, I argue that although there have been gains in political democracy, economic democracy has lost ground in both Mozambique and Nicaragua. In addition, I assess the potential and the limitations of postrevolutionary participatory democracy occurring in the form of autonomous organizations in civil society. Although there is more organizing, greater freedom, and a greater diversity of voices represented today, these voices sometimes have less power to effect change on a national level, particularly in Nicaragua. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations are increasing in number within an expanded civil society to fill the void of an ever-shrinking neoliberal state. I caution that civil society is becoming a weak substitute for a fuller understanding of democracy in the state, the market, and the family. In other words, expansion of civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the consolidation of political, economic, and participatory democracy.

Chapter 8, "The Contemporary Women's Movements and Emergent Feminisms in Mozambique and Nicaragua," concludes the book with an examination of the nature of women's organizing in each country in the postrevolutionary period. The theoretical debates, strategic challenges, and prominent women's organizations existing in both contemporary women's movements are discussed. In Mozambique, women's organizing focuses on the law, land, family, economic development, and, more recently, violence against women. In Nicaragua, women's organizing is coalescing around an intersectional approach to body politics, attempting to establish a link between practical gender needs and strategic gender interests such as domestic violence, reproductive rights, women's health, and economic opportunities. In addition, I examine the contemporary constructions of feminism emerging in each country in the context of the theories and practices of comparative intersectional feminisms discussed in Chapter 2 and argue that the constructions of feminism emerging in both countries challenge some of the dualisms that are taken for granted in many Western feminisms, and as a result, have much to offer to the future of global feminist theorizing and organizing.

2

"After Acknowledging Differences, We Must Also See What We Have in Common"

Feminist Contestations and Commonalities across First World/Third World, African, and Latin American Divides

> *I always make the irony or the joke, what a bunch of idiots we are in the Third World? We discover the subject and in the North they declare it dead!*
> —Sofía Montenegro, Nicaraguan Feminist Theorist/Activist, Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/25/00

> *Sometimes we go too far in this search for particularity. In the beginning of Women's Studies, there were abusive generalizations because people were not taking into account other countries, the Third World, the periphery. So, the reaction: we are different, yes. We are not saying we are not different, but women are dominated and discriminated against all over the world. What differs is the degree, the way things are done, how things are implemented. After acknowledging differences, we must also see what we have in common. Desires, dreams women share around the globe.*
> —Carla Braga, Mozambican Feminist Theorist/Activist, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/15/99

Introduction

Carla Braga and Sofía Montenegro highlight the delicate balance of theorizing and practicing comparative feminisms: how to acknowledge the differences among and between women of different racial, national, class, ethnic, cultural, and sexual identities living in a variety of diverse political, social, and economic contexts without disembodiment, while also recognizing the common dreams and common struggles shared across those differences that provide the basis for solidarity without reification. This chapter presents a brief overview of socialist feminisms, Third World feminisms, African feminisms, and Latin American feminisms in order to provide an intersectional theoretical framework for the analysis of women's activism and feminist agency

in revolutionary and postrevolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua. After analyzing the contributions of these various theoretical approaches, I attempt to construct an integrated vision of comparative feminisms based on the adoption of a standpoint of intersectionality, using intersectionality as both a methodological approach for conducting cross-cultural research and a normative theory for envisioning an emancipatory, feminist, anti-oppression politics.

The Contributions of Socialist Feminisms

Marxist and feminist theorists have traditionally disagreed on the origin of the oppression of women, the reason for its perpetuation, and the means to achieve its demise. While orthodox Marxist analyses of women's oppression have focused on the category of "productive" labor, defined as wage labor performed in the marketplace, socialist feminists have introduced the importance of examining the category of "reproductive" labor, defined as unpaid labor performed in the family, subsistence, and informal economies, as the locus for understanding both the root cause of women's oppression and the path toward women's emancipation. Moreover, many Marxist analyses of women's oppression take as a given a "natural" sexual division of labor and do not account for or explain the preexistent power relation that allows men to relegate women to the lesser valued sphere of reproduction, often reducing all forms of material oppression to the economic. There is an extensive socialist-feminist literature of theorists and practitioners who have tried to bridge the gap between class-based and gender-based oppressions by attempting to theorize the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy. I briefly examine this literature to explain (1) why a socialist-feminist understanding of the spheres of production and reproduction must be reexamined and resurrected as we assess the successes and failures of revolutionary movements for social change in the late twentieth century, and (2) what contributions a socialist-feminist approach can make to a contemporary project of comparative intersectional feminisms.

Numerous scholars have pointed out the inadequacies of an orthodox Marxist framework to fully explain the oppression of women.[1] Many point out how Marx mentions both production and reproduction, and then proceeds to ignore reproduction and focus only on production.[2] Thus, many Marxist-feminists have subsequently attempted to take Marx's concepts of 'production,' 'reproduction,' 'surplus value,' 'class,' and 'exploitation' and apply them to the situation and experiences of women.[3] As a result, a heated debate emerged on the nature of domestic labor, that is, labor performed in the realm of the household for no wages. Some authors argue that understanding domestic labor is the key to understanding exploitation in the modern capitalist era.[4] The argument most often made is that the contradiction between paid and unpaid labor around the world is based upon a sexual division of labor in which paid labor performed in the public sphere of the market predominantly by men is considered productive,

whereas unpaid labor performed predominantly by women in the private sphere of the home and family is considered nonproductive or reproductive.[5] There has also been a remarkably intricate modes-of-production debate about whether domestic labor performed in the household constitutes value-producing capitalist production,[6] a precapitalist or noncapitalist remnant of our feudal past perpetuated or co-opted by capitalism to fulfill certain functions,[7] or even its own autonomous domestic mode of production.[8] Some point to the inherently gendered nature of Marx's concepts of production, reproduction, productive labor, and nonproductive labor and assert that the only way Marxism can explain the oppression of women is if Marxism itself is transformed.[9]

Socialist feminisms offer an essential component of any emancipatory vision for women globally because of their focus on the economic conditions and material realities of women from different countries, regions, races, ethnicities, and cultures. Generally, socialist feminists accept the analysis of capitalism as the fundamental cause of alienation and exploitation in the global political economy today. However, they shift the focus of Marxism to explain the specific exploitation of women within a global capitalist system. Thus, they emphasize the roles of domestic labor, reproductive activities, the family, and the distinction between the public and the private spheres of production as these have changed throughout history and continue to perpetuate the system of capitalist patriarchy.

In her classic article, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," Margaret Benston uses a political economy approach to construct a definition of women in capitalist society. She argues that women have a different relationship to the means of production than do men, thus placing the roots of the secondary status of women in economics. Using an argument from Ernst Mandel, she argues that not all production under capitalism is commodity production for exchange. Rather, there are two classes of products that remain simple use-values: subsistence production by the peasantry for its own consumption and all things produced in the home.[10] Commodity production has thus transformed the way that men labor by creating a sphere in which they do not labor: the sphere of socially necessary production known as household labor. Benston thus defines women as "that group of people who are responsible for the production of simple use-values in those activities associated with the home and family."[11]

Benston was one of the first scholars to draw attention to the fact that reproductive labor must be taken seriously in any analysis of the workings of the economy and not relegated to marginal or nonexistent status (as it was by Marx and Engels). According to Benston, women's work is not counted because it is not wage labor. Thus, it is not worth money. It is therefore valueless, expected, and not considered work; it is this reality that serves as the material basis for the inferior status of women. Because women do not earn money for the work they perform in the home, this activity is considered valueless. Why

should women expect to be worth as much as men, who work for money? If the proletariat are slaves to wage labor, what is the housewife? Women have historically worked, but historically *work* has been defined as what men do.[12] From a Marxist perspective, to think that a wage compensates for value created is to idealize capitalism, but as Catherine MacKinnon points out, "No Marxists are heard to argue that, therefore, workers should not be paid."[13]

What type of equality results when women are given the opportunity to work for a decent wage outside the home? The version of liberation that results in both capitalist and socialist systems is that women become as free as men to work outside the home while men remain free from work within it.[14] Moreover, work opportunities for women outside the home often fall into specific division of labor categories, those which pay less money, often involve performing caregiving functions, are devalued, and are seldom in a position of ownership.

In her groundbreaking essay, "The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community," Mariarosa Dalla Costa challenges the traditional Marxist position that housework is nonproductive. Marx argued that only labor that produces a commodity for exchange and thus has surplus value leading to capital is productive. Dalla Costa argues that what the housewife produces in the family is not simply use-value but surplus value through the commodity of labor power and, as such, is productive in the Marxian sense.[15] It seems impossible that any Marxist who claims that the only thing a worker has to sell is "his own labor power" would ignore the labor power of the unpaid domestic worker as a commodity, as productive work. Even Marx's concepts of 'worker,' 'work,' and 'production' are gendered. He fails to see how the housewife and her labor are the basis of the process of capital accumulation:

> Capital is able to hide behind the figure of the husband called "breadwinner," with whom the woman, called "housewife," has to deal directly and for whom she is supposed to work out of "love," not for a wage.[16]

What Marx failed to address was that women *are* producing a commodity in the home: the commodity of *labor power*. While production has been going on in the public realm of the market, the reproduction of everyday life (including food preparation, cooking, cleaning, child-rearing and emotional support) has been going on in the private realm of the home, assumed, ignored, and yet providing the foundation for economic, sociocultural, and political development in the state, the market, and civil society. This is still true and highly applicable in the case of advanced industrial societies, but the situation for women in developing countries like Mozambique and Nicaragua suffering from physical threat and economic scarcity is obviously greatly exacerbated. Not only must this work in the reproductive sphere be considered valuable to the rest of society, it must be realized as essential to the very functioning of society.

If it were to be seen as such, revolutionary visions and emancipatory projects would be dramatically altered. As Jane Parpart and Sharon Stichter argued in 1990, "The task ahead is . . . to raise women's status within the global political economy, and this cannot be accomplished without a recognition of the totality of women's productive and reproductive contributions, and an understanding of the interrelations between them."[17] This remains our task today.

Women, Gender, and Development: The Superexploitation of Third World Women

Many socialist feminists have analyzed women's oppression in the developing context through a comparison of the exploitation of women, nature, and colonies by examining the process of colonization by advanced industrial countries within an imperialist international economic order. Indebted to the work of dependency theorists writing about the experiences of countries in Latin America and Africa, describing the colonial and neocolonial processes by which core capitalist countries condition the underdevelopment of peripheral countries, many socialist-feminist scholars have theorized the structural similarities between women's struggles, the struggles of Third World countries against imperialism, and the struggles of all peoples marginalized by capitalism.[18]

Maria Mies states that the subsistence production of life, performed mainly "through the non-wage labor of women and other non-wage laborers as slaves, contract workers, and peasants in the colonies," forms the basis upon which capitalist productive labor can be built and exploited.[19] Without the "superexploitation" of nonwage laborers (women, colonies, peasants), wage labor would not be productive. What distinguishes Mies's analysis from others in the domestic labor debate is her interest in going beyond fitting household labor into Marxist theory by examining unpaid labor in the context of the developing countries of the Third World:

> In contrast to the West's debate on housework, we were not mainly concerned with the integration of housework into Marxist theory in which, so far, it had been "forgotten." Our main concern was to show that capitalism was more than the relation between wage labor and capital. The analysis of housework and of other non-wage work of subsistence producers in the colonies leads to a fundamental critique of the common perception of capitalism.[20]

Mies theorizes the connections between the exploitation of women, peasants, and colonies, thereby revealing her commitment to a global common ground upon which to build a feminist struggle uniting women and peoples of color against imperialism.

Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen's work also reveals an excellent analytical blend of socialist feminist domestic labor debates, discourse on dependent capitalism, and the merger between capitalist and noncapitalist modes of production. Bennholdt-Thomsen analyzes the parallels among all nonwage labor performed throughout the world, including subsistence agricultural production engaged in by peasants in the "Third World" and domestic labor performed by "housewives." This unpaid labor "reduces the cost of labor for capital and so ensures the super-exploitation of both peasants and women."[21] Bennholdt-Thomsen argues that there is a fundamental contradiction within the capitalist mode of development between subsistence production and social production which is necessary for the accumulation process:

> Within the present capitalist world economy, housewives and peasants (men and women) are the main subsistence producers; in different concrete forms both reproduce labor power for capital without compensation. . . . These two groups are integrated into the capitalist mode of production through their marginalization, i.e., they form the consolidated mass of the industrial reserve army of labor, and as such they are continuously reproduced as part of the process of extended reproduction of capital.[22]

Claudia von Werlhof also argues that women's work has effectively been the "blind spot" in the critique of political economy and that all unpaid labor around the world within First World and Third World contexts exemplifies the "over-exploitation" of labor in that less than the costs of the reproduction of labor is covered by wages. She agrees with Bennholdt-Thomsen that capitalism creates unpaid labor relations outside the sphere of wage labor as an original form of accumulation, and thus these relations cannot be considered noncapitalist:

> This supposedly "non-capitalist" relation ("non-capitalist" because it is outside wage labor), that is, a production relation in which life (for capital the potential-commodity labor power) is (re)-produced by unpaid, use-value oriented subsistence work; this relation is very convenient for capital, precisely because of its difference from the wage labor relation. Without risking or paying anything, capital appropriates (it robs) the surplus labor made day in, day out by these subsistence producers, whose labor has been transformed into labor power usable for capital as wage labor, or in other forms. Only on this very basis does the "real" process of capital valuation and accumulation begin.[23]

In theorizing the connection between unpaid domestic labor and subsistence agriculture performed mostly by women in developing countries, von Werlhof argues that there is an analogous relationship between the macro

relation First World/Third World and the micro relation man/woman. She not only attempts to make the case for women as a class similar to slaves and serfs but also challenges the predominance of the wage-labor relation and the two-tiered class structure within capitalism by arguing that the nonwage-labor relation is an integral part of capitalism and constitutes the third and lowest tier in the class hierarchy.

Jane Parpart's work on women in Nigeria reveals the fact that although women's employment outside the home has increased, there has been no lessening of women's heavy domestic responsibilities, resulting in the "double day" phenomena.[24] Jane Jaquette's edited volume on Latin America raises the double burden to a triple burden by including women's activity in community organizing, political associations, and women's groups.[25] While the Classical Marxist analysis adopted by most revolutionary socialist parties (including the Sandinistas and Frelimo) asserts the liberating aspects of women's paid work, numerous feminist scholars assert that this is only the case to the extent that women's burden of productive and reproductive labor in the household is lessened. This will occur only when we challenge the sexual division of labor and when men fulfill their share of unpaid, domestic duties globally.

Gwendolyn Mikell and the other authors in her edited volume on African feminism use insights from class and gender analyses to focus on the relationships between production, reproduction, and gender relations, and they acknowledge the impact Marxist-feminist analyses have had on the "underanalyzed but crucially important" category of reproduction to explain gender relations in Africa.[26] Delia D. Aguilar and Anne E. Lacsamana also place the global political economy and women's labor in the productive and reproductive spheres of life at the center of their analysis of women and globalization.[27] I agree with these assessments, as my work in understanding gender relations in Africa and Latin America owes a great intellectual debt to socialist-feminist literature, gendered political economy, and the intersection of class, gender, racial, and national identities in a global context. I continue to focus on the categories of production and reproduction throughout my analysis as I believe these categories highlight the intersections of Marxism and feminism, the public and the private, and gender and class in ways that shape women's organizing, women's activism, and feminist agency in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua.

Contestations of First World and Third World Feminisms

Many scholars have questioned the relevance of Western feminist ideas for women in the Third World.[28] For some, the assertion has been based on a privileged arrogance that "poor Third World women" do not have the luxury to support, advocate, or even understand feminist ideas. For others, the claim has been that feminism itself is a bourgeois ideology of the First World that

privileges gender oppression and struggles against patriarchy at the expense of oppressions based on race, class, and nationality. As First World and Third World feminists began to dialogue, the notion of many feminisms emerged, incorporating a dedication to focus on the intersection of gender, race, and class-based oppressions in specific, local, and historical contexts.

Cagatay, Grown, and Santiago acknowledge that although a significant number of First World women at the UN Conference on Women held in Copenhagen in 1980 advocated focusing on issues they perceived as common to all women despite nationality, race, and class, a minority of First World women and most Third World women argued that gender oppression cannot be separated from national, class, or racial oppression.[29] Between Copenhagen in 1980 and the Second UN Conference on the Status of Women in Nairobi in 1985, researchers and activists began integrating gender, class, and race in more effective ways. First World feminists began to see survival issues as feminist issues, and Third World feminists began to realize that national liberation movements need to struggle around women's specific issues.[30] As Jane Parpart summarizes the issues, while many Third World women have often argued that global inequalities, and not men, were their main enemy, recent scholars have come to recognize the relevance of some feminist concerns to the condition of African women—namely, the impact of reproductive burdens on paid labor.[31] This leads Parpart to claim that feminist categories of analysis "can and should be applied cross-culturally, but always in specific historical and cultural contexts."[32] Anne McClintock aptly expresses how one should begin to conduct cross-cultural feminist research, with the recognition of multiple feminisms based on women's intersectional subject positions:

> There is not only one feminism, nor is there only one patriarchy. Feminism is imperialist when it puts the interests and needs of privileged women in imperialist countries above the local needs of disempowered women and men, borrowing from patriarchal privilege. In the last decade, women of color have been vehement in challenging privileged feminists who don't recognize their own racial and class power.[33]

As Chandra Talpade Mohanty has argued, defining feminism in purely gendered terms assumes that identities of womanhood have nothing to do with race, class, nation, or sexuality: "Ideologies of womanhood have as much to do with class and race as they have to do with sex."[34]

Third World Feminisms

Any attempt to identify and define *Third World feminisms* inherently contains two simultaneous projects: the deconstruction of Western feminisms and the construction of feminisms grounded in the histories, cultures,

and experiences of women from the Third World.[35] Numerous scholarly literatures have addressed the need to understand that notions of womanhood and manhood are constructed along racial, class, national, cultural, ethnic, and sexual dimensions. Just as socialist feminists have attempted to understand the relationship between gender and class, Black feminist thought and the scholarship of women of color in the African diaspora offer invaluable race and class critiques of White Western feminisms.[36] Moreover, women from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean have constructed versions of feminism with expanded inclusions of, and particular sensitivities to, women's racial, class, cultural, and national identities and experiences, often drawing on the literature of African American feminists and making connections between Africa and the African diaspora. Third World feminisms are inherently intersectional in their approaches, which is why I contend that they are more theoretically sound and empirically accurate than many of the feminist frameworks that have been developed from a gender-focused First World perspective.

Autonomy and Women's Organizing in the Third World

Much of the work that has been done on women's organizing in the Third World examines women's activism within the context of other movements for social change (anticolonial, antidictatorial, socialist, and democratization struggles).[37] This has been the case because much of the mobilization of women in the Third World has taken place within the context of other human rights struggles; however, all too often, women's gender interests have been ignored or dismissed within such struggles. Articles on Brazil, China, Chile, the Occupied Territories, Namibia, and South Africa all reveal a similar dynamic with regard to women's liberation struggles.[38] The research demonstrates that women's movements and women's interests have historically been subsumed by, and deemed secondary to, national liberation, democratization, and other movements for social change. It seems that whatever the driving force of change was seen to be in these countries—modernization, development, economic growth, democratization, national liberation, or the transition to socialism—the common idea fostered was that "overall social change would also bring about equality for women."[39] It was assumed that when the anticolonial struggle was won, national liberation was achieved, or socialism or democracy was in place, women would automatically be emancipated. This has proven *not* to be the case, and thus a preoccupation with the need for autonomy for women's organizations and women's movements has emerged in the literature.[40]

Numerous scholars cite the centrality of autonomy to African women's movements. Ifi Amadiume argues that African women traditionally had autonomous organizations for which they sought the power "to defend and

maintain their autonomy," thus making autonomy "the central characteristic of indigenous women's movements in Africa."[41] Aili Mari Tripp states that "one of the most complex and critical issues facing Africa today is the need for political space to mobilize autonomously from the state and from the party in power."[42] Tripp further points out that in the context of civil war and violence, many African women's movements have pursued a politics of unity and "have consciously adopted unifying strategies" in an attempt to minimize difference.[43] What I call "unity feminism" in Mozambique and Nicaragua supports this assertion (for further discussion, see Chapter 8). As my research on women in Mozambique and Nicaragua also confirms, Tripp asserts that it is because of the proliferation of autonomous women's organizations in civil society independent from the mass organizations of a ruling-state-party that women have been able to make as many gains as they have.[44] In one of the few other studies comparing Mozambique and Nicaragua, Cochran and Scott came to the same conclusions regarding the importance of autonomy: "Relations with party and state constitute other dimensions critical to the proper political functioning of mass organizations. Without some independence of function, personnel, and budgets, popular organizations will be ineffective in serving as watchdogs of party and state agencies and as lobbies for mass interests."[45] As a result, autonomy plays a prominent role in my analysis of women's activism and feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua.

African Feminisms

An extensive literature has emerged in the field of African feminisms. This literature can best be divided into three main categories: (1) a critique of Western feminist theories and the applicability of Western feminisms to African contexts;[46] (2) an argument that African feminisms are newly emerging, are uniquely African, and are radically different from Western feminisms;[47] and (3) an assertion that "the African woman was the first feminist," defining African feminisms as inherently intersectional and, therefore, the most inclusive of feminisms worldwide.[48]

Oyeronke Oyewumi offers a criticism of the Western feminist imposition of gender categories into African contexts in which she argues they did not preexist Western colonialism.[49] In fact, Oyewumi challenges what she defines as several key assumptions of Western feminisms: that gender is a category of analysis that is universal, timeless, and salient in serving as a fundamental organizing principle for all societies, and that "woman" is an essential, fixed category of humanity universally subordinated to "man."[50] Oyewumi argues in her analysis of Yorubaland that other social hierarchies such as seniority, lineage, and timing of and reason for entry into the clan (i.e., birth versus marriage) were the salient, explanatory social categories within Yoruba society, yet were often misunderstood to represent gender hierarchies based upon the

imposition of the bio-logic of Western gender discourses.[51] Oyewumi's analysis is critical in its challenge to Western feminist scholars engaged in cross-cultural comparative research, reminding scholars to question the presuppositions of their categories of analysis. While I agree that there is a certain bio-logic in identifying who constitutes 'women' in a given society, I think it is possible to identify women and men in postcolonial societies and analyze their individual and institutional relationships and relative power in different contexts without presupposing an essentialist, timeless, fixed, universal notion of womanhood.

In 1997, Gwendolyn Mikell identified what she called a "newly emerging vision of African feminism" characterized by "an African-feminist approach to public and private life."[52] What distinguished this newly emerging African feminism, according to Mikell, was that "in general, African women's biological roles were not viewed as preventing them from taking on political and economic responsibilities. Even their biologically based responsibilities have tended to transcend the household and move outward into other aspects of social and community life."[53] This supports what I found in my interviews with Mozambican women, who often asserted their power through their roles in the home and family, not through attempting to liberate themselves from these roles. This also helps explain why the foundational principles of African and Western feminisms begin from such different places: "Until recently, the reference points for Western feminists and African women activists have been totally different, because Western women were emphasizing individual female autonomy, while African women have been emphasizing culturally linked forms of public participation."[54] Mikell argues that "the slowly emerging African feminism is distinctly heterosexual, pro-natal, and concerned with many 'bread, butter, culture, and power' issues. To this extent, it parallels the recent growth of feminism in many other non-Western countries."[55] It is evident from Mikell's understanding of African feminisms, and from my research as well, that African women are concerning themselves with both practical (bread and butter) gender needs and strategic (culture and power) gender interests simultaneously.[56]

Filomena Chioma Steady argues that African feminism is inherently intersectional and therefore more inclusive than other feminist ideologies, because it "combines racial, sexual, class, and cultural dimensions of oppression."[57] Moreover, it is precisely because of the intersectional nature of African feminism that Steady recognizes its urgency, necessity, and revolutionary potential to end multiple oppressions:

> Significantly, the issue of racism combined with sexism is explosive and potentially revolutionary. It threatens to destroy the existing power base of the world economy, which is dominated by whites. Maintaining an inequitable and unjust world economic order is most profitable to the strongest, richest, and most powerful men and women in the world.

> The subordination of the majority of black men and women has been vital to this world order, for the productive and reproductive labor of black women have served and continue to serve as necessary prerequisites for capital accumulation on a world scale. By being at the bottom of the structure, poor black women, not the mythical Atlas, hold up our unequal and unjust planet. For this reason, primarily, an African feminism that encompasses freedom from the complex configurations created by multiple oppressions is necessary and urgent.[58]

I recognize the revolutionary potential of African feminisms because I agree that they inherently address racial, class, ethnic, cultural, national, and gender-based oppressions. I also share the foundational premise that poor women of color in the developing world are structurally located at the bottom of the global political economy, and it is for this reason that I have chosen to study women's experiences within revolutionary movements in the developing world and to learn from the struggles and opportunities of women's activism and feminist agency that have emerged. I have also chosen to expand my research beyond the boundaries of Africa, beyond the boundaries of any one country or region, to conduct a cross-regional comparison in order to learn from African and Latin American women's experiences in critical relation to one another and to make a contribution to comparative intersectional feminisms.

Latin American Feminisms

Several frameworks have been proposed by scholars and practitioners to categorize and understand women's activism and feminist agency in Latin America and the Caribbean: (1) practical versus strategic gender interests, (2) feminine versus feminist organizing; (3) *feministas* versus *políticas*, (4) *autónomas* versus *militantes*, and (5) *feministas* versus *movimientos de mujeres*. I will discuss these approaches through a direct analysis of the literature itself as well as through an examination of the history of the feminist *encuentros* that have taken place throughout Latin America from 1981 to 1999, as they effectively elucidate the development of feminism in the region.

In her analysis of women in revolutionary Nicaragua, Maxine Molyneux introduces what has become one of the standard distinctions accepted by feminist scholars theorizing Third World women's movements: practical and strategic gender interests.[59] Molyneux's work has been pivotal in shaping the way both scholars and activists have understood women's interests, and as a result, women's organizing, in the developing world.

Molyneux begins her analysis with a distinction between women's interests and gender interests, arguing that because gender is only one component of women's identity, identifying women's gender interests will avoid any essentialist notion that women share a common set of interests despite the racial,

class, national, ethnic, sexual, and other differences that constitute women's experiences and identities. After setting up the category of "gender interests," Molyneux proceeds to identify two kinds of gender interests. *Practical gender interests,* as defined by Molyneux, are based upon immediate perceived needs. They are usually class-based and "concrete" and pertain to "the daily welfare of the household and the position of women in the gendered division of labor."[60] *Strategic gender interests*, on the other hand, are explicitly designed to overcome women's subordination and include the abolition of the sexual division of labor, the alleviation of the domestic burdens of child care and labor, the establishment of political equality, the protection of reproductive rights, and the elimination of violence against women.[61]

In her analysis of engendering democracy in Brazil, Sonia Alvarez establishes one of the most accepted distinctions of women's organizing in Latin America based on the work of Molyneux: feminist organizing versus feminine organizing. According to Alvarez, "Both movement participants and social scientists in Latin America commonly distinguish between 'feminine' and 'feminist' groups and demands."[62] She cites Paul Singer's distinction between the two: "The struggles against the rising cost of living or for schools, day care centers, etc. as well as specific measures to protect women who work interest women closely and it is possible then to consider them feminine demands. But they are not feminist to the extent that they do not question the way in which women are inserted into the social context."[63] In other words, for Alvarez, feminist organizing is organizing that takes place around strategic gender interests, and feminine organizing is organizing that takes place around practical gender interests.

Jeff Haynes also adopts the approach of Molyneux and Alvarez in differentiating among women's empowerment groups in the Third World: "Feminist groups pursue what are known as 'strategic' objectives, while feminine groups seek so-called 'practical' goals."[64] Despite his use of the analytical categorization, however, Haynes identifies problems with it: "It is important to note, however, that such categories are more for analytical convenience than anything else; in practice there is much blurring between categories."[65] In her fieldwork in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico, Lynn Stephen "found again and again in the actions and words of the women I worked with, whether or not they linked their political activism to feminism, that the feminist/feminine dichotomy did not hold."[66] I had the same experience in my interviews with women from Nicaragua. What struck me the most was the holistic, integrationist approach adopted by the women activists and feminists I interviewed in their struggles around economic opportunities, health and wellness, reproductive and sexual rights, and violence against women—interests considered both practical and strategic. Stephen also found that the type of women's activism she examined "integrates a commitment to basic survival for women and their children with a challenge to the subordina-

tion of women to men. Their work challenges the assumption that the issues of sexual assault, violence against women, and reproductive control (for example) are divorced from women's concerns about housing, food, land, and medical care."[67] What, then, are the problems with the practical/strategic and feminine/feminist frameworks to understand women's organizing in Latin America and beyond, and how should we as feminist scholars and practitioners use these categories most effectively?

Practical and Strategic Gender Interests: A Critical Assessment

Nikke Craske argues that "the separation of gender interests into practical and strategic can help us understand the reasons behind political participation and the strategies and tactics employed."[68] However, Craske also asserts that "although dichotomies are conceptual tools which help us to understand the world, they are generally too simplistic and rigid."[69] Molyneux's distinction "assumes that struggling for strategic (feminist) interests requires a consciousness of gender position and is thus a challenge to gender relations, while the struggle for practical (feminine) interests may not challenge dominant gender roles."[70] As Sally Westwood and Sarah A. Radcliffe assert, this understanding places practical and strategic interests in hierarchical opposition to one another "such that women, in order to progress, must move from one to the other."[71] Understanding them as poles of a continuum or as having a dialectical relationship between them seems to make more sense: "It is clear, however, that the two are frequently related and that for many issues there are both practical and strategic implications. Any struggle requires the prioritization of the demands, which reflects needs, available resources, and costs. For those women more involved in practical struggles it reflects their priorities as much as a lack of consciousness of gender subordination."[72] Molyneux's claim that the politicization of women's practical interests creates the consciousness for women's strategic interests places a hierarchical, developmentalist logic on a process that occurs in a complementary, dialectical, and cyclical way. Marianne Marchand agrees that the two categories of interests should not be dichotomized but rather understood along a continuum where the middle represents concerns that are both practical and strategic.[73]

Sally Westwood and Sarah A. Radcliffe further assert that the distinction between practical and strategic gender interests is problematic because it suggests a simple, hierarchical dichotomy that aligns itself with the perpetuation of the distinction between the public/political (strategic) and the private/personal (practical), which feminists have long fought to overcome: "This, as we suggest, may be helpful for organizing commonsense but does not provide a theoretical base for understanding women as political subjects and

actors."[74] Haynes also worries that the practical may be associated with the private sphere and the strategic with the public sphere, and thus argues for a concentration on the intersections of the practical and strategic.[75]

Furthermore, the distinction between practical and strategic gender interests and feminine and feminist organizing perpetuates a class/gender divide, a socialism/feminism divide, an economics/sex-violence-culture divide, and a practice/theory divide, all of which have served both to perpetuate negative stereotypes of feminism as unconcerned with "ordinary women" and to undermine intersectional feminist theories and practices in the region and the world. Molyneux recognized that the practical/strategic distinction "has apparently been deployed in the form of a too rigid binary, with practical interests set against strategic in a static, hierarchised opposition," but still maintained, "Yet we surely need distinctions as heuristic devices if only in order to reveal how much more complex reality is."[76] While the categories of practical and strategic gender interests are clearly useful, as this book elucidates, it is important for us as feminist scholars and practitioners to recognize how easy it is to allow them to operate in the same way as so many hierarchical dualisms of Western thought and to caution against making, explicitly or implicitly, these additional vertically reinforcing associations:

Practical gender interests <> Strategic gender interests (Molyneux)
Class   <> Gender
Economics   <> Sex/Violence/Culture
Production   <> Reproduction
Materiality   <> Ideology
Base   <> Superstructure
Practice   <> Theory
Feminine organizing   <> Feminist organizing (Alvarez)
Women's activism   <> Feminist agency (Disney)

What I contend is that while all women's activism may not be explicitly *feminist*, much of women's activism around class, gender, economics, sexuality, violence, culture, ideology, and materiality in the productive and the reproductive spheres of life does involve the exercise of *feminist agency*. If these categories are to remain useful, they must be understood as having a dynamic, dialectical relationship among and between one another. This book aims to show exactly that.

Perhaps one important alteration that can be made to these categories is to refer to them as practical gender *needs* and strategic gender *interests*.[77] Interests are inherently strategic, needs are inherently practical, but both are intrinsically linked. Moreover, it is important to assert that neither category is more essentially class or gender based. I contend that practical gender needs for women include the ability to feed one's family, have access

to a safe and legal abortion, and live without fear of family violence, whereas strategic gender interests include the fight for a living wage campaign, the struggle to legalize abortion, and the passage of a domestic violence law to secure those needs. How much more practical is the right to eat than the right to be free from violence? As Nicaraguan feminist activist Ana Criquillon put it, "A woman can starve to death or die by domestic violence. Either way, the outcome is the same: she's dead."[78] Practical needs should not be reduced to the economic, and strategic interests should not be equated with sex/violence/culture and ideological struggles, which are often just as practical. Moreover, I argue that feminist agency is born out of the process of women's organizing *precisely because* women's organizing brings to the surface women's discovery of their own practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in both the productive and the reproductive spheres of life. The experiences of the *feministas* and the *movimientos de mujeres* at the Feminist *Encuentros* reveal the uses of, the problems with, and the intersections between these categories.

The Feminist *Encuentros*[79]

In their analysis titled "Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogotá to San Bernardo," Sternbach et al. assert that "not only is feminism appropriate for Latin America, but it also is the kind of thriving, broad-based social movement that many other feminist movements are still aspiring to become."[80] Several scholars use the regionwide Feminist *Encuentros* to document the diverse development of Latin American and Caribbean feminisms from 1981 to 1999. In this section, I briefly describe the key contestations that emerged at the eight *encuentros* as they help to describe the central issues that continue to define, characterize, and constitute Latin American feminisms. The chart that follows is designed to summarize the *encuentros* and elucidate the subsequent discussion.

Latin American and Caribbean Feminist *Encuentros*[81]

Year	Location	Attendance	Key Contentions/Developments
1981	Bogotá, Colombia	200	Autonomy: *Feministas/Políticas/Militantes*
1983	Lima, Peru	600	Engaged Autonomy: No *Feministómetro*
1985	Bertioga, Brazil	900	Racial/Class/Sexual Inclusivity of Feminism
1987	Taxco, Mexico	1500	*Históricas/Movimiento de Mujeres*
1990	San Bernardo, Argentina	3200	Policy Advocacy & Movement *Redes*
1993	Costa del Sol, El Salvador	1300	Autonomy: UN Conference/NGO Forum
1996	Cartagena, Chile	700	*Autónomas/Institucionalizadas*
1999	Juan Dolio, Dom Rep	1300	*Eje Transversal &* Critical Reflection

At the first Feminist *Encuentro* in Bogotá in 1981, the main discussions centered around the issue of autonomy, the relationship between feminism and socialism, and the differences among and between two distinct group approaches to gender struggle: (1) the *feministas* (feminists), who believed in pursuing autonomy defined as "independence from any organization that

considers the battle for women's liberation a secondary goal;"[82] and (2) the *políticas* or *militantes*, who defended a strategy of *doble militancia* (double militancy), or concurrent participation in feminist and leftist, revolutionary political party organizations. The *feministas* viewed feminism as "a new revolutionary project, the first real alternative for the total transformation of oppressive social relations in Latin America" because "neither capitalism nor socialism alone could eliminate women's oppression, and that, consequently, women's specific demands must be articulated in a movement outside and independent of all existing political parties."[83] The *políticas* or *militantes*, on the other hand, held a primary commitment to socialism and "insisted that feminism in and of itself could not be a revolutionary project."[84] At the second *Encuentro* in Lima in 1983, the more controversial and explicitly feminist theme of patriarchy was selected as the focal point of discussion, concerning some that a *feministómetro* (feminist yardstick) not be employed to discern who was "feminist enough" to participate. Eventually, "the *feminista/política* debate faded into the background as many feminists adopted a revised understanding of what we might call "engaged autonomy"—negotiating with or participating in leftist and revolutionary movements and parties, as well as dominant social and political institutions, while maintaining a critical and *feminist* stance" [emphasis in original].[85]

Issues of race and class were taken to new heights at the third Feminist *Encuentro* in Bertioga, Brazil, in 1985 when, on the first day of the conference, a bus of twenty-three women from the *favelas* (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro, predominantly Black and poor, asked to be admitted despite their inability to pay the registration fees. Several opinions were expressed about how to handle the situation: (1) the organizers had already secured 100 scholarships for Brazilian women who could not pay the registration fee; (2) many poor and working class participants from among Brazil's *movimientos de mujeres* argued that their groups raised funds and applied for scholarships to attend; (3) many among the organizers and participants felt it was manipulative for the women on the bus to demand being admitted at such a late date, and some *feministas* even accused leftist political parties of orchestrating the incident to discredit feminism as "elitist and bourgeois"; (4) many participants felt that preventing the *favela* women from participating was "emblematic of the racism that pervaded Brazilian feminism"; (5) some participants felt it would be a better strategic decision to let the women participate if for no other reason then to counter the negative publicity and appearance of racism and classism in the movement.[86] When the organizers decided not to let the women into the conference, they refused to leave and camped outside the gates, "thereby creating a separate and distinct space for those who wished to talk to them. Many participants did."[87] This proved to be only the beginning of addressing issues of racial and class inclusion in Latin American and Caribbean feminisms.

Of the 1,500 women who attended the fourth Feminist *Encuentro* held in Taxco, Mexico, in 1987, there was unprecedented participation from the *movimientos de mujeres* from Central America, including women's groups who explicitly identified with feminism, poor and working-class community organizations who provided urban services and focused on issues including reproductive rights and violence against women and women's health care centers. This *encuentro,* more than any other, brought the issues of practical/feminine and strategic/feminist organizing to the surface of discussion. These categories and ways of organizing proved to be very divisive to the Central American *movimientos de mujeres* (grassroots women's movements) and the South American *históricas/veteranas* (long-term veteran feminists) that were present.

> The mostly South American feminists who had organized and attended the earlier *encuentros* responded to the growing participation of women from the *movimientos de mujeres* and from Central America by asking whether the latter were really feminists. They asked whether problems of urban services, health programs and the communal kitchens (practical gender interests) should not be left to the *movimientos de mujeres* while the feminists focused on strategic gender issues such as abortion, domestic violence and sexual and reproductive freedom.[88]

The response to this question from the *movimientos de mujeres* was a claim based precisely upon attempting to bridge what many saw as a counterproductive gap between Molyneux's notions of practical and strategic gender interests and between Alvarez's notions of feminine and feminist organizing. The *movimientos de mujeres* claimed that they were developing a new kind of feminist practice based on politicizing the issues of survival and everyday life.[89]

To put the issue another way: why can't women's organizing around women's daily survival issues be an example of feminist agency? Are poor urban and rural women who are organizing around "practical" economic issues necessarily *not* exercising feminist agency? Amy Lind also criticizes this assumption:

> Implicit in this approach is the assumption that women's "basic needs" are different from their "strategic needs" and that a "practical" or "survival strategy" cannot simultaneously be a political strategy that challenges the social order. . . . It is too often assumed that most poor women are only concerned with their daily survival and therefore . . . are not really challenging the sexual division of labor. . . . The division between "practical gender interests" and "strategic gender interests" misrepresents the struggles of poor women who do, in fact, question or attempt to change the social (gender) order.[90]

The implication is that economic interests (practical) drive women to organize, through which they come to understand their feminist (strategic) consciousness. Why can't women's organizing around economic issues be *feminist*? And why aren't women's campaigns for reproductive rights *practical*? Limited definitions of feminist agency need to be challenged in *theory* the way they are being challenged in *practice* by grassroots women of color in the Third World. The problem seems to be with the self-fulfilling prophecy of imposing an elite, Western model of feminism on Third World women and saying it does not fit, rather than creating a model of feminism that *does* fit the local, contextualized, and historical struggles of women in the developing world.

The Taxco *encuentro*, more than any other, raised the issues of divisions within Latin American feminisms and "represented a transition from the small group of dedicated feminists to a large, broad-based, politically heterogeneous, multiracial movement."[91] While some *históricas* and *veteranas* felt that the level of feminist discourse was more basic and the regeneration of feminist strategies more limited due to the *encuentro* becoming a "feminist school for the masses," others felt this attitude reflected the reemergence of the *feministómetro* "and rejected the assumption that Central American, indigenous, or poor women were not quite 'feminist' enough to participate."[92] In fact, when it was proposed at the final plenary that in the future two *encuentros* be held, one for the *feministas* and one for the *movimientos de mujeres*, "Central American women and women from unions, parties, and popular movements were all chanting 'Todos somos feministas' (We are all feminists), demanding that the veteran feminists acknowledge the growth and diversification of the feminist cause."[93]

The next several *encuentros* dealt with issues pertaining to the massive growth in size of Latin American and Caribbean feminisms and the institutionalization and professionalization of women's and gender issues and gender policy advocacy accompanying the preparations for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Alvarez and colleagues define two distinctive logics that emerged in the 1990s that came to inform Latin American feminisms evident at the last four *encuentros*: (1) a policy-advocacy logic "seeking to promote feminist-influenced gender policy through formal governmental and non-governmental institutions;" and (2) an identity-solidarity logic "of more grassroots oriented, less professionalized movement activists" that focused more on "feminist identities, communities, politics and ideas" than with formal institutions.[94]

The fifth *Encuentro,* held in San Bernardo, Argentina, in 1990, the largest thus far with 3,200 attendees, including women from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), state ministries, and even elected officials, focused on legal change. Gender policy advocacy, highlighted by the creation of several formalized, regionwide feminist *redes* (networks) emerged at this *encuentro* and was taken to new heights at the sixth *Encuentro* in Costa del Sol, El Salvador, in 1993, which accompanied the NGO Forum preparatory process for Beijing.

What also makes the sixth *encuentro* unique is that it achieved "an even higher level of racial, ethnic, and class diversity than the previous ones, enjoying first-time participation by black women from the Caribbean, indigenous women from Andean countries and Guatemala, and many poor women from the cities and rural areas of Central America."[95] Issues of autonomy reemerged throughout the Beijing process and seventh *Encuentro*, held in Cartagena, Chile, in 1996, this time between the *autónomas*, Chilean *feministas* (who identified with social movement politics), and the women they identified as *institucionalizadas*, those who continued to align with parties, the state, and the new professionalized UN-NGO network who had "sold-out to the forces of patriarchy and neoliberal capitalism."[96] Cartagena was perhaps the most divisive *encuentro*, as women publicly accused each other of creating undemocratic spaces for the meeting, having narrow definitions of feminism, and using the movement as a vehicle to increase their own personal power.[97]

The last *encuentro,* held in Juan Dolio, Dominican Republic, was characterized by an *eje transversal,* a creative, interactive, performative dimension designed to serve as an equalizer for women participants to provide for several alternative avenues for expression and communication.[98] The spirit of critical reflection in Juan Dolio seemed to dissipate some of the conflicts of Cartagena, though the issues of the "professionalization" of the movement persist in discussions of transnational and global feminisms.

What the Latin American Feminist *Encuentros* elucidate is how much the theorists of women's organizing, women's activism, and feminist agency can learn from the practitioners: "First, in working with women of the popular classes, feminists learned that so-called taboo issues such as sexuality, reproduction, or violence against women were interesting and important to working class women—as crucial to their survival as the bread-and-butter issues emphasized by the male opposition."[99] In addition, women activists themselves are often transformed through the very process of organizing, in which the dialectical, not unilinear, relationship between the practical and the strategic emerges: "In the process of organizing around 'survival issues,' many women participants in the *movimientos de mujeres* were empowered both as citizens and as women and consequently often had begun to articulate demands for sexual equality in their homes and communities."[100]

The Impact of Globalization:
Regional, Global, and Transnational Feminisms

Within the context of assessing the positive and negative impacts of globalization over the past forty years, an extensive literature has emerged on global feminisms and transnational feminist networks. Whereas many Marxist critics of globalization[101] focus on the devastating impacts of "globalization

from above"—including neoliberalism and structural adjustment, the privatization of basic resources, decreased funding of health and education, decreased wages, and an increased cost of living that produces the worst results for the most impoverished populations in the developing world—many feminist scholars have also recognized the dialectical emergence of "globalization from below" in the birth of women's organizations, women's movements, transnational feminist networks, and global feminisms.[102] In *Globalizing Women*, Valentine Moghadam adopts a Marxist-feminist approach and argues that one positive aspect of economic globalization and the expanded incorporation of women into exploitative paid and unpaid labor has been the "unintended consequences" of the emergence of transnational feminist networks and the proliferation of women's movements on a local and a global scale.[103]

As the discussion of the transnational Feminist *Encuentros* attests, the institutionalization of women's issues and gender mainstreaming that took place through the implementation of the UN Decade for Women (1975–1985) and the global UN conferences of the 1990s provide the context in which global feminisms have emerged and developed.[104] While the *Encuentros* may be the best-known example of regional activism, Melinda Adams enumerates the regional women's networks in Africa from the 1950s to the 2000s, highlighting just how important the 1985 Nairobi Conference and the 1995 Beijing Conference were in the development of autonomous women's activism.[105] The official Beijing preparatory process was critical in expanding women's activism at the grassroots, national, subregional, regional, and international levels in Africa, including seven conferences in East, Southern, Central, North, and West Africa and culminating in the Seventh African Regional Conference on Women in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2004.

The role of African regional conferences on women has clearly had an impact on the continent. On July 11, 2003, at the African Union (AU) Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique, the AU adopted the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, a supplementary protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights adopted in 1981. What makes the "Maputo Protocol," as it has come to be called, unique, is that "for the first time in international law, it explicitly sets forth the reproductive right of women to medical abortion when pregnancy results from rape or incest or when the continuation of pregnancy endangers the health or life of the mother. In another first, the Protocol explicitly calls for the legal prohibition of female genital mutilation."[106] Whereas many praise the existence and impact of new transnational feminist networks, others have criticized the "imperial march" of Western feminism across the globe, couched in terms of a global feminism that actually imposes "Europology" on the world: "an elaboration of what is a distinctly European phenomenon into a human universal."[107]

What this book hopes to do is assess the achievements and limitations of women's activism and feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua from the

perspectives of women in each country during two specific recent periods of globalization: (1) revolutionary challenges to colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, and globalization, and the counterrevolutionary insurgencies that took place from the 1960s to the 1980s; and (2) postrevolutionary transitions to neoliberal capitalism and multiparty democracies, and the accompanying growth of "feminist civil society" that has taken place from the 1990s to the 2000s.

Women's Activism and Feminist Agency

Why do I create two distinct categories of "women's activism" and "feminist agency"? Don't these categories simply reproduce the dualistic critiques I and so many others have offered of other frameworks used to understand women's organizing and women's movements around the world? Despite all of the contestations over what constitutes feminism in the First World, Third World, Africa, and Latin America, one thing seems consistent across all of the literatures just examined: while one might argue that all women's activism is inherently feminist through the process of engaging women to transform their lives, not all women's activism is self-identified as feminist by the women participants themselves, nor is all women's activism necessarily feminist in its aims (antifeminist women's activism, for example). Thus, some language is necessary to understand and explain how women, in this case in Mozambique and Nicaragua, came to be active, and what constitutes the nature of their activity.

Anne McClintock describes how women's full participation in nationalist liberation movements was often granted, "but their emancipation was still figured as the handmaiden of national revolution. . . . Only recently has women's empowerment been recognized in its own right as distinct from the national, democratic, and socialist revolution."[108] In answering the question of why women are invited into national revolutions, McClintock uses Frantz Fanon's analysis of the role of women in the Algerian revolution for national liberation: "Women learn their militancy only at men's invitation. Theirs is a *designated agency*—an agency by invitation only. . . . The ferocity of the war was such, the urgency so great, that sheer structural necessity dictated the move. . . . In this way, the possibility of a distinctive feminist agency is never broached."[109] M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty define their understanding of agency within the context of their notion of anticolonial, anticapitalist "feminist democracy." They stress the importance of "re-presenting" women not as victims or dependents but as agents of their own lives. They define *agency* as "the conscious and ongoing reproduction of the terms of one's existence while taking responsibility for this process. And agency is anchored in the practice of thinking of oneself as a part of feminist collectivities and organizations."[110]

Feminist agency has emerged for women in Mozambique and Nicaragua through the process of women's participation and the shift in women's activism from mobilization to organization. Women were first mobilized by the leaders

of the revolution for the purposes of achieving the successful implementation of the male-determined revolutionary agendas. As women began to actively participate in preexisting revolutionary organizations of social justice, they communicated with other women, shared their experiences, saw the emergence of both the contradiction in and the intersection between their labor in public production and private reproduction, and learned that their individual oppression was not unique. Women's feminist agency has grown as women have come to bring a specifically gendered analysis of women's oppression into the revolutionary organizations in each country. And finally, as women have felt stifled and repressed within male-led revolutionary structures, they have ventured off to create their own organizations in civil society during the postrevolutionary periods that have explicitly feminist structures, goals, and agendas. This process of feminist agency, emergent in both Mozambique and Nicaragua, is the focus of this book.

A Standpoint of Intersectionality: Toward a Theory and Method of Comparative Feminisms

The term *intersectionality* was first used by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her 1989 article, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex," in which she attempts to develop a Black feminist criticism of the single-axis framework in antidiscrimination law. Crenshaw argues that dominant conceptions of discrimination condition people to think along a single categorical axis (i.e., race or gender), thus erasing the experiences of Black women, who experience racial and gender oppression simultaneously. In a subsequent article on intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color, Crenshaw describes her usage of the term as primarily focusing on the intersection between race and gender, but welcomes others to expand that methodology to include multiple identity categories:

> I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory. In mapping the intersections of race and gender, the concept does engage dominant assumptions that race and gender are essentially separate categories. By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable. While the primary intersections that I explore here are between race and gender, the concept can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such as class, sexual orientation, age and color.[111]

I want to expand Crenshaw's notion on an international dimension to include issues of race, gender, class, nationality, and postcoloniality and suggest that

intersectionality be used as both a normative theory of and empirical method for the study of comparative feminisms as a variant of standpoint theory. One of the founders of feminist standpoint theory, Nancy Hartsock, tells us that when material reality structures groups in fundamentally opposing ways, "the vision of each will represent an inversion of the other, and in systems of domination the vision available to the rulers will be both partial and perverse."[112] If the vision of the oppressor is partial, is not the vision of the oppressed also partial? Or is the vision of the oppressed somehow universal?

Charles Mills refers to standpoint theory in *The Racial Contract*, and sums it up as follows: "The term 'standpoint theory' is now routinely used to signify the notion that in understanding the workings of a system of oppression, a perspective from the bottom up is more likely to be accurate than one from the top down."[113] Mills states that he is arguing for a kind of "racial" version of standpoint theory. Georg Lukacs argued for a kind of "class standpoint" by asserting that the proletariat, being the identical subject-object of history, is able to see reality in its totality, and is therefore the class most capable of historical universal liberatory transformation. Nancy Hartsock essentially agrees, perhaps not about race or the proletariat *per se* but about the standpoint of the oppressed: "As an engaged vision, the understanding of the oppressed, the adoption of a standpoint exposes the real relations among human beings as inhuman, points beyond the present, and carries a historically liberatory role."[114]

If this view is correct, it would follow that the best way to understand the relationship between global systems of racial, sexual, and class domination is to theorize and conduct research from a standpoint of intersectionality, perhaps specifically from the perspective of poor women of color in the Third World, who experience every day the intersectionality of racism, sexism, and classism on a global scale. The voices and experiences of women in the developing world can best help us understand the intersectionality of race, gender, class, national, colonial and imperialist-based oppressions *precisely because* of their location at these intersections. It is important to state, as Kimberlé Crenshaw did, that "intersectionality is not being offered as some new, totalizing theory of identity."[115] Rather, adopting a standpoint of intersectionality is simply one of many standpoints one could adopt in attempting to theorize, analyze, understand, and change subordinate realities. Moreover, there are many different intersectionalities one could choose. I am simply saying that adopting a standpoint of intersectionality will illuminate more theoretically and empirically than adopting a framework from the perspective of any one standpoint.

As Ange-Marie Hancock defines with clarity, "The term 'intersectionality' refers to *both* a normative theoretical argument *and* an approach to conducting empirical research that emphasizes the interaction of categories of difference (included but not limited to race, gender, class, and sexual orientation)" [emphasis in the original].[116] Thus, intersectionality is both a diagnostic tool

to describe the multiple subject positions of women around the world and a prescriptive way of envisioning the kind of world women activists and feminist agents work to bring into being. This book adopts an intersectional empirical approach and asks several normative theoretical questions in conducting cross-cultural comparative research of the experiences of Mozambican and Nicaraguan women. How have Mozambican and Nicaraguan women participated and maneuvered both within and outside of male-led socialist revolutionary parties to pursue their own (sometimes self-identified and sometimes not) feminist agendas? What can First World feminist theorists and practitioners learn from the inherently intersectional theories and practices of women in Mozambique and Nicaragua located at the intersections of multiple identities and oppressions, including nation, race, class, and gender? These questions are at the heart of this book; they reveal my methodological and theoretical bias toward intersectionality as a necessary deconstructive corrective to Western feminisms and as a constructive tool to build more inclusive, democratic, anti-racist, and anticapitalist feminisms.[117]

Conclusion: Comparative Intersectional Feminisms

M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty adopt a framework of Third World feminism that challenges the "originary status" of Western feminism:

> It does not simply position Third World feminism as a reaction to gaps in Western feminism; it does not summon Third World feminism in the service of (white) Western feminism's intellectual and political projects. Instead, it provides a position from which to argue for a comparative, relational feminist praxis that is transnational in its response to and engagement with global processes of colonization.[118]

I am attempting to engage in comparative feminist praxis by examining the theories and practices of women's organizing in the Marxist-inspired revolutionary, counterinsurgency, and postrevolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua. What is needed, then, is a comparative, intersectional understanding of feminism that allows for multiple articulations within the context of multiple oppressions on a global scale. That is why I use and advocate using a definition of feminism constructed from the vantage point of a standpoint of intersectionality of women located at the intersection of gender, race, class, national, cultural, and postcolonial oppressions. According to Gita Sen and Caren Grown, attempting to write precisely from this vantage point:

> Feminism constitutes the political expression of the concerns and interests of women from different regions, classes, nationalities and

ethnic backgrounds. There is, and must be, a diversity of feminisms, responsive to the different needs and concerns of different women, and defined by them for themselves. This diversity builds on a common opposition to gender oppression and hierarchy which, however, is only the first step in articulating and acting upon a political agenda.[119]

This description works well in conjunction with bell hooks's definition of feminism, expanded to apply within a global context:

> To me, feminism is not simply a struggle to end male chauvinism or a movement to ensure that women will have equal rights with men; it is a commitment to eradicating the ideology of domination that permeates Western culture on various levels—sex, race, and class, to name a few—and a commitment to reorganizing [U.S.] society so that the self-development of people can take precedence over imperialism, economic expansion, and material desires.[120]

These are the intersectional definitions of feminism I find to be the most hospitable to conducting comparative feminist research. They are informed by socialist feminisms, Third World feminisms, African feminisms, and Latin American feminisms, all of which have informed my work. As I conducted my analysis of women's activism and feminist agency in Mozambique and Nicaragua, I was also conscious of identifying feminism along the following three dimensions:

1. Feminism as an *analysis* of the oppression of women in the political, economic, social, cultural, and familial spheres of life
2. Feminism as a *movement*, based on this analysis, to end the oppression of women and improve the status of women of all races and classes in the political, economic, social, cultural, and familial spheres of life
3. Feminism as a *theory,* aimed at sharpening the analysis that attempts to illuminate both the gendered nature of everyday life and the ways in which systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, culture, and postcoloniality intersect and are constructed by, within, and through one another, in order to better inform the strategies and tactics of the movement

In conclusion, this chapter has presented the theoretical framework and conceptual parameters for understanding how women are organizing and constructing feminism in two specific contexts (i.e., in a Latin American context and in an African context), and, in doing so, makes a contribution to the theories and practices of comparative intersectional feminisms.

3

"Doing a Revolution Doesn't Stop You from Being Machista"

The Birth of Revolutionary Women's Organizations and the Limits of Marxism-Leninism in Mozambique and Nicaragua

> *Women suffered double exploitation: from the colonial regime and in the home because of the husband. Women were silenced by the husband and the regime. Frelimo saw that it would be difficult to liberate the country and not women: it would be leaving half of the country behind. Frelimo wanted to give them a voice, a place to talk, freedom.*
> —Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/5/99

> *There was an exercising of power without limits, an abuse of power. Gender manifestations are one part of the abuse of power. . . . I am a kind of living memory of the story of the limitations of the revolution.*
> —Zoilamérica Narváez, Stepdaughter of leader of the FSLN and President of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega, who publicly accused him of years of sexual abuse in 1998, Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/14/00

Introduction

In the postrevolutionary period, as Frelimo continues to maintain party dominance in Mozambique, women like Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, continue to celebrate Frelimo's legacy as the party that liberated women. However, in Nicaragua, after the Sandinistas lost the elections and became the opposition party in the 1990s, there was a real space to be critical. The story of Zoilamérica Narváez, the stepdaughter of FSLN leader and President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, epitomizes the emergence of an immanent critique and the recognition of revolutionary contradiction in the country. In 1998, Narváez, a member of the Sandinista Youth organization since she was thirteen years old and a member of the party since she was twenty-one, publicly accused her stepfather of years of sexual abuse beginning when she was eleven years

old. It was the most highly publicized case of family sexual abuse in Nicaraguan history, dividing the women's movement and bringing to the forefront of feminist debates the legacy of the revolution and the degree to which patriarchal power relations were perpetuated within the Sandinista revolutionary framework. In her research on conceptions of gender in colonial and postcolonial Mozambique, Signe Arnfred discovered that despite the radical political and economic transitions Mozambicans have experienced over the past fifty years, from a colonial authoritarian regime, to a socialist one-party state, to a multiparty neoliberal democracy, gender discourses and policies have remained remarkably similar.[1] This tension between recognition and resentment characterizes the revolutionary periods in both Mozambique and Nicaragua.

This chapter examines the origin and history of the national-level women's organizations in each country, the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) in Mozambique and the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE) in Nicaragua, as well as their relationships to, and degrees of autonomy from, the revolutionary state parties in power in each country, Frelimo in Mozambique and the FSLN in Nicaragua. To assess the degree of autonomy the women's organizations of Mozambique and Nicaragua had in relation to their revolutionary parties, it is essential to analyze two dimensions of autonomy: autonomy of thought and autonomy of action, that is, the ideological space to think critically and propose alternative policy recommendations and the decision-making structures to implement such proposals.

The evidence in this chapter reveals that the revolutionary analyses, the theories of women's emancipation espoused, and the practices of democratic centralism adopted by Frelimo and the Sandinistas were framed by Marxist-Leninist understandings of the causes and thus the solutions of women's oppression, which, both theoretically and empirically, impeded the articulation of a feminist analysis of women's oppression, particularly in the spheres of home, family, and reproductive labor. Moreover, a patriarchal political culture and verticalist organizing structure permeated the revolutionary organizations of both countries, thus preventing gendered revolutionary change in the public and private spheres of women's lives. Three fundamental elements were missing from both revolutionary analyses of women's oppression: (1) an analysis of women's oppression in the reproductive sphere; (2) a gendered reconceptualization of 'production' and 're-production'; and (3) an analysis that showed the intricate connections between these two spheres, as well as between material and ideological levels of oppression, socialism and feminism, and the specific concerns of women and the interests of the revolution.

As a result, the framing of both revolutionary movements in Mozambique and Nicaragua led to a lack of ideological and organizational autonomy for the national-level women's organizations, the OMM and AMNLAE,

respectively, throughout the 1980s. While the women's organizations in each country were very active and participatory, they lacked both the ideological autonomy to theorize women's oppression and the organizational autonomy to make their own decisions. *Ideological autonomy* refers to the ability of women in the women's organizations of the OMM and AMNLAE to theorize, understand, and analyze the oppression of women from a gendered or feminist perspective and, as a result, to shape and conceptualize women's emancipation accordingly—of, for, and by women. *Organizational autonomy*, on the other hand, refers to the ability of women in the women's organizations of the OMM and AMNLAE to act, make decisions, elect leaders, issue statements, and shape policies on behalf of women given their analyses of the causes of women's oppression and thus the solutions for women's emancipation. For the most part, the OMM, created by Frelimo in 1973, and AMNLAE, controlled by the FSLN since 1979, were constrained by the hierarchical party structure and state-driven top-down leadership model of their revolutionary parties.

Numerous scholars have addressed the achievements made and limitations imposed by socialist and nationalist revolutionary movements upon women's mobilization, participation, and organization.[2] Norma Stoltz Chinchilla summarizes well the Sandinista impact on the development of feminism in Nicaragua:

> The Sandinista revolutionary experience, combined with the Central American context of underdevelopment, backwardness, and a high degree of external intervention and influence, has marked the Nicaraguan feminist experience. In the revolution, women gained a heightened consciousness, and a capacity for organization and analysis, that they could not have gained by any other means. At the same time, the political movement that served as the framework for Nicaraguan women's political coming of age was heavily influenced by the tradition of clandestine armed struggle, which emphasized military hierarchy and discipline, centralization of leadership, compartmentalization of information, the subordination of individual needs to the collective and the public (productive) sphere as the force behind all change.[3]

Women have been invited into the revolutionary process to achieve the socialist-nationalist goals of the revolutionary leaders and to change and modernize *women,* not to change the process or the revolutionary vision itself. Both Frelimo and the FSLN adopted a limited productivist Marxist-Leninist theoretical understanding of women's emancipation: integrate women into the fields of military defense and economic production, and thus achieve women's emancipation. As a result, women's emancipation in the reproductive sphere of life, including subsistence agriculture and family farming, reproductive rights, and sociocultural equality for women

and men, was not addressed by either revolution. In fact, the distinction between productive and nonproductive labor was upheld in both revolutions in ways that perpetuated gendered political economies and the superexploitation of women. As Shireen Hassim has observed about the relationship between nationalist movements and feminist movements in Southern Africa: "Women's incremental gains within nationalist movements did not obliterate the fundamental character of the politics of national liberation, in which women were mobilized primarily for the purposes of nationalism and as secondary subjects within the nation (and within subordinate women's organizations)."[4]

Organizations are made up of leaders and members, neither of which is a monolithic group. The women and men that I interviewed in Mozambique and Nicaragua include both leaders and members of the women's organizations and political parties under study, some of whom remain active in the organizations and parties today and others who have left the organizations, the parties, or both, to pursue their own autonomous organizing in civil society in the postrevolutionary period.[5] Most of the respondents represent an elite within their countries because they are urban, educated, and live in or near the major cities.

The Birth of the OMM

The birth of the OMM is rooted in two previous organizations: Liga Feminina Moçambicana (League of Mozambican Women [LIFEMO]) and the Destacamento Feminino (Women's Detachment). In 1962, soon after its founding, Frelimo created a women's league, LIFEMO, to "unite Mozambican women in the anti-colonial struggle, to promote the well-being of Mozambican women and children, and to combat illiteracy."[6] According to journalist Carlos Cardoso,[7] LIFEMO was effectively "a leaders' wives' club."[8] The second organization for women created by the Frelimo Central Committee in response to pressure from women militants was the Destacamento Feminino.[9] The Women's Detachment was a military organization used to mobilize women to join the liberation struggle. In 1966, the Frelimo Central Committee decided that "women should take a more active role in the struggle for national liberation, at all levels"[10] and that "the emancipation of women is central to the liberation struggle."[11] The political and military training of women began as an "'experiment' to discover just what contribution women could make to the revolution—how they would use their initiative, whether they were, in fact, capable of fulfilling certain tasks."[12] The experiment proved highly successful, and the Women's Detachment was created by 1967 and formally announced at the second Frelimo conference in July, 1968.[13]

Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, was a part of this original experimental group of women. She has been involved in the revolutionary

movement since she was very young, helping her father distribute letters inviting people to join the Frelimo movement: "When colonialists noticed, my father was jailed. I stopped my studies due to a lack of money to continue, and began working with friends of my father. In 1964, when the struggle started, my father was killed. Before he died, he said, 'If I die, continue to work with my daughter . . . the first born, the only girl.'"[14] Mateus went on to become a part of the first group of women who had military training:

> On December 12, 1964, after my father died, I was requested to work at the Central Base because no one could read or write. In 1967 our first visitor was Felipe Magaia,[15] from the Department of Defense, wanting to know how we were doing our activities. In November, 1966, there was a meeting at the Central Committee of Frelimo that said our base should have political and military training. In March 1967, myself and 27 other girls between the ages of 17 and 20 began political and military training.[16]

In many ways, the presence of armed women in and of itself served as a critical form of political education to "dispel myths about the innate incapacity of women."[17] According to Manuel Tomé, Head of the Frelimo Parliamentary Group and former Frelimo Secretary-General, a debate took place within Frelimo "trying to give women their adequate place" in the armed struggle, culminating in the creation of the Destacamento Feminino in 1968: "The Women's Detachment was a turning point for women in Frelimo: not only were they taking care of children and old people, but they were also Freedom Fighters."[18] Indeed, some have claimed that it was women's military involvement in the war that gave them greater legitimacy when they started demanding peace.[19]

In 1972, the Central Committee of Frelimo decided to establish the OMM "as the arm of Frelimo in charge of mobilizing and uniting all women so that they will become involved in the revolutionary process."[20] Despite Frelimo's apparent commitment to the mobilization of women, both through the Women's Detachment and the OMM, the question of mobilization *toward what end* remains. Stephanie Urdang points out that the importance of mobilization, while emphasized throughout the revolutionary struggle, was curiously absent from the strategy proposed for the emancipation of women:

> Discussion of the need to mobilize women politically centers rather on mobilization to join the general tasks of the current phase of the revolution. But political mobilization expressly to fight for their rights as women, and against the attitudes and customs that perpetuate women's subordination within both the home and the larger society, is treated for the most part as secondary.[21]

The difference between mobilization as women and mobilization as Frelimo revolutionaries is a critical one, given the fact that the agenda of each group may or may not be the same. Former OMM Secretary-General Salomé Moiana stated herself that "the OMM did not arise as an autonomous initiative of women. It was, rather, *an expression of Frelimo's will to liberate women*" [emphasis mine].[22]

There are many different explanations of the creation of the OMM, but one thing is indisputable: it was created by Frelimo. According to Secretary-General Paulina Mateus, "One of the objectives was to make sure all of the women participating in the struggle were in the organization and participating in liberation, seeking equality with the men and fighting against the exploitation of women."[23] Former Secretary-General of the OMM, Salomé Moiana, stated in 1981 that because of the fact that in traditional society women are not "trained to participate in the life of the community, there was a need for an organization to politicize women and involve them in the struggle."[24] Moiana states that the main objectives of the OMM were "to mobilize all Mozambican women regardless of race, position or place of birth," to support Frelimo, and to create an awareness among Mozambican women of women's struggles in other countries.[25] According to Leith Mullings, the purpose for the creation of the OMM was the need to integrate women from all parts of the country in order to spread the revolutionary gains from the liberated areas in the north to the cities in the south.[26] Since Frelimo had declared that a multiracial Mozambique was its goal, "reeducation of large numbers of Portuguese women will be necessary."[27] Another explanation is offered by Stephanie Urdang, who cites the age gap between women as the reason for the founding of the OMM. Although the Women's Detachment appealed to younger women, particularly women without children, older women did not have an organization they could see as theirs. "It was the acknowledgment of this gap" that led to the founding of the OMM in 1973.[28] In the resolutions from the Second Conference of the OMM held in November 1976, racial prejudices, age, and "veteranism" (the need to assert superiority because one has been in the revolutionary struggle for a long time) were cited as factors causing divisions between women and men, and among women.[29] In breaking down these divisions, Frelimo and the OMM encouraged women to identify in their common struggle for socialism, not in their common struggle as women.

The most important criticism of the founding structure and operating mechanism of the OMM is that it was created by the Frelimo leadership and remains incorporated into the Frelimo structure. The fact that the organization was created *by men for women*, at the very least, raises questions about the organization's autonomy, legitimacy, and ability to represent the interests of Mozambican women. The OMM accepted the analysis that the goal for which Frelimo was fighting was the "liberation of all the people from the exploitation which is also the cause of the oppression of women."[30] This, of

course, was class exploitation. While I do not doubt the sincerity of the OMM or even much of Frelimo's leadership, I question the ability of a male-led, class-based analysis to fully recognize, understand, or fight to eliminate, in all spheres of life, the power dynamic involved in gender-based oppression.

The History of the OMM

Since its creation at the First Conference of the OMM in Tanzania in 1973, which established the rules of the organization, the institutional history of the OMM can be traced through its national conferences. During the Eighth Session of the Frelimo Central Committee, held in February 1976, the Frelimo leadership decided that the OMM should hold its Second National Conference November 10–17, 1976. This conference outlined structures at various administrative levels "which function according to the principles of democratic centralism."[31] In February 1977, the Third Congress of Frelimo was held, at which the decision was made to transform Frelimo into a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party, run by the process of democratic centralism.

The Second Conference of the OMM had as its theme, "New Rules for New Life." The document *Resolutions from the Second Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women* contains information on the general state of women in the areas of society, family, economy, and culture. The topics selected by the Frelimo leadership as areas for the OMM to analyze and combat are quite revealing and include the following: illiteracy; obscurantism and superstition; tribalism, regionalism, and racism; rumour, intrigue, and slander; superiority and inferiority complexes; single mothers; divorced women; the idle woman; abortion; urban social problems; liberalism; adultery; prostitution; divorce; alcoholism; and abandoned children. The issues Frelimo selected for the OMM represent an intersection of what the party often referred to as the evils of African traditions, Portuguese colonization, and liberal bourgeois democracy. Women's feminist or gendered concerns were not the motivating force of Frelimo or the OMM. According to Signe Arnfred, Danish sociologist who was in Mozambique working with the OMM from 1980 to 1984, "The OMM was restructured during the Second Conference—before I came onto the scene. At the first conference, it seemed to be organized from the bottom up, by women themselves, who were more in touch with what the people actually wanted. The problem was when people didn't toe the correct political line. Deolinda Guezimane, the first Secretary-General of the OMM was ungracefully dismissed. She was replaced by Salomé Moiane, a party girl."[32]

The Third National Conference, held in 1980, reveals the effects of such restructuring. This was the first OMM conference held after Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party. The most interesting thing to note is the stark difference between the *Resolutions of the Second National Conference* and the document of the Third National Conference of the OMM in March

1980. Whereas the Second National Conference Resolutions refer to issues dealing with women as determined by the party, the document of the Third National Conference of the OMM says absolutely nothing about women! It contains a historical overview of Frelimo, a geography and encyclopedic sketch of Mozambique, and a list of the fundamental principles of Frelimo in multiple spheres of life.

After the OMM conference in 1980, where women's concerns seemed conspicuously absent, the Frelimo party asked the OMM to establish a committee to prepare a conference on the problems of grassroots women in Mozambique.[33] As a result, Signe Arnfred and Mozambican scholars Isabel Casimiro and Ana La Forte began interviewing women from all over the country in an attempt to create a body of knowledge about the problems women face in different parts of Mozambique. They received direct instructions from the party to carry out research to determine what were the problems that kept women from "growing up."[34] These interviews with grassroots women constituted the foundation of the Fourth Conference of the OMM, deemed the "Extraordinary Conference," held in 1984. The main issues raised were polygamy, initiation rites, relations between parents and children, and prostitution. According to Signe Arnfred, "On the whole, in the OMM the line was very much in my view given from the top down. It was nice to hear someone from the higher levels of the party asking, talking about and learning from grassroots women."[35]

In 1990, things started to change. Mozambique began undergoing another phase in its path toward political democratization: from a one-party participatory socialist state to a multiparty liberal capitalist democracy. This transition had a significant impact on the OMM. The separation of party, state, and government created a new space in civil society for autonomous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop. As Rachel Waterhouse explains it, "When the country changed to a multiparty system and free market economy under a new national constitution . . . it signalled the end of Frelimo's support to 'popular' organizations."[36] Where would the OMM fit into this new picture? The Fifth Conference of the OMM in 1990 addressed issues such as the new Constitution, new political parties, and new organizations such as Forum Mulher (Women's Forum), Mulher, Lei e Desenvolvimento (Women, Law and Development [MULEIDE]), and Associação para Promoção do Desenvolvimento Economico e Socio-cultural da Mulher (Association for the Promotion of Women's Economic and Socio-Cultural Development [MBEU]). According to Paulina Mateus, the First Congress of the OMM "grown up" was in 1996. The recent history of the OMM between 1990 and 2000 is a very interesting one centered around the emergence of autonomy struggles (see Chapter 4 for more discussion on this topic). However, this story cannot be told without first understanding the lack of autonomy that existed both theoretically and practically for the OMM in relation to Frelimo during the revolutionary years from 1973 to 1990.

The Theories of Women's Emancipation of Frelimo and the OMM: A Lack of Ideological Autonomy

Any exploration of the history of the women's organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua and the commitment of the revolutionary parties to the emancipation of women must examine the body of ideas that shaped the parties' theoretical approach toward women's oppression, as well as the extent to which the women's organizations had the ideological autonomy to theorize their own program for women's emancipation. The "Woman Question" has occupied a central role in the theories and practices of socialism in a way that it has not in liberal democratic discourse, where the commitment toward individual rights has been seen as the path to fight for the rights of any particular identity category, such as women and racial minorities. As Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, and Marilyn B. Young assert, in Marxist-informed governments "both the promise and the frustration" of women's emancipation are of "particular interest."[37] Why has there been a different discourse surrounding the need for women's emancipation within socialist revolutionary movements, and has it made any difference? I address these questions by analyzing the theoretical approach toward women's emancipation as conveyed in the discourse, theories, documentation, and speeches of the parties and the women's organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua in order to assess the *framing* of the analyses of the OMM and AMNLAE.

The revolutionary analyses adopted by the Frelimo and Sandinista parties were framed by Marxist-Leninist understandings of the causes and thus the solutions of women's oppression. As a result, the theories and practices of the OMM and AMNLAE were also framed by Marxist-Leninist analyses of the Woman Question, which focus primarily on a productivist model of integrating women into the revolutionary cause via productive labor without an analysis of: (1) the gendered division of labor and women's primary participation in reproductive labor; (2) the intersections between women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in the interconnected spheres of production and reproduction; and (3) women's input as to the substance of the overall revolutionary vision for society. Although the discourse of women's emancipation was seen as critical to the articulation of the revolution, the achievement of the *socialist* revolution—and the mobilization of women in defense and production that was required to accomplish it—was seen as synonymous with the liberation of women. There was no alternative or autonomous discussion of what women's liberation might entail.

Marxist Production versus Feminist Reproduction

One of the most often cited theoretical approaches to the Woman Question in Mozambique is the speech President Samora Machel made at the opening of

the Second Conference of the OMM. Machel's speech highlights the fact that Frelimo followed an orthodox socialist line on women's emancipation. In his opening address to the Second Conference of the OMM, designed to breathe new life into the organization, President Machel criticized the OMM leadership for "adopting and pushing values that were present under colonialism."[38] He also criticized younger members of the OMM for their misconception that men were their enemies. Machel clearly saw the struggle for the liberation of women as part of, subsumed by, and secondary to the struggle against class exploitation.

Machel articulates for Frelimo the orthodox Marxist position that class exploitation originated when human beings began to produce more than they could consume, laying the material foundations for the emergence of a class that would appropriate the fruits of the majority's labor.[39] Machel goes on to describe the special nature of the oppression of women: "To possess women is to possess workers, unpaid workers, workers whose entire power can be appropriated without resistance by the husband who is lord and master."[40] What Machel fails to analyze is how and why the labor power of women can be appropriated "without resistance" by men. He assumes women will be possessed from the start and that their labor will be unpaid. How did men become the lord and master? Machel assumes an unequal power relation existing between men and women without ever explaining how it came into being or attempting to dismantle it. Only a gendered, socialist-*feminist* analysis of power relations between women and men can begin to grapple with such questions.

Urdang also notes that while Machel was able to criticize the "false consciousness" developing in the OMM, he was not able to see that the same criticism was applicable to him and the Frelimo leadership:

> Noticeably absent from his criticism was any recognition that as a mass organization of the party, OMM has largely been guided by the party and its goals articulated in speeches such as these by top members of the party, all male. . . . OMM has never been conceived of as an autonomous women's movement. It has always followed and been expected to follow the lead of Frelimo.[41]

Thus, the interests of Mozambican women as women, as well as oppressed peasants and exploited colonists, were never really a part of Frelimo's ideology, for they were never seen as an independent end in and of themselves, only as a means to an end. The fact that the OMM was never an autonomous women's organization has impeded the organization's ability to articulate a feminist analysis of the oppression of women separate from the interests of socialism.

The OMM documents that establish the most detailed theoretical framework for understanding the organization's construction of the emancipation

of women are the *OMM Informative Bulletin* and the *Resolutions from the Second Conference: New Rules for New Life*. As described earlier, the topics that were selected in the Second Conference by the party leadership include such areas as tribalism, superiority and inferiority complexes, single mothers, divorced women, the idle woman, liberalism, and adultery. Reading through the document reveals an often antifeminist approach, in which women are understood as participating in the creation of, and thus responsible for, the societal problems identified. I analyze these documents in detail to elucidate the theoretical framework of the Woman Question that guided the organization.

The OMM approach to the emancipation of women was a productivist approach from the beginning:

> To involve women in the process of National Reconstruction is not an easy task. . . . The OMM has established the following priorities: 1. to involve women in *socially productive*, collective labor by encouraging them to enter communal villages, join cooperatives and participate as wage workers in national Reconstruction. . . . Involving women in *socially useful production* is central to the OMM strategy [emphasis mine].[42]

learly, the question that arises is what constitutes "socially useful production" from the point of view of the OMM, the Frelimo party, or both? First of all, in Mozambique, 96 percent of women are engaged in subsistence agriculture in the form of family farming. Not only was it unnecessary to integrate women into socially useful production because they were already doing it, but giving women more agricultural labor was not the path toward their liberation. The theories of women's emancipation taken from a European Marxist model ignored the material reality of women's lives in the developing world and thus provided an inadequate solution for women's oppression. In his analysis of agricultural production in Mozambique, Merle Bowen elaborates this argument, describing Frelimo's agrarian strategies as, for the most part, antipeasant, focusing on a top-down, large-scale, state farm model of production, rather than asking the peasants what worked for them: historically, a bottom-up, small-scale family farming model.[43] In a country where 80 percent of agricultural labor is performed by women, antipeasant means antiwoman. Women were not consulted for their ideas regarding socially useful productive models, nor was a reproductivist approach ever considered.

Involving women in socially useful production was seen as the central OMM solution for women's oppression. Yet, when it came to analyzing the central problems for women, the material constraints of productive and reproductive labor were not the focus; rather, the cultural impediments to women's participation in the revolutionary process tended to get the most attention:

The principal obstacle that prevents women from fully participating in the revolutionary process is the continued resilience of *traditional and colonial practices which reinforce women's sense of inferiority* and maintain them in a subordinate position. These include initiation rites, child marriages, brideprice, polygamy, superstition and obscurantism, prostitution, alcoholism and bourgeois liberalism and sexual corruption. . . . Moreover, *women who are involved in socially productive activities are in the vanguard of the struggle*; their newly found confidence in their work capacity and their intelligence compels them to fight actively against anything that hinders the development of their creative initiative [emphasis mine].[44]

Despite the fact that women's gendered participation in paid and unpaid labor is not analyzed as part of the problem of women's oppression, participation in socially productive activities is seen as the solution. As a result, cultural problems are assumed to have economic solutions.

Polly Gastor of the Centro Informática at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane and a resident in Mozambique since the late 1970s, agrees: "'Women into Production' was the OMM Watchword. There was very little impact on the family. The OMM women were in literacy classes, they did their stuff. A lot of them had difficulty with their husbands because of it. The traditional view was of women as commodities."[45] It is interesting to note that while an analysis of women's reproductive labor in the family was not discussed in the *Resolutions from the Second Conference*, the role of woman as educator within the family was, and this role was connected to production: "Woman has a fundamental role as educator of the new generations. She must engage in production and move from merely carrying out duties to planning and directing them, thus liberating her creative initiative."[46] Women's success as educators of the family was connected to their engagement in production, seen as the liberator of women's creative initiative.

The *Resolutions from the Second Conference of the OMM* also focused on women's participation in production to combat the problems suffered by abandoned wives and divorced women, making the following recommendations: "1) Encourage woman to win her *economic independence*. This is the *basis for her affirmation as a useful individual*, capable of fulfillment within society; 2) Seek to integrate the divorced woman into *collective life and production* in the Communal Village, Cooperative or other unit of production; 3) Make known to the divorced woman with children her legal rights relative to the father's participation in the upkeep of the children" [emphasis mine].[47] Clearly, economic independence is seen as the most important path toward women's emancipation. The importance of women's economic independence is not disputed, but women's emancipation in the cultural, social, political, and familial spheres of life is ignored by this economistic approach. In addition,

the fact remains that the discourse itself only values women's participation in the productive marketplace, and it does so at the expense of women's participation in the reproductive sphere of home and family. In fact, in this analysis it is women's place in production alone that makes her useful as an individual. This helps to explain how the OMM characterizes the idle woman:

> The idle woman is not involved in collective production. She is a phenomenon characteristic of the city. She is completely dependent upon her husband and generally does not get involved, except through him. She is an individualist with narrow horizons. She is insecure, conservative and an agent for rumours and intrigue. She finds change very difficult to accept. Because of this, she is an excellent victim of reaction. Distrusting, she feels jealous of women who work outside the home.[48]

The "idle woman" in the OMM Resolutions is dependent upon her husband, individualized, conservative, jealous, reactionary, nonworking and, most importantly, nonproductive. Clearly, subsequent socialist feminist analyses of the undervalued reproductive labor of women in the domestic sphere challenge this perspective, asserting that "every woman is a working woman." In a developing country like Mozambique, where 80 percent of the labor force is involved in agricultural labor, with 96 percent of women involved in the agricultural sector, predominantly family farming, how many women are idle?

The concluding section of Part I of the *Resolutions from the Second Conference of the OMM* highlights the fact that the OMM accepted Frelimo's political line on the emancipation of women and that this emancipation was best understood through women's relation to production:

> Many of the social problems analyzed in this part of the document are the consequences of the old mentality. They are the product of social values born out of relationship to exploitation as much in feudal society as in capitalist-colonial society. They will tend to disappear with the *materialization of FRELIMO's political line on the emancipation of women. Woman, integrated into production*, the constructor of the material and ideological basis for Socialism, will accelerate the establishment of new social relations. No longer will she be the victim of retrograde and reactionary ideas. The new generations will be able to grow up free of material and moral miseries. The Struggle Continues! [emphasis mine].[49]

The OMM's own documents repeatedly refer to the adoption of Frelimo's political line on the emancipation of women: "*Women are certain, however, that guided by the correct political line of their vanguard party, FRELIMO, and*

organized in the OMM, the emancipation of women will become a reality in a socialist Mozambique" [emphasis mine].[50] Clearly, the OMM lacked the ideological autonomy to determine its own line on the cause of women's oppression or the means to achieve its demise.

Discursive Rhetoric or Substantive Commitment?

While everyone I interviewed discussed the rhetorical place 'women's emancipation' held in the revolutionary discourse of Frelimo, some people questioned the centrality of and motivation for women's mobilization. Célia Diniz, the Mozambique country representative of the Africa-America Institute, raised the issue of whether Frelimo's commitment to women's emancipation was substantive or pragmatic: "Frelimo had a great input in calling for women's participation. I don't know if it was because of profound belief or because it was the way to get them into power."[51]

Founding member of Frelimo and member of the National Assembly, Sérgio Vieira admits that both pragmatic necessity and commitment to emancipation were factors in the mobilization of women: "The struggle and success of the struggle depended on the involvement of all of us, men and women. We thought or were convinced that the process of the emancipation of women was there, and that unless women were involved, they would always be second class."[52] Women were seen as central to the success of the revolution. But were women able to contribute to the form, shape, and vision of that revolution? Polly Gastor has difficulty distinguishing Frelimo's views about gender from the party's general revolutionary approach:

> It is difficult to compartmentalize questions as gender questions. The whole Frelimo ethos was about struggle, sacrifice, morality, Protestant ethics. Men and women made huge personal sacrifices. Personal agenda sacrifices were constantly demanded during the revolutionary struggle. This ethos was still maintained for some time. . . . In general, after independence, Frelimo's strategy was one of social engineering and optimism. If they could get girls into school, children of workers and peasants, then the idea was that girls would grow up ready to take on modern society and take their place in it.[53]

But, for Gastor, the question still remains: "Were women actually being accepted on equal terms? There were good women militants, who, when married, relapsed into housewives."[54]

The theoretical approach toward women's emancipation that was adopted by Frelimo, and through democratic centralist means by the OMM, seems to reflect the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist line on the Woman Question: the integration of women into production will emancipate women. The added

workload on women who were already engaged in reproductive labor was not considered, nor was the gendered division of labor between men's work and women's work questioned. The distinction between productive and reproductive labor was not challenged by the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Frelimo. Instead, women's identity was understood as a class identity and not as a gendered one: "Our identity resides in our condition of being exploited and oppressed in the common fight for emancipation. It is a class identity."[55] Women's interests were assumed to be synonymous with women's *class* interests. The OMM lacked the ideological autonomy to conceive of women's interests any other way.

The Relationship between Frelimo and the OMM: A Lack of Organizational Autonomy

The relationship between the state party organization and the national women's organization in any revolutionary context reveals a lot about the approach toward women's emancipation that will be adopted and the degree of organizational autonomy women will have in determining that approach. To what extent did the OMM have the organizational autonomy within the decision-making structure to set its own agenda and engage in its own practices to achieve women's emancipation?

From 1973 until the New Constitution was introduced in 1990, the OMM was the only national-level women's organization in Mozambique: "At that time, there was only one party: Frelimo. There were no other women's organizations. All of the women belonged to the OMM. We were always working inspired with the political line of Frelimo."[56] According to the report prepared for the 1995 NGO Forum in Beijing by Forum Mulher, a coalitional organization of women's organizations in the postrevolutionary period, "Despite having had an important role in mobilizing women in the first years of independence, [the OMM] limited itself almost exclusively to being the Party's 'right hand' for integrating women into the national tasks considered to be priorities."[57] Despite the important gains Frelimo made for women articulated by Teresa Cruz e Silva, Director of the Center for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University, she also agrees that the agenda of the OMM was the agenda of the Frelimo party: "Like most organizations, the OMM came under the umbrella of Frelimo, and in my opinion, the OMM was a particular case of an organization under the umbrella of Frelimo."[58]

National party officials, as well as current and former members of the OMM, explain the relationship between the party and the women's organization as unidirectional.[59] According to Alcido Nguenya, then Member of Parliament, member of the Permanent Commission of Parliament, and member of the Political Commission of Frelimo, "The relationship between

the OMM and Frelimo is very interesting. The OMM is not a member of Frelimo, but rather is the hand or the helper of Frelimo, which goes to the OMM when it wants something about women. Frelimo needs the OMM. . . . The OMM is an instrument of Frelimo. *Frelimo used the OMM to do its policy on women*" [emphasis mine].[60] Carla Braga, former member of the OMM and researcher on the Land Campaign at Eduardo Mondlane University, left the OMM because the organization was not feminist enough for her: "I really see the OMM as just a way of Frelimo to put out their ideas, as a way of using women in power. For instance, the city was dirty, so the OMM and the mass organizations were recruited to clean the city, do landscaping work and the vaccination campaign. . . . This is the state's work! The OMM will take care of it!"[61] Ana Rita Sithole, Frelimo member of the Permanent Commission of Parliament and member of the OMM, agrees that there was not a lot of autonomy or independence under Frelimo. But she argues that "the OMM played a very important role in this society. Even though it's Frelimo-oriented. . . . Each party has its women's group."[62] Thus, for Sithole, the OMM always was a women's organization of the party.

Leaders and members of women's autonomous NGOs in the postrevolutionary period also describe the limitations placed on the OMM. When asked about the relationship between Frelimo and the OMM, Elisa Muianga and Celeste Bango of MULEIDE confirmed a close relationship between the two: "The OMM and Frelimo. That's right. They are together. The OMM can do whatever they want inside the ideal of Frelimo. They cannot do things outside the ideal of Frelimo."[63] Eulália Temba of Women and Law in Southern Africa—Mozambique (WLSAMOZ) asserts that the OMM never had the space or the freedom to develop its own analysis of women's oppression like the new NGOs have: "Men decided the political line of the OMM, which was the same as Frelimo ideology . . . you must follow all ideas, all ideology. . . . Now, members have the responsibility to incorporate new points of view. The NGOs deal with feminism and gender. The OMM was created by men! Don't forget this!"[64] Ana Fernandes, director and plant manager of Rio Pele Textile Factory, hesitated when asked about the relationship between the OMM and Frelimo: "I think its okay to talk about it now."[65] She proceeded to describe the authoritarian tendencies within Frelimo: "There was pressure to join Frelimo. To be anti-Frelimo was very bad. Everyone received direction from Frelimo."[66]

Signe Arnfred, a Danish sociologist who worked with the OMM, agrees that the organizational identity of the OMM was determined by Frelimo: "All the time I was there, from 1980 to 1984, they didn't do anything that was not confirmed by the party. They never took initiatives, there was never disagreement. The Party sent initiatives down to the OMM. On the whole, in the OMM the line was very much in my view given from the top down. The OMM was taking too much direction for my liking."[67] When it comes to assessing the degree of autonomy of the OMM, Arnfred states:

They never tried. They never tried their own issue, their own autonomy. Maybe if they had tried . . . The Second Conference shows that they felt threatened. . . . it wasn't by leadership of nice party girls, but was a grassroots movement. The preparation was grassroots. The Executive Committee and the President of the party made sure women couldn't get a chance to talk. Maybe if the women's organization tried . . . The party control device was through the women leaders. Leaders are always good party girls.[68]

This connection between OMM leadership and party positions within Frelimo was described in numerous ways during my interviews. When I asked Ana Rita Sithole, Frelimo Member of Parliament and OMM member, about the relationship between the OMM and Frelimo, she responded as follows: "Sometimes we feel Frelimo uses us for mobilization for elections and that we are not a part of the big decisions. There is a tense relationship. However, most of the OMM leaders have Frelimo responsibilities. If not, they will not rise—they will not become OMM leaders!"[69]

Not only is party support important for becoming an OMM leader, but membership in the OMM is an important path for becoming a candidate for Frelimo party positions. One of the most important roles of the OMM today is in submitting names of women to the party for elected positions. Generossa Cossa was elected to the Maputo City Council working in the areas of gender, youth, social assistance, and civic education: "I was elected as an OMM member. I am still an active member of OMM. It is a really strong organization. If you go to a meeting, you'll feel that! People fight to get seats, to get elected . . . The OMM is one of the ways to get into Parliament."[70]

In conclusion, since its inception, the OMM was an organization of the Frelimo party, significantly constrained by a top-down leadership model in terms of agenda-setting, flow of information, and ideological parameters.

The Birth of AMNLAE

AMNLAE was born out of the Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC), the first national women's organization in Nicaragua, created in September 1977 to fight against the Somoza dictatorship. AMPRONAC's first assembly brought together sixty women who denounced the atrocities being committed by the Somoza regime during the long years of martial law.[71] Thus, the main purpose of the organization was to organize and mobilize women in opposition to the abuses of the dictatorship. AMPRONAC's initial goals included the protection of human rights, the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, and the mobilization and participation of women in issues of national concern. According to Dora Zeledón, National Coordinator of AMNLAE and FSLN member of the National Assembly, AMPRONAC was

the first national women's organization: "It was the biggest, most massive organization of Sandinistas, plus religious women, plus middle class women, plus peasants, all coming together to struggle for political prisoners."[72]

Different sources reveal different degrees of influence of the FSLN in the creation of AMPRONAC. In her account of the Nicaraguan women's movement, Katherine Isbester argues that many accounts of AMPRONAC's history have left out the role of the FSLN in creating AMPRONAC, providing the image that AMPRONAC began as an autonomous movement of women.[73] Isbester seeks to issue an historical corrective, citing two sources stating that Sandinista commander Jaime Wheelock contacted Lea Guido and Gloria Carrión, two women leaders whose affiliation with the FSLN was well hidden, asking them to form a mass-based women's group organized around women's problems.[74] However, Thelma Espinoza, Vice Coordinator of AMNLAE, cited the fact that AMPRONAC had its birthday in 1977, "before the FSLN victory," as evidence for AMPRONAC's autonomous origin.[75] Moreover, Gilma Yadira Tinoco, Director of the Comisión Interuniversitaria de Estudios de Genero (Interuniversity Commission of Gender Studies), stressed the significance of the autonomous creation of AMPRONAC: "The organization had its origin before the revolution against Somoza, as AMPRONAC. Later on, it became an organization supporting revolutionary combatants. Its origins were political: to denounce the crimes committed by Somoza. It was created by women, not by the party. By mothers and family relatives."[76]

Despite the discrepancy over the origin of AMPRONAC, perhaps attributable to the fact that it took place during the period of the clandestine war against Somoza, all sources agree that AMPRONAC was able to achieve a degree of autonomy that its off-shoot organization, AMNLAE, explicitly established as a Sandinista organization, was unable to achieve, however short-lived. As AMPRONAC began to focus its analysis on the particular oppression women suffered under the Somoza regime, it expanded its agenda to include explicit women's demands. In March 1978, AMPRONAC celebrated Nicaraguan Women's Week by outlining its new set of demands, including the following: freedom from repression, freedom of association, freedom for political prisoners, justice for those guilty of crimes and barbarities, maintenance of the cost of living, repeal of all laws that discriminate against women, equal pay for equal work, and elimination of the commercialization of women.[77]

Two political strands existed within AMPRONAC. One faction argued that it was possible to reform the government, while the other felt that it was necessary to fight for a complete transformation of society. In the spring of 1978, a national vote among the 3,000 members resolved the issue, and AMPRONAC declared itself a Sandinista organization.[78] The women's organization decided to join the United People's Movement, the broad coalition of opposition groups (which included the FSLN) formed to oust Somoza. According to Auxiliadora

Mesa, lawyer and professor at Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), and member of the Centro de Mujer y Família (Women and Family Center): "Once the FSLN assumed power, thanks to the support of the people, AMPRONAC became an expression of the party."[79] Thelma Espinoza, Vice Coordinator of AMNLAE, concurs, "In 1979, with the Sandinista victory, their role changed . . . they become a part of the Sandinista Party."[80]

After the Sandinista Victory, AMPRONAC changed its name to AMNLAE, The "Luisa Amanda Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan Women." The newly identified organization was named after the first woman believed to have been killed in the war against Somoza. According to Maxine Molyneux, AMPRONAC was transformed into AMNLAE to "advance the cause of women's emancipation and carry through the program of revolutionary transformation."[81] By the end of 1981, AMNLAE had already "reduced its public identification with 'feminism' and spoke increasingly of the need to promote women's interests in the context of the wider struggle."[82] According to Tomás Borge's 1982 speech to AMNLAE in León, "The central task of AMNLAE should be the integration of all women into the revolution, without distinction. It should be a broad and democratic movement that mobilizes women from the various social sectors, so as to provide a channel for their political, social, economic, and cultural demands and to integrate them as a supporting force in the tasks of the Sandinista People's Revolution."[83] Once again, as was the case in Mozambique, the goal of mobilizing women into the revolutionary project does not address the issue of mobilization toward what end. If the purpose of the mobilization of women is simply to help achieve the goals of the revolution, to what extent do women help inform, shape, and influence the goals of the revolutionary project itself?

Despite AMNLAE's origin out of a semi-autonomous, antidictatorial women's group, the organization suffered the same fate at the hands of the FSLN as the OMM experienced with Frelimo: a lack of ideological and organizational autonomy. María Lidia Mejía, a founder of AMNLAE and coordinator of AMNLAE in the department of Granada, addresses the pragmatic necessity that guided the FSLN's use of women's mobilization: "Because the FSLN said we must integrate women into the struggle for production—to feed us during the war—they gave us things to do. They never asked us what we needed."[84] AMNLAE, just like the OMM, effectively became the Women's Section of the FSLN. It was designed to function within the parameters defined by the party and assumed to share the same national goals. The analysis of the FSLN located women's emancipation within the broader strategy of the revolution. This means, effectively, that "policies for advancing the cause of women's emancipation would be pursued as long as they contributed to, or did not detract from, the realization of other broader goals."[85] From its inception, AMNLAE took its position and its analysis from the FSLN:

AMNLAE is first and foremost a Sandinista organization. This political commitment shapes its development and strategy. The key to women's liberation, AMNLAE argues, lies not so much in meeting women's immediate demands as in ensuring the success of the entire revolutionary process.[86]

According to the original founders of AMNLAE, the interests of women and the interests of the revolution were one and the same. From its very beginnings, AMNLAE and the FSLN framed a class-based movement for socialism and a gender-based movement for feminism in terms of an either-or choice. This false antagonism between fighting for one's rights as a worker and fighting for one's rights as a woman shaped the entire framework in which the Nicaraguan women's movement developed. At the First National Meeting of Women Leaders sponsored by the FSLN, Mónica Baltodano, long-time FSLN activist and military fighter and current member of the FSLN National Assembly, clearly stated that in cases where the interests of women may differ from the interests of the revolution, the class struggle reigns supreme over the struggle against machismo:

We have said that women must wage a constant struggle against discrimination. However, we know that in our society the class struggle is not abolished, and *therefore the fundamental base of our ideological struggle is the real and objective existence of a class struggle.* Our *main struggle* is as *revolutionary women at the side of the workers, not as women against attitudes of machismo* [emphasis mine].[87]

Inherent in Baltodano's argument is that only class-based oppression is real and objective. She also assumes women's struggles are purely ideological, denying the reality of ideological struggles and the objectivity of women's oppression. The intricate connections between struggling as women workers, a 'practical' gender interest, and struggling against machismo, a 'strategic' gender interest, are not acknowledged, nor are the connections between ideological and material levels of oppression. The agenda is conceived of as either-or from its inception.

The remainder of this chapter examines the nature of the relationship between AMNLAE and the FSLN in an attempt to understand to what extent AMNLAE cultivated the ideological and organizational autonomy to incorporate a gendered analysis of women's oppression into the theories and practices of the revolution. After a brief examination of the history of AMNLAE as an organization, I explore the productivist theories of women's emancipation adopted by the FSLN, and by direction, AMNLAE, and the verticalist organizing practices of the FSLN in relation to AMNLAE.

The History of AMNLAE

Despite the greater hope for the autonomy of AMNLAE as compared with the OMM (given its semi-autonomous origins in AMPRONAC), both organizations effectively became the women's section of their revolutionary party, mobilizing women for the cause of the revolution without women having the space to shape the theory and practice of that revolution. According to Ana Criquillon, long-time feminist activist in Nicaragua, "AMNLAE's principle objective was the integration of women into all the tasks, activities, organizations and goals of the revolutionary process, in the belief that this was the best strategy to achieve the emancipation of women."[88] LaRamee and Polakoff argue that "AMNLAE always had an ambiguous and contradictory role vis-à-vis the revolutionary state. Even though the state and the party both had a formal commitment to women's emancipation and participatory democracy, AMNLAE was still an organization created by and for the party and not by and for women."[89] The two main problems AMNLAE faced as a mass organization were (1) the concern that one organization could adequately address the needs and interests of the diversity of Nicaraguan women, and (2) the fact that AMNLAE was ultimately responsible to the party.

According to Norma Chinchilla, as early as October 1981, there were concerns regarding AMNLAE's goals, membership identity, and relationship with the FSLN: "Sandinista feminists took the position that AMNLAE's lack of dynamism was due to its timid defense of women's specific demands, its failure to articulate an explicit critique of sexism, and its passive dependency on the FSLN hierarchy for its strategy and program."[90] As a result, at the First National Assembly of AMNLAE in 1982, a change was proposed regarding the organization's identity and strategy: to move AMNLAE from being a direct membership organization to becoming a "political-ideological social movement."[91]

In 1983 the FSLN called upon AMNLAE to direct its energies single-mindedly to the war efforts. Soon after the Sandinista victory, the question of the military draft was raised. The role of women in the military draft is one of the only issues on which the FSLN and AMNLAE publicly disagreed in the history of their relationship. AMNLAE insisted that to maintain women's equality with men, particularly given women's strong military involvement in the revolution, they had to be a part of the draft. The FSLN strongly disagreed, passing a law calling for the active service of males only, age 17 to 22. Defense Minister Humberto Ortega released a statement that women have "objective limitations," despite the fact that women were one-third of the revolutionary army, and in 1984 were 20 percent of the army and 50 percent of the militia.[92] With the establishment of the male-only military draft and the discouragement of women from continuing their direct military participation in the army, the symbol of motherhood took on a new political meaning in Nicaragua. Contra

propaganda began arguing that the revolution was taking sons away from their mothers.[93] To counteract this, AMNLAE was assigned the task of providing support for mothers of mobilized sons, primarily through the creation of "Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs."[94] This organization was created to provide support for mothers whose sons had been killed by Somoza's National Guard in the war or by the counterrevolutionary forces and to mobilize mothers in support of the revolutionary war effort.[95] Katherine Isbester asserts that at this historical moment, "the Sandinista ideal shifted from personhood to its diametrical opposite, motherhood. . . . As a result of its new focus on motherhood, AMNLAE lost its ability to create an alternative identity for women."[96]

During the mid-1980s, debates ensued within AMNLAE as to how to deal with the Woman Question within the context of the revolution. In 1987, AMNLAE held its Second National Assembly, adopting a new approach similar to the OMM's Extraordinary Conference of 1984. Grassroots meetings were held around the country to discuss the role and future direction of the organization: forty thousand women met in six hundred base assemblies to discuss issues and concerns to be taken to the Assembly by the one thousand delegates.[97] The main issues raised in these grassroots meetings span the categories of practical gender needs and strategic gender interests, including sexuality, workplace discrimination, and domestic violence.[98] Interestingly, after these topics were raised in the Assembly, Bayardo Arce of the FSLN National Directorate gave a speech that questioned the very need for a women's organization in the Sandinista revolution. These grassroots meetings showed that "specific problems in women's 'personal lives' hampered both their involvement in production and their participation in the political process."[99] Raising children single-handedly, deciding how many children to have, and surviving domestic violence were finally beginning to be recognized in Nicaragua as material realities which, despite occurring in the private reproductive sphere of the home and family, have a vital impact on and interconnection with the public productive sphere of politics and the market.

In response to these meetings, AMNLAE drafted a New Agenda, which contained issues dealing with power relations between men and women, including sexual harassment, domestic violence, rape, and the choice of when and whether to have children. In addition, new spaces for women's organizing began to emerge outside of AMNLAE, particularly the Women's Secretariat of the Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Rural Workers Association [ATC]) and the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones de Profesionales (National Confederation of Professional Organizations [CONAPRO]), which began to challenge AMNLAE's leadership monopoly over the Nicaraguan women's movement.[100] In fact, Helen Collinson argues that the thunder of AMNLAE's "new agenda" had been stolen by the Women's Secretariat of the ATC, which was already talking about women's specific problems and their connection to production and the revolutionary project.[101]

While the Women's Secretariat of the ATC was focusing on women's specific concerns, AMNLAE was devoting less and less of its time to mobilizing women as women, and as a result, to developing an analysis of women's oppression. Helen Collinson refers to this as the great ambiguity in AMNLAE's role as a women's organization:

> It faced problems that other mass organizations did not face. For the most part the other organizations organized people according to their geographical position: the CST organized workers in factories, the ATC organized agricultural workers, the CDS worked in neighborhoods and markets. Yet for AMNLAE it was not so easy. Their constituency was all women . . . They were to organize women as AMNLAE and encourage women to integrate themselves into other organizations. At the same time they were also charged with the responsibility of formulating and advancing women's interests.[102]

It is precisely this divided role that prevented AMNLAE from developing into an autonomous entity in its own right. AMNLAE never had the time or space to develop an analysis of women's oppression, let alone an analysis to link women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in both the productive and reproductive spheres of life to the Sandinista struggle. The great ambiguity of AMNLAE, caused by its relationship with the FSLN, played a major part in its failure to develop an autonomous analysis of women's oppression. The FSLN directives always received priority.

The Theories of Women's Emancipation of the FSLN and AMNLAE: A Lack of Ideological Autonomy

As was the case in Mozambique, the theoretical approaches to women's emancipation adopted by the party and the women's organization in Nicaragua were framed by Marxist-Leninist understandings of the causes and thus the solutions of women's oppression, impeding the emergence of a gendered analysis. The practical needs of the revolution in the productive sphere were incorporated into the revolutionary agenda at the expense of women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in the reproductive sphere.

Marxist Production versus Feminist Reproduction

The 1969 Historic Program of the FSLN expressed the Sandinista commitment to women's emancipation by asserting that "The Sandinista people's revolution will abolish the odious discrimination that women have been subjected to. . . . it will establish economic, political, and cultural equality between woman and

man."[103] How was this commitment to women's equality understood and to what extent was it genuine? The speech delivered by Tomás Borge in León, Nicaragua, on September 29, 1982, was the first speech given specifically on the status of women by a government leader after the overthrow of Somoza on July 19, 1979. The theory and practice of democratic centralism was as clearly at work in Nicaragua as it was in Mozambique. In the publication of the speech, there are numerous citations of "AMNLAE women responded with 'National Directorate, we await your order!'" As Doris Tijerino states, the "vanguard of the FSLN" gives out directives to all of its organizations, including AMNLAE.[104]

Borge's speech clearly gives a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the origin and history of women's oppression that is both class reductionist and materially economistic. First, he states definitively that the Woman Question is simply a part of the larger revolutionary analysis of society: "The woman question is *nothing more* than an aspect of social reality in its totality. The definitive answer to the liberation of women *can emerge only* with the total resolution of the class contradictions, of the social diseases that originate in a society like ours" [emphasis mine].[105] Not only is women's emancipation understood within the context of a class revolution, but women's oppression is reduced to economic dependency: "Woman was the first enslaved human being on earth. Even before the state of slavery existed, women were slaves. As you know, *dependence and social oppression is based on the economic dependency of the oppressed* with respect to the oppressor. Woman was economically dependent on man even before class exploitation arose" [emphasis mine].[106] Borge's analysis presents several problems. First of all, like Samora Machel, he never explains exactly *how* women came to be the slaves of men. Secondly, the only form of dependence that he acknowledges is economic dependence. All forms of dependence and social oppression (physical, psychological, sexual, cultural, personal, and ideological) are reduced to economic dependency. As Mónica Zalaquett of the Center for the Prevention of Violence states, "The classical Marxist understanding of women's discrimination seen as economic discrimination is very limited because through history discrimination has multiple manifestations and acquires different dimensions—political, economic, psychological. The problem should be attacked through different dimensions."[107]

Even when Borge correctly analyzes the burden of reproductive labor which women as a gender class share, as well as the superexploitation of women's unpaid domestic labor, he ignores the gendered relationship which lies at the base of the oppression and acknowledges only the economic base:

> Independently of the fact that women, in this stage, continue to bear the main responsibility for reproduction and the care of children, the burden of housework and discrimination still relentlessly weighs down upon them. . . . Of course, behind this objective reality there is an economic base. . . . This explains why many times women are still

compelled to do work that pays no wages, that is not taken account of anywhere, that is not credited toward social security. Independently of the fact that women often receive the help of men, the truth is that the customs and level of development of our society impose this superexertion on women. And it is in this sense that women are not only exploited—they're superexploited. They are exploited in their workplaces, if they work. They are exploited by lower wages and exploited in the home. That is, they are triply exploited.[108]

Despite the fact that Borge seems to have a nuanced analysis of the root cause of the triple exploitation of women in both the productive and reproductive spheres of labor, he perpetuates the traditional Marxist distinction between productive and nonproductive labor, which contributes to gendered political economies that undervalue women's work:

Women workers constitute 40.5% of the workforce in the country. This means that 183,448 women work outside the home. At first glance, this seems like a very high proportion and could bring us to the conclusion that women's participation in production is very significant. Yet, if we analyze the type of work women carry out, we see that a high percentage of these women are really under-employed, and that another large layer is employed in *domestic service-work that is not productive and that will have to be regulated and limited in the future* [emphasis mine].[109]

Borge, along with many orthodox Marxists, discounts all domestic service work as nonproductive. This raises at least two troubling questions: (1) how can capital-saving reproductive labor performed for free, which otherwise would have to be paid for in the market, not be considered 'productive'; and (2) why is the goal of women's productivity equated with women's emancipation?

The problem with Marxist theories of women's emanicpation is that they rely on three fundamental fallacies: (1) women's oppression will automatically be achieved when class contradictions are resolved; (2) women's emancipation will be achieved through women's engagement in productive labor; and (3) class interests trump gender interests in any revolutionary struggle for emancipation. Each of these fallacies was raised by Nicaraguan women feminist activists during my interviews.

Sofía Montenegro, prominent feminist theorist and activist, and former member of the FSLN and AMNLAE, explains the automatic assumptions of women's emancipation which guided Sandinista socialism:

For society in general it was the idea of bringing about a sort of endogenous adaptation of socialism, with the willingness that it

should be an open society with a mixed economy, bringing about changes, which obviously were linked with the economic and social changes, but linked with the productive sphere . . . the traditional leftist idea that if you change the correlation of voices economically and the hegemony of classes then the emancipation of women will come by itself automatically.[110]

Ana Criquillon also critiques the productivist bias of the Sandinista Marxist-Leninist approach, and the association of women's engagement in production with women's emancipation:

> The assumption was that women going to work would resolve all of their problems. Little by little, the FSLN evolved, so that by the middle of the decade, they realized work by itself would not solve the problem. . . . The analysis was limited, but they did not come up with a new one. On the other hand, it wasn't a priority.[111]

Vilma Castillo Aramburu, Executive Director of Puntos de Encuentro, describes how the focus on resolving the contradiction among classes blurred the material reality of power relations based on gender oppression: "In general, most of the time the Sandinistas focused more on the Marxist analysis of classes and taking Marxism and adopting it to women. They thought by resolving economic problems, they could solve women's problems. . . . Nor did they have an analysis of power relations or power within workspaces."[112]

Gilma Yadira Tinoco, Director of the Comisión Interuniversitaria de Estudios de Género, gives support to the argument that the FSLN and, by direction, AMNLAE, adopted a Classical Marxist understanding of the relationship between class and gender oppression:

> AMNLAE developed historically as it had to develop as the other mass organizations did. Its main purpose was to defend the goals of the revolution. The particular interests of the organization were put into a secondary level following Classical Marxist theory. Classical Marxism concluded that the subordination of women has its origin in the class struggle. The fight for class equality will achieve equality for women. That conception was not just handed by the male leadership but the women leadership at that time. By the end of the1980s this conception had less support.[113]

According to Tinoco, the perception today is that class and gender struggles are not contradictory, but, in fact, intersectional: "In previous years, however, a clash was constructed between the two positions: gender or class—you had

to go toward one or the other. Today, it is seen as not just possible to merge the two but necessary!"[114]

The assumed dichotomy between class and gender oppression buttressed another dichotomous relationship: emancipation in the public sphere of production versus emancipation in the private sphere of reproduction. Argentina Olivas of the Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa asserts that neither AMNLAE nor the FSLN had a feminist analysis of women's oppression in the private sphere of life:

> I think they didn't have it. They saw women's participation more as women developing the self in the public sphere. Women's groups created at this time—we realized we were oppressed by Sandinista men and men on the left—we received bad treatment, rape, etc. So, women started organizing themselves. They were demonized, satanized. One of our colleagues, a lesbian militant of the FSLN . . . they caused her to leave the party.[115]

Olivas commented that working in organizations in the public sphere was a good experience because the men and the women worked together, "but internally, in the house, it was women only."[116] Sonia Agurto, Executive Director of the International Foundation for the Global Economic Challenge (FIDEG), describes her realization of the missing analysis of the Sandinistas: "I was not understanding why some women were leaving the party. But as I started joining women's organizations and movements, I realized the Sandinistas had an analysis of class, and not gender. Many women were expelled from the party for defending women's rights."[117] Not only was the Sandinista leadership not providing an analysis inclusive of women's oppression, but it also punished those members who tried to do just that.

The leadership of the FSLN adopted a productivist, reductionist view of the revolution and the problem of social transformation. As a result, both the FSLN and AMNLAE ignored women's practical gender needs in the reproductive sphere of life, which, as Sofía Montenegro points out, includes everything from handling the material shortages and emotional losses of the Contra war to caring for the needs of young children:

> The shortages, the handling of the food crisis. . . . everything that means the reproduction of domestic life was becoming quite complicated, and it was women who had to handle this crisis. On the one hand to have to handle the crisis of the emotional losses due to the amount of dead people that were around, and it was their sons, their husbands, their children, and on the other hand to have to keep on going in the rear guard, economically, socially, but at the same time they have to handle their own life, in their own barrios and their own house, and

it was too fucking much. And the emphasis at that moment in the war that was the party line: that the women that mattered were the women that were older, the mothers of the ones that were fighting. The younger women who had small children and therefore not subject to the draft were thinking of some other things. Milk, for example.[118]

Conflicting interests between different sectors of society, including mothers of young children and older mothers who had lost sons in the war, began to emerge during the worst parts of the Contra War in the mid-1980s. This heightened the productivist/reproductivist divide and highlighted new issues that would need to be dealt with, such as the availability of milk to feed young children, and contraception to prevent the birth of new young children:

For example, the necessity to control reproduction for women, because older women did not have this problem; they were already grandmothers. But the women who were in their reproductive life cycle, they were fertile, they had all kinds of complications of health, and they demanded this attention. And that's how the discussion of reproductive rights and the necessity of dealing with health problems like abortion and contraception began. . . . because I mean that was the problem. If you got pregnant or you wanted to avoid a pregnancy there was no way you could prevent it. So, it began with some women asking that in the basic grocery quota that you got, the state should put some pills every month, like oil, rice, beans and pills.[119]

This example of including birth control pills in the monthly rations from the state reveals just how differently a monthly basket of "necessities" would look if it were being constructed by men or by women, from a Marxist-Leninist productivist view or within a feminist reproductivist framework.

In conclusion, it was precisely *because* AMNLAE did not have autonomy from the FSLN that the organization did not have a program that fought for both the practical gender needs and the strategic gender interests of Nicaraguan women in the productive and the reproductive spheres of life. As a result, the theories of women's emancipation adopted by the FSLN framed the ideological limitations of AMNLAE. A productivist, economistic, class-based analysis of women's oppression seemed to be the only viable option. Ana María Pizarro, Director of SI MUJER and formerly with the FSLN Ministry of Health, sums up well how the economistic emphasis of theorizing women's emancipation as women's integration into production is based on a class understanding of women's oppression as opposed to a gendered understanding:

I think the Sandinistas, as all revolutions of the 1970s, never got to incorporate as an element of women's oppression the gender

oppression. For them, women suffered oppression because they were poor, not because they were women. . . . They didn't consider the specifics of women, with the exception of poor women versus non-poor women. Talk about women was about unemployed women. There was not a recognition of women's specific needs. For example, reproductive rights—control of women's bodies was not taken up in the revolution. In the 1970s, control of women's bodies, birth control, and reproductive rights were rejected by the Latin American left as examples of Yankee Imperialism and issues of Latin American sovereignty. They never understood these issues as citizens' rights.[120]

Discursive Rhetoric versus Substantive Commitment

What does the Sandinista leadership have to say about the party's commitment to women's emancipation? Víctor Hugo Tinoco, member of the FSLN since 1973 and member of the National Assembly and National Directorate of the FSLN since 1994, has worked in different political and military positions, from the struggle against Somoza in the 1970s to diplomatic responsibilities in the 1980s. Tinoco asserts that "by the triumph of the revolution, the FSLN was looking to shape a fairer society with decreasing poverty and decreasing class differences."[121] He also has "a sense that at that time, the topic of women's rights was not as strong" but that the struggle for a fair society included women.[122] And yet, Tinoco admits very clealy the secondary status of women's gendered concerns:

> In the 1980s, the topic of *women's issues was hidden*, *dissolved*, because, again, there were *national challenges which made other goals secondary*. In the 1980s, it was defense of the revolution, an effort to build a new social and economic order. Those were the most important objectives. Women's issues were hidden despite a very important role in society. This was the same as in the struggle against Somoza. In the military, women were often better combatants than men! Also, during the 80s and the defense of the revolution, women got involved in production. *The gender goal was dissolved* [emphasis mine].[123]

Tinoco's statement highlights exactly the points missing from the historic analysis of the FSLN. There were "women's issues" and then there were "national challenges." Women's issues were not conceptualized as a national challenge. Yet he points out that women got involved in production. Perhaps women's sense of themselves was increased by their participation in the productive sphere of labor, but this was not the goal of the production policy, only a byproduct. Did the Sandinistas have any 'gender goals'?

Jaime Wheelock, a founding member of the FSLN, National Directorate member for twenty years and former Minister of Agriculture, insists that the Sandinistas had as one of their main goals "to develop assured thinking toward women's emancipation. It's not that we didn't try. We couldn't, *even when we charged our own women to do it*" [emphasis mine].[124] In his assessment of how well the FSLN incorporated a gendered analysis of women's oppression in terms of theory and practice, Wheelock seems to identify two main limitations: (1) the priority of war, perpetuated by the United States; and (2) the cultural assumptions of Nicaraguan women and men:

> The first obstacle was to fight the dictatorship, the second was to confront the war directed by the U.S. Having just 200,000 combatants . . . for example, a girl, during the revolution, would be a student, coffee collector, and a soldier. Women's agenda became shaped as we were winning the war. . . . In 1987, we issued The Proclamation. We thought about women. . . . UNAG and the FSLN created cooperatives to identify beneficiaries of land ownership including the army, at one moment as a recruiter for the army. It is possible that the women's organization suffered a lot at that time. The organization lost its importance— 1983–1986. During that period of crisis, it wasn't a priority in the time of war. Many of the women's organizations were supporting the war, collecting coffee, occupying different affairs, not their own.[125]

Wheelock's insistence that the FSLN thought about women is evidenced by the Proclamation of 1987, issued after the crisis period of 1983–1986 during which, by his own admission, AMNLAE had suffered and lost its importance. (For discussion on the motivation for and impact of the Proclamation, see Chapter 4.) However, suffice it to say here that, by 1987, the Proclamation was too little too late.

Although the most entrenched members of the FSLN argued that the party did have an analysis of women's oppression, other former Sandinistas argued that there was no special commitment to women as a particular group in society; rather, they argued that there was a genuine commitment to equality for all. According to Ana Criquillon, long-time feminist activist with the ATC and the FSLN and now in the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua, "The Sandinista revolution pretended to achieve the same rights for men and women. It wasn't a specific goal for women. Equality was the main goal for all Nicaraguans."[126] However, for Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, Director of the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), former Vice President of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court and militant member of the FSLN, even the commitment to equality remained more in the realm of theory than practice: "The historical program of the FSLN proclaimed the equal participation of

women. Documents were created regarding the equal political participation of women. However, the practice was different."[127]

For many, the theoretical commitment to equality could not compete with the practical embeddedness of machista culture. According to María Rosa Renzi, UNDP Gender Representative, "It is true that the revolution recognized equality for everybody, and women became active in areas traditionally not for them."[128] Renzi, however, goes on to argue that the revolution also taught Nicaraguans that there is not enough willingness to fight gender oppression because of its cultural embeddedness in society, from the top level leaders to the lowest grassroots level:

> It was machista—reproductive and sexual health were not targets. There were not changes in this area. The revolution was [doubletalk]: there were speeches about women's participation, but there wasn't input about women's strategic interests. . . . Women had different salaries and the worst positions. Women were almost never in positions of decision-making or managing.[129]

Mónica Zalaquett, director of the Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia and self-identified Sandinista, agrees that many women participated in the revolution and had opportunities that they never had before. However, gender relations and family transformation were not the focus of the Sandinista analysis of women's oppression:

> I think the Sandinistas wanted to incorporate women into all of their plans for transformation. But the problem of women was not a very important issue—they cared about the social relations of production, not the social relations of gender. Conscious feminists were stigmatized and rejected. There were women's organizations—AMNLAE. But with the war, the transformation of the family was not important, and when the family is not transformed, society does not change.[130]

Zalaquett agrees that for the Sandinistas, the solution was understood as getting more women into production. Although the creation of child care centers did accompany this goal for productivist ends, the transformation of machismo in the reproductive area was not promoted.

The Relationship between AMNLAE and the FSLN: A Lack of Organizational Autonomy

While the divide between theory and practice exists within any revolutionary movement, the degree to which people are willing to talk about it varies

greatly. Many of the individuals I interviewed in Nicaragua were very willing to be critical of the FSLN leadership, given the three electoral defeats of the Sandinistas as opposed to the electoral victories and continuing governing power of Frelimo. Obviously, losing power and becoming the opposition party versus remaining the party in power shapes the context in which people feel they can be critical. This explains why in many ways postrevolutionary Nicaragua provides a unique and interesting time to gather the histories of activist women and their experiences with the FSLN in the 1980s, a time when criticism was squelched.

The main criticisms that emerged from my interviews with activist women in Nicaragua, many of whom have left the party and AMNLAE and have started their own autonomous NGOs in civil society today, have led me to make the following assertions: (1) the verticalism of the FSLN party led to a decision-making structure in which decisions were directed from the top down, through the direct oversight of National Directorate members Tomás Borge and Bayardo Arce over AMNLAE, preventing real autonomy for the organization; (2) the lack of a critical questioning and revolutionary under-standing of gendered and cultural power relationships in the FSLN led to the patriarchal exercise of power both within the party structure and within the reproductive spheres of the home and family, thus revealing the stark contrast between revolutionary theory and patriarchal practice. Next, I discuss each conclusion in turn.

"Verticalism" in the FSLN

Sofía Montenegro, feminist theorist and activist within the Comité Nacional Feminista, and formerly with the FSLN, AMNLAE, and the Sandinista news-paper *Barricada*, summarizes well the verticalism of the FSLN and the lack of ideological and organizational autonomy that resulted for AMNLAE:

> There is a political axiom: without autonomy there is no political protagonism. You cannot be a political actor if you do not have your own thinking. So if you are subordinated to somebody's thinking or vision and on top of that organizationally you cannot take decisions, what sort of strength can you have? And this was not the women who ideologically could stand up because they were part of the same ideology and framework and frame of mind. You needed someone who was outside that frame who could really change AMNLAE from within, someone who would rebel. That would have been impossible. . . . since they were appointed by the party, the party decided.[131]

During most of the 1980s, AMNLAE's leadership and agenda-setting were determined by the party. All Secretaries-General of AMNLAE were appointed

by the National Directorate of the FSLN until after the 1990 electoral loss, and all budgets were managed by the party. María Lidia Mejía, AMNLAE Coordinator of the Department of Granada, further explains how little autonomy the organization had, describing the direct oversight the FSLN National Directorate had over the mass organizations:

> Yes, we lacked autonomy. It was ridiculous at that time. To have a women's organization addressed by a man. Borge assisted their work. Within the FSLN Directorate, each one of the members had to deal with one of the organizations: the ATC, the CST, the Youth Organization, AMNLAE. Borge told us, "You do this." They tell the women what to do . . . In some tasks they assigned, we wanted to say yes, but we did not want to continue to be used."[132]

Sandra Ramos López, former member of the FSLN, AMNLAE, and the CST, agrees: "AMNLAE never was independent from the party. Its structure was from the party. Men, Bayardo Arce, was always overseeing and watching. In reality, the National Directorate of the FSLN was managing society."[133]

According to Ana María Pizarro, Director of SI MUJER and formerly with the Ministry of Health under the FSLN from 1984 to 1989, "We had to leave AMNLAE. AMNLAE was and practically is the organization of the FSLN. Obviously, any leader of AMNLAE would never go against the National Directorate."[134] Vilma Castillo Aramburu, Executive Director of Puntos de Encuentro, agrees that the party limited AMNLAE's autonomy: "They had relative autonomy—limited, as long as they did not confront the leaders of the party. The goals, the party defined for AMNLAE, always within the space of the FSLN."[135]

Lilleana Salinas, Coordinator of the Centro de Mujeres (ISNIN), expresses that it was precisely AMNLAE's lack of autonomy that explains why she herself was never a member of the Sandinista women's organization:

> I grew up being a member of different organizations of the FSLN. I was a volunteer member of the popular health campaigns, collecting coffee beans, and the education crusade. But a member of AMNLAE—never! When I knew of different abuses that affected poor people, I began to take part in activities to help people. AMNLAE is not an organization to help women. It is an organization to help the party. The expression 'to help women' was translated as saying 'yes' all the time to the party, even if it affected women. . . . behind AMNLAE, being in charge, were the men of the party. Bayardo Arce—many women didn't know he was behind AMNLAE. But the people taking orders from him knew it. Many women leaders at that time denied it.[136]

Dora Zeledón, National Coordinator of AMNLAE, confirms that "Tomás Borge and Bayardo Arce partly directed the mass organizations. That's a reality."[137] She also commented that AMNLAE made "mistakes," including its "vertical orientation," after 1991, thereby causing many women to leave the organization.[138]

In addition to a standard top-down decision-making model, disagreement was handled in a way very well described by the notion of 'verticalism.' One interviewee expressed her experience with the way internal dissension was dealt with:

> There were groups of women inside pushing for more autonomy. The women calling for more autonomy were demoted. The women who say, "Yes, Sir" can stay and the women who say, "No, Sir" can walk. Due to ideological divisions—I was one of the women who was kicked out of the assembly. I was a danger. I was on the National Assembly of AMNLAE, Managua for five years. They ejected me from AMNLAE for one year.[139]

Another interviewee explained fears regarding how disagreement would be dealt with and the possible sanctions that might ensue: "The problem is that sometimes you say things. If you take another position, they can reduce funds to sanction you. In some cases, a woman was a single mother. You had to agree with the party and say yes. Otherwise you would lose your job."[140] In describing the relationship between the women's organization and the party, Sandy Suarez García also said that when there were differences, sanctions were issued: "party women sanctioned AMNLAE . . . when sanctions started, people were disqualified from the party. To the disqualified person, they would take out your authority, exclude you."[141] It appears as if the FSLN's commitment to verticalism and quieting dissension within the party had an impact on the decreasing commitment of some AMNLAE members to the party and the increasing push for greater autonomy that will be the topic of Chapter 4.

Perhaps the best example of the FSLN's verticalist relationship with AMNLAE occurred in 1988. By the end of the decade, AMNLAE leaders had decided to pursue major structural changes to achieve the democratization of the organization. Throughout the 1980s, the leadership of AMNLAE had been appointed by the National Directorate of the FSLN, which also selected members to have direct oversight over the women's organization (Tomás Borge and Bayardo Arce). In 1989, AMNLAE initiated a democratic process to elect a new national assembly and executive committee, with several openly identified feminist leaders from key sectoral organizations within the women's movements as candidates. Bayardo Arce, member of the FSLN National Directorate in charge of AMNLAE, asked the women's organization

to wait until after the upcoming national election for the sake of keeping unity to ensure the Sandinista victory.

In May of that year, the FSLN proceeded to freeze AMNLAE's internal election process and remove its national leadership. The FSLN appointed Doris Tijerino as the head of AMNLAE during the time of the election, a well known Sandinista militant and the first woman Chief of Police. Several of the feminist activists I interviewed said that it was no coincidence that the former Chief of Police was put in charge of the women's organization at the time. When the Sandinistas faced the election of 1990, feminists and women members of AMNLAE found themselves tired of waiting, and asking themselves, what are we waiting for?

A Political Culture of Patriarchal Power?

One of the main emergent critiques of the Sandinistas is that they never adopted a revolutionary understanding of power relationships outside the realm of class and imperialism. From the political level to the sexual level to the cultural level, the party never examined or attempted to transform the process of power-sharing. According to Zoilamérica Narváez, the political culture of the revolution was a culture of war and "a culture of silence: clandestine, out of the law, a culture of secrets, a culture of rumors, behind closed doors. This kind of political culture, because of the war, was concentrated. It makes the separation between the public and the private worse. There is also a culture of fear and subordination."[142] Narváez blames the militarization of Nicaraguan society for the culture of violence that permeates various aspects of human interaction, citing the FSLN as the perpetrator of such values after the revolution. Narváez's analysis links violence against women with violent political relations and violent styles of communication, and she concludes that the ways people were, and are, treated are both sexist and violent: "The distribution of roles is very sexist. . . . not just in terms of policy-making, but ideology- sustaining, perpetuating machismo and patriarchy. In public offices, how many women leaders are there? They are all in services, not administration. There had never been a woman member of the National Directorate until after Dora María Telles[143] resigned."[144] It seems evident that power relations between men and women, in terms of public political leadership in the state and private political power in the family, were not challenged by the FSLN.

Marcia Ramírez, sister of former Vice President and founder of the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) Sergio Ramírez, asserts that the sphere that was most left untouched by the Sandinistas was the sphere of cultural power relations between men and women in the family:

> In the 1980s if you would have asked me that [re: women's emancipation], I would have said, "Yes." Those were our dreams. We had

faith that the Sandinistas were working for women's rights. They said it, but I think now, looking back, it was a lie. I don't think they left us enough spaces. Many women with the capacity didn't get where they deserved. Not in the revolution, but in terms of cultural positions. It is the idea that the man almost by nature is superior to the woman, in terms of family, work . . . He is the one to determine what is to be done, he has the power.[145]

Many people I interviewed described a clear contrast between the way male Sandinista leaders treated their wives and children privately, and the kind of feminist speeches they gave publicly. Ramírez continues:

Top leaders abused their wives, abandoned their kids, sexually harassed their subordinates. I think deep changes were not made about the relations between men and women. I feel the revolution was a space to be aware of our rights, but there was not a focus on gender. This caused many women to divorce, separate.[146]

Sofía Montenegro also spoke about the contradictions of Sandinista leaders engaging in gender violence: "These same men who stood up and talked about the revolution and democracy and then committed violence with their wife or their children and all these sorts of inconsistencies create what we call: *dissonanca cognitiva*."[147] When asked just how many "revolutionary" Sandinista men engaged in private gender violence, she responded:

The majority of them. At all levels. And therefore we began to say that we have to combat machismo. So by 1987, with the rewriting of the Constitution, I think it was the opportunity we took to promote the debate of equal rights for women, which entered finally as a principle of the Constitution. And it forced, we forced, the Front to make a Proclamation of Principles [*La Proclama*] by the party, to compromise itself to fight against patriarchalism, both patriarchal structures and machista attitudes. Politically, and the private ones.[148]

The Proclamation to which Montenegro refers is the Proclamation of 1987, passed by the FSLN after internal pressure from women within AMNLAE and the party. This Proclamation was the first directly stated public commitment of the FSLN to fight attitudes of machismo and to recognize women's unequal contribution to reproductive labor in the family. The impact of the Proclamation, which turned out to be more rhetorical than substantive, proved to be too little too late.

It wasn't only women who complained of the machismo of male FSLN leaders. Javier Matus Lazo, Director of CENADE, Center of Action and

Support of Rural Development (Centro de Acción y Apoyo al Desarrollo Rural), described the topic of women's emancipation within the revolution for him as a very difficult one because of the divide between revolutionary theory and patriarchal practice:

> There were speeches on women's liberation, equality of conditions, but there was never a complete analysis. . . . There were sexual abuse attitudes by great leaders, commanders that were talking about this great equality. The problem is that it was not addressed correctly. . . . I was one of the people more affected because you think that leaders practice what they say, but then you realize in reality, you get disappointed.[149]

I would like to close this final section of the chapter with a few brief examples of activist women in Nicaragua and their practical historical experiences with the political culture of patriarchal power of the FSLN.[150] Helen Dixon, feminist activist in Nicaragua formerly with Grupo Venancia in Matagalpa, discussed how for her the key issues became how to transform power relations, particularly the vertical power structures that accompanied the FSLN party structure, exacerbated by the war and the struggle for survival.[151] With the Contra War, things were more hierarchical and the political culture was not questioned. Dixon described how she came to realize that "feminism represented a criticism of political culture, which eventually starts to question how leadership gets chosen. When nine men on the National Directorate are appointing the women leaders of AMNLAE, suddenly you start to question how nine men can choose women's leadership."[152]

Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, Director of CENIDH, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, former Vice President of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, and militant member of the FSLN, is no stranger to the patriarchal culture of power of the FSLN. She chose to run for the position of presidential candidate for the party against Daniel Ortega in the 1996 elections simply for the purpose of fostering democratic competition. When Nuñez was the senior Vice President of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court in 1988, just as the position of the presidency of the Supreme Court became vacant, she was transferred to the Governmental Commission on Human Rights. According to Nuñez, the move from the Supreme Court to the Human Rights Commission was an "undeserved punishment," a decision that came down from the "machistas" on the National Directorate of the FSLN, securing the impossibility of her promotion to the presidency.[153] However, Nuñez turned this punishment into an opportunity. Her work with the Human Rights Commission, including having to defend one of her Contra co-torturers, helped her to do the work she is doing today at CENIDH: "Our organization is the one with the greatest credibility for our work."[154]

María Lourdes Bolaños, founder of the oldest alternative feminist health clinic in Nicaragua, Centro de Mujeres IXCHEN, and FSLN member of Parliament, has also had her disagreements with the party. She was removed from the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, and Comandante Tomás Borge "gave" her to AMNLAE in 1983, wherein she created the Legal Office of AMNLAE. After Bolaños started writing articles on domestic violence, intrafamilial violence, domestic work and abortion, she received a reprimand from AMNLAE: "They called me from AMNLAE and told me I could not . . . I had to stop talking because I was dividing women in the FSLN. They wanted to take away my militant membership."[155]

Ritha Fletes Zamora, former member of the FSLN National Assembly and AMNLAE, also describes how difficult it was as a woman participating within the party: "Obviously, it was not easy to achieve a university education and participate in the party as a woman; it was more difficult. Even though it was a young revolution with young people, we have to remember the education was machista. But, at least it gave people the spaces. . . . revolutionary men . . . gave nothing for free."[156]

When asked how many members of the National Directorate engaged in behaviors consistent with machismo, one female FSLN member interviewed replied, "Machismo? Todos. All of them! The behavior of the leaders of the National Directorate never recognized women's merit—not only in political life but also in personal lives. They treated women like objects. Doing a revolution doesn't stop you from being machista."[157]

Conclusion

In conclusion, both the OMM and AMNLAE were constrained by the top-down leadership models and decision-making structures of the ruling revolutionary state parties, Frelimo and the FSLN, respectively. While both parties expressed a rhetorical commitment to women's emancipation, the substantive understanding of that emancipation was seen as included in, secondary to, and subsumed by the achievement of the socialist revolution. Women's emancipation was predominantly defined through women's increased participation in productive labor in the public sphere of the market and, militarily, in defense of the revolution. While these may be necessary conditions for the liberation of women, and do challenge certain gender-role stereotypes about the inherent incapacity of women, they are not sufficient. The intersections of women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in the productive and reproductive spheres of life were, for the most part, left unexamined, as were gendered material and cultural power relations in the family. As a result, women in the parties and the women's organizations, specifically identified in Nicaragua, struggled with verticalism and patriarchal political cultures within the theory and practice of revolutionary society.

Both women's organizations, then, struggled within a class-based framework to mobilize women for the revolution. While feminist practices did emerge, neither the OMM nor AMNLAE achieved a sufficient degree of ideological or organizational autonomy from the state party to develop a feminist analysis of women's oppression in the state, the market, civil society, and the family. How they chose to organize and what they were able to achieve are the subjects of the rest of this book.

4

"Women Are Not Cows—We Are Active Agents of History"

*Autonomy Struggles Emerge in
Mozambique and Nicaragua*

> *There was a coup d'état. At the Seventh National Conference of the OMM in 1996, they voted to come back. Nobody was guessing it would happen. The OMM never talked about returning. . . . It was very well orchestrated. It was not discussed by the membership.*
> —Terezinha da Silva, Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária in Matola, long-time member of the OMM, President of the Board of Forum Mulher and former Director of the Faculty of the Social Sciences at UEM, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/23/99

> *I think nobody can say women are what they are because of an institution. . . . Do not think our institutions are the creators. They facilitate. Women are not cows. You cannot put signs on us. We are active agents of history.*
> —Sandra Ramos López, Coordinator of the Movimiento de Mujeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas—María Elena Cuadra, Former member of FSLN, AMNLAE, CST, Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/10/00

Introduction

The story of Sandra Ramos López, a former member of the FSLN and a founding member of the Central Sandinistas de Trabajadores (Sandinista Workers Central [CST]) from 1979 to 1993, is one of the best examples of an activist woman who fought for years within the Sandinista union movement to incorporate the rights of women, only to decide to seek autonomous organizing outside of the party. After leaving the party, Ramos López became the Coordinator of the Movimiento de Mujeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas—María Elena Cuadra (Movement of Working and Unemployed Women). Her organization was born in 1994 out of "violent confrontation with a group of syndicalists" in the Sandinista union movement in Nicaragua.[1] According to Ramos López:

> In the syndicate world, the language is pretty sexist, masculinist. The concept of the worker is patriarchal. They don't talk about workers in a feminist sense. . . . So, a group of women decided to leave the organization to fight for the rights of women in this country. The purpose is pretty simple: to work for the rights of working and unemployed women in Nicaragua. We are working for improved quality of life and working conditions for women in Nicaragua. We also work to create equality among workers in Nicaragua—equality at the working place and in the social arena. We promote the leadership of women . . . simply, to change the world![2]

Sonia Agurto, researcher with FIDEG, confirms that "Sandra Ramos and others . . . the best women left the CST. Women began breaking off to form their own organizations."[3]

In the case of Mozambique, despite the many assertions that the OMM chose to return to Frelimo after a brief period operating as an autonomous NGO, there is a more disturbing account about the decision of the OMM to reconstitute itself as a Frelimo organization. According to Terezinha da Silva of the Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária (Center for Legal and Judicial Training [CFJJ]) in Matola, long-time member of the OMM and former Director of the Faculty of the Social Sciences at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), the decision of the OMM to return to the party was not a democratic choice of its members:

> It was a hot issue. The OMM Provincial leader didn't want to talk about it. . . . [It was an] arrangement with Frelimo. It was organized so well it wasn't discussed. . . . They didn't discuss whether [the OMM] should, or should not go back. For Frelimo, they thought strategies, for elections. For them, it was a way to gain power, having the OMM women together. . . . It was a big loss for me . . . for many of us. We were very shocked.[4]

This chapter examines the struggles that emerged for autonomy in Mozambique and Nicaragua, both between the women's organizations and the parties and within the women's organizations themselves. Women in Mozambique and Nicaragua adopted different organizing strategies, which had an impact on the degree of autonomy that they achieved during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods. In Nicaragua, autonomy struggles began in the 1980s, much earlier than in Mozambique, as women pushed from below to create women's secretariats within the preexisting workers unions and associations outside the structure of the main women's organization (AMNLAE). These alternative organizations helped integrate women into the revolutionary process, thus creating additional spaces for a gendered analysis of women's oppression to emerge. In Mozambique, however, autonomy struggles did not emerge until the 1990s, sparked by the country's transition from a single to

a multiparty state. As a result, the OMM was the only women's organization throughout the revolutionary period, thus providing less of an opportunity for women's gendered interests to emerge.

In the postrevolutionary period in Nicaragua, AMNLAE has become an autonomous organization in the women's movement. In Mozambique, after a brief period of autonomy, the OMM decided to return to Frelimo and remain a women's organization of the party. Why has this been the case? Not only did women's autonomy struggles begin much earlier in Nicaragua, accounting for the stronger foundation of autonomous women's organizations, but the electoral defeats of the Sandinistas in 1990, 1996, and again in 2001 created an environment conducive for women's autonomous organizing, in contrast to the electoral victories of Frelimo in 1994, 1999, and 2004. The relationship between electoral politics, social movements, and civil society proved to be an important one in both countries, as evidenced by the presence, or lack thereof, of autonomy struggles on the part of the women's organizations and the strategies adopted by women in relation to the revolutionary political parties. Three factors have affected the OMM and AMNLAE's organizational abilities to establish autonomy: (1) organizational identity issues, (2) power struggles with the party, and (3) internal women's movement struggles.

Electoral Politics and Social Movement Organizational Autonomy

Electoral politics emerged as one of the most important factors impacting the autonomous decision making of the OMM and AMNLAE. The timing and degree to which the women's organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua sought autonomy has been influenced by the status of the ruling political party. In Mozambique, where Frelimo remains the ruling party, the OMM remains a party organization, whereas in Nicaragua, where the FSLN became the opposition party from 1990 to 2005, AMNLAE has sought autonomy. In her analysis of feminism and antifeminism in postwar Nicaragua and El Salvador, Karen Kampwirth discusses the important role of autonomy for social movements and social movement organizations, which often find it "necessary to seek autonomy from the parties."[5] She is particularly interested in the importance of social movement autonomy as it relates to electoral politics: "The role of social movement autonomy in electoral politics (and, by implication, in democratization) is contradictory. . . . But autonomy is not an unmitigated good. Despite the inherent disadvantages, there are many advantages to affiliation with a political party. . . . At the height of the autonomy struggle, the advantage of autonomy probably outweighed the costs of the resources; after the initial autonomy struggle, the costs of those lost resources became more apparent."[6]

Kampwirth's analysis has interesting ramifications for party organizations like the OMM within a transition from a one-party state to a multiparty state. Autonomy struggles for women's organizations affiliated with the revolutionary party have evolved differently in Mozambique and Nicaragua. The degree to which organizational autonomy outweighed party affiliation in these cases was based upon two factors: (1) the degree of power of the political party (was it the ruling party in power or a defeated opposition party?); and (2) the degree to which alternative space(s) already existed for autonomous organizing. In Nicaragua, the struggle for autonomy clearly reached a height that outweighed the costs of the lost resources of affiliation with the FSLN. This has two causes, possibly interrelated: (1) women within AMNLAE began pushing for autonomy much earlier, in the mid-1980s, so there was a space for an autonomous women's movement to grow and flourish; and (2) the FSLN lost the elections of 1990, 1996, and 2001, thus making party affiliation less advantageous. In Mozambique, on the other hand, where the OMM has decided to return to the party after a period of autonomy, the opposite has been true: (1) the OMM was the *only* space for women's organizing until after the multiparty system was adopted in the early 1990s, thus creating no alternative spaces for women's organizing until much more recently; and (2) Frelimo remains the ruling party in power, having won the elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004. Thus, the same factors are at play in each context: party power and organizing spaces. These two factors serve as good predictors of a social movement's search for autonomy from a political party, particularly in a transition from a single-party state to a multiparty state.

A Question of Identity: What Kind of Women's Organization Are We?

Another aspect of an organization's decision to seek autonomy from a political party is based on the nature of the identity of the organization, and the movement of which the organization is a part. Numerous scholars of comparative women's movements have attempted to define the nature of women's organizing and what constitutes a women's movement. Understanding that women organize for a variety of reasons and within a diverse set of ideologies helps one define women's organizations and women's movements in broad terms, recognizing that women's *feminist* organizations and movements are a subset of such categories. Karen Beckwith defines women's movements by "the primacy of women's gendered experiences, women's issues, and women's leadership and decision-making. The relationship of women to these movements is direct and immediate; movement definition, issue articulation, and issue resolution are specific to women, developed and organized by them with

reference to their gender identity."[7] While I appreciate the primacy of women's experiences and women's leadership in this definition, I worry that the focus on women's gender identity may exclude movements and movement organizations driven by women but with a focus other than gender from inclusion in the broad category of "women's movements." As Shireen Hassim cautions, "Definitions of women's movements should not be so prescriptive or inelastic that they exclude the kinds of organized activities that involve the majority of poor women."[8] However, Hassim goes on to qualify women's movements based upon their inclusion of a distinct feminist ideology: "Nevertheless, a critical factor in shaping whether women's movements aim to transform society is the existence of feminism as a distinct ideology within the movement, emphasizing the mobilization of women in order to transform the power relations of gender. Feminist ideology is pivotal in women's movements, as its relative strength determines the extent to which collective action is directed to democratic ends."[9] Therefore, it is important that scholar-activists recognize the distinction that often exists between women's movements and women's organizations, on the one hand, and feminist movements and feminist organizations, on the other.

Women's organizing experiences in Mozambique and Nicaragua highlight the tensions that exist between what I distinguish as women's organizations, political organizations of women, and feminist organizations. Let me briefly define what I mean by each of these terms. A *women's organization* is an organization of, for, and by women which attempts to fight for the issues unique to women within a particular group. These issues are varied and affected by the other identities of women. Consequently, there are many different kinds of women's organizations: that is, peasant women, union women, professional women, entrepreneurial women, women of color, indigenous women, and so forth, each group fighting for the needs and concerns of the women who constitute that group's constituency in which gender interests may or may not be pivotal. A *political organization of women* is an organization with a particular political identity, often affiliated with a preexistent political organization, usually a political party, whose membership base is constituted by women, such as a party's women's league. A *feminist organization* is an organization with a structural, institutional, and personal analysis of the oppression of women as a gender class, which fights the oppression of women as such, often incorporating the race, class, sexual, national, ethnic, and cultural oppressions women also experience as women. These types of organizations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, tensions often arise when organizations address such overlapping identities internally. This chapter explores the organizational identity issues, power struggles with the party, and internal women's struggles that characterized the movements toward autonomy in the OMM and AMNLAE.

To Leave or Not to Leave: The Autonomy Struggle of the OMM in the 1990s

Why did the OMM decide to leave the structure of Frelimo and become an autonomous organization, and why did it decide to return to the party? In her analysis of autonomy and co-optation in Africa generally and the Ugandan women's movement in particular, Aili Mari Tripp found that women's organizations and the ruling parties with which they were associated often adopted new strategies to deal with the democratic transition from single to multiparty states:

> With the post-1990s political liberalization and emergence of multipartyism, many of these party-affiliated organizations lost their appeal and no longer attracted as much donor support. The parties and their women's affiliates tried a number of new strategies to retain control of women's organizations and tap into donor funding. One strategy was to delink the women's affiliate from the party. For example, the OMM broke with FRELIMO in 1990 but then returned to the fold in 1996 as it was unable to disassociate itself from FRELIMO, which was dependent on OMM as a source of votes.[10]

While my interviews revealed varied and sometimes contradictory answers to the questions surrounding the OMM's period of autonomy from Frelimo, the primary reasons that emerged for the postrevolutionary organizational behavior of the OMM confirm Tripp's findings: (1) organizational identity struggles and the difficulty disassociating from the party; (2) power struggles with the party and the party's need to keep its electoral base mobilized along partisan lines; and (3) the financial advantages of being associated with the ruling party.

Organizational Identity Struggles in the OMM

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the OMM began as a political organization of women, created by the Frelimo party to mobilize women during the revolution. During the revolutionary period, the OMM was more of a political organization of Frelimo women than it was a women's organization or a feminist organization. After the transition to a multiparty state, the OMM attempted to become a nonpartisan women's organization, only to return to the party in recognition of the fact that its true identity was a Frelimo organization of Frelimo women.

The OMM began to become an autonomous non-governmental orginization (NGO) separating off from Frelimo during the early 1990s transition to democracy, after the Peace Agreement with Renamo, but before the first election. Mozambique was becoming a multiparty democracy, and the OMM had

a decision to make. Now that there would be a separation between state, party, and government, and there would be two dominant political parties vying for the power to govern, should the organization remain affiliated with the party or become an independent NGO? In effect, should the OMM remain a *party organization of women* attached to Frelimo or become a *women's organization* in civil society? And whose decision was that to make?

Both Manuel Tomé, then Secretary-General of Frelimo, and Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, described the transition from a single to a multiparty state as a confusing one for Mozambicans in general and for the mass organizations in particular. They both attributed the OMM decision to leave the party as an identity crisis precipitated by the democratic transition. In addition, both leaders attributed the decision to return as an organizational reassessment required for future success. Tomé describes the democratic transition as follows: "In 1990, we changed our Constitution. We introduced a multiparty system. This was a deep, quick change. There were big confusions . . . we think we have tried to prepare ourselves. We have a tradition—what the chief says is always true or right . . . People did not want a multiparty system."[11] After describing the general difficulties with the democratic transition, Tomé discusses the organizational identity issues it raised for the OMM given its relationship with Frelimo:

> In a multiparty system, why have a women's organization linked with the party? We said, 'OK . . . You are Free' . . . maybe we need to let the OMM be a separate organization . . . It could involve more women . . . expand its objectives. But the organization and ourselves, we felt we were losing direction. Unless they act as a trade union, it was not possible to join every political ideology. . . . But there were discussions. And we said, "You are Free" to the OMM.[12]

The language "You are free" was used repeatedly in my interviews with male leaders of Frelimo. This is most revealing of the hierarchical, unidirectional nature of the relationship between the party and the women's organization. If the party is telling the organization they are free to go, *how free were they to begin with*?

According to Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, the organization was in a transitional situation, with many of the members feeling as if they had to adjust to the new multiparty structure. She describes the behavior of the organization most clearly in terms of an organizational identity struggle:

> When we introduced the multiparty system, there were many discussions: will all women be Frelimo? Or not? We decided we should give women options to choose political parties. So, for those women who choose other political parties, how can we have the OMM with

Frelimo? But the OMM was inspired with the political line of the Frelimo party. We were thinking of the women: to make people free so people could choose. But OMM is Frelimo. These were the issues.[13]

The issues raised for the OMM within the transition from a one-party socialist state to a multiparty capitalist state in Mozambique reveal a fundamental challenge for feminism in theory and in practice: is feminism a movement of and for all women regardless of party affiliation and political ideology, or is feminism inherently linked with a particular political agenda? Obede Baloi of the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) explains further the tension that emerged for the OMM between being a women's organization or a political organization of women:

> The OMM is bigger than Frelimo. The OMM is working for women, not Frelimo. The leadership is Frelimo, clearly, but the work is for women. The most important work is for the general idea of human rights. Women are human and have to be treated as equals. There is great work to be done that is being done by the OMM . . . literacy projects, small business creation, health, violence against women and children. I don't see how those problems can be party problems. . . . You have people from Renamo saying the OMM is Frelimo. There is some tension between "we are for all" and "we are a party group." There is still much to be done in women's organizations to handle women's political activity.[14]

Baloi really gets at the heart of the problem for women's organizations like the OMM. Will it be nonpartisan or will it align itself with the party which members feel will best represent their issues and interests? For many Mozambican women, imagining Frelimo women and Renamo women working side by side on women's issues seemed like an impossible coalition, despite the apparent nonpartisanship of many women's issues. Generossa Cossa of Eduardo Mondlane University describes this conflict in clear political terms:

> The OMM is under control on our side to get Frelimo elected. They need Frelimo. They couldn't be out of Frelimo. It wasn't correct to leave Frelimo. Other parties will have their youth and women leagues, too. The OMM and Frelimo need each other. Leaving the party was producing something new—they wanted to be an organization for all women. But they realized they can't be an organization for all women. You can't have Dhlakama's wife[15] at the OMM![16]

Gertrudes Victorino, a freedom fighter in the anticolonial national liberation struggle and member of the OMM since its origin, concurs with this

analysis and helps explain why the members of the OMM decided to return to the party:

> The OMM always defined itself as a member of Frelimo until 1990. Only in 1990, because there were many other organizations . . . Only like that [autonomous] could they integrate in other kinds of women from other parties, groups, etc. . . . In 1996, at the First Congress of the new OMM, women at the base of the OMM went back to Frelimo, the fathers of the organization, our brothers . . . We didn't feel comfortable out of Frelimo.[17]

The language of father-daughter was used by both men and women during my interviews to describe the relationship between Frelimo and the OMM, explaining the origin of the organization, the relationship between the two, and the reason for their continued affiliation. Maria Olívia Alvero, Provincial Secretary of the OMM in Nampula, describes the motivation to return to Frelimo as coming back to where the organization belongs:

> We made our decisions with emotion. Everything was changing . . . NGOs only could help . . . not parties. But once we were separated from Frelimo, we became liberal . . . there was nobody to go and tell it to. . . . We were created by Frelimo, we are back where we belong . . . women started doing whatever they wanted . . . We wanted Frelimo as a partner . . . to discuss strategies, which way to go, ideas, not as an authority but as a partner. During the time [apart], we almost died. Now, resuscitation! Where will we tell our worries, our aims and do something about it?[18]

While Alvero insists that the relationship with Frelimo is not based on authority but rather on a partnership, her comments reveal the need for a higher power for the OMM "to tell their worries to" for discourse and subsequent action.

According to Felipe Paunde, then Provincial Secretary of Frelimo in Sofala Province and now Secretary-General of Frelimo, the OMM tried an experiment when it left Frelimo. He uses this as evidence for the fact that the OMM is independent and makes its own rules: "If they were dependent, they never would have left! Slaves never ask their owners if they can be set free. They are not slaves. Part of the party, yes, but no interference. They chose."[19] However, Paunde's analysis of the return of the OMM reveals something quite different about the relationship between the women's organization and the party, at least from the party's perspective:

> When they decided to come back, the OMM understood who was the one who opened the door for women. The OMM knows that only with Frelimo can women be emancipated. Few parties give the

importance to women that Frelimo does. The OMM realized this, and they decided to come back. *For us, the children are back home.* The OMM saw that without Frelimo they will not go as far and vice versa [emphasis mine].[20]

The metaphor of the OMM as children returning home to their Frelimo parents where they belong, unable to achieve women's emancipation without them, reveals the nature of the top-down, authoritative relationship that continues to persist between the women's organization and the ruling political party. The emergence of a feminist analysis of women's oppression has been hampered within such a framework.

The transition to a multiparty system clearly created an identity crisis for the OMM as an organization for all women or an organization of Frelimo women. The notion of belonging, cited in various interviews, reveals that the decision of the OMM to venture out on its own or stay aligned with the Frelimo party was intricately linked to the organization's sense of *belonging to the party.* It *was* and *is* their identity. When the OMM tried its hand at autonomy, the party quickly responded by creating its own Women's League. The distinction that emerged between the OMM and the new Frelimo Women's League, or rather, that *did not* emerge, helped solidify for the leaders and members of the OMM exactly what kind of an organization they were. Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, explains the situation accordingly:

> It was not a campaign to move out of Frelimo. During the five years, the OMM started to lose members. When Frelimo saw the OMM was out of the party, they created a Women's League of the party. So, most of the members left the OMM, and went to join the league. . . . The first Congress of the new OMM was in 1996. They began losing credibility, losing members. We elected a Secretary-General, and decided to go back to Frelimo.[21]

So, perhaps for very simple and practical reasons, the OMM returned to Frelimo because (1) the same women began attending both meetings, and (2) many women began attending the Women's League of the Party meetings and *not* the OMM meetings. Ana Rita Sithole, Frelimo member of the Permanent Commission of Parliament, and member of the OMM, similarly describes the attempt of the OMM to become an NGO, open to every woman, regardless of party affiliation: "My dear, it didn't work! Is it possible women left Frelimo? But we are losing because of Renamo . . . We found we were weakening Frelimo in terms of mobilization. Frelimo created a Women's League, and it was the same people who attended."[22]

For Alcido Nguenya, then member of Parliament, the Permanent Commission of Parliament, and the Political Commission of Frelimo, the process that

took place during the transition from a single to a multiparty state revealed a lot about the purpose of party alignment:

> During the first phase of the transition to the multiparty system, the OMM thought it must separate from Frelimo. But there was confusion. . . . First, when the OMM left Frelimo because of the multiparty system, they thought that if they had no ideology, they would not be linked to any party and they would have more possibilities, and get more women into the OMM, as the head umbrella of all of the women of Mozambique . . . [this] would destroy the basis of the OMM aligned with Frelimo. Inside the party, they began trying to create a Frelimo Women's Group, and they realized, the OMM is Frelimo women! With the OJM it was the same thing. The multiparty system is now understood by everybody. Now, people understand what multipartyism is! People are either impartial or aligned with a party.[23]

It was important for Nguenya to state that it was the autonomous decision of the OMM to leave, and to return: "When they left the party and became independent, they chose what to do. The OMM decided at their conference. It was their decision. They have their own rules and statutes. Today, the OMM and Frelimo decide things together. The OMM influences women in Parliament in the Frelimo party."[24]

Some observers feel the OMM failed Mozambican women by making the decision to remain a party organization and not transform itself into a women's organization when it had the chance. According to Sam Barnes, long-time resident scholar in Mozambique:

> I never understood why they went back. Perhaps their legitimacy was never accepted. All the same people in the provinces . . . a number of years in leadership . . . there tends not to be much new blood. . . . The OMM, by being a party organization and not a women's organization, failed Mozambican women. It never had the substance. Nobody new could enter. It was a false declaration as an NGO. In a one-party state, there were all kinds of social issues related to women. The OMM was the first organization at the time—it was a novelty. But it never cultivated a feminist analysis.[25]

Maria Fernanda Farinha, never a member of the OMM, also feels that the OMM lost an opportunity when it returned to Frelimo: "They had the opportunity to move away from Frelimo. It was part of the general movement of society, a move toward social movements and away from politics and parties."[26] However, as Carla Braga notes, who left the OMM because it was

not feminist enough for her, "It's better like this—that's what they are, so why pretend to be something different?"[27]

Party Power Struggles

Terezinha da Silva, of the CFJJ and long-time member of the OMM, uses powerful language to articulate why the OMM returned to Frelimo after a brief period operating as an autonomous women's organization in civil society, asserting that "there was a coup d'état" that took place among the leadership of the organization over the membership. Two other women active in the NGO community asserted that the decision to leave and then return to the party was a political strategy orchestrated between the leadership of the OMM and Frelimo: "The OMM left the party to mobilize people for the elections as an independent organization, to register people to vote, and increase their credibility."[28] A former member of the OMM also expressed that she thought it was a Frelimo party decision made in the context of the elections: "Frelimo used the OMM the way they needed/wanted. The OMM as an autonomous organization could lose manpower and mobilization."[29] Obede Baloi, a member of the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, also gave support to a top-down interpretation of the OMM's decision from inside the party:

> I don't think they left and came back. What I heard is that the suggestion came from the leaders within Frelimo in the early 1990s since the OMM was a very big organization working not only for members of the party but as a mass organization, so, it should not be seen as a department within Frelimo but for the whole country in general. . . . The OMM was very well rooted in the whole country. The problem came when the decision to identify as a non-partisan organization was not accepted by all. A new strategy emerged in Frelimo to have these organizations clearly working for the party in time for the elections.[30]

According to Kathleen Sheldon, "OMM leadership abruptly decided to return to their earlier affiliation with Frelimo" during the OMM's First Congress in 1996 after a delegate from Nampula stated in her speech that "OMM is the fruit of Frelimo."[31] After delegates from the audience reacted with supportive pro-Frelimo chants, "with no discussion or formal motion, it then was simply announced that the OMM had returned to its prior affiliation with Frelimo."[32] Whether it was a spontaneous decision of the OMM membership that day, or a strategy decision discussed among and between the OMM and Frelimo leadership in advance of that meeting, is unclear. However, it is clear that the decision was made abruptly, without broad-based deliberation among the membership. The history of the relationship between Frelimo and

the OMM, the similarity of the responses on almost all counts between the Secretaries-General of each, and the repeated references of the child returning to the parent where she belonged, all support the possibility that discussions did take place between Frelimo and OMM leaderships that contributed to the OMM's decision to give up its autonomy and return to the party.

Financial Advantages of Ruling Party Affiliation

The leadership in the OMM also found that being the only women's organization funded by the ruling party was much more lucrative than fighting to fund-raise as one of many autonomous women's organizations in civil society. According to Janet Mondlane, widow of Frelimo founder Eduardo Mondlane, when the OMM suffered from lack of funds, it decided to come back to Frelimo. Frelimo cut its financial support of the OMM when the organization left the party, but as a nonpartisan NGO the OMM had access to new funders that would not have supported them financially as a party organization, such as UNDP. However, according to Edda Collier, former UN Gender Specialist in Mozambique: "The OMM found it unsustainable. They could not show the capacity to raise money."[33]

In conclusion, throughout the revolutionary period, the OMM was the only national organization for women in Mozambique. If you were a woman, you were in the OMM, which had, and still has, a presence in every province in the country. Autonomy struggles only began in the organization during the transition from a single to a multiparty state. Due to organizational identity issues, influence from leaders of Frelimo, and organizational maintenance issues, the OMM decided in 1996 to resume its affiliation with the ruling party after a brief period of autonomy. It appears that the existence of only one organization for women, combined with the electoral victory of Frelimo, created an environment conducive for the organization's continued affiliation with the party. Today, the OMM remains one of the most prominent women's organizations in Mozambique. However, there has been an emergence of autonomous women's organizations in the country beginning in 1991 that have begun to assert prominent roles as feminist organizations in civil society. The contemporary women's movement in Mozambique will be examined in Chapter 8.

Women's Organizing Strategies in Nicaragua: The Birth of Women's Secretariats

In contrast to the OMM in Mozambique, in Nicaragua, AMNLAE began as a women's organization, AMPRONAC, framed by but still outside the official structure of the FSLN. After the Sandinista victory, AMNLAE became

a political organization of women mobilized for the FSLN. However, as autonomy struggles emerged within AMNLAE during the 1980s, AMNLAE faced a similar identity struggle between being an organization of party women and an autonomous women's organization. After the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990s, AMNLAE solidified its identity as an autonomous women's organization.

Even during the revolutionary periods, however, the women in Mozambique and Nicaragua tried different organizing strategies, at the very least, to mobilize women for the revolutionary struggle and, at the very best, to integrate women's interests into the agenda of their state revolutionary party organizations. While in Mozambique there was only one organization, the OMM, designed to provide a space for the mobilization of all women, in Nicaragua, in addition to AMNLAE, there were alternative spaces created by and for women to integrate their interests into other revolutionary mass organizations. Ana Criquillon argues that as early as 1983 there was an emergence of independent feminist initiatives in coordination with AMNLAE that led to the formation of a women's legal office and a research team within the Asociación Trabajadores del Campo (Association of Rural Workers [ATC]) to examine the differential impact of agricultural labor on women and men. There were debates within AMNLAE during the 1980s about the extent to which women should organize separately in a women's organization like AMNLAE, although still a party organization, or should instead integrate into preexisting revolutionary organizations, such as the ATC, Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (National Union of Farmers and Ranchers [UNAG]), and the CST. The result was a decision to do both, and the women's secretariats were born.

Sofía Montenegro describes the birth of the Nicaraguan feminist movement through the lens of the strategy of the women's secretariats, based on organizing "where you are at":

> The feminist movement was beginning to emerge within the wide and broad AMNLAE, and the Sandinista Women's Movement, because you must remember there was no autonomous organization at that time, we were all AMNLAE. But within AMNLAE the feminists were inserted, inside the party, inside AMNLAE or whatever organization we were. . . . We [the feminists] were not more than a dozen in 1979. I was one of the pioneers in that sense. We knew each other, because nobody dared in 1979 to say I am a feminist. But, anyway, we were on the inside, and so from the inside of the organizations we began to push these discussions within the party, within the unions, wherever we were.[34]

Montenegro describes "the emerging sections" that feminists began to create "in every popular organization or mixed organization . . . the emergence of the

secretariats among the campesinas, rural workers, ATC, professional, trade workers, unions, students, whatever, there was a women's secretariat that was beginning to fight in that section, in that sector of women."[35] According to Angela Rosa Acevedo, member of the FSLN, AMNLAE, and the Centro de Derechos Constitucionales (Center for Constitutional Rights):

> The debate was centered between having a separate organization of women or having women participate openly where they were. Many people favored men and women working together, and AMNLAE disappearing. Why does it have to exist as an exclusive organization if women are participating in other organizations? AMNLAE defended the necessity of having different organizations for women defending the different interests of women. . . . This marks the start of the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua.[36]

After the establishment of the Women's Secretariat of the ATC in 1984, women's secretariats subsequently emerged in all the mass organizations of workers: the CST (urban) and UNAG (rural). The ATC is said to have had the strongest women's secretariat.

The decision to support both a separate women's organization within the party structure and women's secretariats within the mixed mass organizations appears to have had the best outcome for women's autonomy. Multiple spaces and places for women to organize, and thus for women's interests to emerge, have led both to the emergence of a gendered analysis of women's oppression in Nicaragua and to the push for greater autonomy for women's organizations.

Three critical findings emerged from my research on the dual organizing strategies adopted by women in Nicaragua. First, the creation of the women's secretariats was not a leadership decision from above, as many other sources have suggested, but rather was a result of pressure from below—from women members at the grassroots level who felt more needed to be done for women that was not being done in AMNLAE. Second, the creation of the women's secretariats opened up more spaces for women to organize and, therefore, for women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in both the productive and reproductive spheres to emerge simultaneously. And finally, despite making several advancements for women, neither AMNLAE nor the women's secretariats were sufficiently autonomous from the FSLN to develop a feminist analysis of women's oppression that deviated significantly from the party line. It was this fact that led to the creation of an autonomous women's movement after the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990. The rest of this chapter explores the different organizing strategies that emerged in Nicaragua and, as a result, the transition that AMNLAE underwent from being a party organization of women to becoming one of many autonomous women's organizations in the contemporary women's movement in Nicaragua today.

Origin of the Women's Secretariats

First, it is important to address conflicting reports over the origin of the women's secretariats. Were the secretariats a top-down "policy" established by the leadership of AMNLAE, or were they a strategy of grassroots members of AMNLAE pushing from below to achieve greater integration of women and gender interests into the mass organizations? The authors of *Sweet Ramparts: Women in Revolutionary Nicaragua*, members of the Nicaraguan Solidarity Committee in London, argued in 1983 that in the early 1980s, AMNLAE pursued a "new line," which was designed to encourage more women's membership in regional organizations, labor groups, and unions, thus cutting into its own organization's membership recruitment of women mobilized as women:

> The new AMNLAE line is that we should concentrate on promoting the involvement of women and their demands within the mass organizations. We are not interested particularly that there should be a separate group (of women), but that women should be involved at all levels, politically and socially, that women take on more responsibilities within their trade unions and that all women take prominent positions within our revolution.[37]

However, my research has revealed that the women's secretariats were created not by AMNLAE as an organization, but by women within AMNLAE: "I think the role of AMNLAE can be valued in their effort to open space. . . . How can we open the spaces for women? We have to value AMNLAE. They promoted the secretariats of women but they did not create them. They were created by women inside the organization brought through the institution."[38] Vilma Castillo Aramburu, Executive Director of Puntos de Encuentro, agrees:

> I don't think it was an AMNLAE strategy, but rather was women's initiative within the mixed organizations. I can talk about my experience within CONAPRO, a professional, mixed organization. Women of that organization, we got together and created sections within the organization. . . . AMNLAE wanted to frame them after they were created.[39]

According to Ana Criquillon, one of the founding members of the ATC and Director of the Board of the Women's Secretariat in 1986, AMNLAE was actually an *impediment* to the approach of multiple organizing strategies for women:

> AMNLAE resisted during the whole decade other spaces for Women's organizations. AMNLAE's position was that women had to be in

AMNLAE. There was a conflict of strategy of organization and power because at the end, AMNLAE wanted to represent the interests of ALL women as the FSLN represented the interests of the population in general. That didn't allow for seeing the differences of race, ethnicity, age, and the diversity of the women's movement. So, the necessity to recognize specific leadership emerged from the spaces themselves.[40]

Criquillon asserts that it was precisely because AMNLAE was "under the eye of the FSLN and was controlled by men" that the women's secretariats of the other organizations provided more opportunities for dialogue, to focus on women's participation, women's labor, and women's workload: "There was more openness to feminist analysis in these spaces than in AMNLAE."[41]

Feminist trends began emerging within these organizations by the mid-1980s, as many individual women began self-identifying as feminists. However, rather than pressuring AMNLAE to define itself as feminist, these women chose to focus on the commonalities they had with AMNLAE rather than the differences, in order to help promote the most progressive Sandinista policies possible:

It was part of our strategy—although not explicitly—to unite women within the Sandinista popular organizations and within AMNLAE, offering feminist analysis and proposing alternative solutions to the problems of the women in these organizations. This is how, without actually forming a feminist movement as such, it was possible for a feminist analysis to gain much greater legitimacy in the country.[42]

It appears that the women's secretariats were the first examples of women's demands for greater involvement in revolutionary decisions and, as such, represented pockets of autonomy within the mass organizations. Demands for greater autonomy continued throughout the 1980s, until the "lid blew off of the autonomous women's movement" in Nicaragua in the early 1990s.[43]

Impact of the Women's Secretariats: The Intersection of Production and Reproduction and the Emergence of Women's Practical and Strategic Gender Interests

There is some disagreement over the impact of the women's secretariats, particularly in relation to AMNLAE. Deighton et al. made a rather startling prediction in 1983: that the new AMNLAE policy of integrationism, integrating AMNLAE as well as individual women into preexisting unions, governmental structures, and labor organizations, would, if taken to its logical conclusion, "effectively dissolve AMNLAE's national structure" and "undermine the possibilities of

women to take action for themselves."[44] This prediction has turned out to be false. Although AMNLAE as a national organization *has* been undermined and fractured, and women's abilities to take action for themselves within AMNLAE were greatly limited, this was true because of AMNLAE's location within and lack of autonomy from the FSLN party structure, not because of the policy of integrationism. Integrationism actually fostered an emergence of women taking action for themselves in alternative spaces outside of AMNLAE, including challenging AMNLAE's monopoly over the Nicaraguan women's movement and fighting for greater organizational and ideological autonomy both within and outside of AMNLAE. It may be true: as more members of AMNLAE integrated into rural, urban, and regional workers unions, the ability of women to participate as active members of a national level organization as women was impeded. However, this did not prevent women from acting for themselves and entering their concerns into the public discourse; it only determined where women's interests would first emerge. And ultimately, it led to the creation of several national women's organizations and an autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua. An examination of the creation of the Women's Secretariat of the ATC reveals how integrating women into the process can dramatically alter the vision.

The ATC was established in Nicaragua in 1978 as the main representative body of agricultural wage workers on cash crop farms, both state and private. The ATC union and the government/employer felt they had a common interest: cash crop production must continue to increase, and to that end, worker demands are important to production. Although 99 percent of the union leaders were men in 1983, 40 percent of ATC members were women.[45] Thelma Espinoza, recent Vice Coordinator of AMNLAE, places the founding of the ATC Women's Secretariat within the context of agricultural production needs. With men fighting and the need to maintain agricultural production, women were needed to take care of the crops. Therefore, women's productivity and the factors that impact women's productivity became important to the ATC for the first time.

The increase in women's ATC membership in the mid-1980s corresponded with a decline in the participation of women and the popularity of AMNLAE. Ironically, the move of women out of AMNLAE and into unions like the ATC did not circumvent the unique interests of women: it only served to determine where they would surface first. As a result of women's increased participation in the ATC, it became known throughout the country for its feminist positions and its attempts to integrate gender-specific with class-based demands.[46] The ATC did not just change the lives of the women involved; the women changed the ATC:

> By opening up a unique space for rural women to discuss their problems and assert their demands, the ATC has been a trail-blazer for

the Nicaraguan women's movement. It's new and creative approaches to women's participation in the economy and in the Revolution have proved so successful that they are thought to have been a major force behind the FSLN's Proclama on women's emancipation in 1987. In the words of Ana Criquillon from the ATC Women's Secretariat, "If we don't change the situation in the home, we will never be able to meet women's demands and we'll never raise production."[47]

How did women change the ATC? In 1983, the ATC held a National Assembly of Rural Women Workers for the purpose of organizing a meeting of women working in agriculture. The members of the newly formed Women's Secretariat realized they knew little regarding rural women's working conditions. As a result, the one hundred delegates in attendance decided to conduct a grassroots investigation, which formed the basis of an official Agrarian Reform Report. Throughout the interview process, the delegates of the ATC realized that issues such as pregnancy, child care, abortion, home and family, previously seen as outside the union's work, were actually an integral part of women's agricultural "productivity," long assumed to be low.[48] As Helen Collinson concluded in her analysis of the ATC, "These discussions made it clear to the union that the successful integration of women into the rural workforce could not be accomplished without taking into consideration women's traditional responsibilities and their daily routine."[49]

In the mid-1980s, the Women's Secretariat of the ATC began to address issues of employment, salary, prematernity and postmaternity leave, day care centers, and protective work legislation for pregnant women. María Elena Sequeira Rivas, Director of the Secretariat Nacional de la Mujer, ATC, explains how the rising need for day care emerged because of the interconnection between production and reproduction: "We had to determine how to increase production because the men were at war, so the production responsibility fell in the women's hands despite the fact that they also take care of the children. That's why the need for day care."[50] Thus, the women's secretariat framed the concerns of women working in agriculture in terms of a necessary investment for future increased productivity and economic development.

The intersections between women's roles in public production in the fields and private reproduction in the home became the clearest when the issue of the agricultural work norm was discussed: the amount of work every employee was expected to complete each day in order to receive the basic wage. The National Committee of the ATC—all men—accepted a proposal by women activists in the union to do a study focused on women in the agricultural sector.[51] The ATC women activists chose to analyze a subject "*that did not seem at all feminist*, that is, the productivity of the workers" [emphasis mine].[52] To assess women's attitudes toward the work norm, the Women's Secretariat organized a series of workshops and discussion groups at the local

and regional levels, encouraging grassroots participation. These discussion groups were a great success and culminated in 1986 at the Second National Assembly, at which hundreds of delegates reported on the results of the grassroots meetings. The study concluded that a "gender-based division of labor was a fundamental obstacle to the participation of women in production and the union" and that therefore women's gender interests had to be linked with their national, class and other interests."[53]

When the members of the Women's Secretariat were asked if they wanted to have the same work norm as men in the agricultural cooperatives, they said yes. However, for women to produce as much as men, they recognized the need for help in the reproductive sphere (child-rearing, subsistence agriculture, family farming) and demanded child care facilities to offset the dual labor burden. As one of the founding members of the ATC, Ana Criquillon was an activist within the secretariat when this issue arose: "Men and women demanded equal work norms in the ATC. This led to questioning work conditions, not just conditions of work but in reproductive and domestic work."[54] This is interesting empirical evidence which reveals that integrating women into the process of social change can alter the vision. The gendered nature of the agricultural work/productivity norm addressed within the ATC is one of the best examples of women making the linkages between what are usually understood as practical 'productive' needs and strategic 'reproductive' interests in Nicaragua.

All of the women agreed that they should accept the same work norm as men, particularly in recognition of the need to raise production. However, at the same time, these women emphasized "that this would be possible *only if women's domestic work was reduced*" [emphasis mine].[55] To this end, they passed resolutions which contained the following demands: child care centers, paid maternity leave, paid sick days to care for children, communal washing places, and mills to grind corn.[56] Perhaps the most important resolution was one which demanded that the union put pressure on its male members to help with domestic tasks.

Within a year, it was evident that the ATC took the demands of the Women's Secretariat very seriously. In 1985, there were thirty crèches (child care facilities) in Nicaragua; by 1987, there were five hundred.[57] In 1983, 1 percent of the union posts were held by women; by 1988, women held 28 percent of all union posts.[58] By 1987, it seemed that, however briefly, an attempt to connect production and reproduction and assert the inseparability of the two spheres of activity was made within the ATC. In 1988 at the Fourth National Assembly, the Women's Secretariat generated new demands, including issuing sanctions against sexual blackmail (similar to what is defined in the United States as sexual harassment) and earmarking 20 percent of all profits earned from export crops for social projects, including child care, health care, and communal laundries. Supporting reproductive

labor such as this was seen by the ATC as an investment for future increases in production and economic development.

Long-time feminist activist Vilma Castillo Aramburu argues that despite their limitations, creating the secretariats of women was a good strategy at that point in the Nicaraguan women's movement. It allowed women to influence certain public policy areas within a range of topics approved by the FSLN—employment for women, women's training, women's leadership, and agrarian reform.[59] Topics such as domestic violence and abortion also began to get some attention with women health programs. María Elena Sequeira Rivas, Director of the ATC Women's Secretariat, describes how in her experience the strategy of moving from a women's organization to a mixed organization actually helped to link the class struggle with the gender struggle:

> To be in a movement exclusively of women means to work for specific interests. Maybe it allows us to be more aware in a systematic matter—to look for our own spaces, to find better ways to defend our rights. In the case of Nicaragua and Central America, there is a great level of machismo. There are two contradictions: struggling/fighting for gender rights and struggling/ fighting for class spaces. With an exclusive women's movement, you almost always fight for gender only leaving behind the work of men. For me, the best struggle combines gender and class and uses mixed groups—victims and victimizers.[60]

I have concluded that the entrance of women into preexisting revolutionary organizations in Nicaragua did, in fact, integrate a feminist vision into the practice of social change, but only after separate organizing spaces for women (the secretariats) existed first so that women could talk about their issues collectively and a feminist analysis of women's oppression could be constructed theoretically. Women need a place and a space to organize autonomously before their practical gender needs and strategic gender interests will be successfully integrated into other organizations for social change. Pursuing multiple strategies and multiple spaces for women's organizing seems to have produced a better outcome for the emergence of feminist struggles in Nicaragua than in Mozambique. Organizing within separate women's organizations as well as within mixed organizations with men seems to produce the maximum outcome of both autonomy and unified change: not either/or, but both/and.

The Path toward Autonomy for
Women's Organizations in Nicaragua

Did AMNLAE simply leave the structure of the FSLN because the FSLN lost power? Would AMNLAE still be a party organization had the FSLN

not lost the elections? Perhaps. Perhaps the loss of power was the catalyst the popular mass organizations, including AMNLAE, needed to pursue their autonomy. But the time was ripe. Women at the base had been pushing for greater autonomy since much earlier, throughout the period of the 1980s. The seeds had been sown for the emergence of an autonomous women's movement with greater freedom and democracy to choose their own leaders, set their own agendas, create their own structures, and pursue their own strategies to improve the lives of Nicaraguan women. Three factors emerged as essential in AMNLAE's transformation toward autonomy and the accompanying creation of an autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua: (1) organizational identity struggles; (2) electoral defeat and power struggles with the Sandinista party; and (3) internal conflict within the leadership and membership of AMNLAE.

Organizational Identity Struggles

AMNLAE suffered the same organizational identity crisis as the OMM. Was it a political organization of women, a women's organization, or a feminist organization? Vilma Castillo Aramburu, Executive Director of Puntos de Encuentro, and no longer a member of the FSLN or AMNLAE, asserts that "AMNLAE was a Sandinista organization . . . There were feminist members of AMNLAE, but it was a party organization."[61] Mónica Zalaquett, Director of the Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia and self-identified Sandinista, argues that AMNLAE was neither autonomous nor feminist.[62]

AMNLAE's trajectory seems to have taken it from being a political organization of women, to a women's organization of the party, to an autonomous women's organization. In Nicaragua, the issue was less about whether AMNLAE would remain a party organization or become an autonomous organization, as was the issue in Mozambique. Rather, the issue was whether AMNLAE would remain the main women's organization, in any form, or whether women would choose to leave AMNLAE and pursue their own autonomous organizing outside of the party's historic women's organization. Eva María Sam Qui, former Director of the Centro de Mujeres, IXCHEN, and ten-year member of the Department of the Interior for the FSLN, describes the process by which feminist women left AMNLAE to pursue their own organizing:

> In the 1980s the mass organizations were supposedly under the guidance of the FSLN. . . . Many women left AMNLAE and formed their own organizations/NGOs. I know at least 10 women from AMNLAE that now have their own NGOs. These women are the ones that keep the feminist ideology and didn't agree with being subordinated to the party. . . . AMNLAE was of the party. . . . AMNLAE was a mass organization of women, not a feminist organization.[63]

It is important to note that all of the women Sam Qui mentioned were additional examples of this phenomenon, beyond the fifteen examples that I came across in my interview process. The Centro de Mujeres IXCHEN and ISNIN are just two examples of alternative autonomous feminist health care centers that have been created in civil society after the loss of the Sandinista state. These and other NGOs are explored in detail in Chapter 8.

According to Mónica Baltodano, an FSLN member of the National Assembly and long-time militant member of the party, "When AMNLAE was created . . . the movement was not just linked to women's discrimination. It was a women's association that dealt with national issues, not just women. . . . After the revolution, the FSLN continued all organizations as a way to work with the people. AMNLAE was like an arm to the people."[64] This seems to address the key issue of identity for AMNLAE: rather than being a women's organization, it was an organization of women that addressed national issues and linked the people with the party, through women. Baltodano agrees that "all things were subordinated to defense. AMNLAE lost its autonomy, limited its feminist profile and postponed [raising] gender flags."[65] Baltodano quickly corrected herself by stating that gender was not just postponed, but rather was seen as something divisive, until there was the development of a critical mass.[66]

Why did women leave AMNLAE? AMNLAE's organizational identity struggles were a result of: (1) a lack of autonomy from the party; (2) an unwillingness to deal with women's diversity; and (3) an antidemocratic, disciplinarian internal leadership approach. Reyna Isabel Rodríguez was an AMNLAE leader in Sandino City for two years. When asked why she left AMNLAE, Rodriguez explained, "They pressured me to leave—AMNLAE at the top national level—because my view was that AMNLAE had to change its strategy. They started defining you as selling out the nation . . . Maybe because I was a very young woman, interested in the integration of diversity."[67] According to Rodriguez, it was in 1993 at a conference of three hundred women that many women within the organization urged the regional director of AMNLAE to change its vision and strategy, asserting that AMNLAE could no longer be a part of the party. Rodríguez states that sixty women ultimately left AMNLAE "because we didn't agree. We decided to stay with our own people and we left. We left AMNLAE."[68] For Rodríguez, it is true that AMNLAE had no autonomy. This is why she left. The kind of changes Rodríguez wanted for AMNLAE were fundamental: to be apart from the party, and to discuss a new strategy/mission: "I would like to see them working in a position more complete, with no more men on top, no longer used by the party."[69] In 1995, Rodríguez was the first Sandinista who renounced the party in El Nuevo Diario: "I am the first one. I was a member of the Sandinista Assembly for the district with Ortega, Hugo, Tijerino. I was a recognized leader in Managua. We presented publicly, in El Nuevo Diario, 1995."[70]

In addition to leaving AMNLAE because of a lack of autonomy, some women left AMNLAE because of the organization's excessive use of discipline to contain dissent and its unwillingness to deal with women's diversity. Auxiliadora Mesa, lawyer, professor at UCA, and member of the Centro de Mujer y Familia, explains some of the key criticisms that led to the dual exodus of (1) AMNLAE from the party, and (2) women from AMNLAE:

> Later, it is necessary to open the ideas to other women, not just the point of view of the FSLN. . . . Many women abandoned AMNLAE because the leaders of AMNLAE did not accept or tolerate the criticisms of women. The principal criticism was of excessive discipline. . . . One of the elements questioned and debated was that anything AMNLAE did had to be approved by the National Directorate.[71]

Sofía Montenegro attributes the occurrence of an organizational identity crisis within AMNLAE to the organization's inability to handle the diversity of women's voices that began to emerge:

> Because AMNLAE had made a program that was tabula rasa, it was a homogenous line, without recognizing that there were differences because this is the problem they had to handle, you know, the different identities that constitute women. . . . We were all Sandinista. We were all AMNLAE. So, they had problems with building with other concepts of identity. For example, there were ethnic identities and all other identities, for example the lesbian identity that was emerging, the difference of generational identity, too. So all this diversity that had its own priorities was not taken into account. So the answer was to make a more pluralistic organization, a wider movement which could contain all the difference, the diversity of identities and also the differences. This is still a problem, you know . . . how do you link unity and diversity.[72]

Here, Montenegro identifies a key dilemma for feminist theorists and activists and all activists who want to effect change for marginalized and oppressed groups: how to recognize and address issues of diversity without losing a unified strategy and vision. Montenegro continues by laying out the fear of losing political force to accommodate political difference:

> Because if you put on top of everything as a priority, diversity, you reify it, and what happens is a big dispensation. Everybody entrenches in their own little identity. You need unity on the other hand in order to have political strength and power. So this is the dilemma, you know, how do you make your cake and eat it? And this was too much

for AMNLAE. And these identities were emerging, and they realized it but they did not know how to cope with that.[73]

In an interesting cross-cultural comparison, Disney and Gelb found in their study of women's organizations in the United States that a willingness to recognize differences among women and discuss conflicts between women was a factor contributing to feminist organizational success:

> This involves constant communication, discursive input, and renegotiation of power relations between decision-making entities as well as a commitment to diversity, focusing on the differences and commonalities among women. One key element of such communicative input is conflict; airing such conflict has been found to strengthen these movement organizations. Allowing conflict to arise and dealing with its resolution is another unique aspect of successful women's movement organizations.[74]

It seems that AMNLAE's inability (or unwillingness) to deal with diversity and conflict has led to its organizational decline, despite the fact that it has been enormously successful in both mobilization outcomes as well as social movement and organizational spillover.

Electoral Defeat and Power Struggles with the Party

As stated earlier, AMNLAE faced an organizational identity crisis very similar to that faced by the OMM. The difference is that in Nicaragua, the issue was not only about how to make the transition into a multiparty state, but also about how to change into a non-Sandinista state. In 1990, unlike Frelimo in 1994, the FSLN lost the presidency and lost the electoral majority in the Assembly. The history surrounding the events leading up to the elections is a very interesting one in helping to understand the path toward autonomy for AMNLAE and other women's organizations in Nicaragua.

As discussed in Chapter 3, throughout the 1980s, the leadership of AMNLAE was not elected democratically by the constituency of the organization, but rather was appointed by the party leadership:

> AMNLAE was run by people who were appointed by finger by designation by the party and obviously none of them were feminists. They were loyal in the first place, they were put there basically because of the loyalty and the confidence the male directorate had in these women, that is, they would never have dreamt of putting a real feminist, a committed feminist as the leader of AMNLAE. So within AMNLAE,

there were fights between the most radical feminists and the traditional sort of feminism that the leadership of AMNLAE had.[75]

According to Sofía Montenegro, although AMNLAE "had some positions that were feminist, it was the feminist movement within AMNLAE which began to create a consciousness in which the basis of women or the women's movement of AMNLAE began to demand more rights and positions on women's situation."[76] It was through this kind of pressure that the first party document on women's gender oppression was created—the Proclamation of 1987:

> It was this climate or this atmosphere where women began to demand every member of the National Directorate, every 8th of March, every Assembly, to bring the issue forward, until they saw there was already a big discontent, which they decided to address as a compromise, and that was the [Proclamation], it had as a result, but it was out of pressure from outside, some of the feminists that were inside the party were pushing for that Proclamation until they finally issued the thing. . . . But then it was too damn late, you know, because the elections came, they made a deal, I remember Bayardo Arce asking us for more patience, because we were demanding that changes be brought in AMNLAE. So there was a truce due to the electoral campaign.[77]

In addition to demands for substantive policy initiatives for women, there were calls for procedural changes in AMNLAE's decision-making structures. Demands were surfacing in AMNLAE for democratic elections of organizational leadership, as well as the creation of representational bodies with elected representatives of various women's constituencies, such as rural women and urban women. As a result, AMNLAE decided to pursue an organizational policy change announced on September 29, 1988, which both highlighted the differences between women yet also fostered a sense of unity among women:

> Under pressure from the women's secretariats of the mass organizations—who insisted that AMNLAE should be more democratic and that women who emerged as leaders in these sectors should play a greater leadership role in the organization—AMNLAE made the decision to reduce drastically the number of professional activists in the organization and instead to make women who were leaders in other organizations the principal promoters of the movement.[78]

A great democratization of the organization was designed to accompany this change, when for the first time both the representatives to the Assembly and the national leadership of AMNLAE would be elected directly by the membership base. This kind of broad-based participation caused a recogni-

tion among women of both their differences (urban workers, rural workers, teachers, peasants, youth, housewives) and their commonalities.[79]

When AMNLAE members approached the party, and Bayardo Arce in particular, the National Directorate member who oversaw the women's organization, they were told to be patient, preserve the unity of the FSLN, and wait until after the elections of 1989 to initiate any changes:

> The logic of the party was "Don't make waves, this is dangerous." It was like opening God knows what, and it will disperse efforts, it will confuse people, or women, and, we need unity above everything. Don't talk about diversity because the whole world will explode! And, so they used all this political manipulation: the war was about to finish, we have gone through the whole decade with this, we will discuss all these changes, they made this political promise . . . after we won the elections.[80]

In an interesting comparison, Ana Criquillon uses the same term to describe the FSLN's blockage of AMNLAE's democratic process as Terezinha da Silva used to describe Frelimo's move to bring the OMM back to the party—*coup d´état*:

> In May 1989, before the assembly and elections could happen, the FSLN carried out a coup d´état inside AMNLAE. Under the pretext that the priority of all Sandinistas was to prepare for the upcoming presidential and legislative elections and that now was not the time for internal debates, the FSLN froze AMNLAE's internal election process and removed its national leadership. . . . this decision was received as a direct order from the National Directorate of the FSLN.[81]

The FSLN replaced the former leaders of AMNLAE with, among others, Comandante Doris Tijerino, right from her position as Sandinista Chief of Police, and Comandante Mónica Baltodano, whose task it was to ensure the women's vote for the FSLN. This push for unity among women before the 1990 elections actually had the effect of separating AMNLAE from the work women were doing in the mass organizations in the various sectors, thus fragmenting the foundation of what would become the autonomous women's movement. The election was lost by the Sandinistas, at least in part, some have argued, because of the gender gap.

Sofía Montenegro explains that feminists within AMNLAE wanted these changes prior to the elections precisely because of the elections, "because, by that moment, AMNLAE was suffering a problem of credibility within the women's movement. It had lost prestige, it had lost initiative, it was paralyzed."[82] Despite the legitimacy issues of the organization, AMNLAE

agreed yet again to support the party through the elections and subordinate its own agenda of institutional democratic change for women. The political outcome of the 1990 elections reveals that perhaps neither the party nor AMNLAE was correct in its analysis that waiting for internal democratization would help get the party elected. The population voted to place a new party into power and, in effect, to end the revolution. Many people attribute the electoral defeat of the FSLN to fear of U.S. escalation in the Contra war, and the desire to end that war. Nicaraguans did fear that as long as the FSLN was in power, the United States would continue the war. However, in addition to fear of external enemies, there was also internal discontent.

How did the electoral defeat impact AMNLAE? Montenegro explains the initial setback of the party loss and the subsequent perseverance of the women's organization:

> Well, you know the result. So what happened was, the elections came, the whole damn thing was lost, but stubborn as we were, and as we are, after the whole mess, we were not very quiet. We were the first social movement that decided to reorganize after the defeat. With power, or without it, we have to change this. So, we made a proposal to do it before, we have to do it anyway, so we went back, discussed it with AMNLAE . . . And that was the moment they decided to put in Doris Tijerino, during the period of the election, because she is a hard woman, loyal to the party, she still is, she's a hard-liner. Of all the leaders to use at this very critical moment of the elections and when everybody was demanding a change in leadership.[83]

After the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, many women continued to work diligently with their original plan to change the internal structure of AMNLAE within the new circumstances. Fifty feminists in Managua had a meeting with the leadership of AMNLAE to devise a plan to make a re-launching of the women's movement in the new situation; they presented their plan a month later at another meeting with the AMNLAE leadership. According to Montenegro:

> Obviously, the leadership of AMNLAE, Doris Tijerino, Mónica Baltodano, and all of the hard-liners refused it, because it demanded elections, that the leadership should be chosen by election from the bottom all the way to the top. . . . There was a big fight and they said, "Well if you do not abide by what was said," that's what Doris Tijerino said, "'you'll will be responsible for dividing AMNLAE," and then we said, "No, you will be responsible for dividing the movement because we cannot accept any more in the name of anything, because we have waited too long, to postpone things, and if you won't accept to do

it, we will go out of AMNLAE, and do this whole damn thing by ourselves." And so we did.[84]

The electoral defeat of the FSLN and the conflict with the AMNLAE leadership set the stage for the birth of the autonomous women's movement. As María Lidia Mejía states, the electoral loss of the FSLN in 1990 actually helped the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua and AMNLAE as well: "After that, AMNLAE proclaimed its freedom, independence, and autonomy. It is becoming more independent than previously. The loss of the election helped us."[85]

In 1993, AMNLAE's path toward autonomy culminated in a National Extraordinary Assembly with four hundred delegates in attendance. This assembly represents the broadest organizational meeting held without dependence on the party or the state. According to AMNLAE National Coordinator Dora Zeledón, "We talked about transforming the gap of inequality between men and women in the private sphere, and promoting women's organizing all over the country."[86] The delegates also decided, "To really unite women and advance in our programs, we needed democratic functions . . . no longer a national coordinator throwing lines to comply with but a National Council was created, managed in the Casas de Mujeres, Houses of Women."[87] Today, the National Assembly contains two hundred women elected from all over the country. There is a National Council of seventeen women, all of the departmental coordinators, and an Executive Board of five members. Zeledón, elected at this Extraordinary Assembly, is AMNLAE's first elected National Coordinator.

As a result of AMNLAE's declaration of autonomy, at the Sandinista Congress in July 1999, there was a reorientation of the FSLN party to create political secretariats of women in each of the departments throughout the country. The move of the FSLN in Nicaragua is very similar to that of Frelimo in Mozambique: if the national women's organization is going to seek autonomy, then the party needs to create new party organizations of women. In Mozambique, this competition was enough to bring the OMM back to the party. In Nicaragua, the autonomous women's movement already had a life of its own, and so instead, this competition is bringing about the demise of AMNLAE. In other words, AMNLAE is still considered too Sandinista to attract members of the autonomous women's movement, yet it is not FSLN enough to be an organization of party women. Hence, its demise is being constructed. However, the importance of AMNLAE will always remain in the historical specificity of the moment it existed and the functions that it served.

Conclusion

Both the OMM in Mozambique and AMNLAE in Nicaragua struggled with issues of organizational identity between being a women's organization or a

party organization of women. Despite these similarities, some striking differences between the two countries also emerged. In Mozambique, the adoption of a multiparty democracy and the subsequent electoral victory of Frelimo caused the OMM to seek autonomy from the party, only to decide to return to the party and remain a Frelimo organization of women, the party being an intrinsic part of the OMM's identity. There are new women's NGOs in civil society today which are contributing to an emerging feminist discourse, but the OMM remains the predominant organization for women in the country. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990 served as a catalyst not only for the autonomy of AMNLAE from the party but also for the proliferation of a vibrant autonomous women's movement composed of more than three hundred women's and self-identified feminist organizations, led by many who had been pushing from within AMNLAE for greater autonomy since the early to mid-1980s.

Both contexts show the transformation of women from mobilization to participation to organization. The process of women's mobilization by Frelimo and the FSLN and the subsequent women's activism that took place within the OMM and AMNLAE have produced the feminist agency and the gendered analyses of women's oppression that have emerged in both countries today. These contemporary women's movement organizations and the emergent feminisms of Mozambique and Nicaragua are examined in detail in Chapter 8.

5

"The Oppressed Woman
Is Easier to Deal With"

*Political Participation, Legal Reforms, and Cultural
Constraints in Mozambique and Nicaragua*

> *It's almost like we are born like this, genetically, almost, for men not to do this
> kind of thing! It's a total mentality: women and men will have to change their
> minds. The process of women's liberation is not so easy. It brings problems for
> both of them. For women to be free, it is hard for men to deal with that kind of
> woman. An oppressed woman versus a free woman: the oppressed woman is
> easier to deal with!*
>
> —ALCIDO NGUENYA, former Frelimo Member of Parliament and Member of the
> Permanent Commission of Parliament, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/21/99

> *Feminism is an ideology, a culture, a political practice which is opposed to
> patriarchy and wants to form a new equality starting with men and women,
> and questioning the power relations between men and women. Feminism has
> a series of basic demands. It is easy to fight for rights—we are creating a new
> political culture.*
>
> —HELEN DIXON, Member of the Autonomous Women's Movements and
> Women's Network of Matagalpa, Consultant, and Writer, Interview,
> Matagalpa, Nicaragua, 1/31/00

Introduction

In her analysis of women in South Africa, Hannah Britton addresses
what she calls two visions, two myths, two incomplete interpreta-
tions of African women's activisms.[1] Sometimes, African women
have been depicted as "crucial political agents who were fully actualized
in their public roles and aware of their power," while other times they
have been understood as unwilling or unable to truly attack patriarchy.[2]
For Britton, the truth lies somewhere in between and is more accurately
reflected by both of these seemingly contradictory assertions: "Women
were leaders in the struggle, but they were excluded from the leadership.
Women have been able to make significant electoral gains, but they have
been unable to fulfill promises of widespread social empowerment and

gender equality. . . . They were progressive, aggressive, and influential, yet restricted by patriarchies in their homes, political parties, and the state."[3] This is exactly what I have found to be the case for women in Mozambique and Nicaragua. As the epigraphs to this chapter reveal, despite the mobilization, participation, and organization of women, changing the patriarchal attitudes of men *and* women and creating a new feminist political culture are long-term goals for which feminists around the world continue to fight.

This chapter addresses the political, legal, and cultural contexts of women's activism in the revolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua and begins to describe the women's organizing and feminist agency that emerge in these areas in the postrevolutionary periods. While certain laws were passed to establish the legal equality of women and men during the revolutionary periods in both countries, cultural impediments that led to the continuing ideological and material oppression of women persisted. Achievements were made for women in terms of political representation, the establishment of the rule of law, and basic constitutional equality. However, legal inaction and pervasive cultural patriarchies prevented women's oppression in the reproductive spheres of home and family from being significantly challenged by Frelimo or the Sandinistas. Women's subordinate status in the sphere of the family, both culturally and materially, was not adequately addressed by either revolution. Yet the active participation of women in the revolutionary struggles in the 1970s and 1980s laid the foundation for the autonomous feminist organizing that took place in the 1990s to demand greater political, legal, and cultural changes for women in both countries.

The Political Representation of Women in Mozambique and Nicaragua

With nearly 35 percent of its National Assembly seats held by women, Mozambique has one of the highest percentages of women in parliament in 2008, ranking second in Africa and twelfth in the world.[4] Mozambique has done very well in increasing the political representation of women for a few key and internationally recognized reasons, most specifically, the adoption by Frelimo of a quota for women candidates and the use of a proportional representation party list electoral system. At its sixth Congress in 1992, the Frelimo party made the decision to introduce quotas to ensure greater representation for women at all levels and in all bodies of the party.[5] Frelimo party policy requires that 30 percent of the party's candidates for the National Assembly be women. In addition, Frelimo's policy also commits (though does not require) the party to balance the distribution of men and women throughout the party list. Edda Collier, then UN Gender Specialist in Mozambique, feels that it was the Marxist perspective of Frelimo that helped women gain greater political

representation than in most liberal democracies: "The Marxist perspective was clearly reflected in the Constitution of 1975. Equality was for everyone—'sex' included . . . The 1990 Constitution also has no discrimination based on sex."[6] It was acting within this framework that enabled the OMM to lobby for a quota for women within all political decision-making bodies of the party. This quota policy for women has achieved much greater political representation for women in Mozambique than in many developed countries.

From the party's revolutionary inception, Frelimo sought to mobilize women and achieve greater women's political participation. Soon after independence, the representation of women in Mozambique ranged from 12 percent at the national level to 28 percent at the local level (see Table 5.1). During the first multiparty parliament from 1994 to 1999, Frelimo boasted a very high representation of women at the national level (see Table 5.2).For Frelimo, the 30 percent quota for women is no ceiling; indeed, 43 percent of Frelimo MPs in 1999 were women. This represents a doubling since 1992.

The visibility of women in leadership positions in Mozambique has improved dramatically over the past two decades. In 1990, the representation of women in management positions within government ministries ranged from 0 percent in the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice to 25 percent in the Ministry of Agriculture and 33 percent in the Ministry of Culture.[7] In 1993, of the 105 leadership positions in the civil service, 10 percent were occupied by women.[8] By 2004, Mozambique proudly boasted a woman Prime Minister (Luisa Diogo), a woman Minister of Higher Education and Technology (Lidia Brito), and two women spokespersons in the National Assembly for Frelimo (Veronica Macamo, First Deputy Chairperson of the Assembly of the Republic) and the Renamo-Electoral Union (Zelma Vasconcelos). After the 2004 elections, women took on an even greater role in administrative

TABLE 5.1.   PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN ASSEMBLIES IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1977

1977	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY	DISTRICT ASSEMBLY	CITY ASSEMBLY	LOCAL ASSEMBLY
Women	12.39	14.70	23.81	20.87	28.30
Men	87.61	85.30	76.19	79.13	71.70

Source: OMM 1980.

TABLE 5.2.   PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN FRELIMO, 1999

1999	MEMBERS OF FRELIMO PARTY	MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE	DEPUTIES OF ASSEMBLY OF REPUBLIC
Women	42	28	43
Men	58	72	57

Source: Frelimo Central Committee 1999.

TABLE 5.3.   WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION AS MINISTERS AND VICE MINISTERS IN
MOZAMBIQUE, 1999 AND 2005

	1999	2005
Number (%) of Women Ministers	3/24 (12.5%)	7/26 (26.9%)
Number (%) of Women Vice Ministers	5/18 (27.8%)	4/15 (26.7%)

Source: Hanlon, Mozambican Government, February 2005. http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/simon/GG3072/Moz-Bull-39-list.pdf.

positions, appointed as seven ministers and four deputy ministers, including Alcinda Abreu as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (see Table 5.3).

Having women in leadership positions is an essential component of any project of women's empowerment, not to mention of dispelling myths of women's incapacity and achieving a truly democratic society. However, the extent to which women will lobby for women-centered initiatives or further a feminist policy agenda once they get into leadership positions is as uncertain in Mozambique as it is anywhere in Africa or the world.

Obede Baloi of AWEPA cites the decision of the Frelimo party to set quotas for women's representation as having a very important impact on women in society: "Women are not only to be in the kitchen, they can be in the Parliament! Frelimo did more. Virgilia Matabele, a woman MP, is the Deputy Chair of the Frelimo group in Parliament. Having a woman communicating decisions of the ruling party has an impact."[9] Sabina Santos, Director of the OMM National Training Center in Machava, supported the fact that Frelimo was open to OMM demands for greater political representation of women: "It was a necessity to put women in government as Ministers and Vice Ministers. So, we had a direct discussion—give us names of women working in factories, graduates. The President asked if he could get a list of names. Now [1999], we have one Minister and four Vice Ministers. It is a very good thing for us. We never had women in those areas before."[10] Sérgio Vieira, founding member of Frelimo, also cited the political gains of women in Mozambique, impressive by any national standards today, while noting the political limitations as well:

> In Frelimo, 43 percent of the members of parliament are women. Of seven Commissions of the Assembly, Frelimo chairs four out of seven, and three are chaired by women. However, many obstacles still exist. For example, women as governors of provinces and administrators of districts are only 5 of 120. It is not a linear process. A lot of things are involved. Like Lenin—strategically, technically, we have to be very patient.[11]

The gains in the political representation of women in governmental positions in Mozambique are often used as evidence of the party's commitment to the

emancipation of women. For national liberation fighter Gertrudes Victorino, my questions about Frelimo seemed obvious: "Of course they had an analysis of women's oppression. They gave us space, otherwise we could not be in the Parliament, for example. Women are inside Frelimo, in the government at every level: City Council, provincial, national. Ministers and vice ministers, directors of firms and factories. Women are studying at the university."[12]

In terms of the political representation of women, Nicaragua has done well, but not as well as Mozambique. Despite the fact that women constituted an estimated 30 percent of the revolutionary combatants in Nicaragua, including several key leaders, women were underrepresented in the decision-making bodies of the revolutionary government.[13] In the mid-1980s, women held 21 percent of the positions in the Ministry of the Interior, Doris Tijerino was Minister of Police, and Dora María Téllez was the Minister of Health.[14] By 1985, 45 percent of the Sandinista Police Force were women.[15] In 1987, women constituted 31.4 percent of governmental leadership positions, 67 percent of Sandinista Defense Committees, and 26.8 percent of FSLN membership.[16] Just before the 1989 elections, women filled 40 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, but still none of the nine members of the National Directorate were women.[17] A concerted effort to increase women's representation within the FSLN started in 1991 after the electoral loss, including an unsuccessful attempt to elect Dora María Téllez to the National Directorate.[18] At the next FSLN National Convention in 1994, party women demanded 50 percent of all party positions be allocated to women to counter the party leadership's proposal of 25 percent.[19] As Ilja Luciak points out in his study of gender and electoral politics in Nicaragua, "The women's strategy proved successful when the party statutes were revised to allocate a minimum of 30 percent of all positions to women," a quota set to be applied in the 1996 elections.[20] However, in the 1996 election, only eight (22 percent) FSLN women were elected to the National Assembly, with the majority of women elected as alternates (fifteen, 41.7 percent).[21] While thirty-two of the ninety (35.6 percent) Sandinista candidates in the election were women, male candidates were given preferential access to the safe seats until the outrage of Sandinista women caused the National Directorate to agree to braid male and female candidates in the national list.[22]

Despite the successful adoption of a 30 percent quota for candidates of the FSLN in 1994, the number of Sandinista women holding seats in the National Assembly actually dropped from 1990 to 1996, from 23.1 percent to 22.2 percent (see Table 5.4). Moreover, the number of women MPs in the National Assembly in Nicaragua has declined because the ruling parties and party alliances in the last four elections (the National Opposition Union, Liberal and Constitutional Party, Liberal Alliance, Nicaragua Liberal Alliance, and Constitutional Liberal Party) have not shared the same goals of increasing

TABLE 5.4.   PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION OF FSLN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, 1980–2006

	WOMEN MPS	WOMEN SUBSTITUTES	TOTAL
1980	7.8	15.7	11.8
1984	21.3	21.3	21.3
1990	23.1	20.5	21.8
1996	22.2	41.7	31.9

Source: Luciak, Ilja A. "Gender Equality and Electoral Politics on the Left: A Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaragua," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 58.

TABLE 5.5.   PERCENTAGE WOMEN MPS IN NICARAGUA, 1984–2006

1984	1990	1996	2001	2006
13.0	16.0	9.0	20.65	18.48

Source: Compiled from the Historical Archives of the Interparliamentary Union. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2235_arc.htm

women's political representation (see Table 5.5). In 2008, women constituted 18.50 percent of the Nicaraguan National Assembly, holding seventeen out of ninety-two seats, placing Nicaragua sixty-second in the world in terms of the representation of women in lower houses of parliament.[23]

Political Representation: Quantity versus Quality?

Women's political representation numerically does not necessarily translate into women-centered policy initiatives substantively. An extensive literature has emerged regarding the relationship between women's descriptive, demographic, or quantitative representation on the one hand, and women's substantive, strategic, or qualitative representation on the other.[24] Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim articulate the difference between a "feminine presence" and "feminist activism" in politics, noting that descriptive representation may be best understood as a necessary initial step to the achievement of substantive representation.[25] Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango of MULEIDE, one of the first autonomous women's organizations to emerge in Mozambique in the postrevolutionary multiparty period, also describe the difference between the quantitative and qualitative elements of women's representation:

> In Africa, Mozambique has the second highest percentage of women in parliament. The question is to know if they are fighting for women inside. Are they representing women? Probably not Frelimo,

but women in parliament are discussing it in meetings with other organizations. We cannot be happy with the number of women in parliament but with the *quality* of women in parliament. This is the first parliament. It is a quick evaluation, but we are not satisfied. But, they are learning now. They have no practice. We must give them time, then criticize them [emphasis mine].[26]

Mozambican scholar activist and feminist Carla Braga also pointed out the difference between the quantity and the quality of women serving in parliament, agreeing that numbers are not enough: "How many times did this woman make an intervention in Parliament? How many times was she heard?"[27] Despite pointing out the increase in the number of Ministers, Vice Ministers and MPs in Mozambique, Edda Collier also asserted an important realization for scholars and activists of women and electoral politics: "You don't necessarily get empowerment from participation."[28]

María Elena Sequeira Rivas, Coordinator of the Women's Secretariat of the ATC in Nicaragua, makes the same point about women's representation in the National Assembly there :

Sometimes, it's not enough for us to have a woman if she doesn't defend our interests. Its worse than a man! Therefore, for me, my organization, collectively, men and women, we are fighting for living spaces we all deserve. For example, at the FSLN there is a 30% quota because there is not clear consciousness. Quotas are necessary, yes, but from my point of view, those spaces are not occupied by the women who should occupy them.[29]

Rivas correctly points out that increasing women's participation in political positions is only one aspect of representation and empowerment. What women do and say when they get there is just as important: "Today, there are more congresswomen and ministers of republics and municipal government leaders and mayors. In that way we have achieved. But the problem of consciousness we face between women themselves. For example, Violeta Chamorro, the President, told women to go home and take care of their kids."[30] María Lourdes Bolaños talked about the abysmal representation of women in leadership positions in Nicaragua as well as all over the world: "The Supreme Court and Electoral Commission have 12 candidates, 0 of whom are women. And the FSLN is the only party concerned with women. Not even the party, but *women of the party*" [emphasis mine].[31] Clearly, while each country has made great strides in terms of women's representation in the national legislature, women's overall access to state leadership positions and their ability to pressure for women's interests within those positions still requires more work. Moreover, it appears as

if the achievements that have been made have been due to the efforts of *women themselves* operating within their political parties and pushing those parties to adopt increased representational opportunities such as party quotas and leadership appointments.

Legal Reforms for Women in Mozambique

Throughout the years since independence, Mozambique attempted to create a unitary, hybrid legal system, a combination of formal law and customary law. Much of the formal law in Mozambique was carried over from the period of Portuguese colonial rule. As a result, many of the laws in effect in the postindependence era, such as the Family Law, Civil Code, and Penal Code, remained the laws of the colonial era. For example, under the Portuguese Civil Code, the man was defined as the head of the family. This means that women have been subject to the "marital power" of their husbands, required their husband's consent before taking any paid job, and have not been owners of household property, which has been administered by the husband. For the past twenty-five years, many women lawyers and women's NGOs have been working toward legal reform of the Civil Code in Mozambique. Carla Braga describes the discriminatory treatment women have received by Portuguese law, and subsequently, by Frelimo and OMM inaction, for the past two decades:

> In the Portuguese Penal Code, crimes such as adultery were defined and punished in different ways, more harshly on women. Legal reforms are in process, but 20 years after independence, these laws are still enforced and still on the books! Why did Frelimo or the OMM *not* take this as their charge? You can always blame colonialism, even after independence.[32]

With the rise of autonomous women's NGOs in civil society in the postrevolutionary period, this has finally started to change. Through a combination of government initiatives, efforts of women MPs, and, most importantly, pressures and demands placed on both by women's organizations in civil society, the successful passage of an extremely progressive Family Law was achieved after years of research and struggle. The New Family Law, in draft form for over twenty years before getting through the Mozambican parliament in December 2003, epitomizes both the historical and cultural impediments to change, as well as the legal and material achievements of Mozambican women lobbying in parliament and organizing in civil society. Before examining the achievements of the New Family Law in the postrevolutionary period, it is important to first discuss the legal position of women after the revolution.

Constitutional Equality

Mozambique's 1975 Constitution contained several strong statements against oppression and exploitation and for women's empowerment. The constitution declared "the elimination of colonial and traditional oppression and exploitation structures and their related mentality." It also stated that women's emancipation is "one of the essential tasks of the state" and established that "women and men have equal rights and duties in the economic sphere." This principle is restated later when the constitution declares that "women and men have the same rights and are subject to the same duties" and that this notion should guide "all state legislative and executive action" that "protects the marriage, the family, motherhood and childhood."

Despite the constitutional mention of the family, fatherhood is conspicuously absent from the list of things the state must protect, suggesting that the discourse of Frelimo was, at best, gendered, and at worst, patriarchal. The sphere of home, family, and marriage continued to be understood as the sphere of women and children, thus perpetuating the sexual division of labor that allows men to abdicate their responsibility to engage in the reproductive labor of the household, including family farming, food provision, cooking, cleaning, and child care. The history of male labor migrancy in Mozambique has often been cited as a major contributing factor to this sexual division of labor. As Chapter 6 elaborates in detail, migrant labor has both contributed to and challenged the sexual division of labor in Mozambique in interesting ways. Men's migration to urban areas left women in the rural areas tending to the fields and engaging in all of the reproductive labor of the family economy. It has also created the conditions for women to become heads of household, pursue income-generating survival strategies, and assert decision-making power in the family. Still, while women were encouraged and, often through necessity, *forced* to engage in the productive labor of the money economy, men were not equally encouraged to assist in the unpaid labor of the family economy.

Moreover, though equality between men and women was established in the 1975 Constitution, it was not codified in the civil or customary law. This contradiction was most evident with respect to the Nationality Law and the Family Law. The Nationality Law (enacted on the same day as the Constitution of 1975) deprived Mozambican women of their citizenship when they married foreign men, though not Mozambican men when they married foreign women.[33] This law remained in effect until 1987, despite its unconstitutionality. At the Second National Congress of the OMM in 1976, President Samora Machel argued that Mozambican women were weaker than Mozambican men and thus would be influenced by foreign men in a way that Mozambican men would not be by foreign women. Even the OMM noted how enemy infiltration was easier with women due to women's "unbalanced development" compared to men:

Mozambican woman's present situation manifests her unbalanced development in relation to man in cultural, socio-political, and economic terms. It derives from her discriminatory education in traditional society which was aggravated by racial, social, and sexual discrimination that Portuguese colonization imposed. It is in this context that we should understand why illiteracy, obscurantism, tribalism, regionalism, and racism, as well as inferiority complexes, are more ingrained in women. . . . Woman is frequently the transmitting agent for wrong ideas because of her feeling of inferiority and insecurity. That is how enemy infiltration is made easier. The enemy will freely propagate lies thus trying to degenerate the Mozambican Revolution.[34]

This OMM passage attempts to explain the rationale behind the unequal, gendered nature of the Nationality Law: women's "unbalanced development," "inferiority complexes" and "discriminatory education." Discrimination against women notwithstanding, this discourse clearly blames the victim. The Nationality Law has often been cited as evidence for the charge that Frelimo's support for women's emancipation was more in the realm of rhetoric than reality.

The New Family Law

Women's subordinate status in the family did receive some attention by the Frelimo government. One of the first attempts at legal reform in the revolutionary period was directed at the Family Law. In 1980, a Draft Family Law was prepared by the Ministry of Justice and the Faculty of Law at Eduardo Mondlane University as part of a Family Law Project. It was designed to replace the Portuguese Family Law and to reform discriminatory customary law without directly addressing the diverse marriage systems that exist throughout Mozambique (matrilineal, patrilineal, Islamic, Christian, and civil, to name a few). From 1982 to 1990, parts of the Draft Family Law were put into use as a result of a Supreme Court of Appeal Directive.[35] The Draft Law was in use until the adoption of the New Constitution in 1990, when it was deemed null and void because a new Family Law had never been approved. In 1998, after almost twenty years in draft form, the Ministry of Justice, under the direction of President Chissano, ordered the Commission for Legal Reform to study, research, and draft a new version of the Family Law in consultation with civil society. After much lobbying on the part of women's groups in civil society and women MPs in parliament, the New Family Law was passed by the National Assembly in 2003.

The history of the Family Law is a long one, involving actions on the part of executive governmental commissions, legislative assemblies, and NGOs in

civil society. The successful passage of a flawed though extremely progressive Family Law in the Mozambican National Assembly was the result of a concerted, cooperative effort among and between women MPs and women in civil society. This process of feminist agency is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. For now, it is important to discuss the achievements and limitations of the law in the context of legal, political, and cultural change for women.

What Does the Law Accomplish for Women?

The New Family Law, deemed everything from progressive to feminist, makes great strides in challenging the history of traditional family structures in Mozambique. Overturning years of patriarchal privilege in the family, property rights, and divorce law, the new law recognizes shared leadership and property in the family and two types of divorce: that based on mutual consent and that sought by one spouse through litigation. The law works hard to recognize religious law and customary law alongside civil law; this is perhaps its most difficult challenge. In April 2004, President Joaquim Chissano returned the law to parliament with claims that the sections of the law dealing with the mutual recognition of religious, civil, and customary marriages were unconstitutional. The National Assembly's Legal Affairs and Social Affairs Commissions reworked the law in light of Chissano's objections. On August 24, 2004, during an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Republic, the amended bill was passed unanimously and with acclamation.[36]

One of the most important achievements of the law is its challenge of the assumption of a male head of household. Under the New Family Law, a woman or a man can be the chief of the family. Moreover, the law recognizes both customary marriages and de facto unions. A *de facto union* is defined in the law as a woman and a man cohabitating for at least three years but not marrying legally. De facto unions are the most prominent form of relationship in urban areas. Under the new law, women within de facto unions and traditional or religious marriages would be able to seek alimony, maintenance, or custody in the case of divorce or separation, even though the couple may have never legally married.[37] Only about 10 percent of marriages in Mozambique are official, civil marriages through the state. Ninety percent of marriages are customary, traditional, or religious. Maria José Artur, national coordinator of Women, Law, and Southern Africa (WLSA), explains the thinking behind the New Family Law's treatment of alternative forms of marriage:

> The Family Law set out to give recognition and legal status to traditional and religious marriage. The idea is that it doesn't make sense to say to people, "Get married in a civil marriage after your traditional or religious marriage." According to the old law, traditional and religious marriages did not count. Our proposal was that if you are 18 years

old, monogamous, with two witnesses, that would count and should be recognized. The idea is to respect other forms of marriage and not only civil marriage.[38]

Most importantly, the recognition of noncivil marriages affords the law the opportunity to protect the children of these unions. The New Family Law eliminates the distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children and affords equal rights to both. In addition, the law raises the minimum age of marriage for boys from 16 to 18 and for girls from 14 to 18, although it allows exceptions for girls at 16 "under special circumstances" and with parental consent.[39] The law also makes it easier for couples to adopt, and acknowledges the concept of 'foster family' for the first time in Mozambican history. The practice of taking in foster children has become common in Mozambique because of the number of children orphaned or abandoned during the war years, or whose biological parents are dying of HIV/AIDS. Ultimately, the law goes a long way in improving the status of women in the family in three key areas: (1) the husband is no longer automatically assumed to be the head of household, and no longer automatically represents the family—either partner may do so; (2) the right of a husband or wife to work may not be restricted by the other partner, and the wife no longer needs to ask her husband's permission to go into business or contract debts; and (3) the children of traditional, customary, religious, and civil marriages will have the same protections under the law.

Throughout the 1990s, the draft law was circulated around the country, becoming the subject of extremely heated debates because of its challenge to the patriarchal family structure and because of the great diversity of marriage and kinship systems throughout the country. Historically, customary law in Mozambique recognizes monogamous and polygamous marriages, hinders women from obtaining contractual capacity, and favors the father or his male relatives in custody situations. Only the man has been allowed to initiate a divorce in both patrilineal systems and Muslim societies. The New Family Law attempts to provide protections to women and children within these varied situations without challenging the traditional or religious belief systems of polygamy, patrilineality, or Islam. Before discussing the most controversial elements of the Family Law, we must understand the diversity of marriage, inheritance, and kinship systems that exist in Mozambique.

Matrilineal and Patrilineal Societies in Mozambique

There are two different types of marital, kinship, and inheritance systems in Mozambique: patrilineal in the South and matrilineal in the North. In the southern patrilineal systems, the wife moves to live with the husband's family after marriage, who pays lobolo to the woman's family in the exchange.

Lobolo, or bride price, is a practice that occurs throughout Mozambique. It is still practiced in the capital city of Maputo and in the surrounding rural areas. Lobolo refers to an exchange from the family of the groom to the family of the bride in patrilineal systems which represents a shift in 'ownership' and responsibility for the bride, as she will leave her family and go to live with the family of the groom. Originally, the lobolo signified only an alliance between two families. Money was first introduced into this custom during colonization.[40] The bride price is seen as compensation from one family to another for the loss of the labor power that the bride-to-be represents. It is important to note that in this custom the woman is acknowledged as *having value* in and of herself and her person, the loss of which is paid for economically. Lobolo, then, is very different from the exchange of a dowry, which is given to *add value* to the woman in question.

Many women in Mozambique, however, describe the payment of lobolo as a system in which the man is understood to have "paid" for the woman and thus has power over her, their children, and her capacity to ever leave the marriage. According to a 1997 Women, Law, and Southern Africa Mozambique (WLSAMOZ) study titled *Families in a Changing Environment*:

> The situation that we found shows that the marriage establishes an exchange of services between families in which "lobolo" has an economic and a moral basis and stabilizes the matrimony, making the husband and his family responsible for maintaining the woman. Marriage is patrilocal and the woman becomes the *circulating element*. Power over her is transferred from her family to that of her husband. In case of death of the husband, the woman continues to *belong* to the husband's family, not inheriting, nor being able to decide about herself, her children, or even the items she brought in at the wedding. The woman rarely divorces either, because there are not many reasons that can legitimate a woman's request, or because even if accepted by the relatives, the woman must always leave the children at her husband's [emphasis mine].[41]

The practice of lobolo, therefore, limits the exercise of women's agency in the marriage. Lobolo has been found to discourage divorce in patrilocal societies because the control of the woman is given to the husband and his family through an economic bond, meaning that the woman would be expelled without her children following a divorce, and the lobolo would be paid back. It also indicates that the woman's autonomy, even after the husband dies, is circumscribed.[42] Responsibility for the widow often transfers to the husband's brother. Sabina Santos, Director of the OMM Training Center in Machava, argues that "lobolo is the symbol of marriage," citing the fact that "money and jewels are used to get the woman as a wife."[43] The OMM agrees that lobolo puts

women in a position of total dependence on men, "who, because they have paid for them, can use and disown them as mere objects."[44]

In the northern matrilineal marriage systems, on the other hand, women have more power in terms of property and divorce because after marriage, the husband goes to live with the family of the wife: "In Mozambique's matrilineal societies, residence is with the wife's family and the social father of the couple's children is the wife's brother, whereas in patrilineal societies, the social father is the biological father and the children belong to the husband's family."[45] In many ways, there are significant differences between the power and decision making available to women in each system. For example, in cases of domestic violence or divorce, women living with their own families in matrilineal systems have much more power: they have rights over the children, and often, it is the family of the wife that expels the husband in cases of violence, adultery, or divorce. In patrilineal systems, the husband and his family have exclusive rights over the children and banish the wife in cases of divorce, often accepting adultery on the part of the husband. According to Sabina Santos, the center of the family is the man in the patriarchal South, while the center of the family is the woman in the matriarchal North:

> Everything revolves around the man or the woman. For example, in the North, there are ritual initiations. Young women learn how to treat a husband, whereas in the South, women cannot know anything about men! Yes, the men have the power because even in the North, the leading person at a marriage ceremony is the man. But in the North, when a man gets married to a woman, the man builds a home in the zone of the woman. In the South, the woman goes to live with the man. In the North, women are more powerful than in the South. In the North, a man can take a decision, but he consults his mother, wife. In the South, men consult women less.[46]

Despite these nuanced differences, in both systems, it is still often a man who holds the property and decision-making power, even in the matrilineal systems. The 1997 WLSAMOZ study confirms these findings:

> From the findings from the matrilineal groups, it can be concluded that although the marriage is defined and oriented by the wife's family, the men continue to hold power as uncles and brothers. Although inequality is common in all regions, regardless of lineage, in matrilineal societies, the woman has greater possibilities to intervene to modify the model of traditional marriage. That is because she occupies a more socially visible position that reinforces her "destiny" as producer of resources and children.[47]

It is also important to keep in mind that in both matrilineal and patrilineal societies, the presence of children determines the validity of the marriage, circumscribing the discourse and practice of women's reproductive rights: "In every region of the country, both in cities and countryside, a marriage is only fulfilled when there are children as the guarantee of family reconstitution. Children are a resource and an investment that at the same time provide a symbolic recognition of the family in society. . . . In the social conception, a woman without children is not a complete person."[48] In patrilineal systems, if there are no children, then property goes to the husband's sister. If the husband dies, the wife is given to the husband's brother.

Mozambique is a culturally diverse society. As just discussed, not only are there patrilineal and matrilineal marriage systems in the country, regional differences from the south to the center to the north of the country, and religious differences from traditional African religions to Islam to Christianity, but there are also traditions of polygamy in both the Muslim and African patrilineal communities. As a result, a real effort was made to draft a family law that would respect the cultural diversity of the country, while also protecting the rights of women and children. This was not always easy and in fact proved to be quite controversial in several key areas, especially with regard to polygamy. What follows is a discussion of some of the debates that arose around polygamy and the compromises that were made in the parliamentary passage of the law in December 2003.

Polygamy and the New Family Law

The debates surrounding polygamy, both on the floor of the Assembly of the Republic and in community meetings in civil society,[49] proved to be the most controversial, without consensus emerging among the women or the men involved in the debates. For the leaders and members of the women's organizations in civil society, one thing was clear: their goal in the New Family Law was to protect the women and children of polygamous marriages without defending polygamy. This proved to be extremely difficult, though necessary. As Zelma Vasconcelos, MP and spokesperson for the Renamo Opposition Electoral Union in the National Assembly, argued: "There is a provision in the law that states that if a man dies, wife number two, number three, and number four should have legal recourse. The law should not be saying that. That, in effect, condones polygamy!"[50] When asked whether such a provision was designed *not* to protect polygamy but rather to protect the women and children who, though perhaps unfortunately, currently live within polygamous marriages, Vasconcelos responded by saying, "We are trying to create a society. We should be writing laws for the way we want society to be. We should be writing laws for the future, not for the present."[51]

In response to the points made by Vasconcelos, several women leaders in civil society articulated the difference between defending polygamy as a system and defending the women and children that currently live within polygamous relationships. According to Terezinha da Silva with CFJJ and former Director of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Eduardo Mondlane University:

> There is polygamy in Mozambique. The law is not protecting polygamy. The women and children need to be protected. . . . We interviewed the children, men and women, girls and boys, children of polygamous marriages. We interviewed Islamic and non-Islamic [families] . . . Everybody is saying "No! We suffered from a polygamous marriage. Only children of the first wife got benefits, privileges." This led to a bad economic situation for many . . . And with AIDS, it is just not possible to have polygamy.[52]

Isabel Casimiro, long-time feminist activist, scholar, and researcher of women's organizing in Mozambique and former Frelimo MP, asserted that not everyone was against polygamy in the debates in parliament and society at large: "I think if I know this version [of the law] it tried to take all things into consideration."[53] Casimiro agrees with Vasconcelos that law is written for the future, but she also says the law needs to take into account present realities: "When we say women and men are equal, we know it is not true. But we write it for the future. But the future must also take into account the past. Polygamy is a reality"[54]

It is interesting to note that men on the floor of the National Assembly tended to make arguments in favor of polygamy, while men in the communities often spoke about the economic difficulties of polygamy and the responsibility of caring for several wives and all of the children that were born from polygamous marriages. These different perspectives among men about polygamy seem to highlight the class system that polygamy in fact is: those elite men that can afford to have several families want to protect the tradition, while those men who cannot are beginning to recognize that the tradition may not only oppress women. The economic aspects of polygamy are discussed further in Chapter 6.

It has been very difficult for women in Mozambique to reach consensus about the relationship between polygamy, feminism, and religious freedom, both in terms of the theories of women's movements and the provisions of the Family Law. In Islamic communities in Mozambique, the arguments for and against polygamy are less economic and more religious and generational. Selma Augusta, a woman who joined Forum Mulher to represent Muslim women during the public discussions around the Family Law, stated that the Koran allows men to have up to four wives and that it is not her place to question that. It is a matter of faith.[55] However, she argued very adamantly that the Koran also clearly states the conditions under which a

man should take up to four wives: those conditions include equality, dignity, and respect.[56] Augusta also asserted that the Koran states that only if a man can treat his wives equally in terms of material and nonmaterial resources (e.g., economic resources and emotional love) should he take on more than one wife. Selma's son, Aly Elias Lalá, said that for him, he does not believe equal emotional love would be possible, so this is why he does not plan to take on more than one wife.[57] Generational differences also emerged in the Muslim community meetings that took place around the Family Law. Aly recalls conversations he has had with several young Muslim women who *do* challenge the Koran: "I understand their argument. And if it were me, I would probably feel the same way. I do not want to be one of four, or three, or even two. But for me, it is not my place to question the Koran. Allah is all knowing . . . there are things that can be seen and known that we would not think of. It is a matter of faith."[58]

Protecting the women and children of polygamous marriages without either defending or condemning polygamy within the provisions of the Family Law proved to be the most difficult aspect of negotiation. Several other areas of the law were also controversial and ended in compromises being made by women leaders in civil society and parliament in order to ensure the passage of the law. One such compromise was the special circumstances clause of the age of marriage for girls, allowing girls to marry at 16, two years younger than boys. Because of the strong lobby of traditional communities in the country, the commitment to an equal age for girls and boys to marry was compromised, despite the seemingly unanimous commitment to encouraging girls and boys to stay in school longer and pursue their families later. Obviously, these kinds of goals require cultural change, not simply legal change.

Legal Reforms for Women in Nicaragua

In September, 1979, the Statute of Rights and Guarantees, Citizens Rights, and the Bill of Rights established the legal equality of men and women in Nicaragua. These statutes were used until 1987 when the new Constitution was adopted. Many important laws for women and families were passed between 1979 and 1987.[59] In 1979, the Provisional Media Law was passed, which prohibited the use of women as sexual objects in advertising. In 1981, AMNLAE's first proposal to the Council of State, the Adoption Law was passed, which established the irrevocability of adoption in Nicaragua. Two laws in particular were passed regarding relations between women, men, and children in the family: (1) the Law Regulating Relations Between Mothers, Fathers, and Children (1981), which abolished the legal doctrine of *patria potestad* (male head of household and father power in the family) and established the equal rights of women and men over the custody of children in divorce settlements; and (2) the Law of Nurturing (*Alimentos*) (1982), which recognized the legal

rights of illegitimate children and mandated shared responsibility (*guardia compartida*) of mothers and fathers for their children and men's responsibility to share domestic labor.[60] These laws were an important step toward correcting the contradiction that existed in Nicaraguan society between women's responsibilities within the family and men's rights according to Family Law. Such contradictions can also be seen in the Civil Law of 1904, which established preferential treatment for the father as the head of the family. Infidelity of the woman was considered adultery and was penalized, while infidelity of the man was considered concubinage and was not penalized.[61] In addition, a Unilateral Divorce Law was passed, allowing one member of a couple to obtain a divorce without demonstrating cause. This law was criticized by the Church for "attacking the main element of the family."[62]

Angela Rosa Acevedo of the Center for Constitutional Rights agrees that the 1987 Constitution entailed much transformation and improvement in terms of regulations for individual human rights related to women:

> This Constitution takes into account all the debates around the world regarding women's rights. At the level of the political system, it is different from ever seen before—pluralism. We recognized the mixed economy with this Constitution, and for the first time the three powers appear: (1) Electoral Supreme Council; (2) Judicial Power; (3) National Assembly. The most important thing of the 1987 Constitution was the participation of the people in the decision-making process.[63]

However, Acevedo argues that while the formal principle of equality for women was codified in the 1987 Constitution, there was no accompanying legislation to make decision making effective in this area: "We didn't fight against those ideas that are at the base of these inequalities. For example, the family is undemocratic. Motherhood is the principal vision of woman, along with control of woman's freedom through the social—women for others not for themselves. The fact of working in an independent organization for women [can help] to make that equality possible."[64]

Vilma Núñez de Escorcia of the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), describes how inadequate the official gender policies of the FSLN were and how even the laws that were passed were passed only with great effort from individual women and AMNLAE as an organization: "The official policies lacked a lot. I am convinced there was an advance, but some advances were not enough. They were not a result of party policy but an outcome of women's efforts. For example, the first transformation of the Family, was the Law of Relations: Mother, Father, Children, to equalize relations in the family. This was the struggle of [individual] women plus AMNLAE."[65]

The fruits of women's labor seemed most evident when the FSLN issued its long formal statement on women and the Sandinista Revolution, known

as *La Proclama*, read at the Third National Assembly of AMNLAE on International Women's Day, March 8, 1987. The most important statements made in *La Proclama* included an acknowledgment of patriarchy and the additional sex exploitation specific to women; a condemnation of machismo; an argument that women's issues cannot be put off until after the war; and, for the first time, an assertion that dealing with the inequalities between men and women would actually strengthen, and not divide, the revolution.[66] As a formal statement of the FSLN, *La Proclama* seemed to end the marginalization of the "Woman Question." Now, the entire FSLN had the responsibility of considering the concerns of women. In the words of Beth Stephens:

> The Proclamation thus came out strongly in support of those who argue that women's oppression cannot be overcome as part of the general battle against exploitation and inequality, but rather requires a *head-on confrontation with the ideology of machismo* and its manifestations in the "private" realm of the home and personal relations [emphasis mine].[67]

Why the change of heart? Why, after all the years of clearly stating that women's specific concerns were not only distinct from and secondary to the class-based concerns of the revolution, but also that they would divide the movement, would the FSLN suddenly acknowledge the importance of the concerns of Nicaraguan women? There seem to be two answers to this question: (1) the decision was much more practically than ideologically oriented; and (2) the FSLN really didn't change its position regarding class and gender-based oppressions, as evidenced by events at a subsequent town meeting.

First, with so many men mobilized for the war effort, "it was imperative for the survival of the revolution that women's productivity be raised, particularly in the cash crop sector."[68] Thus, the FSLN's strategy regarding women appeared to be based on increasing women's participation in the "productive activities" of cash crop agriculture, with no reconsideration whatsoever of the category of "production." As Patricia Chuchryk concurs, the FSLN strategy continued to focus on increasing the participation of women in productive activities and thus often ignored issues related to women and reproduction despite the language used in the Proclamation.[69] Katherine Isbester cites the FSLN's declining support among women of all ages as a factor in the Sandinista Proclamation, stating that "*La Proclama* was an attempt to make the FSLN more attractive to women."[70] Isbester cites a 1988 survey of 1,123 randomly selected Managuans, in which 63 percent of women did not identify with any political party, as evidence for the FSLN's declining popularity. Despite its questionable intent, Isbester and others still see *La Proclama* as a moral symbolic victory for Nicaraguan women.[71]

Six months after the Proclamation was released, during a September 1987 town meeting with more than two thousand women from across the country, President Daniel Ortega articulated "a lengthy analysis of the dichotomy between the bread-and-butter issues raised by working-class women and the feminist concerns of the urban professionals. He charged the latter with being out of touch with women workers and peasants and concluded that poor women not only view economic survival as their priority but also reject the feminists' concerns as foreign imports, unrelated to their lives."[72] This discussion revived debates within the Nicaraguan women's movement between *militantes* and *feministas* on what exactly was the relationship between defense of the revolution and women's particular interests. Ortega's comments seem to contradict Stephens's argument that the FSLN ever intended a "head-on confrontation with the ideology of machismo." The struggles for autonomy that had emerged within AMNLAE by 1987, growing in strength to the present day, reveal not only the unwillingness of the FSLN to adequately take on machismo but also the refusal of women within the party to accept it any longer.

The Cultural Context of Gender and the Family in Mozambique

Legal reform for women, while essential, is inherently limited by the gaps between law, ideology, education, and culture. Sam Barnes, head of planning and assessment for the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance in 1992–1994 and long-term resident of Mozambique, argues that despite the fact that conventions like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) were signed by the Frelimo government, the laws on the books still conflict "because under Frelimo as a Marxist state, laws were not considered important. You had ideology to protect you, you don't need laws. So, many of the fascist laws are still in place. After ten years, they began looking at the laws, in the early 90s. Frelimo doesn't quite understand what it means to be a state run by laws."[73] Jennifer Garvey, lawyer with the Ministry of Mineral Resources for eleven years, agrees that there had not been a "culture of law" in Mozambique until 1990 and the establishment of the New Constitution: "The Portuguese were extraordinarily hierarchical, and the Frelimo system was a very hierarchical and very centralized system. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. The rule of discretion was replaced by the rule of law."[74] And yet, even with "good laws" on the books, cultural norms shape the extent to which laws are interpreted, enforced, internalized, and even known to exist within a population. How have cultural understandings limited achievements for women, particularly in the sphere of the family, in Mozambique?

In every society, there is a distinction between legal principles and cultural practices. Head of the Frelimo Parliamentary Group and former

Frelimo Secretary-General Manuel Tomé asserts that whereas some things can be established by decree, such as freedom and equality for women, other practices, such as lobolo, polygamy, and prostitution must be analyzed and changed from a cultural point of view:

> After independence, we gave greater importance to women. The emancipation of women was seen as something women and men should fight for. We have made some mistakes, we have to admit that. This was a cultural revolution. We had to change centuries of thought . . . more deep work . . . one speech won't change that. Polygamy, the education of children, dignity in which women will not accept being a second or third wife. There are women who say "We are very happy . . . once a week you sleep with me, no problem" . . . We did not have a profound analysis of prostitution . . . only a moral perspective, not an economic one. We had a deep analysis, although not a very complete one.[75]

Cédia Montero, former coordinator of Forum Mulher, agrees: "In Mozambique, as in other African countries, the cultural problems are still very strong."[76] Montero implicates both African and Portuguese cultural traditions in the oppression of women. Ivete Mboa, Director of the Associação das Donas de Casa in Matola outside of Maputo, also argues that women suffer the double cultural oppression of traditional Mozambican cultures and colonial patriarchies: "In some countries, including Mozambique, women have to suffer twice. During colonial times, society thought that men were superior to women, not equal to. In our culture, the man is a human being of the first category. The woman is of the second category."[77]

Not only have Mozambican women experienced the oppressive system of Portuguese colonization but they have also experienced a "traditional feudal ideology which conceives of the woman's role as serving men—as an object of pleasure, as a procreator, and as an unpaid worker."[78] One of the main concerns expressed by the OMM in the *Resolutions of the Second Conference* was the fact that many women in Mozambique suffer from a lack of self-confidence and a feeling of inferiority concerning their own abilities. The OMM feels that the process of traditional education, including the perpetuation of such practices as initiation rites, lobolo (bride price), and polygamy, all of which occur in different areas and to different degrees today in Mozambique, has inculcated in women a "spirit of submission" that fosters a "passive acceptance" and subordination, often leaving women feeling unable to express their own opinions.[79] The family is neither a "haven" from the cruelty of the market, as some Marxists argue, nor simply a concern of bourgeois feminists. The ideological values of traditional feudal society are "inculcated in a woman from the moment she is born by a whole educational system within the family."[80]

Frelimo, through the OMM, took a firm position that traditional education, initiation rites, religion, and inequality in the family inculcate in women a feeling of inferiority that prevents women from seeing the possibility of their own emancipation:

> Traditional society, as well as colonial society, saw woman as an object of pleasure and cheap manual labor. Apart from being a laborer, they kept her away from science to impede any thought that society might be changed. Here, again, initiation rites inculcated in women erroneous concepts of her being inferior. Apart from making her conform this made her the transmitter of the theory of the impossibility of women's liberation. Religions are a form of obscurantism, though more subtle, which perpetuate the concept of the inferiority of woman. . . . The process of rendering the woman inferior originates in traditional education. It is vindicated by the initiation rites and other such traditional practices which lead to passive conformism and lack of initiative. Woman becomes an object of appropriation and pleasure, bartered by the family and subjugated to the husband's will. . . . The feeling of inferiority impedes woman's participation in meetings and even in the family where, faced with her husband and children, she is incapable of expressing her opinions. Her inhibition and lack of initiative become translated into an inability to take on responsible jobs and to break out of her conditioning.[81]

The position expressed here reveals a progressive understanding of the phenomenon of internalized oppression, explaining how oppressed groups—in this case, women—often internalize the values of their oppressor and come to believe in their own inferiority. During the Conferência Extraordinária in 1984, the OMM examined the causes of "why women stopped, and didn't grow."[82] Interviews were conducted across the entire population, young and old, men and women. According to Sabina Santos, OMM Machava, the conclusions that were drawn were that "traditional education cuts the emancipation of women."[83]

President of O Núcleo da Mulher Acadêmica (Women's Academic Nucleus [NUMAC]) Generóssa Cossa agrees that "in the rural areas, boys are taught to be the man-boss-leader; girls, are taught to be mothers—obedient to their husbands. The different treatment of boys and girls has an impact. There is what is written in the Constitution, and then there is the practice."[84] The cultural education of girls and boys in the family plays a very important role in shaping gendered expectations of manhood and womanhood. Cossa blames the gendered participation of girls in the reproductive labor of home and family for their unequal educational achievement:

Because of cooking, bringing water, all these activities, girls are not prepared the next day, they fail, don't do as well, and are condemned to marry early. Parents don't realize that when they ask their daughters to do home activities, they are taking time away from them to study. We have to sensitize families. NUMAC is working in that direction. The less time the girls spend cooking and doing housework can prepare them for their future . . . to have a better husband! Mothers are not helping change things! Their daughters are expected to do the domestic work! We discuss this, sharing responsibilities in the family. I can assure you this issue was not even on the agenda. It is quite interesting. Men and boys have to be asked to do more work. Family Law is difficult. Men don't want to give up their power, and it is not only men. Women are used to having male power on top of them![85]

Not only do pervasive cultural patriarchies in the family limit the empowerment of girls and women, but they also prevent girls and women from accessing the educational knowledge of their legal rights. Carla Braga, former researcher with WLSAMOZ, discussed the limitations of legal change for women in terms of illiteracy: "I'm giving it so much importance. How many women will this actually affect? Most women live by customary law versus written law. . . . There is little knowledge of the law, even among literate people. Statistics in rural areas say 80 percent are illiterate, and 20 percent are literate."[86] The urban/rural divide in education and literacy is another impediment to legal and cultural change for women in Mozambique.

The Culture and Materiality of Machismo in Nicaragua

Just as in Mozambique, the necessity of changing the cultural attitudes of *machismo* in order to improve gender relations between women and men was a consistent theme throughout my interviews. What exactly is machismo, and how do ideological attitudes create material realities? Maxine Molyneux defines machismo as a "value system underpinned by widespread internal migration under which men had relations with several women and left them to raise the children."[87] Traditionally, machismo is measured by the number of children a man has fathered. Angela Rosa Acevedo addresses the cultural assumptions behind male procreation:

There is a cultural tendency that is very common in Nicaragua. Many men have the idea that if they have as many kids as they can, this is how they show their masculinity. At the same time, culture identifies

women as the reproducers—the bodies that make the kids. So, men
have kids outside of marriage and the women are left caring for the
children born outside of marriage.[88]

According to Comandante Carlos Núñez, a dominant male figure in the
FSLN, machismo means "reducing the woman to an object. The man acts
as head of the family, directs everything, takes command, imposes his will
without taking into account what I would call the exercise of democracy in
the home."[89] As Núñez clearly realizes, the establishment of "democracy in
the home" can only be achieved by attacking machismo.

A young undergraduate from Casa Miriam articulates well how *machista*
attitudes are inlcucated within the minds of both women and men in the
family:

> Machismo is the historical condition of the superiority of men to
> women in many aspects of life. I don't think just men are machista.
> Mothers brought ideas from different generations, who also teach
> their kids machismo. To change machismo, we also need to change
> women. To teach mothers not to make differences between their
> daughters and sons. For society, it is bad that machismo exists. It
> prevents women from achieving their full development. The mentality
> starts in the family, institutions, and government. The struggle is in
> the minds of women and men.[90]

The struggle to end machista culture and establish women's equality is in the
minds of men and women. And yet, the struggle is also in and on women's
bodies. Ana María Pizarro of SI MUJER is critical of cultural explanations
that use *machismo* and *machista* attitudes of Nicaraguan women and men to
explain patriarchy devoid of an acknowledgment of the relationship between
culture and materiality: "Some explanations blame culture and men's sexual
practices. I don't think that it is culture. I think patriarchalism is expressed
in terms of men's control of women's bodies."[91] A better approach to under-
standing machismo is through the lens of the intersection of culture, a stra-
tegic gender interest, and materiality, a practical gender need.

The ideology of machismo and the materiality of women's oppression
are intricately linked. Cultural attitudes manifest themselves into empirical
realities in the everyday lives of women. Machista attitudes materialize in
women's experiences of domestic violence, curtailed mobility and behavior
in the public sphere, and the gendered division of labor. Vilma Núñez de
Escorcia asserts that there are many manifestations of machismo in all
spheres of life of men's behavior, including relations with their daughters,
separating the public sphere from the family sphere, and the use and abuse of
male power.[92] For example, Concepción López, AMNLAE and FSLN leader

in León, describes how machismo played itself out in her family in terms of different expectations for the male and female members of the household: "As my father was . . . he didn't allow my mother or his daughter to go out without permission. We didn't have the right to go out . . . to schedule, for pleasure, to make ourselves beautiful. My father was a machista. The man could put on cologne and go out, but the woman had to stay at home. Machismo is rooted in the countryside. For example, men don't allow women to participate, to come to the city, to buy things—just if they are sick."[93] Machista cultural ideas also determine how women and men define *work* in Nicaraguan society. According to María Rosa Renzi, UNDP Gender Representative in Nicaragua:

> Machista is a society in which all the policies are targeted by and for men. Women's role in society is not appreciated, not considered. Many women consider that they do not work, but that they just help their husband, when 80% of the money at home comes from them! They do not consider their work at home, work.[94]

It is particularly noteworthy that when women are not only performing more physical productive and reproductive labor but are actually bringing more income into the family, a typical masculine measure of work productivity, they still consider themselves as "helping" their husband and not actually "working" in their own right. Gendered constructions of 'work' are addressed in Chapter 6.

How was machismo manifested within the Sandinista leadership? Vilma Núñez de Escorcia comments on the early understanding of Sandinista women that Sandinista men could easily integrate their revolutionary ideas with machista practices:

> A revolutionary person has a set of values, convictions, practices of equality. But their treatment of women: we knew pretty early you can be very revolutionary and lack something in practice. The machismo of the Sandinista leaders was not just in not seeing the merit of women as professionals in a space that we deserved, but it was also being abused: politics, charisma, hitting on young girls/women, seducing . . . the abusiveness of Clinton—male power.[95]

Male power often took the form of long-term political leadership. Even Sandinista militant Doris Tijerino associated machismo with leadership lacking limits: "It is wrong for one person to stay forever in a position. One of my critiques is leaders staying too long and not giving space to anybody else. I had my period, and I left. This is a machista attitude."[96] Interestingly enough, however, when I applied Tijerino's standard to Daniel Ortega as head of the

FSLN party and presidential candidate for the third time during our inter-view, she felt it was a different situation: "The case of Ortega is very different from the mass organizations. The FSLN is a very diversified organization . . . the majority sectors within the party do not admit easily a proposal of change. So, Ortega becomes a unifying element."[97]

With machista attitudes so culturally embedded, how does one begin to challenge the ideology and materiality of machismo? AMNLAE Coordinator Dora Zeledón sees education as the key to fighting machismo: "Machismo is in the minds of men and women. How do you change that? Education."[98] Former FSLN National Directorate and Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock agrees that education is essential for challenging patriarchal notions of women in the family and even goes so far as to say that resistant familial attitudes in the countryside challenged the success of the revolution:

> The first aspect must be education. It is not enough to establish a legal framework because the obstacles for women's participation come from the family. The Nicaraguan family, both rural and urban, is very traditional. Part of the misunderstanding with the revolution had to do with women's role. We wanted women to become part of the organizations, but the family structures were very patriarchal. It was considered a violation of the family that we got so deep into their customs. Some of the military movement in the countryside was a revolt of the campesinos to these drastic changes. They have their own worlds, their own norms. . . . You've got to change relations in the family, influencing within the family, duty to read and write. Even who teaches the young people. In some cases, if the professor was a young man, parents did not allow close relations with their daughters as students. Even worse, if young women were invited to participate in the union meeting, it had to be held in the kitchen! Those were considered hostile attacks.[99]

Education is a key element of challenging patriarchal attitudes both in the public discourse and the private sphere of the family. Education was a central concern of both revolutions and an area in which substantial achievements have been made, only to suffer huge setbacks during the revolutionary 'civil wars' and postrevolutionary neoliberal reforms. Access of young girls and women to education remains a central component of any project of women's emancipation.

Conclusion

In our view, true emancipation for women cannot be brought about by formal equality only, even if it leads to increased opportunities

in public life and equal rights on fundamental issues like the right to divorce. The notion of equality must also challenge the relations inside the family, which are based on differences. Introducing formal equality in a society where social and cultural norms are based on differences can lead to what theoretical discussions in women's law describe as a situation of "de jure equality and de facto discrimination." This is the result when gender-neutral laws meet gender-specific realities.[100]

Tremendous gains were made by the Sandinista and Frelimo revolutions in terms of political representation, equality before the law, education, and access to basic material resources for populations who had been denied the basic ability to rule and govern themselves for centuries due to dictatorial and colonial authorities. Gilma Yadira Tinoco, Director of the Comisión Interuniversitaria de Estudios de Género in Managua, cites women's participation in Nicaragua in the crusade of education, the promotion to popular participation of women as leaders in the community, and women's access to certain political positions as three areas of mobilization that promoted women's empowerment in previously unrepresented spheres of life.[101] Such gains made in both countries, particularly amidst foreign-funded civil wars, cannot be understated. However, legal inaction and cultural patriarchies in both Mozambique and Nicaragua have seriously limited women's emancipation in the reproductive sphere of home and family. Challenging male superiority in the family (or in society) was not on the agenda of either revolution. Ideology and materiality are mutually reinforcing. Ideological campaigns to challenge machismo and male domination and encourage female opportunity and equality must accompany material changes in the sexual division of labor, access of girls and women to education, equal relations in marriage and family, equal power in political decision-making institutions, and equal access to social, political, economic, and legal rights.

6

"I Can Do Anything a Man Can Do"

*Military Participation, Economic Production, and
Women's Emancipation in Mozambique and Nicaragua*

> *With the FSLN and the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Movement, we have achieved
> a lot. Those myths were broken. For example, women not being at the war
> front, or women not being able to keep up with production. When the men
> were at war, women showed them—women kept up with production.*
> —María Elena Sequeira Rivas, Secretariat Nacional de la Mujer, ATC, Interview,
> Managua, Nicaragua, 1/27/00

> *I want to develop, to grow, to show I'm a person, too. I'm not born just to be a
> toy for someone else. I'm a person, and I can build anything and do anything
> a man can do.*
> —Carmen Gamilo, OMM Day Care Facility, Interview, Beira, Mozambique, 7/26/99

Introduction

One of the most important achievements of Frelimo, the OMM, the Sandinistas, and AMNLAE has been to challenge myths of women's incapacity. As Carmen Gamilo and María Elena Sequeira Rivas argue, women have been able to demonstrate that they can make similar contributions as men to the development of society. However, acknowledging that women can "keep up with production" is only one aspect of women's emancipation. Recognizing and sharing the reproductive labor of society between women and men is equally important. As María Elena Sequeira Rivas had hanging up on her wall in her office at the ATC, "Cocina en huelga" (Kitchen on strike). What a gendered analysis of women's oppression will contribute to a class analysis is a reframing of the question. Perhaps instead of asking whether women can keep up with production, we should be asking, "can men keep up with reproduction?"

The Frelimo and Sandinista revolutions identified the emancipation of women with women's increased participation in the public worlds of military defense and economic production. As a result, there were tremendous achievements for women in terms of challenging myths of women's innate incapacity and access to the public spheres of defense and the market.

However, each of these achievements comes with its own setback. Women's military participation served to challenge traditional gender roles as well as to create a political culture of war and violence which reinscribed patriarchal power relations. Women's increased participation in formal and informal economies led to women's increased consciousness about their own capabilities. However, it also led to an increased burden of labor for women that was not offset by men's increased participation in reproductive labor in the family economy. As a result, although women's power has increased in the family, it has taken the form of women's increased workload; the gendered power relations between women and men have not been significantly altered. In fact, the challenging of *half* of the sexual division of labor (women into production) has altered notions of men and women's roles in ways that have not necessarily been liberating for women or men. As long as gendered participation in the spheres of production and reproduction persists, women's emancipation will remain a utopian myth.

Challenging Myths of Women's Incapacity: Military Participation and Women's Emancipation

There are many perspectives about the impact of women's military roles on women's equality and emancipation. Does women's military involvement simply increase women's access to the masculine roles of patriarchy, oppression, and war, or does the military participation of women during revolutions and wars for national liberation serve as a significant contribution to the ongoing global struggle for women's equality and liberation? According to Leith Mullings, some of the most significant transformations in the status of women have occurred in Mozambique, "where the liberation of women was declared a major and necessary step in the process of social revolution."[1] Hafkin and Bay declare that many observers cited the newly independent regime in Mozambique as a model to be emulated in terms of its treatment of women.[2] Ali Mazrui emphasizes the importance of Frelimo's use of women combatants through the creation of a new type of resistance, which he feels has been implemented in southern Africa, inspired by the Marxist tradition: androgynous warriorhood. Mazrui defines *androgynous warriorhood* as "a principle which seeks to end the masculine monopoly of the skills of war."[3] How pervasive androgynous warriorhood has been in Mozambique is debatable. As Kathleen Sheldon points out, the military participation of women in postindependence Mozambique has received little analysis.[4] According to Ernestina Kampue, a woman who was wounded in combat and went on to be elected head of the OMM in Palma, "Most of the members of the Female Detachment were demobilized. Many went to the OMM as full-time activists, but some simply returned to their homes."[5] However, one of the OMM's noteworthy accomplishments was the training of ten thousand women in the grassroots militias formed to combat Renamo.[6]

In an interesting comparison with the counterinsurgency war in Nicaragua, Cynthia Enloe argues that the implementation of a new male-only conscription law, after women had been 30 percent of the combatants in the war against Somoza, was interpreted by many women activists as "a step toward remasculinizing the state's military."[7] In 1980, women were 6 percent of the officers of the Sandinista Popular Army (ESP) and 40 percent of the army.[8] Women protested their gradual shift into noncombatant roles and the Sandinista Police Force, sending the message that "women's role was adjunctive rather than essential."[9] As Katherine Isbester asserts, "Women were fully aware that much of their right to equality derived from their participation in the Insurrection, and they were apprehensive that their secondary status in the ESP would be reflected in the society at large."[10]

How important is the active military involvement of women for the success of a socialist revolution? How about for the success of a feminist revolution? According to Américo Magaia, a prominent businessman and former Frelimo militant who spent five years in jail under the Portuguese secret police, women's military involvement in the anticolonial war contributed to their process of emancipation:

> In our traditional culture, women perform the household duties: children, cooking, etc. But with Frelimo that changed. In the beginning, women did the food preparation and nursing, etc. As a progression, women participated militarily. . . . They used women as carriers of weapons. They have the ability to do what the men were doing . . . Because of traditions, women accepted their inferiority. But since they proved they could shoot and kill the enemy, then there was no difference . . . This was the beginning of their own liberation.[11]

Polly Gastor of the Centro Informática at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) also argues that participation in the liberation struggle was emancipatory for women: "This was the thing to be doing. New kinds of relations between men and women emerged through a lot of opposition. In the Women's Detachment, women were trained alongside men in the same camp. Women were also being role models for girls. In the liberated areas, they would target girls to go to schools. The families needed convincing!"[12]

Initially, men in the military strongly opposed such participation by women. Many people I interviewed commented that the greatest resistance in the countryside was voiced about the fact that women in the military detachment were wearing pants. As Eulália Temba of WLSAMOZ remembers, "Women had to wear uniforms with pants. Women had always worn skirts. One of the challenges to masculine power was for women to wear pants, a uniform, and use weapons. Women participated in all of this."[13] Américo Magaia agrees, describing the difficulty Frelimo had in creating the Women's Detachment due to gender, sexual,

and age dynamics within society: "Frelimo had to convince the soldiers to share the front lines with girls . . . there was fear they would have private relations with them! And, in our traditional society, it is considered an insult for girls or women to wear trousers . . . so, it was not easy to recruit for or create the Destacamento Feminino.[14] Wise people, elderly, age 70–80, were saying 'No! You are bringing disgrace to our country. Where have you seen women performing the same tasks as men . . . wearing trousers . . . ' so, it was not easy."[15]

Women's involvement in the Mozambican revolution as freedom fighters helped challenge traditional notions of women's inferiority. At the very least, it sparked a discourse about the differences and similarities between men and women. Manuel Tomé, Head of the Frelimo Parliamentary Group and former Frelimo Secretary-General, describes the debate which took place within Frelimo about women's military participation in the national liberation struggle: "There were very interesting discussions: women cannot do fighting versus women can do the same work. Of course, women and men are not biologically identical, but we are essentially the same."[16] In addition, as Edda Collier, UN Gender Specialist in Maputo, articulated, women's military involvement in the war gave them a more powerful voice in the early 1990s when they started demanding peace.[17]

The successful military leadership of women during the Nicaraguan revolution is well documented. Women directed the liberation of León, the first city that was taken. In addition, in each of the takeovers of Managua, Massaya, Granada, and the Pacific, one of the main leaders was a woman. Ritha Fletes Zamora, former Sandinista member of the National Assembly, argues that women's military participation helped "break through structures of oppression. We also showed them through practice. Doris Tijerino, Mónica Baltodano, Gladys Baez, Claudia Chamorro, all militarily showed they could do it."[18] However, although women's military participation helped challenge myths of women's incapacity in Nicaragua, as it did in Mozambique, many women argue that the military structure of the revolution created a political culture of war within society which reinscribed patriarchal power relations. Moreover, while women's military leadership appears to have helped challenge women's and men's sense of women's gender role limitations, and was feminist in that sense, it does not seem to have helped establish a feminist consciousness of women's oppression or alter women's status and equality in other spheres.

Challenging Myths of Women's Incapacity: Women and Economic Production

One of the most often cited achievements of the Mozambican and Nicaraguan revolutions is that the participation of women in the public projects of military defense and economic production challenged preconceived myths

about women's incapacity. The questioning of women's traditional behavior in the private sphere and welcoming of women's participation in the public sphere were the most revolutionary aspects of the liberation struggle for women. As Eulália Temba of WLSAMOZ states, "They started to permit the participation of women even in the armed struggle, breaking all stereotypes, all traditional ways: women as inferior, staying home, caring for children. There was very important social change in Mozambique in my opinion. Not all Frelimo members, particularly men, agreed with the political and economic decision-making regarding women."[19]

However, despite the fact that women's inherent inferiority was questioned, and women's innate incapacity was rejected, women's abilities to reveal and express their capacities were still inscribed by men and often in categories of labor traditionally assigned to women. Listen to how Terezinha da Silva, former Director of the Faculty of Social Sciences at UEM, describes Frelimo's understanding of the emancipation of women: "Let's put women into development. Put women into the front of Frelimo activities at the secondary level, working to carry guns, carry water, cook food. They asked the OMM to do the social activities. The tendency is to look at women as the property of men."[20] Women were permitted to carry water and cook food for the revolution. How revolutionary is this? Women were *already* carrying water and cooking food for the family, and thus for society, expected and not counted as an "economic contribution" to production. Moreover, women carrying water and cooking food for the revolution does not challenge the preexistent and continuing power relations between women and men in the sexual division of labor, particularly in the reproductive sphere of home and family. In the Nicaraguan case, Thelma Espinoza, former Vice Coordinator of AMNLAE, similarly points out that women had always been contributors to production: "In 1970, women were always working in the fields with children on coffee crops. The difference in the 1980s is that all kinds of women participated in production, students, young people, men and women in the production of coffee. It was part of the culture—women always worked."[21] It is important to note that in citing women's practical commitment to the revolution, Espinoza points out that women had always worked, before, during, and after the revolution, even if what women did was not counted as work.

Nonetheless, Sofía Montenegro describes how women's economic participation contributed to the development of women's consciousness, perhaps because for the first time, women's work was counted as productive and necessary:

> The war meant that hundreds of thousands of men went out to war, many women also went out to war, but basically it opened up a space for women to have the possibilities to run factories and to be the so-called rear guard in the economy, so that's where I think it was

a big training school for many women, in which women discovered many capabilities and possibilities, of running a factory, being a leader, being a boss, and beginning to think not only in the small space of the home, but to think that you were responsible for a territory, or being responsible for a national organization.[22]

Montenegro's account is reminiscent of a liberal feminist notion that what is necessary for women's empowerment is women's entrance and participation in the public spheres of the market, the state, and civil society to enable women to gain the confidence and sense of self to know that they have the capacity to perform what had previously been deemed men's work. This proved to be challenging in and of itself in Nicaragua to patriarchal notions of male and female roles in the public and private sphere:

That sort of thing widens your sense of commitment, on the one hand, and responsibility on the other, but at the same time is a challenge to yourself. And I think this was a very critical point because women discovered, we discovered, that we could do it alone. That we could run the damn thing while all these men were busy fighting. . . . So, when men came back from the war they found out they were mutual strangers. Because they wanted the things to go back to the status quo before they went, and women obviously resisted, because that meant giving up their jobs, giving up participation, giving up whatever. . . . This provoked, of course, many ruptures of couples, conflicts in the family and whatever. And it created a space and the need to discuss these types of things.[23]

As transformative as women's public sphere participation was for Nicaraguan women, it still was not enough to truly challenge patriarchal assumptions about gendered divisions of labor. The most transformative element of women's participation in economic production took place when men came back from the war, and women and men were forced to address how much things had changed—and how much they had not changed. Women's participation in the public worlds of work, government, and society did not, by any means, eliminate the cultural underpinnings of patriarchal notions about appropriate behavior for women and men, especially in terms of reproductive labor and gender violence in the home. According to Montenegro, women's gendered consciousness for themselves emerged as women "began to see the inconsistency of the public speech with the private behavior."[24] For example, the ability of women to rise within the structures of the party based on merit was theoretically there, "but if you were busy administering the crisis in the home, obviously the one who was going to have an ascent or a promotion or whatever was your husband, or your lover, but not you. Because he had someone doing

all the work so that he had time."[25] The perception generally accepted was that women must not be rising in party structures because they were incapable, rather than because "we had the worst part of the deal."[26]

Undoubtedly, the process of military and public economic participation was, in and of itself, an achievement for Nicaraguan and Mozambican women. When asked about their experiences in the two revolutions, most women expressed gaining a sense of self-efficacy and confidence, overcoming "domestic isolation," and discovering common problems shared with other women through communication in the public sphere. Contrary to the Marxist-Leninist philosophies of Frelimo and the FSLN, women's participation in economic production and military defense is not a sufficient condition for women's emancipation; it is, however, a necessary step for the development of women's feminist agency.

Women, the Economy, and the Family: The Intersection of Production and Reproduction in Mozambique and Nicaragua

With Mozambique's independence in 1975, women became one of the main issues on the government's agenda, to such an extent that the effective participation of women in society was considered an essential condition for the triumph of the revolution. In other words, implicitly or explicitly, the transformation of society required fundamental changes in relations between men and women, and in the sexual division of labor, a source of inequality between the sexes and which fomented discrimination against a woman as "the slaves' slave." The policies of the Frelimo government encouraged the *real participation of women in the economy*1, improvements in their education and precarious state of health and de jure and de facto participation in political decision-making bodies [emphasis mine].[27]

The revolutionary policies of the Frelimo government were designed to emancipate women through their 'real participation' in the economy. With 96 percent of women engaging in subsistence agriculture to feed their families and sell their goods in informal markets, the question can be raised: weren't women already "really" participating in the Mozambican economy? The most important sentence for the purposes of my study is what appears in the footnote contained in the above quoted passage: "Although this position was correct, it ignored the fact that, as the main food producers in the family sector, women were already participating actively in the country's economy."[28] While men in Mozambique tend to be cash croppers or migrant

laborers working for a low wage, the majority of women are food croppers engaging in unpaid subsistence farming "not only for themselves and their dependents but the male workers as well."[29] In addition, women are responsible for all the unpaid household labor and childrearing, constituting their dual labor burden. Woman have historically not been considered part of the economically active population because they were not involved in the money economy. Obviously, who is considered part of the economically active population will determine who gets to help shape economic policy, in whose interests such policy will be shaped, and who will benefit. A restructuring of the reproductive sphere did not accompany Frelimo's plan for women's emancipation, which focused exclusively on the increased participation of women in the productive economy.

In sub-Saharan Africa, women contribute 60 to 80 percent of the labor of food production both for household consumption and for sale.[30] Thus, women are already actively participating in the productive economy. In 1975, the year Mozambique gained its independence under Frelimo leadership, it was estimated that women contributed an estimated three-quarters of the labor required to produce the food consumed in Africa.[31] According to the FAO, women provided 90 percent of the labor for processing food crops and providing water and fuelwood for the household, 80 percent of the labor in food storage and travel from farm to village, 90 percent of the work in hoeing and weeding, and 60 percent of the work in harvesting and marketing.[32] Today, these figures have not dramatically changed. According to *Africa Recovery*, despite country variation, in many African countries, women continue to account for up to 80 percent of food production, earning women farmers the title "invisible producers."[33] And yet women are not usually considered part of the economically active population unless their work involves cash transactions. Thus, women continue to be exploited on the basis of their contributions both to production and to reproduction.

Women's unpaid subsistence agriculture, family farming, and all of the other types of unpaid labor performed in the reproductive sphere of the family economy have not been considered active contributions to the productive economy, either by capitalist development experts or by socialist revolutionary leaders. Despite their rhetorical commitment to women's emancipation, both Frelimo and the FSLN focused on production at the expense of reproduction without seeing the intersection of the two spheres from the perspective of women. The emphasis on large-scale state farms, the devaluation of family farming, the gendered access to paid agricultural labor on state farms and in cooperative membership, and the perpetuation of the sexual division of labor in the sphere of reproduction all reveal the limitations of a productivist, economistic model of emancipation that does not consider the reality of the intersections of these spheres in women's lives.

The Rural Transformation Plans of Frelimo

When Frelimo came to power in Mozambique in 1975, the rural transformation of Mozambique was cited as the country's most important priority of development.[34] As 90 percent of the population lived and worked in rural areas, it is easy to understand why agriculture was seen as the key to the future of Mozambique.[35] Most of the agricultural production occurring at this time was family farming, and most of it was done by women. The hope of female family farmers was always to produce not only enough to feed their households, but also a surplus to sell so that other necessities, including soap, cooking oil, and *capulanas* (hoes), could be bought.[36]

One of the visions of Frelimo was the collectivization of agriculture, seen as a means of linking the liberation of women with socialist production. During the Second Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women, held in 1976, a text was prepared that described Frelimo's ideology and strategy for the rural transformation of the countryside:

> Reduced to an object of pleasure, a reproducer of children, a producer of food for the family's subsistence, an unsalaried worker in the service of the "head of the family," the woman peasant at the same time has a very great revolutionary potential from which the Mozambican revolution cannot be cut off. This observation is based on the objective reality that our principal activity is agriculture and that most agriculture is for subsistence and is done by women. The revolution must aim at transforming this agriculture into organized, planned, collective agriculture. Mozambican women not only cannot remain outside this process, but they must be its principal agents and beneficiaries.[37]

This statement by the Frelimo leadership strongly suggests an understanding of the plight of Mozambican women farmers as well as a commitment to the transformation of the countryside. To what extent were women the "principal agents and beneficiaries" of collective agriculture in Mozambique? The plan itself was divided into three sectors: state farms, agricultural cooperatives, and family farms. State farms consisted of large-scale development projects with paid agricultural work available, predominantly to men. Agrcultural cooperatives consisted of men and women farming the land cooperatively, usually with a combination of subsistence family farming, producing a surplus for the cooperative, and some paid agricultural work for the state. Family farms remained the dominant domain of women, farming their individual plots for subsistence. Communal villages were also planned to support the cooperatives and family farms, while providing the labor for the state farms. Communal villages were established with the government's promise of new services, for

"only when people lived in concentrated settlements, the government argued, could it begin to provide services such as water pumps, schools, clinics; to do so for a widely dispersed population was impossible."[38]

One of the problems expressed by many of the younger women in the cooperative was that, unlike many in Nicaragua, it did not have a crèche (child care center). While a community attitude was formed around agricultural production, child care responsibilities as well as household maintenance remained largely in the hands of individual female members. Although Frelimo made "an admirable effort to restructure gender relations of production," the restructuring of reproductive tasks was not achieved, thus leaving Mozambican peasant women with a dual labor burden.[39] Moreover, despite women's access to land, they often did not have access to the technology of the cooperatives, including such equipment as the tractor and irrigation pump, which were controlled by men. Women in both Mozambique and Nicaragua identified use of the tractor as a tool of sexual blackmail.

State farms were the least successful creation of Frelimo's rural transformation plan. Urdang states that despite the fact that they received the largest allocation of resources, they were "badly conceived and never viable."[40] Agricultural investments from 1977 to 1983 reveal Frelimo's large-scale, state farming bias and, hence, lack of attention to women's gender interests in the productive sphere: state sector, 90 percent; cooperatives, 2 percent; small-scale family farming, virtually nothing.[41] The most predominant criticism of the rural development project, in general, and of state farms in particular, is that women, regarded as the "principal agents and beneficiaries," were not consulted at all during the planning and implementation process:

> In Mozambique, one must ask whether the outcome could have been different, at least to some degree, if the government had gone to the *women* themselves before embarking on their program of rural transformation. It is fairly certain that they would have insisted on strong state support for *family production* rather than pumping limited resources into state farms.[42]

Urdang concludes that if women had been consulted, Mozambique could have shifted to family farming eight years earlier and been better able to feed the population.[43] Instead, the Frelimo government, just as under colonization, focused more on cash cropping than ensuring food for daily consumption. Moreover, the focus on state farms perpetuated a gendered access to the money economy. Paid work on state farms was predominantly the work of men for two reasons: state farms offered virtually the only pay packet for agricultural workers, and driving tractors, an essential part of the job description, had always been considered "men's work."[44] Thus, a gendered division of labor persisted even within the so-called revolutionary rural

development plan. Work for pay (production) is work for men; work for free (reproduction) is work for women.

Formally, women's equal economic status was officially codified in the Mozambican Constitution, in which Article 17 states that "women and men have equal rights and duties in the economic sphere." Several important laws have been passed to grant women rights in the economic sphere. The Law of Sixty Days, passed in 1976, permits pregnant women workers sixty days paid leave. Article 228 of the Rural Labor Code grants all women workers the right to miss two days of work per month without losing any salary. And in 1981–1982, the Labor Act was passed, which enacted legislation to protect women from job and wage discrimination. In reality, however, women's participation in the paid sphere of the market is very low in Mozambique, while their participation in unpaid reproductive labor is enormous. In 1990, women accounted for 1 percent of wage laborers. Moreover, only 1 percent of women worked in cooperatives, 8 percent worked in industry, and 19 percent worked in the commercial sector.[45] Although 97 percent of women worked in the agricultural sector, only 1 percent of women worked in agricultural cooperatives.[46] This means that the other 96 percent of women working in the agricultural sector were engaged in the unpaid reproductive labor of family farming. Women "are the main people directly responsible for food production, and through their domestic work ensure the reproduction of the labor force. Due to their excessive workloads and low educational levels, women continue to occupy the worst paid jobs and to have difficulty in obtaining formal employment."[47]

The Rural Transformation Plan of the FSLN

After the fall of the Somoza dictatorship, the FSLN nationalized all of the land owned by Somoza and his friends, one-third of the land in Nicaragua. This land was turned into agricultural cooperatives, state farms, and private peasant family plots. The Sandinista investment in agricultural development generally reveals the same pattern as in Mozambique, with large-scale state farming development projects receiving the largest investment and family farming receiving the smallest, yet with more of an investment in the cooperative and family sector by the Sandinistas as compared with Frelimo: state farms, 50 percent; cooperatives, 30 percent; private ownership/family farming, 20 percent. According to Maria Rosa Renzi, the Sandinista Agrarian Reform Program redistributed two million *manzana* (city blocks) to campesinos.[48] The system was modeled on a mixed economy of 80 percent state ownership and 20 percent private ownership. In addition, the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law set up a system whereby judges could hear cases of peasants who wanted to expropriate land to form cooperatives.

There were two types of agricultural cooperatives in Nicaragua. The CAS (Sandinista Agricultural Cooperative) was a completely cooperative venture

TABLE 6.1.   AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN NICARAGUA (%), 1990–1992

	1990	1991	1992
Small and medium producers	56.0	40.0	29.0
Large private land	31.0	56.0	71.0
Popular public area (APP)	13.0	4.0	0.0

Source: Banco Central de Nicaragua, 1994, cited in Cynthia Chavez Metoyer , "Nicaragua's Transition of State Power: Through Feminist Lenses" in *The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution*, edited by Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden, 125. New York: St. Martin's Press (1997).

where the land was farmed collectively. The CCS (Credit Service Cooperative) consisted of families who farmed their own plots and only shared resources and credits. Among most cooperative members, the CCS is more popular. However, it is interesting to note that when women formed and participated in cooperatives, they preferred the CAS, believing that the CCS structure would lead to "individualism."[49]

In the postrevolutionary period, it is easy to see how land redistribution priorities have shifted from a revolutionary to a neoliberal agenda. After the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the distribution of land has changed dramatically: the holdings of both small and medium producers and state-owned public areas have decreased while large privately owned land has increased (see Table 6.1).

Popular public area land refers to land set aside by the state for communal production. While cooperatives constituted 13 percent of the land area in the 1980s, they were less than 4 percent of land area by the early 1990s.

The Gendered Nature of Coopertatives
in Mozambique and Nicaragua

Women's participation in agricultural cooperatives in Nicaragua was also low, but it was higher than in Mozambique. In 1982, 6 percent of cooperative members were women, and in 1990, 12 percent.[50] While women did make progress in their ability to receive the benefits of full cooperative membership, it is important to distinguish in Nicaragua between working on a cooperative and being a full cooperative member. Although women made up the majority of the workforce on many cooperatives, only 50 percent of cooperatives contained women members.[51] Most women continued to work as seasonal laborers and thus have been unable to receive the benefits of full cooperative membership, including taking part in the decision-making process and receiving a share of the profits and technical training.

Why haven't the benefits of cooperative farming for women been as far-reaching as expected in either Mozambique or Nicaragua? For the most part, the answer lies in the reproductive sphere of the home and family and the

continuation of the sexual division of labor. Most women have children who they need to care for and cannot leave alone for an eight-hour work day. Thus, family farming at home is a better choice for most women than cooperative farming, which has required work hours and no child care.

In addition, men's attitudes and the legacy of machismo are important factors impeding women's full membership in cooperatives. In Nicaragua, because women's "contribution to productive work has been so undervalued in the past, many men still have not even considered the possibility of women becoming full cooperative members."[52] As Cynthia Chavez Metoyer points out, "the Law of Cooperatives provided the *legal grounds* for women's incorporation and leadership in production cooperatives under the same conditions as their male counterparts" [emphasis mine].[53] However, to what extent were the social, cultural, and personal grounds laid for women's equal incorporation and leadership in cooperatives? Data compiled by Chavez Metoyer reveals that women's public economic and political responsibilities increased, while they continued to be responsible for both production and reproduction in the household: "In short, the outcomes of the Sandinista agrarian reform failed to accomplish the original intentions to integrate women into the cooperative movement because structural and ideological barriers such as the subvaluation of women's work, the 'double day' workload, and historically constructed norms of the gender division of labor were not eliminated."[54] Both the Sandinista and Frelimo agrarian plans emphasized large-scale state farms. The resulting devaluation of family farming, the gendered access to paid agricultural labor, and the perpetuation of the sexual division of labor in the sphere of reproduction kept both countries from fully exploring the possibilities for women within a communal or, for that matter, an individualized family farming context.

Women and Agricultural Production Today in Mozambique and Nicaragua

An analysis of gross domestic product (GDP) and labor force participation by sector today in Mozambique and Nicaragua reveals that agriculture accounts for the smallest percentage of GDP in each country (17.1 percent in Nicaragua and 23.0 percent in Mozambique), the service sector accounts for the largest percentage of GDP in each country (46.8 percent in Mozambique and 57.0 percent in Nicaragua), and industry fits in between (30.1 percent in Mozambique and 25.9 percent in Nicaragua) (see Table 6.2).

In Nicaragua, there is a close approximation between the input of labor force participation and the output of GDP by sector, with agricultural output lagging behind: 52 percent of the population works in services, which constitutes 57.0 percent of GDP, 29 percent works in agriculture, constituting 17.1 percent of GDP and 19 percent works in industry, constituting 25.9 percent

TABLE 6.2.   PERCENTAGE GDP COMPOSITION AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
BY SECTOR, 2008

	MOZAMBIQUE		NICARAGUA	
	GDP	Labor Force	GDP	Labor Force
Agriculture	23.0	81.0	17.1	29.0
Industry	30.1	6.0	25.9	19.0
Service	46.8	13.0	57.0	52.0

Source: Compiled from the CIA World Factbook, 2008.

of GDP. However, in Mozambique, there is a huge discrepancy between the agricultural input of the population and the percentage agricultural output in terms of GDP: 81 percent of the labor force participates in agriculture, 13 percent of the population works in services, and 6 percent works in industry. Yet while 81 percent of the population is working in agricultural production, only 23 percent of what is produced contributes to the GDP. This is explained predominantly by the fact that most of the agricultural production performed in Mozambique is subsistence-based family farming, performed by women for no wage, and therefore invisible, "unproductive," and not counted in the GDP. It also means that the input of the agricultural laboring population is not manifested in sufficient output for the population. Investments need to be made in terms of infrastructure and industry, such as processing raw materials rather than exporting them out of the country, so that the balance of trade can be altered and more of the country's resources can be turned into wealth *inside* the country.[55]

The Land Campaign and the New Land Law in Mozambique: Potentials and Limitations for Women's Emancipation

The most promising recent achievement for women in agricultural labor in Mozambique is the passage of the 1997 Land Law. While the Land Law establishes innovative support for women's continued access to land, it does not address women's disproportionate contribution to production and reproduction and therefore leaves unchallenged the gendered relationship of women and men to the land. Although women have been working the land for centuries, women have not always *owned* the land; traditionally land is passed down through the husband's lineage in patrilineal societies and through male relatives of women within matrilineal societies. Incorporating a gendered perspective, advocates of the Land Law demanded that land ownership be granted to the individual or a community, not to the head of household or the family, both of which have historically, through customary and civil law,

placed land rights in the hands of men. As the predominant agricultural producers in Mozambique, women have finally become the focus of the policies on land tenure.

José Negrão[56] was National Coordinator of the Terra Campanha (Land Campaign), a movement of more than two hundred organizations, including NGOs, grassroots organizations, and churches that were the strongest advocates in the successful passage of the Land Law. The members of the Land Campaign have identified tenant security as the real problem for peasant producers, predominantly women, in Mozambique. The World Bank proposed issuing land titles for each single family, while government land policy since 1995 has focused on small shareholders and private enterprise. The Land Campaign rejected both approaches.

In addition, Negrão and the Land Campaign argued, "If we want to solve the problem of tenant security, we must establish a right of occupation based on oral testimony."[57] As a result, the Land Law allows for two unique aspects of land ownership: community ownership and rights to ownership expressed through oral testimony. Because women in the field seldom owned property, the recognition of oral testimony is particularly important. Today, Mozambique is one of the only countries in Africa in which the rights of occupation can be asserted through oral testimony.

Rachel Waterhouse, then Coordinator of the Program on Land Rights and Gender Equity for Action Aid, studied gender relations and land tenure in a village in Maputo Province, conducting research and civic education on the Land Law as it was being revised. Issues such as community versus individual land titles and women's representation were discussed. According to the Old Land Law of 1979, peasant farmers occupying the land had use rights to the land. But it was hard to collect written evidence during the adjudication process to recognize ownership rights. In the civil code, written evidence overrides oral evidence. In 1986, regulations were passed to allow peasant farmers to apply for the title and deed for the use and ownership of the land: "It was practically free, but you had to have the land demarcated and mapped out. To have it shown on the map was expensive. Only the government did it, because these were times of war. So, the question was raised, 'How can we offer people more security? How can we better protect the rights of peasant farmers?'"[58] One of the most complicated aspects of the New Land Law is the regulations for community titles. Practitioners are still working on the technical process of how the community will be represented, particularly when men tend to migrate and women stay and work the land.

Communal ownership and oral testimony provide very interesting possibilities for ensuring women's reproductive and productive capacities through land tenure, access, and security. Women engage primarily in family farming with the intention of feeding their families and producing enough surplus to sell their food crops in the informal market. The survival of women and

their families depends upon women's access to land. Negrão and the Land Campaign worked tirelessly to link women's family farming goals with Mozambique's development plan by challenging the typical assumption that development equals commercial production:

> We have to transform subsistence versus commercial development. Why do we take for granted that it is like this? I am questioning the assumptions of land issues, development, and other concepts of the North. . . . There is no development without savings and investment of savings in the country. During the socialist years, labor went to state farms and we saw growth without development. Our point in the Campaign is to mobilize the savings of the rich guy and get him to invest it in the small owner. Both cotton and cashews are produced by small holders. . . . We must increase the manufacturing done in Mozambique with the small holder through family farming.[59]

The Land Campaign appears to understand that women and small land-holders are the predominant producers in Mozambique and that for development to take place, they must be the beneficiaries of economic investment. The problem in the contemporary neoliberal economy, however, is that international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank seek to destroy the sovereignty and autonomy of state development alternatives. This poses a severe challenge to Mozambicans. The ability of women to have access to land, labor, and capital in the processes of production and reproduction is intricately linked to this challenge.

Despite the Land Campaign's positive assessment of the Land Law, the extent to which the law will actually benefit women remains to be seen. In many ways, the Law highlights the possibilities *and* limitations for women's empowerment in agricultural Mozambique. Land tenure, access, and security are all necessary conditions for protecting women's reproductive and productive capacities. But they are not sufficient conditions. Men and women's gendered participation in productive and reproductive labor continues to determine the differential experiences of freedom and exploitation within which men and women live, particularly in the agricultural economies of the developing world. As Carla Braga points out, land access is not the only important element of women's emancipation: "Women [already] have access to land in different degrees: If not, they couldn't be the main producers in Mozambique!"[60] Braga shares my concern about the persistence of women's excessive workload in the spheres of production and reproduction, which is ignored in struggles for land security: "Access is not the problem, but too much work for women!"[61] Once again, the gendered nature of the division of productive and reproductive labor remains an unanalyzed component of the power differential between women and men; it persists as an absent (yet essential) element of women's emancipation.

Gendered Participation in Productive
and Reproductive Labor

It is widely accepted among scholars that a sexual division of labour operates in both the market and in subsistence production and reproduction. Men are typically protected from most domestic responsibilities because sexual divisions of labour, combined with other socially constructed hierarchies, make domestic reproduction and production biological extensions of women. . . . I am not suggesting that divisions of labour by sex are inherently exploitative. Yet they become so when they establish hierarchies of responsibilities that value "masculine work" over "feminine work."[62]

Cynthia Chavez Metoyer correctly points to the relationship between production and reproduction within the sexual division of labor globally. Further, she identifies the locus of exploitation within that sexual division of labor: valuing men's work over women's work. In both Mozambican and Nicaraguan revolutionary contexts, women's emancipation was understood as women's participation in previously designated "men's work"—defense and production outside the home. There was no comparable encouragement of men to participate in "women's work" nor any other, deeper understanding of what women's emancipation might constitute. This is clearly a result of the unequal value attached to men's and women's work and the economistic framing of emancipation. With few exceptions, women "elevated" themselves to perform men's work, while men refused to "lower" themselves to perform the work done by women. This has led, in both Mozambique and Nicaragua, to an undue burden of labor in the lives of women and a *questioning* of the role of men. As women engage more and more in the monied economies of informal markets and continue to perform the unpaid family farming, genderd notions of masculinity and femininity are challenged in ways that are not necessarily emancipatory for women or men.

Javier Matus Lazo of the Center for Action and Support of Rural Development (CENADE) argues, "The thing is not to give more work to women. Also, give women's work to men! Women go to meetings, go to church, work with their families; men work half a day, and then lay down in the hammock!"[63] Irma Ortega of the Center for Rural and Social Promotion, Research, and Development (CIPRES) agrees with this gendered analysis of the productive and reproductive spheres of labor in Nicaragua, noting the disadvantages that continued for women even when they entered the public sphere of production: "Even bringing women into the public sphere had disadvantages: lesser salaries, limited training, male bosses, sex-segregated labor. As for men in the reproductive sphere, people will say men were at war. It is a way to cover up that argument. Men didn't take up those responsibilities here. In the rural areas,

even though both do the same job category, the man is seen as a 'producer,' the woman as an 'assistant' to him."[64] Sonia Agurto of FIDEG, a research NGO founded in 1990 studying micro and macro economics in Nicaragua, reminds us that even what men and women define as *work* is a gendered construction, often shaped by the category of ownership: "Through the whole history women have been doing productive work. But for rural women, the man owns land. She works sometimes more than he. But when asked, 'Do you work?' the answer she gives is, 'No. I am just a housewife. I do not work.'"[65]

In a 1997 study by FIDEG, "La Esperanza Tiene Nombre de Mujer: La Economía Nicaragüense desde una Perspectiva de Género" (Hope Has Women's Name: The Nicaraguan Economy from a Gender Perspective), the categories of productive and reproductive space are used throughout to examine the inequalities that exist between women and men in both urban and rural sectors. Productive space refers to the sphere of paid labor in the marketplace, while reproductive space refers to the sphere of unpaid labor performed within the realm of home and family. Table 6.3 shows the the comparative distribution of work-time spent by men and women in these respective spaces:

It is evident that women spend much more time than men engaging in work in the reproductive sphere, and men spend much more time than women engaging in work in the productive sphere. What is perhaps even more striking is that when women and men are working comparably in the productive sphere (urban, age 20–24: 49 percent/51 percent), and even when women are engaging more in productive labor than men (rural, age 20–24: 58 percent/42 percent; urban, age 45–65: 53 percent/47 percent), women are *still* performing more of the reproductive labor, 80 percent to 20 percent in rural areas and 90 percent to 10 percent in urban areas. It is this phenomenon that results in the double

TABLE 6.3.   DISTRIBUTION OF WORK TIME BY GENDER AND AGE IN URBAN AND RURAL SECTORS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL IN PRODUCTIVE AND REPRODUCTIVE SPACES (STRUCTURAL PERCENTAGE) IN NICARAGUA, 1997

	AGES 15–19				AGES 20–24			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Productive space	57.95	42.05	82.01	17.99	51.39	48.61	42.05	57.95
Reproductive space	9.34	90.66	19.03	80.97	8.56	91.44	19.30	80.70

	AGES 45–65				OVER 65			
	Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Productive space	47.36	52.64	82.22	17.78	54.20	45.80	86.05	13.95
Reproductive space	9.91	90.09	23.52	76.48	15.62	84.38	35.02	64.98

Source: María Rosa Renzi and Sonia Agurto, *La Esperanza Tiene Nombre de Mujer: La Economía Nicaragüense desde una Perspectiva de Género*, 202–203.

TABLE 6.4.   TIME ALLOCATION OF ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF A RURAL WOMAN IN NICARAGUA

	WOMEN	DAUGHTERS	HUSBAND/SONS
Household Maintenance	9 hrs 38 min.	6 hrs 39 min.	50 min.
Cooking and dishwashing	6 hrs 43 min.	2 hrs 2 min.	—
Collecting water	35 min.	5 min.	—
Fetching wood	—	20 min.	35 min.
Cleaning	5 min.	7 min.	—
Sewing	10 min.	2 hrs 35 min.	—
Errands	—	55 min.	—
Child care	2 hrs 5 min.	35 min.	15 min.
TOTAL	19 hrs 16 min.	13 hrs 18 min.	1 hr 40 min.

Source: Martha Luz Padilla and Nyurka Perez, "La Mujer SemiProletaria," CIERA, 1981.
Cited in Cynthia Chavez Metoyer, "Nicaragua's Transition of State Power: Through Feminist Lenses" in *The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution*, edited by Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden, 123. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

and triple burden of labor for women, the lower wages and decreased economic capacity of women, and the continued cultural expectations of women's work in the home that perpetuates women's cultural and material oppression in the family. A 1981 study of the gendered division of labor between mother, father, daughters, and sons in the life of one rural family in Nicaragua reveals the gendered divison of labor in the family that persisted even during the idealistic early years of the revolution (see Table 6.4). Time spent engaging in household maintenance, child care, cooking, cleaning, collecting water, fetching wood, and sewing ranged from an average of 1 hour a day for the husband and sons and 16 hours a day for the wife and daughters.

The experience for women appears to be the same in Mozambique. According to *The Situation of Women in Mozambique,* a report compiled by women's NGOs to the African Preparatory Conference for Beijing in Senegal in 1994 for the NGO Forum in Beijing in 1995:

> Life is difficult for women in Mozambique, a consequence of such factors as their high illiteracy rates, precarious health, excessive workload and minuscule degree of participation in decision-taking bodies. Nonetheless, women continue to be the main producers of food and survival strategies, even though this role is not socially recognized and men retain the effective administration of the income produced by women on the formal and/or informal labor markets.[66]

The report continues by stating that the traditional image of women remains "as the 'doer' of domestic tasks, always subordinate to or dependent upon the man, head of the family, who works outside the home."[67] Terezinha da Silva, former Director of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at UEM, asserts that the division of labor between production and reproduction is about

the control of resources, what is counted as work and who is considered as contributing to development:

> The problems are of inequality and power in the family. Economic work is done even inside the household, work as a productive role, yet the domestic sphere is not considered part of a productive role, and thus is not considered work. . . . We need statistics on how much work is done in the family and not taken into account in the national census because it is not considered "work" . . . Frelimo now doesn't take this into account.[68]

The divisions of inside/outside, private/public, household/market, and the informal/formal economy also become blurred when women are selling vegetables from their subsistence agricultural family farms on streets and highways to try to subsist. In an era of neoliberal capitalist globalization, subsistence agriculture requires sale in the market economy to truly mean subsistence.

One of the obstacles Carmen Gamilo, a woman from Beira who works at the OMM day care facility, cites to women's growth and development is when "a woman wants to work, has no place to work, no jobs . . . she can sew, and then sell when she is finished, but even if she knows how to sew, who will buy? It is easier to sell in the informal market."[69] But what happens when a woman does enter the formal or informal labor market? Is there a change in the division of reproductive labor between the husband and the wife? Gamilo comments:

> Now, a woman can get out of the role of a man and show that she exists. We heard our mothers only stayed home. We have a voice now. We are active now. We work outside the home. Some men help. Some men say, you decided to work, you need to know that the work at home is also yours. Some women get up at 4:00 A.M. Today, a woman needs to work. A man's money is not enough. She must work to help him.[70]

A woman needs to work for income in the informal or formal market as a survival strategy because, even if her husband does work for pay, it is not enough to survive. And yet, "she needs to know that the work in the home is also hers."

Women's Participation in the Informal Economy

The Women and Law in Southern Africa, Mozambique (WLSAMOZ) Research Project published the results of a study in 1992 conducted in various urban and rural suburbs of Maputo, titled *Maintenance Rights and Women in Mozambique,* which addresses these very issues of women's participation in paid, unpaid, formal, and informal labor. Maintenance rights were defined for the purposes of the study as "the laws which deliberate on the

responsibilities of parents to support their children, and on the duty and right of spouses to provide each other with mutual financial and material assistance during and after marriage."[71] One of the explicitly stated conceptions framing this study was "a feminist perspective, defending women's rights within the context of gender relations," revealing the willingness of some of the newer NGOs to identify with feminism.[72]

The target population consisted of women with maintenance problems and eligible to exercise their maintenance rights. Using marital status as the point of reference, six groups of women were identified from the sample: single mothers (9.4 percent), married women (30.3 percent), separated women (10.4 percent), divorced women (2.7 percent), abandoned women (4.6 percent) and widows (26.7 percent). The target population consisted of women between the ages of 20 and 29 and 30 and 39; households of women and children with an average of eight members in urban areas and six in rural areas; two-thirds women heads of household; 50 percent of women with no formal education; US$80 per capita family income.[73] The study determined that "the most important activities of the target group, apart from domestic work, are in the informal economic sector. They include buying and selling goods and domestic production for sale. Both take place in the informal market, in the so called 'dumba-nengues' . . . 90 percent are unable to purchase sufficient food for a diet providing 900 calories per day."[74]

Dumba-Nengue is a southern Mozambican proverb that means "You have to trust your feet."[75] In her account of the Renamo war in Mozambique, Lina Magaia explains how "most of the peasants abandoned their fertile lands and profitable cashew trees after the MNR [Renamo] plundered their fields, burned their homes, press-ganged their sons, and raped their wives and daughters. Those who 'trusted their feet' survived, but the areas to which they fled were less hospitable so that today they live in poverty."[76] Today, dumba-nengue refers both to the notion that you have to keep on running to survive and to the actual informal markets women have created to do just that.

How have women in Mozambique been able to continue to perform all of the reproductive labor of the home and family, including family farming, as well as create income-generating survival strategies in the informal market? According to Maria Alvero, OMM Nampula:

> The OMM does sensitivity training for men, to tell the man he must help her, because she will be more tired. With the old people, this is hard; with the young people, if both go outside and leave Mozambique to study or work, he will be more willing to help . . . if both stay here, he will be less willing.[77]

The OMM has also established "interest circles" for women to come together at the local level and talk about their needs and concerns. The topics of

conversation often involve "sewing and the domestic economy . . . We teach women cooking, caring for children, health, nutrition, education."[78] There are four interest circles in Nampula City, which meet two times a week. About twenty women attend each meeting. OMM activists often go out to other areas, to people's houses or to small farms, teaching in the home. According to Alvero, issues of women's work in the sphere of reproductive labor emerge as the most important problems women face:

> One of the biggest problems is that women complain they work harder, even when both are working. She wakes up early, tends to the house, cooking, goes to the small farm, still carries the children, baby on back . . . That's why we do sensitivity training and theatre—to show how things work! To change minds![79]

Ivete Mboa of Associação das Donas de Casa (ADOCA) also describes the double burden of labor that results from women's unequal responsibilities in the reproductive sphere: "Women suffer twice. Even women who exercise [the use of] money and have a job to work, these women have to go home and do the domestic activities. Men do nothing at home! Women do both!"[80] Her analysis comes with some optimism and hope, however, that things begin to change when men experience the reality of women's lives:

> Many men in society are beginning to understand. For example, I know a couple where the woman had an accident and was close to death. The man began to work at home, and he began to understand how important his wife was. Now, he is a good man completely! Of course, women are the mothers, so we have to change their minds. The sons of today are the husbands of tomorrow.[81]

Hermengilda Thumbo of the Mozambican Association of Rural Development (AMODER) is less optimistic: "The attitudes of men are not very different, not very improved. Now, we're losing this small gain. Men now want women to gain a good income and also take care of the children and the home."[82] What Thumbo and Mboa both agree upon is that women will be fundamental to changing the attitudes of men through the way women parent their sons and daughters. Ana Maria Montero of UEM agrees, describing how the gendered division of labor is reproduced in the home in the minds of sons who watch their fathers' lack of participation in the domestic sphere:

> Now I'm divorced. During the time I lived with my husband, it was difficult to change the thinking of the child. I was married, my husband did not help me with the house activities. My son saw that, and learned that it is not necessary to do that. My son later saw his nephew washing

dishes and asked his nephew, "Why are you washing the dishes?" His answer: because all the people in the house need to do the same.[83]

Mboa, Thumbo, and Montero all remind us that one way women can change the minds of men is through feminist parenting: not reinscribing the sexual division of labor in the tasks we provide our sons and daughters. Sérgio Vieira, a Frelimo founder and MP, disagrees. He argues that change is more likely to occur through practical necessity and economic development:

> It is still the attitude of men that housework is for women, but changes do occur—not because you wish but because you are forced to. My wife is working and I am working. This is practical and immediate. It is not because of a philosophical belief but because of a practical necessity. . . . When will domestic work disappear? With development. Economic development: mechanization, better qualification, not by law.[84]

If domestic work has not disappeared in the most advanced, economically developed industrial countries in the world, how likely is Vieira's hypothesis? Rather than theorize about the disappearance of domestic labor in the future, revolutionary leaders would do better to encourage men to share the burden of reproductive labor with women in the present.

Polygamy: An Extension of Gendered Reproductive Labor

One of the realities in Mozambique, which continues to work against men's increased participation in reproductive labor, is polygamy. Polygamy is a cultural-economic system supported by the system of patriliny, whereby children belong by rights to the paternal clan, and women belong to men. The OMM defines polygamy as "a system whereby the man possesses a number of wives."[85] Polygamy is about the power and control of resources. Preserving the system of male domination which permeates the cultural realm of society, not to mention the minds and bodies of women themselves, polygamy perpetuates the unequal distribution of the economic and political resources the society has to offer. Moreover, polygamy perpetuates the sexual division of labor in which women are expected to be the reproductive caretakers of men and children.

So why do many Mozambican women support polygamy? The demographic imbalance of women to men is an argument often offered as to why each man may need to be betrothed to more than one woman. Due to the gendered labor patterns that take men to the cities while women stay home in the rural areas, the female to male ratio in some rural areas is eight to one. As

a result, some women I interviewed argued that woman may *need* to share a man in order to have access to heterosexual pleasure, affect, emotional bonds, childbearing, and economic subsistence. Sabina Santos, Director of the OMM Training Center in Machava, explained the existence of polygamy in terms of the shortage of men, particularly in the rural areas, in Mozambique:

> But we have a problem here in Mozambique because of the war. Women are 52 percent of the population and men are 48 percent. There is polygamy in Mozambique. This is another problem: each man has 2 or 3 women. The problem is that the family accepts it. Even the women accept it! One of the problems is that when alone, single, many men are looking to you. Once you get married, you get more respect! So, women would rather marry men with more than one wife than not marry at all. Even mothers will accept that for their daughters and the first wife will, too. In the rural areas, it is worse.[86]

Santos' comments imply that perhaps if single women were more respected, they would not choose a polygamous marriage. For Fatima Trinta, OMM Nampula, the real issue of polygamy is whether or not each wife is treated equally. When I asked Trinta about the possibility of polygamy for women, her response revealed both the cultural assumptions and the material differences between women and men:

> The problem is that when a woman has a relation with more than one man, she becomes without value. With men, it is different: he is powerful, he is superior! Women need to be more sensible, respect yourself. The problem is that for a man, it's different; a man gives money and food. Women depend on the man; men don't depend on women for these things, just fun. If women had economic independence, there would be no problem.[87]

According to Trinta, non-monogamous women decrease in value, whereas non-monogamous men do not. Why is this the case? Trinta also asserts that economic independence for women would challenge polygamy. If this is true, what does this reveal about the nature of polygamy?

Polygamy is intrinsically an economic system as well as a cultural system. It is based on the economic capacity to care for multiple partners, and as a result, it is inherently gendered in a world where women have less economic capacity than men. Morever, polygamy is constructed through accepted patriarchal norms of what constitutes appropriate behavior for women and men. In a world of equal economic and social independence for women and men, the discourse around polygamy would take a very different form. Both domestic labor and inheritance are implicated in the current discourse around

polygamy because of the gendered division of labor in the home, family, and the very act of reproduction:

> There are two kinds of men—those who help, and those who don't. We must continue to mobilize and sensitize the men, that women are persons too, they get tired, they need help. Sometimes, they suggest, "Let me go out and have another woman and make children—I'll bring them home and then you can take care of them!" On Mozambique Island, I know a woman who could not have children who found a new wife for her husband, and she cares for and feeds the children.[88]

The intersection of polygamy with the sexual division of labor raises the following question: if men were expected to perform the caregiving labor for all of the children and the wives in their family, would they still choose to procure more of each?

Ana Maria Montero of UEM describes the complexity of assessing women's oppression within modern society as compared with their experiences within traditional practices such as polygamy:

> That is not an easy question. In some traditional social relations, women get some space to assert leadership positions more than in modern society. In Mozambique, who can be a polygamous man? Only those with wealth because they have to pay lobolo! Polygamy also results in more women in the labor force for domestic labor and the children, and it requires a wife's authorization and advice. Older women stop doing heavy work that the younger wives do. Therefore, for some groups of women, polygamy is a form of liberation.[89]

I cannot disagree with this statement within the current structure of a gendered division of labor in which women are expected to perform domestic tasks. And yet, aren't some groups of women being liberated at the expense of others? What if women were not solely responsible for the domestic labor? Then, procuring more *husbands* would be just as viable an option as procuring more *wives* for assistance in performing the tasks of reproductive labor. While the argument for polygamy as a labor-saving device for women may be true within the current gendered division of labor, it does not question the gendered power dynamic underpinning that division of labor or the practice of polygamy itself.

Male Migrant Labor and the Sexual Division of Labor

The history of male migrant labor in Mozambique has often been cited as another contributing factor to the sexual division of labor. In fact, migrant labor has both contributed to and challenged the sexual division of labor in

Mozambique. Men's migration to urban areas to look for work has left women in the rural areas tending to the fields and engaging in all of the reproductive labor of the family economy. However, it has also caused women to rise to the level of head of household, pursue income-generating survival strategies, and assert decision-making power through the family. Although women's experiences in the public sphere of paid work contribute to women's consciousness, men's consciousness and women's emancipation require men's participation in reproduction.

How has the gendered relationship between migrant work and family farming impacted women's emancipation? Edda Collier, then Gender Specialist at the Ministry of Social Action in Mozambique, argues that in some ways, this division of labor provided women with an opportunity to challenge gender-role stereotypes: "Women came from rural zones, left extended families, married or divorced, due to the economic crisis, and came to urban zones. Men were always mine workers, living in dormatories. Women did the reproductive work and had informal businesses, paid work, and sometimes multiple sexual relations. The mines situation made women able to break free from traditional gender roles."[90] Frelimo MP and long-time member of the OMM Ana Rita Sithole also described how the history of male migrant labor can be understood as contributing to women's increased power in the family:

> Many women are heads of the family due to the war and mining. Men have gone to Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Most of the women who head families have power . . . Women are taking power slowly. If you want to be equals, you have to work side by side with the men. We have to work together. But we also have to take the lead ourselves. Enabling girls to go to secondary schools—most girls stay home with mothers and sisters. In Mozambique, women are a very important source of power. We know that and we have shown it . . . If we don't work hard, then once a woman gets into power she becomes a man.[91]

In a parallel argument about Nicaragua, Cynthia Chavez Metoyer states that the scarcity of male labor during the Contra war required women to enter sectors of the agricultural and industrial economy dominated by men, thus challenging sex-segregated employment. Yet despite this apparent challenging of the sexual division of labor, "women's status remained subordinate to that of men."[92] Why, one might wonder?

To her argument, Chavez Metoyer adds, "*Moreover*, a rigid division of labor persisted in which women were considered primarily responsible for reproductive work" [emphasis mine].[93] Her use of the term *moreover* places the maintenance of the sexual division of labor in the home as an additional aside. I would argue that the maintenance of rigid gender roles within the sphere of reproductive labor is not "moreover" but, rather, is the

key to women's continued subordinate status in all spheres of everyday life. Welcoming women into productive work in the public sphere of paid labor will never in and of itself eliminate women's subordinate status to men; only a simultaneous altering of the sexual division of labor within the reproductive sphere of the home and family will begin to challenge women's subordinate status in all spheres of society. Challenging only one-half of the sexual division of labor is really no challenge at all. As long as reproductive, caregiving labor is performed, expected and ignored, predominantly by women, men will never value it, and men will never value women.

A Space for Men? Gender Reciprocity in the Spheres of Production and Reproduction

If women's gender roles are expanding to include the tasks of men, but men's gender roles are not expanding at an equal rate to include the tasks of women, are men in a sense not being replaced within an imbalanced feminism? Hermengilda Thumbo of AMODER speaks of exactly this problem:

> Men are not expected to be the economic provider and still not expected to do anything else! We don't realize our power. We are the ones who produce the income and the wealth. But we are afraid. I don't want to live alone, but I don't want to live with someone I don't like. Men with a progressive attitude are scarce. We need more good quality men. Most of my friends are divorced and on their second marriage, so that says something.[94]

As women are becoming more and more adept at reproductive maintenance and income-generating activities, what lies ahead for the relationships between women and men? Terezinha da Silva sees women's survival strategies as becoming threatening to men:

> Men are threatened by women today. More men are unemployed. Women as a survival strategy do everything. They are inventing ways of making income. Men do nothing! We saw how much women are a threat. We have the power because we have the money and vice versa. Now, if they don't have money or a job, you see women doing hard work.[95]

As long as the sexual division of labor in the reproductive sphere persists while women are participating in increased numbers in the paid economy, women will continue to carry a laborious burden, and men's roles will continue to be in question.

Ana Maria Montero also worries about the impact that gendered changes in society are having on men. Montero argues that the stress masculinity puts on men increases their level of mortality. Masculinity is associated with participation in paid labor. Femininity is associated with work in the informal sector. Men still engage more in the production of commercial crops while women engage in subsistence production or family farming. As a result, in an economy in which the number of jobs is decreasing, women are accepted more in the informal sector than men and therefore are more successful. Montero argues that the informal sector is subverting notions of masculinity and femininity, and as a result, women are becoming the leading breadwinners and political decision makers in the family. According to Montero, this process is taking a heavy toll on men in society:

> When men are unemployed, their masculinity is challenged. The in-laws think they are not a man. Even working for a low wage. The wives and husbands may not accept it if we challenge current gender relations. There is a need for "feminist" associations. How are we preparing the next generation through socialization? Feminism has a big voice outside, but not inside Mozambique.[96]

Feminist reconsiderations of gender role expectations and sexual divisions of labor will liberate both women and men from limiting and constraining notions of masculinity and femininity, however globally or locally constructed.

Nina Berg raised similar questions about the difficulties of challenging women's roles in African societies because of the lack of a role for men:

> It is hard on men—alcoholism in Africa is a huge problem. Women would always have care-taking. This is a huge problem in African societies. Gender issues are not equal to women's issues. Women do too much work. Men have no place at all, no sphere at all. Breadwinner? Unemployment, frustration . . . The question is, where are the men?[97]

As discussed in Chapter 2, African feminists have often argued that the place of power for African women has always been the home and family. According to Ana Fernandes, manager of a textile factory in Mozambique, "The African woman has a lot of power. She makes all of the decisions in the home."[98] Feminist agency, then, becomes an issue of asserting power *through* the reproductive sphere of the home rather than seeking a power to *overcome* the home. What is interesting, however, is that while many people I interviewed cited Mozambican women as the center of survival, the center of the household, and the wielder of power over decision making in the household when it comes to children, few acknowledged the degree to which Mozambican women are overworked as a result of such power: "While

women's heavy workload is recognized as an unfair burden, Mozambican society does not confront the situation directly." In order for women's work, and women's power, in the reproductive sphere to be reassessed in Mozambique and Nicaragua, gender issues will have to be the core of the movement instead of women's issues.

Toward that end, WLSAMOZ completed a study in 1997 titled, "Families in a Changing Environment in Mozambique," in which they asked the pivotal question: which survival strategies modify the gender and power relations within families in terms of access and control of resources and the exercise of reproductive rights?[99] The study, which explicitly defines households as "social units of co-operation and generators of the production and reproduction strategies of their members," confirms my hypotheses about women, work, and feminism in Mozambique.[100] In some ways, women in Mozambique assert power through the sphere of the home and family and have deliberative, decision-making power as men become increasingly less central in this sphere for various complex reasons. However, women's increased power often simply takes the form of increased work within a traditionally defined gendered set of roles, without challenging the nature of those roles:

> In a society that is particularly affected by the absence of men, through emigration or war, it is possible to speak, although cautiously, of an alteration in power relations or rather a transfer of power, although provisional and not very visible. If the woman continues to be subordinated by the place for which she is destined, as clearly expressed in the education of girls, and by the functions that she has to fulfill in sustaining the home and routine problem resolution, she is gaining a new visibility in the private and public spheres. *While there are signs that show a certain transfer of powers, it is questionable whether the woman's accumulation of functions is any more than an addition to her tasks without altering the social role(s) destined for her* [emphasis mine].[101]

Women's increased functions in the public and private spheres of work, home, and family do not appear to have been accompanied by a transformation of the gendered power relations between women and men within these spheres: "The position of the woman in either the large families (extended or mutiple) or the nuclear family, is defined by a sexual division of labor and on the basis of reproduction, i.e., on a family model where the woman gains identity through her function of wife and mother—a guarantor of continuity of a certain social order."[102] Eulália Temba of WLSAMOZ asserts that Frelimo's lack of a program of emancipation for women in the reproductive sphere has not only led to more work for women, but it has also left untouched the persistence of gender violence in the home:

> While there were changes in the public sphere, all things were still
> the same in private: double burden, gender violence, violence against
> women. We know there are Frelimo members, educated men, who are
> violent with their wives, and not helping their wives at home. In the
> urban area, more men may help women. In the rural areas, culture
> and tradition are still very strong. For a man to do a woman's job is
> not well received.[103]

Because of the hierarchical relationship established between men's work and
women's work, women are made better by performing the tasks assigned to
men, while men are made worse by performing the tasks assigned to women.

Nina Berg and Aase Gundersen argue that the concept of equality that
has been articulated in Mozambique has been the "broader socialist concept
of equality, which has been introduced without any specific analysis of gender
issues."[104] They spell out very clearly the gendered implications this has on the
continuing sexual division of labor in the country and women's unacknowl-
edged performance in productive and reproductive labor:

> With the emphasis on participation in production and decision-
> making, the notions of equality and emancipation, as put forward
> by the Mozambican authorities, have the male model as norm; women
> should be emancipated to be more like men. This approach overlooks
> the fact that women are already responsible for the majority of the
> country's agricultural production, namely the family farm labor,
> in addition to trading activities in the informal sector, extensive
> household tasks and child-rearing. The traditional sexual division of
> labor, especially in rural areas, leaves women with little time to assume
> additional duties in the name of equality and emancipation.[105]

Lina Magaia, writer, parliamentarian, and long-time Mozambican activist, gives
a very simple yet profound everyday example of how women and men need to
have equal political status rights in the reproductive realm of the family:

> Women and men believe things should be that way. . . . They have to
> feel it. Women are feeling it in their blood. For example, a woman had
> her baby on her back, and she wanted to dance. So, she took the baby
> and gave it to the husband. This is a little example of freedom. It is
> representative of having the same rights as men.[106]

Women are beginning to ask the questions that challenge the gendered divi-
sion of labor in the home. As Ana Fernandes states, "The role of women in
the family is still traditional. Even if a women works outside the home, she
is still responsible for the cooking, cleaning, etc. There are four children in

my family: two girls and two boys. We cook lots of meals for the father. Why doesn't he do that for himself?"[107]

Conclusion

The Sandinista and Frelimo revolutions brought about major achievements for women in terms of participation in military defense and economic production. Women's access to public participation through various political mobilizing efforts gave them a greater sense of their own abilities, capacities, rights, and desires. The sexual divison of labor has been half-challenged: women have been encouraged to take on men's roles. Women often gain an increased sense of self-respect if they can "do the same thing a man can do." What did not occur was either the encouragement of men to engage in "women's work" or a questioning of the status attributed to the gendered roles in the sexual division of labor. As a result, the sexual division of labor in the household and family economy remains intact, as it has in every other "revolutionary" society known to woman. As Catherine MacKinnon has stated, the type of liberation achieved in most socialist societies renders women as free as men to work outside the home, while men remain free from work within it.[108] The same can be said of capitalist economies. As long as the sexual division of labor and the secondary status of women in the sphere of home and family remain unchallenged, women's subordinate status will persist in postrevolutionary societies as it does in nonrevolutionary societies.

7

"There Are No Alternatives: Is This Really Democracy?"

*Democratization and Civil Society
in Mozambique and Nicaragua*

*Revolutions are not permanent. It is a mistake to think in terms of permanent
revolution. Any revolution that doesn't end up in democracy becomes a
counter-revolution. If we make an historical evaluation of the Sandinista
or Nicaraguan Revolution, we have to admit that it accomplished its
main objectives: to overthrow the dictatorship, to make changes regarding
property ownership in favor of the lower classes, and to establish the basis
for democracy. We accomplished, in many crucial aspects, giving freedom to
a human force and leaving it organized. Organized social popular forces are
the basis of any democracy. In addition, we put a professional armed forces in
place and we established laws, both constitutional and electoral. It was with
our own laws that the FSLN lost the elections. But with it, what was lost was
the government, not the revolution. The revolution continues on.*
—Jaime Wheelock, former FSLN National Directorate and Minister of Agriculture,
Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/24/00

*There is nobody here to defend Marxism. The values and ideas are coming
from that time. What would people defend today? Not values, but things:
a house, a job. Liberal capitalism versus not having these things. There
is a nonstop march coming all over Africa. Call it globalization, call it
capitalism. People are trying to adjust. The superpowers are the U.S., the
IMF, and the World Bank. Markets have been well orchestrated all over the
world. All people are affected by these things . . . There is no capacity at all
to counterpoint anything, not even ideas. . . . We need an alternative. There
are no alternatives. Is this really democracy?*
—Célia Diniz, Africa-America Institute (AAI) County Representative in
Mozambique, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/1/99

Introduction

The words of Jaime Wheelock and Célia Diniz are powerful
reminders of the values of nationalism, socialism, and democ-
racy, which underpinned the revolutions in Mozambique and

Nicaragua. They remind us that not only were colonial and neocolonial regimes replaced with governments that went on to establish the rule of law, set up democratic elections, and mobilized the people to participate in the political and economic processes in each country, but also that the forces of neoliberal globalization threaten the very institutions of democracy actively at work in the postrevolutionary periods in both countries today. Whereas Chapters 3 and 4 focused on feminist critiques of democratic centralism and verticalism in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua, this chapter addresses critiques of neoliberal capitalist democracy from the perspective of revolutionary democracy.

Much of the recent scholarship in comparative politics, on the right and the left, holds up civil society as the great hope of democratic consolidation.[1] I argue that this civil society approach assumes a particular definition of democracy: one that is both liberal and capitalist and one that is characterized not only by basic political rights and freedoms but also by the assumption of neoliberal economics. In effect, these scholars argue for pluralism from a position of monism: while they value the pluralism of civil society, neoliberal capitalist democracy becomes the only game in town.[2] The lack of alternatives to neoliberal globalization, to which Célia Diniz speaks so eloquently, hardly seems to resemble pluralism or democracy. Diniz addresses the monism that results from neoliberal global capitalism. As poverty increases, individuals have less of an ability to influence democratic outcomes in everyday life, and as international financial institutions play an ever increasing role in shaping the global economy, states have less and less power to ensure a minimal standard of living for their populations.

This chapter addresses the complicated changes that neoliberal democratic capitalism has ushered into Mozambique and Nicaragua in the postrevolutionary period. The first section examines the concepts of democracy, civil society, and democratization and demonstrates that while political democracy has increased in the postrevolutionary periods in both countries, economic democracy has decreased.[3] I argue that, as a result, one of the great losses of the postrevolutionary period has been the reduction of revolutionary democracy to neoliberal democracy. After examining the gains and losses in economic and political democracy, I address the discourse and materiality of "civil society" by examining the changes in participatory democracy that have taken place from the revolutionary to the postrevolutionary period and make three key points: (1) revolutionary mass participation through a centralized state has given way to postrevolutionary autonomous organizing in civil society, characterized by greater freedom, participation, and diversity; however, party membership has replaced citizenship in both countries and, as a result, has limited access to certain kinds of discursive democracy; (2) the NGO-ization of civil society has resulted in a dominance of donor community interests rather than grassroots interests; moreover, NGOs in civil society

have risen in numbers as a necessary replacement to fill the void created by a neoliberal state. As a result, civil society is becoming a weak substitute for a fuller conception of democracy; and (3) autonomous women's organizing in civil society has produced greater participatory democracy, decentralization, diversity, and freedom within the women's movements in both countries; however, at least in Nicaragua, it may have also resulted in less power to effect national-level change through the state.

Despite the fact that in Nicaragua autonomous organizations in civil society are bringing to the surface critical issues that were previously repressed under the revolutionary government, the NGO movement is burgeoning with organizations trying to fill the void left by the loss of a revolutionary Sandinista state. The persistence of a Frelimo-dominant two-party state in Mozambique has allowed for greater cooperation with the state for women, but the fact that the contemporary state is neoliberal creates many of the same limitations. Moreover, NGOs in both countries are funded by an international donor community, which often determines the interests over grassroots organizations. In effect, civil society is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Democratization of the state, civil society, the market, and the family must remain part of any equation for democratic consolidation.

Democracy, Civil Society, and Democratization: A Critical Examination

Many debates have taken place over competing definitions of democracy: indirect or representative versus direct; elite versus popular; electoral participation versus discursive participation; procedural versus substantive. The definition of democracy that remains predominant is that attributable to the work of Joseph Schumpeter: democracy is a political system with free, fair, competitive, multiparty, periodic elections in which elites compete for the people's votes within a framework of universal suffrage and the rule of law protects basic political rights.[4] Although this definition is very important in establishing the basis of political democracy, many scholars have argued that it is based upon a limited, procedural, elite notion of democracy that does not take economic rights or active citizen participation into account.[5]

Contemporary discussions of democracy and democratic consolidation go hand in hand with analyses of the importance of civil society. The concept of 'civil society' has undergone numerous transformations in the history of political thought.[6] Today, a traditional understanding of state/civil society relations identifies the state as the realm of coercion and civil society as the realm of freedom.[7] In the discourse on democratic consolidation, civil society is understood to be the realm of freedom, autonomy, and voluntary associations which exists outside the state. Larry Diamond argues that democracy

requires political institutionalization through political parties and state structures and that vital for these purposes is "a vigorous and autonomous civil society."[8] After describing the voluntary, autonomous, pluralist nature of civil society, Diamond goes on to explain what kinds of organizations are excluded from civil society:

> Organizations that seek to monopolize a sphere of collective life (in the sense of denying the legitimacy of competing groups) or to envelop totally the lives of their members are, thus, not part of civil society. Civil society also excludes the private dimensions of individual and family life, the inward-looking activities of parochial groups, the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the state. Actors in civil society recognize the principles of state authority and the rule of law, and need the protection of these in reality to prosper and be secure.[9]

By this definition, neither the Frelimo nor the Sandinista liberation struggles would be understood as being a part of civil society, though both were clearly a part of the processes of democratization in Mozambique and Nicaragua. Irving Leonard Markovitz takes issue with Diamond's narrow view of civil society: "Skeptics have doubted that violent explosions by illiterate, unemployed lumpens can add to the construction of democracy, or even that these disorganized have-nots are part of civil society."[10] In "Civil Society, Pluralism, Goldilocks and Other Fairy Tales in Africa," Markovitz identifies two competing approaches to the understanding of civil society: (1) establishment approaches toward civil society, which assume capitalism and neoliberal structural reforms; and (2) radical approaches, which assume a utopian vision and mass participation from below. He argues that the dominant literature on civil society today presupposes capitalism and liberal democracy. For Markovitz, "Civil society, like procedural democracy itself, provides cheap and effective mechanisms and solutions for the problems of societal conflict."[11] Mahmood Mamdani identifies an antistate romanticization of civil society, while Ellen Meiksins Wood warns that civil society has become "an all-purpose catchword for the Left, encompassing a wide range of emancipatory aspirations."[12] Champions of civil society often reduce the necessary role of the state in achieving democratic consolidation and social justice. As the neoliberal state does less and less to secure the welfare of its citizens, organizations in civil society try to plug the holes of a sinking ship.

Moreover, discourses on "transitions to democracy" often imply a developmentalist progression from something worse toward something better. During their postrevolutionary transitions to neoliberal, capitalist, multiparty democracy, Mozambique and Nicaragua have experienced increasing political freedoms and increasing commodification, but also decreasing access to

the commodities people need to survive and increasing economic inequality. In addition, although autonomous organizing has certainly increased in civil society today, with women's organizations among the most prominent, many people argue that grassroots discourse has actually decreased, and the ability of civil society organizations to impact state decisions is limited by party politics, religious influence, and neoliberal financial institutions, to name a few. Thus, a more nuanced analysis of democratization is necessary to adequately understand the changes that have taken place in people's lives in Mozambique and Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990 and from 1990 to the present.

What did the postrevolutionary transitions to democracy mean in Mozambique and Nicaragua? How were people's everyday realities affected, both economically and politically? My interviews in both countries reveal a complex combination of economic and political losses and gains as a result of democratization: basic political rights and freedoms have increased; access to basic resources has decreased; access to autonomous organizing has increased; yet grassroots discourse within party structures has decreased. Thus, participatory democracy through the state revolutionary mass organizations has been replaced by autonomous organizing in civil society with both positive and negative consequences. The autonomous organizing of today, made possible both because of and in response to the mobilization and participation of the revolutionary periods, has brought issues and criticisms to the surface that were repressed during the 1980s. Yet a limited definition of democracy as multiparty elections has replaced a vision of democracy as participation, citizenship, social justice, and equality. As a result, civil society appears to have become a weak replacement for participatory democracy rather than a key component of a larger vision of social citizenship. This chapter assesses the complex consequences of democratization in Mozambique and Nicaragua by examining the economic, political, and participatory manifestations of democracy and civil society in the contemporary postrevolutionary period.

Surviving Democratization in Mozambique and Nicaragua: From Revolutionary Democracy to Neoliberal Democracy

One of the common themes that emerged from my interviews in both countries was that a reductionist understanding of the concept of democracy accompanied the transition from the revolutionary to the postrevolutionary period. During the revolutionary period, a comprehensive view of democracy as having political, participatory, and economic aspects predominated, as Katherine Hoyt has argued in the case of Nicaragua.[13] I refer to this definition of democracy as *revolutionary democracy*. In the postrevolutionary period, democracy has been reduced to its narrowly political aspects only

(multiparty elections and basic political rights) and, in fact, has been paired with a neoliberal approach to economic policy with a shrinking welfare state and an expanded role for international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. I refer to this approach toward democracy as *neoliberal democracy* and argue that revolutionary democracy has been replaced with neoliberal democracy in both countries. Using Hoyt's categories, virtually everyone I interviewed described a gain in terms of political democracy, a loss in terms of economic democracy, and certain gains *and* losses in terms of participatory democracy. If this is the case, then we certainly need a more nuanced understanding of democracy. I would argue that we should cease using the concept of 'democracy' without a modifier to explain exactly what aspect of the system we are talking about, for example, political democracy, economic democracy, or participatory democracy. There is no need for theory that confuses more than it clarifies.

Mónica Zalaquett of the Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia addresses the reduction of revolutionary to neoliberal democracy in Nicaragua by focusing on the distinction between political and economic rights, and questioning the reduction of democracy to political rights. When I asked if Nicaragua was more or less democratic today under a neoliberal capitalist multiparty state, Zalaquett responded by distinguishing between what she referred to as bourgeois democracy and economic democracy:

> It depends on how you define democracy. If it is political rights to elections—bourgeoisie democracy—then there have been certain improvements. However, if you understand democracy in the wider sense of social and economic rights, there has not been an advancement. To the contrary, we have moved backwards. In the current period, there have been certain losses of the advances of the revolution. If you consider the social aspects: literacy has decreased. Illiteracy is up from 12% to 30%. Agrarian reform was equally distributed. There were a few families owning great properties. Now, land is being concentrated in a few hands, every year it is getting worse. It is different for country people. There is no other option than selling their properties. Add to that more than 70% of the population recognized as poor, 50% as extremely poor. You cannot see this as an economic democracy.[14]

Lilleana Salinas, former Executive Director of the Centro de Mujeres, ISNIN, also critiques the reduction of democracy in the 1990s in Nicaragua to a few political freedoms: "Democracy is the power of everybody. We are not living a democracy. If we misinterpret the word as freedom of speech, political participation . . . these are democratic values; however, despite these things, there are no laws to protect my life, in terms of dignity, respect, and the right to education."[15]

Some of the people I interviewed compared the Sandinista democracy of the revolutionary period with the neoliberal democracy of today and expressed dissatisfaction with both approaches to democracy. Irma Ortega, formerly with the Sandinista Ministry of Agriculture and critical of the concentration of power of the FSLN in the 1980s, describes in vivid detail what has been lost in the neoliberal period. Ortega argues that neither democracy nor development in Nicaragua can be understood as the establishment of the free market when the majority of the nation's people do not have the capacity to purchase the goods sold at multinational corporations (MNCs):

> Was there a democracy in 1984? There was a lot of concentration of party, but from that to now, I wouldn't say it was a democracy, but a concentration of power by the FSLN. Devil's advocates would say the situation of war pushed them to apply excessive control. Democracy today? We have to ask what people's power exists today? Everyday, dignified life is limited. . . . The opening of McDonald's . . . this is a wonderful thing we have achieved, but people don't have the power to acquire . . . We have McDonald's, the circles in the city, automarkets, the cinema, fountains with lights . . . but the poverty of the population is increasing and there is terrible unemployment, drugs, prostitution, money laundering. We cannot prove it, but we can see it. So, I don't know which moment was worse. The 1980s, during the war, the lines to get basic food were very long, but more or less people had some capacity. Of course, some had more. But today, what percentage of the population has access to basic necessities?[16]

According to the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, 47.9 percent of the Nicaraguan population lives below the national poverty line; in Mozambique, 69.4 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line, and 45 percent of the population at birth has the probability of *not* surviving to age 40.[17]

Justiniano Liebl, with Centro de Apoyo a Programas y Proyectos (Support Center for Programs and Projects [CAPRI]) and liberation theologist in Nicaragua for more than fifty years, describes how this increasing poverty manifests itself as a loss of access to the basic resources of survival for many Nicaraguans:

> People lost their food. Before, nobody was ever without food or jobs. There were little salaries. Every fifteen days, we all got arroz, frijoles, rice, beans, oil, sugar. Nobody went hungry, nobody. There were no rich people, and there was not a lot extra. To get milk, you had to go to five different stores. There was a shortage of everything: toilet paper, soap, milk. The gringos were the enemies of humanity.[18]

Yalile Giacomán also with CAPRI, agrees, describing how many of the economic gains made under the Sandinista regime have been lost in the contemporary period: "There were not people begging. There were not kids at street lights. All kids were at school. We lost health care. Education is practically private . . . 90% knew how to read and write. Practically everybody had a job. Everybody ate . . . At the time of the Sandinistas, I was able to save $50. Today, I make more and I don't save anything![19] With increasing privatization and costs of living, not only do savings decrease but so do the vision and the possibility of economic democracy.

From Socialism to Capitalism: Political Democratization, Market Capitalization, and the IMF

The trends we have seen in Mozambique and Nicaragua are political democratization, market capitalization, neoliberal economic policies dominated by international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and a declining role of the domestic state in terms of establishing a basic standard of living for all citizens. Ana Fernandes, manager of Rio Péle textile factory in Maputo, describes what this has meant for Mozambicans:

> Political rights, GNP and inflation have all increased. The economy is generally doing better, but how does it reflect in the population? The IMF and World Bank are part of the problem. They are killing the local industries. This is NOT better for the future. The State was financing everything. Now, there is abandonment, neo-colonization. We export raw materials, so we need to protect local industries . . . 80% of the population is poor . . . very poor. A few are very wealthy and have Mercedes, Ferraris . . . In the U.S. "socialism is terrible." I don't feel it was that bad. In socialism, everybody had the right to the same things. Health care was free. We had Cuban and Chinese doctors. Education was free, but in the 80s, the country could not afford it. Everything was free, free, free! But we did not have the infrastructure. Now, we are not socialists, we are capitalists. With the sudden changes, you start to question the economic indicators. They say Mozambique is a great example for the IMF and the World Bank. It is doing so good. But look at the population! We must need different economic indicators.[20]

Teresa Cruz e Silva, Director of the Center for African Studies and Professor of Social History at UEM, shares Fernandes's concerns: "The World Bank and the IMF used to consider this country as an example because of the peace process and structural adjustment measures, but there is more and more poverty in this country. . . . It is difficult to change policies. The situation now

is very difficult because the economic policies of Frelimo failed. So we are dependent on the IMF and World Bank now. As Joseph Hanlon[21] said, 'The World Bank is the chief of the nation.'"[22]

The same situation is taking place in Nicaragua. Poverty has been exacerbated into beggary as the IMF and World Bank are praised for macro-economic indicators and the state has less control over the economy. As Lilleana Salinas summarizes:

> That's not development—even though you see them, you can't go there. That's how people think—we now have Supermercados, but no one can go there! The neoliberal government is praised by international donors. But they are demanding—poverty. For example, we had poor, but now we have beggars! It is not true that the World Bank and the IMF want to save us. Our sons and daughters are poorer than we.[23]

Many people I interviewed described the loss of governmental autonomy that has accompanied the antimajoritarian application of neoliberalism in Nicaragua and Mozambique specifically, and the Third World more generally. Mónica Zalaquett describes the loss of domestic economic power that has accompanied the increased influence of international financial institutions:

> Here, there are two big influences: financial organizations, like the World Bank, IMF, and Interamerican Bank of Development, that manage our economy. Different functionaries of government are really subordinated to them. We don't have economic policies set by our own country . . . This is not necessarily bad, but . . . they are not very worried about the social effects. The World Bank and the IMF have other interests: the interests of European countries and the U.S. and making these countries overcome poverty.[24]

Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank since the late 1980s have had a profound impact on the everyday survival of Mozambicans and Nicaraguans. The IMF economic reform program in Mozambique was accompanied by a massive devaluation of currency, resulting in the 1987 rate of 42 meticais to the dollar falling to 840 meticais to the dollar.[25] This currency devaluation, along with the removal of subsidies that went along with the package, "caused sharp price rises that were not compensated for by wage increases."[26] After the 1987 imposition of the IMF-prescribed economic recovery program in Mozambique, a loaf of bread cost US$1, one-sixteenth of the minimum monthly income of a domestic worker, US$16.[27] Thus, urban poverty increased. Moreover, an inability to purchase enough food for the family in cities often accompanies the inability of rural women to produce enough food for their families.

In 1988 in Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista government responded to the high costs of defense of the revolution and social service subsidies for health care and education by imposing a set of policies consistent with IMF neoliberalism: shifting to export-oriented production, devaluing the currency, laying off thousands of workers in the public sector, and drastically cutting social spending.[28] Florence Babb asserts that "this may account in significant part for the Sandinistas' electoral loss two years later and for the gender gap in the vote, with more women than men supporting the UNO [Unión Nacional Oposición]."[29] However, Babb also shows that the neoliberal structural adjustment subsequently imposed on Nicaragua by the UNO government "has had much worse consequences. . . . Nicaragua had never had a worse depression, with levels of unemployment and poverty unprecedented in the country's history. Between 1990 and 1992, formal sector employment dropped 18 percent, with many workers leaving jobs in health, education, and other public services. Unemployment rose to 19 percent and underemployment to 45 percent in 1992."[30] The Chamorro government accepted an economic "reform" program in 1990, which devalued the national currency by 180 percent, increased inflation by 150 percent, and decreased workers' salaries by one-third.[31]

Women suffer a particular fate when structural adjustment programs are imposed because of their relationship to reproduction. As Cliff explains, all structural adjustment policies have a built-in gender bias because they ignore productive, unpaid labor:

> When macro-economic policies are formulated to reallocate resources, the lack of explicit consideration of the process of reproduction and maintenance of human resources tells against women. For the implicit assumption of macro-economic policy is that *the process of reproduction and maintenance of human resources which is carried out unpaid by women will continue regardless of the way in which resources are reallocated* [emphasis mine].[32]

The cost of a longer and harder working day for women will not be considered in the evaluation of the success of such macro-economic policies as currency devaluation because it is invisible, informal, assumed, and often unpaid. The disregard for the social reproduction of human resources and the assumption of the survival mechanism of informal markets perpetuates a gendered notion of development and places women in a position of exploitation and subordination.

In describing how women have been affected by the economic transition from socialism to capitalism, Sabina Santos, Director of an OMM Training Center in Machava, a rural community outside of Maputo, describes how women have suffered more in the transition:

> All women want the establishment of economic stability. During the socialist regime after independence, the situation changed drastically. Today, with the multiparty system and free market capitalism, there is another big change. One suffers and feels it more. Under socialism, things were free. Now, we buy everything. Women are the ones who suffer it more everyday.[33]

With their gendered responsibility for social reproduction and family maintenance, women carry a disproportionate burden of structural adjustment policies on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, democratic consolidation will never be a reality as long as international financial institutions determine economic policies for states that increase poverty and decrease people's access to the goods and services required for survival.

International Financial Institution Interference in Mozambique: The Case of Cashews

From 1960 to the present, Mozambique went from producing half the world's cashews, involving millions of peasants in agricultural production and employing more than ten thousand workers in cashew processing, to producing only 5 percent of the world's total cashew market through one million peasant producers and one hundred members of the processing workforce.[34] In April 1995, the Frelimo government decided to create a gradually decreasing protectionist export tax on raw cashews (26 percent, 20 percent, 16 percent, 12 percent, 8 percent) from 1996 to 2000 to allow owners of newly privatized companies to rehabilitate and modernize cashew processing factories.[35] This Frelimo policy, however, was never implemented because of interference by the World Bank, which commissioned a study of the cashew industry in 1994 by Hilmar Hilmarsson that was released in mid-1995. The study argued that the inefficiency of the cashew processing industry in Mozambique and the low pay given to peasant producers suggested a strategy of liberalizing the export of raw cashews.[36] Despite extensive critiques by the Associação dos Indústriais de Cajú (Cashew Industry Association [Aicajú]), of the data used in the Hilmarsson study, and a lack of communication with and knowledge of the cashew industry, the World Bank adopted the policy of rapid liberalization of raw cashew exports in Mozambique.[37] According to Joseph Hanlon, "Industry people said privately that they are convinced that study would never have been released if the industry had been privatized to foreign companies as had been expected, and that the World Bank was only prepared to force the free market on domestic capital and not foreign investors."[38] Mozambican acceptance of the liberalization policies was deemed a necessary condition of the 1995 World Bank country assessment strategy and the 1996 IMF policy

framework paper.[39] The case of cashews in Mozambique epitomizes the loss of state autonomy over domestic economic policy decisions to international financial institutions during the era of neoliberal globalization, as well as the contradiction between what so often amounts to "free unfair trade" for developing countries and "protectionist fair trade" for the developed world and foreign investors.

After traveling to Mozambique in 1997 to "meet civil society" and talking with President Joaquim Chissano and a member of the cashew industry, then President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn suspended the policy, ordered a new study be conducted, and harshly criticized the Bank's handling of the situation.[40] The new study, conducted by international consultants Deloitte and Touche and released in 1997, stated that the World Bank policy should be abandoned.[41] Moreover, the United Nations Development Programme stated in its 1998 detailed study of the cashew sector that Mozambique should adopt "infant agriculture policies" for its cashew industry even though such policies are "anathema" to free market ideals: "There is no universal recipe for pursuing these objectives, but policy makers should at least commit themselves to exploring the range of possibilities rather than slavishly surrendering to the seductive elegance of the free market model. There is abundant evidence that sub-Saharan African agriculture has not responded as hoped to price liberalization and trade deregulation."[42]

While Mozambique and Nicaragua have qualified for debt relief through the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives under much global pressure for the IMF and World Bank to reconsider their relationship to the goal of poverty reduction, the assumptions of export-led growth, reduced public spending, and free market neoliberalism are still predominant among international discourses of development and continue to threaten goals of economic democracy.

Political Democracy: Freedom of Speech and Basic Political Freedoms

Despite the increased poverty and decreased commitment to economic democracy ushered into the postrevolutionary periods in Mozambique and Nicaragua, have there been any important gains in political democracy? Célia Diniz referred to Mozambique under a one-party state as "a very discretionary system, very dangerous, with no counter-power."[43] One of the worst abuses by Frelimo was Operation Production, a campaign initiated in 1983 to forcibly remove thousands of "surplus" members of urban populations deemed "unproductive," including the unemployed, the homeless, and prostitutes, and fly them to rural areas such as Niassa, a province in the North of the country, to work on state farms.[44] Several people I interviewed referred to the rounding

up of unemployed people and prostitutes to be taken to reeducation camps, referring to the particularly well-known story of Luís de Brito, Mozambican professor and head of the Faculty of Marxism-Leninism at UEM, who was taken to Niassa. As one person noted, "This was clearly a mistake." In addition to these political abuses of the revolutionary state, workers also suffered under new laws calling for public floggings and executions for economic crimes: "Port and railway workers, historically the most militant sector of the working class, were the first to be flogged."[45]

Groupos Dinimizadores (GDs) were the dynamizing groups of Frelimo, replaced in many areas by the early 1980s with party cells organized on the local level, "everywhere, on the job, where you live." Some people interviewed referred to the positive aspects of the dynamizing group meetings as places where discursive democracy and participation took place on a regular, localized basis. Others criticized the rush to judgment that often emerged from the power of the GDs and the discretionary justice that characterizes one-party states:

> For example, there was a robbery at UEM. The Grupo Dinimizador (GD) had the police and political powers. There was a Saturday morning meeting at 10 A.M. The GD presents the findings of the robbery of the transport sector. The meeting ended. At 2 P.M., the Political Police were outside. They took the guys accused to re-education camps without their day in court. It was very complicated in those days. We told the Director of the University you cannot do things like that. One guy stayed in the camp for years. Discretionary justice. It's much better now. It is always dangerous when you have only one choice. The multi-party system is much more open, fresher. Frelimo continues to be very influential.[46]

Maria Fernanda Farinha of AUSTRAL also cites greater freedom of expression as the positive political change that has taken place after the adoption of the multiparty system in Mozambique: "People feel more free. There was a lot of repression. I never felt it. I always felt I could say whatever I wanted. I don't need people to give me room. I'll take it! But there were people who felt one thing: that there was one way of thinking, not much debate."[47]

Feminist theorist and activist Sofía Montenegro pointed out some of the same political gains in the postrevolutionary period in Nicaragua: "The gains include a less dogmatic vision of the world for what is proper of the left—insight, tolerance, good bourgeois tolerance, good bourgeois values: respect for individualism. Collectivism denied individuality. The next experiment needs to combine the best of both worlds: commonality plus individuality without one overcoming the other. I think this depolarization of politics is necessary. It was painful learning the gain."[48]

It seems that while political freedoms have increased—particularly freedom to critique the party and of local initiative—access to basic necessities, and thus economic democracy, has decreased. Signe Arnfred, Danish scholar and researcher who has spent a significant amount of time in Mozambique, summarizes well what has been gained politically and what has been lost economically in the transition from a socialist one-party state to a multiparty democratic capitalist state:

> Today, we have gained more openness. The fear and repression of Frelimo, being afraid of criticizing the party, not being open to political debate. There was no debate. It was the party line in the early 80s. The politics of the party was a uniform line, you were not supposed to question. You felt like participating in meetings as long as you didn't question the party line. People were materially poor, but happier then. We had a feeling of a better future which we don't have now. Education and health care were free! Since the structural adjustment discussion has been taking place, it is very sad to see. It was hard to find things before but there was a hopeful feeling.[49]

Participatory Democracy: From the Revolutionary Participation of Women in the State to Autonomous Organizing in Civil Society

The transition to a multiparty state in Mozambique and to a non-Sandinista multiparty state in Nicaragua has had an enormous impact on the nature of democratic participation in the postrevolutionary period. Both countries experienced a transition from a centralized, single-party state apparatus that played an historically significant role in organizing their populations to participate in mass-based organizations governed by the ruling party, to a decentralized, multiparty state characterized by autonomous organizing in civil society outside the state party governing apparatus. What impact has this transition had on the nature of participatory democracy in both countries? Three main themes emerged from my research in this area: (1) the revolutionary period constituted a highly participatory period characterized by more discourse among the general population but less discursive and organizational freedom; (2) the postrevolutionary period is characterized by many decentralized autonomous organizations, with greater freedom, more diversity, more space for individual initiative, and horizontal decision-making structures; (3) the NGO-ization of civil society has led to the domination of international funding agencies over grassroots concerns, where NGOs led by urban elites are often funded at the expense of the state.

Revolutionary Participation in
Mozambique and Nicaragua

Jocqueline M. Evans, a young leader in the FSLN Women's League in Granada, asserts that the major contribution she perceived by the FSLN during the revolutionary period was the importance given to the increased participation of young people and women:

> The primary objective, after the overthrow of Somoza, was to consolidate the revolution. There was a new interpretation of the administration of public popular power. This demanded that the masses get involved in popular organizations, like AMNLAE, the CST, ATC. The goal we were pursuing was to create a better distribution of wealth for the masses. At that first moment, women's participation increased in these tasks: police, armed forces, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Plannification. . . . We became more sensitive to our role as citizens—we went to the rural areas for the literacy campaigns, the women and youth. . . . I was the woman growing up to see that freedom. Women had more opportunities to project themselves into the army, health, knowledge. . . . To sum up, women's participation was fundamental and important to the FSLN.[50]

Dora Zeledón, AMNLAE Coordinator, also describes the historic role the Sandinista revolution played in mobilizing women to get involved and in bringing women into the public sphere: "There was a broad process of consultation. Women were consulted at the grassroots level. Women won the right to get out of the four walls of the house and into the public sphere into posts of power and leadership. The revolution opened an historic opportunity for women because women made a difference with that participation."[51] Zeledón goes on to argue that despite the fact that gender consciousness was not really a part of the FSLN, the efforts that were made on behalf of women have led to the fact that "today, we have one of the most active and belligerent women's movements in Central America."[52]

Ana María Pizarro, Director of SI MUJER, similarly states the connection between the mobilization of women during the revolution and the organization of women taking place today: "At a general level, we cannot deny or ignore women's participation during the revolution. Women during the revolution acquired their own voice, their own leadership. That makes the feminist movement today the strongest and best organized in Central America."[53] María Rosa Renzi, UNDP Gender Representative, agrees that the revolution provided the resources to create more participation, allowing women later to develop their "organizational capacity."[54]

Rosario Pasquier, Director, Asociación de Padres de Familia Doris María Morales Tijerino, goes one step further than paying tribute to the revolutionary

years. Pasquier actually argues that people were *more* politicized during the revolutionary years than they are today:

> I think we should talk about the Revolution as a whole. It was made by many people, not one. For example, right now, many people of this country have to make the changes. We lived through the dictatorship, wanted to study, saw the poor nutrition of kids. The revolution was something magical, something wonderful. With the revolution, people participated more. For example, women read the paper, got involved. Then, society was more politicized. People are less politicized now. In that period, solidarity prevailed. We shared the things we didn't have. We took care of things in the evening. At Cine Blanco, we'd see a prostitute, and we'd say, "Hey girl, aren't you worried?" In everyday life, things have changed.[55]

Perhaps Noè Silva epitomizes best the effect that living in a revolutionary society can have on one's notion of people power and political efficacy: "We need to make another revolution! It doesn't have to be a war. The people need to step up and demand from the government. They are supposed to work for us—they don't! We elected them, we can take them down! We did it once—with weapons!"[56]

Since Frelimo is still in power in Mozambique, there is both less criticism of the party taking place as well as less of a need to defend the legacy of the revolution. Everyone I interviewed paid unanimous homage to Frelimo as the party that liberated Mozambique and the party that emancipated women. According to Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango of MULEIDE: "Frelimo was the first one to start to give value to women—an equal seat. For example, in the liberated zones, the men helped the women and the children. Reference is obliged to the OMM, which is an inspiration to women's organizations then and now. MULEIDE, MBEU, AMRU, ADOCA[57]: there are many women's organizations today, made up of members of the OMM."[58] Corporatist participation through the state-revolutionary-party governments has paved the way for pluralist participation by autonomous women's organizations in postrevolutionary civil society, with many benefits emerging for women (see Chapter 8 for further discussion on this topic).

Decreased Discourse?
Party Membership versus Citizenship

Did the revolutionary period offer anything better in terms of participation of the masses? Many people I interviewed argued that there was actually more pluralism in the single-party system in Mozambique because there was more grassroots consultation and discussion of different outlooks. The late Carlos

Cardoso pointed out the ironic inconsistency of equating multipartyism with political democratization: "Now, there is *formally more pluralism*, but *actually less consultation*. This is the first government that makes more decisions in private than in public since independence" [emphasis mine].[59] For Cardoso, "the only thing that has substantially increased is freedom of speech. The last three years of this government has been the most democratic in terms of freedom of speech, but the least democratic in terms of consultation."[60] Today, in the multiparty state, there is less official consultation between the government and the people. Neoliberal capitalist democracy is the only game in town.

One of the most often cited reasons for this loss of discursive democracy is the fact that party membership has replaced basic citizenship in both Mozambique and Nicaragua. In a discussion I had with Gulamo Taju and Ana Maria Montero, who were then heading the NGO Development Project at UEM, Taju pointed out the distinction that has emerged today in Mozambique between citizen and party member: "We are not members of Frelimo. Before, as a citizen, I participated openly. Today, as a citizen, I cannot participate unless I am a member of the party. This is a new model of a multiparty society: 'nonmembers' are excluded."[61] This is one of the negative aspects that has emerged from the transition to a Western-style liberal democracy: political party power in a newly emerging multiparty state allows membership to trump citizenship. Ritha Fletes Zamora, then FSLN member of the National Assembly, argued that the same thing is happening in Nicaragua: "One of the principal policies of neoliberalism and multipartyism is that the only way for women and men to achieve positions of power is through parties."[62] As Mónica Baltodano summarizes Nicaraguan politics, "It has become a system of parties and not of people."[63] The Pact that was formed between the Liberal Alliance and the FSLN, assuring institutional power-sharing between the two parties, is perhaps the most empirical example of this new system of parties over people.[64]

Postrevolutionary Participation: More Freedom, More Diversity

One of the most positive elements regarding the change from a one-party state to a multiparty state in both countries is, quite simply, that today more organizations exist autonomously from Frelimo and the FSLN, and therefore, there is more space for freedom of speech and the expression of opinions and ideas that differ from the party/state/government.

Since the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, there has been a vast proliferation of new organizations in Nicaragua. Javier Matus Lazo of CENADE cites the strengthening of civil society as a positive aspect of this transition: "There are more NGOs, with more autonomy, not in the interests of the party but of the groups themselves."[65] Long-time Sandinista Yalile Giacoman of

CAPRI agrees with the gains ushered in by the autonomous organizations: "We have improved in the area of civil society. For example, during the Sandinista era, the main organization for women was AMNLAE. Nowadays, there are many organizations for women that have incorporated the Sandinista ideology—Puntos de Encuentro, SI MUJER."[66] Giacomán notes that after the adoption of a multiparty democracy and the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the two positive results have been the absence of war and the presence of autonomous NGOs: "The civil organizations are better than the FSLN organizations. We were organized according to the structure of the party. They would teach us that social problems have community solutions. Even members of the resistance [Contras] are following the line of civil organizations."[67] Eva María Sam Qui, former Director of the Centro de Mujeres, IXCHEN, also argues that the benefits of the organizations in civil society today are their autonomy and their horizontal decision making: "The mass organizations have developed and transformed, are more horizontal, there is more participation of members, they have their own agenda, they have overcome the structure of the party. The party has not transformed."[68]

In Mozambique, Maria Fernanda Farinha argues that things are better today because of the diverse expansions in civil society: "There are more organizations, NGOs, associations in the 1990s. More opportunities for the people to get involved. More *different* opportunities for the people to get involved."[69] However, despite the positive organizing element of the new civil society, Farinha also cites the divisions that can occur as a result of more options: "There were more things to put people together before. Today, there are more things to pull people apart."[70] Luisa Capelão, a Portuguese Mozambican native working with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), also praised the growth of a strong civil society: "We need a strong civil society. We did not have a strong civil society under Frelimo. For 90 percent of the NGOs that started, the source of the funds has been for women, gender, human rights."[71] What could possibly be wrong with increased funding for women's and human rights NGOs?

Participatory Democracy or Neoliberal Necessity: The NGO-ization of Civil Society

The multiplicity of diverse organizations in civil society has been a definite improvement in terms of citizen participation. However, two negative consequences have emerged as a result of this transition: (1) the "NGO-ization" of civil society: new organizations often represent the interests of the donor community and not the grassroots interests of the people; (2) NGOs have risen to fill the void created by a declining neoliberal state.

While there may be more room for individual creativity within nongovernmental organizations, agendas are often superimposed from above, that is,

from the donor community of USAID, the IMF, the World Bank, and other international development agencies. Several scholars have argued that the Frelimo government's "embrace of the approach to development sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank has been accompanied by a dramatic erosion of domestic authority, as donors, foreign consultants, and NGOs assume responsibilities previously reserved to the state."[72] A report from the Consultative Group/Donors Meeting from March 1995 discussed "demands for even more detailed donor intervention than in the past to keep a much closer watch on what the government is doing; one donor warned of the danger of trying to 'co-govern with Frelimo.'"[73] Several development working groups exist in this international policy network, including the Development Partners Group, which addresses budgetary issues of economic and development and contains heads of missions in Mozambique of bilateral donors, UNDP, and the international financial institutions. During the transition to the postrevolutionary neoliberal multiparty state in the early 1990s, David Plank asserted that "Mozambican leaders have been obliged to cede substantial influence over domestic political arrangements and policy choices to external agencies in order to maintain the flow of aid and avert economic collapse."[74] More recently, Anne Pitcher seeks a more nuanced analysis of the privatization process in Mozambique, assessing both the limitations and the opportunities of privatization and liberalization in the county, citing both the role of redirected state powers and the voice of smallholders in the process.[75]

In an interesting analysis of the excluded and marginalized sectors of Mozambican society, Ana Maria Montero, formerly with the NGO Development Project of UEM, concludes that while they have experienced a decreasing opportunity to participate within the democratization process of the multiparty system, there has been an increasing opportunity for people to take initiative and organize creatively. However, she worries about the extent to which this initiative is reflective of actual grassroots concerns or rather simply mirrors the interests of international funding agencies:

> International agencies like USAID are more concerned with women (gender), human rights, civic education, the environment . . . not necessarily hunger, jobs, housing . . . They may be imposing their agendas and changing the objectives of the organizations, intervening in local activities, disputing local spaces. The NGOs did not fill the gap for mass participation.[76]

Montero used the concept of 'the NGO-ization of development' to refer to the top-down process of money and influence exercised from the international donor community through local NGOs. Moreover, Montero has concluded that the new opportunities for organizing through the auspices of NGOs is an opportunity open predominantly to urban elites: "NGOs are constituted by the urban

elites that feel excluded from politics and economics. . . . They have no capital to run a business. NGOs provide an alternative way to deal with the political and economic exclusion of such elites."[77] For Montero, Mozambique's transition to a neoliberal capitalist democracy has allowed more spaces to emerge for urban elites to organize, but not necessarily for other sectors of society.

Carlos Cardoso agreed with the general sentiment expressed by Montero and Taju regarding the NGO-ization of development. While there is room for more individual creativity, agendas are also superimposed. He reminds us, however, that there are exceptions to the rule, and he expressed greater hope for the possibilities of civil society: "There are NGOs that are genuinely in the movement, despite the fact that they began because of donor money. . . . There is a wave of opportunism, but some good is being done. Civil society is the struggle for a better epoch."[78] I think this is a beautiful sentiment, and in many ways I share Cardoso's optimism. The question, however, remains: who will be a part of that struggle, and who will define what "the better epoch" will look like?

Justiniano Liebl, who has worked on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua for years and now works at CAPRI, an organization which publishes a directory of all of the NGOs in Nicaragua, makes an argument that in Nicaragua the Sandinista organizations of yesterday are the NGOs of today: "The popular mass organizations became the NGOs. The NGOs today are doing the work that the Sandinistas were better at! The people who lost their jobs with the Frente formed NGOs. Alemán feels he has to destroy the NGOs, because they are mostly Sandinista residue."[79] Many people I interviewed in Nicaragua commented that the NGOs of civil society today are simply filling the void left by the defeat of the Sandinista government and doing the work that should be the responsibility of the state. In the 1980s, there were nine NGOs in Nicaragua. In the early 1990s, hundreds were born. As Mónica Zalaquett attests, civil society has been "practically born with thousands of Sandinistas from government trying to continue the revolution from outside, finding spaces for survival, salary, to work alongside government" in NGOs.[80]

Irma Ortega's story, a very common one among activist women in Nicaragua, exemplifies this transition from working within the Sandinista state to working within a postrevolutionary NGO. Ortega started to work with the Sandinistas immediately after the July 19, 1979, triumph of the revolution with the Sandinistas and was employed by the FSLN until they lost power in 1990. She worked with the Ministry of Agricultural Development from 1979 to 1982 at the Centro de Investigaciónes y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (Center for Investigations and Studies of Agrarian Reform [CIERA]) and afterward continued working for the FSLN party for eight more years. After being unemployed in 1990, she began working at the Center for Rural and Social Promotion, Research, and Development (CIPRES) conducting research on agrarian cooperatives, women's access to land, and development of bean and corn seed. She has been at CIPRES ever since: "This work has been an

enriching experience. It has allowed me to be in contact with many women throughout the country. Besides being the director of many projects, I attend other conferences, teaching and training with women. Another thing very enriching for me is talking to women of other NGOs because I am in charge of gender here at CIPRES."[81]

From her vantage point, both inside the state and party apparatus and now outside the state in the NGO community, Ortega provides a very interesting critique of the changes that democratization and civil society have ushered into Nicaragua. In the following passage, Ortega describes the transformation in the organizing that has taken place from the revolutionary period to the present, making the critical point that the NGOs have merely risen to fill a void created by a neoliberal state:

> Effectively, there was a lot of grassroots participation: children, youth, women, rural, urban workers . . . but the limiting obstacle was that everything revolved around the structure of the party. In the 1990s, the most active groups today are women. The unions are still active, but they are divided too much. It is important to get together without changing the individuality of each. The women's encuentro motto was "Unity with Diversity." Many women's movements, like the Network of Women on Violence and Health, have emerged in the 1990s with the emerging of NGOs. Rather than being a demonstration of "democracy" that we have today, it is more of a necessity of society to address problems the government and the state no longer address. The state is becoming free of these responsibilities. It is more than the outcome of "wonderful democracy."[82]

Ortega reminds us that even if civil society is the struggle of autonomous grassroots organizations for a better epoch, the state will have to have a role in guaranteeing, and not blocking, that new epoch for all its citizens. María Rosa Renzi, UNDP Gender Representative makes very similar claims about the rise of NGOs to fill the void of a weak state: "Some sectors of civil society have flourished. Some of these things the state has stopped doing. Is this a social motivation or a necessity?"[83] The NGO-ization of civil society appears to be a necessary outcome of a neoliberal state: activists attempting to fill the holes of a sinking ship.

Civil Society: A Weak Substitute for Democracy?

When the FSLN lost control of the state, many Sandinistas attempted to try to continue the work of a welfare state through NGOs in civil society. But how can civil society compete with the power of the state? Mónica Zalaquett agrees that the autonomous organizing of today has the freedom and vibrancy the

Sandinista period was lacking; however, what is lost is an organized governmental strategy:

> Many Sandinistas left, not just referring to the Sergio Ramírez Branch,[84] but there are many who belong to no particular branch. We lead our Sandinismo from the NGOs—This feels like more of a transformative element than all my years with the FSLN. I think now, there is more richness, more creativity, more initiative, more freedom of speech, but a lot of disorder . . . not a part of a plan of a nation. I don't know where we are going as a government or as a people . . . Neither the government nor the NGOs should be put before people's interests . . . I favor the creation of permanent coordinating spaces of NGOs with governments over specific topics.[85]

Zalaquett highlights the struggle for autonomous organizations working in civil society today which mirrors the question for feminism raised in the introduction to Chapter 2: how to organize a diverse collection of interests in civil society into a plan of social justice for the nation-state as a whole. Clearly, civil society has the potential to be an agent of democratization, but it can also be used as a substitute for a fuller conception of democracy at the level of the state, market, and family.

Perhaps Zoilamérica Narváez articulates best the distinction between a vibrant civil society and a powerful democracy. Narváez credits the recent period of democratization with creating new spaces, leaders, and thinking around feminist ideas and practices, but she praises the revolution for establishing a "culture of organization" around the politics of solidarity in Nicaragua. In the postrevolutionary period, she is concerned about the divisions that democratization has revealed and the difficulties of unifying around common causes as a result:

> The culture of organization has been the heritage of the revolution—a lot of organizations, a lot of participation. Now, it's true, for more opportunities, but now there is a new authoritarian system. We do not have the capacity for new coalitions, we do not have capacity building. In the past, we focused on what we had in common; now, there are more divisions, more weakness. There is hopelessness among the people, who just want to survive. We don't have a common idea of nation, we don't have common heroes, common symbols. . . . In the 90s, we fell in love with social movements, in love with more identities. There are as many problems as there are identities. But political power issues cross everything. . . . The structure of power stays the same. Political power must be transformed. The issue of democracy is not

just the number of participants or spaces for process but the issue of the production of ideas about power.[86]

Power is often used to distinguish between what is possible within the realm of the state and what is merely discussed within the realm of civil society. Ana Criquillon describes the power differential between the revolutionary organizations and NGOs of today: "The union organizations were at the center of the revolution. . . . To be at the center is to have more power, more power to change things . . . Unions have lost power in policy-making today due to neoliberal government and policies."[87] Pressure from organizations in civil society can only go so far, especially decentralized NGOs led by urban elites and funded by the international donor community. Democratization will be achieved only when civil society, the family, the market, and the state are targets for and vehicles of social, political, and economic change.

Conclusion

In conclusion, both Mozambique and Nicaragua have experienced gains in political democracy, in terms of freedom of speech and expression, and losses in economic democracy, in terms of decreasing access to basic necessities and increasing economic inequality. The transitions from centralized single-party states to decentralized multiparty states have led to complicated gains and losses in terms of participatory democracy. Autonomous organizing in civil society has replaced mass organizations of the state, allowing for more freedom of association, more diversity, and greater grassroots initiative. However, both countries have also seen the NGO-ization of civil society, in which international funding agencies fund urban elites to help ease the pain of neoliberal structural adjustment policies. Moreover, party membership seems to have replaced citizenship in terms of mass-based discourse on national policy issues.

Ultimately, autonomous organizing in postrevolutionary civil society constitutes both the prospects for progressive change through the exercise of grassroots agency, as well as the limits of liberal democratic capitalist monism through the preservation of the political and economic status quo of the international funding community. This is precisely why any movement for revolutionary democratic change cannot rest on civil society alone. It is clear that the process of the revolutions encouraged the participation of the masses and, as such, is largely responsible for the increase in autonomous organizing in civil society today; however, it is also clear that the revolutions discouraged diversity and squelched dissent. The concluding chapter of the book examines the kind of diverse organizing that is taking place in the autonomous women's movements of Mozambique and Nicaragua and assesses what they have to offer to the theories and practices of comparative intersectional feminisms.

8

"Partners in the Home, at Work, and on the Street"

The Contemporary Women's Movements and Emergent Feminisms in Mozambique and Nicaragua

> *As you said, our women are fighting to survive. Women are the chief of the family. They are fighting to improve their economic life. At this moment, we are fighting for gender equality. Not differences of sex. We know the sexes are different, but the capacities are the same: administrators, managers, making decisions, giving opinions. . . . We are fighting for gender equality. Yes, this is feminism.*
> —Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, Interview, Maputo, Mozambique, 7/5/99

> *I have to tell you, I am against theoretical feminism in the developed world. . . . In Europe and the U.S., the situation is different. They have created the conditions for development . . . It is not the same to talk about feminism in Nicaragua or Spain or the Nordic countries because of the differing GNP per cap. So, I critique some people who are more concerned about finding the G-spot than increasing the GNP!" [emphasis mine]*
> —Ritha Fletes Zamora, Former FSLN Member of Parliament, Interview, Managua, Nicaragua, 1/10/00

Introduction

Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, and Ritha Fletes Zamora, former FSLN Member of Parliament in Nicaragua, articulate extremely effectively the contestations that exist between First World and Third World feminisms and how feminist discourses from the developed world may have different priorities than feminisms emerging from the developing context. Mateus focuses on why a politics of gender equality and not gender difference may make the most sense for the theories and practices of women's organizing in Mozambique, and she asserts that this is, in fact, feminist. Zamora's concerns echo the distinction often made between sex/violence/culture feminists and economic feminists, also challenging the notion of difference feminism. If we as feminists continue to divide ourselves along these categories, and prioritize either the G-spot

or the GNP (gross national product), both of which involve material (practical) and ideological (strategic) struggles, *without* looking at the intersections between women's economic opportunities and women's sexual and reproductive health, we will continue to perpetuate false dichotomies that either alienate women of diverse racial, class, economic, national, and sexual identities or weaken our analyses and programs for social change. The key for future feminist struggles globally is to better examine the connections and intersections between women's economic, political, social, cultural, and sexual struggles in the productive and reproductive spheres of our lives.

This chapter addresses the kinds of organizing taking place, the current debates, and the constructions of feminism emerging in the autonomous women's movements in Mozambique and Nicaragua, including an assessment of the relationship of the OMM and AMNLAE to the autonomous women's movements in each country today. The transition in Mozambique and Nicaragua from a one-party Marxist-Leninist state to a multiparty capitalist state has ushered in new organizing opportunities for women. Both countries have experienced a transition from one, predominant, state-controlled national women's organization (OMM, AMNLAE) to numerous autonomous women's organizations in civil society. More than fifty women's organizations and gender-related nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged in Mozambique in the postrevolutionary period, while in Nicaragua, AMNLAE is simply one of more than three hundred women's organizations within the autonomous women's and feminist movements that exist all over the country.

The electoral victory of Frelimo and the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas created the very different terrains upon which the postrevolutionary women's movements have developed in each country. The state-as-friend scenario that persists in Mozambique under the leadership of the ruling Frelimo party has been replaced in Nicaragua by a state-as-enemy context: first when the opposition FSLN party engaged in a power-sharing pact with the ruling Liberal party and then when the recently reelected FSLN party formed an alliance with the Catholic Church and conservative religious groups to the detriment of women's rights. This helps explain why the women's organizations in civil society are *working with* the 34.8 percent women parliamentarians in Mozambique, whereas the women's organizations in Nicaragua are *working autonomously from* the state and the 18.5 percent women elected into parliament. Given these different postrevolutionary political contexts, I would like to conclude the book by exploring the nature of women's organizing and the constructions of feminism emerging in contemporary Mozambique and Nicaragua and assess what they have to offer to the theories and practices of comparative intersectional feminisms.

Contemporary women's organizing is taking different forms in Mozambique and Nicaragua. In Mozambique, women's organizations are targeting the state for legislative change, focusing on family law, economic development, and violence against women. In Nicaragua, women's organizing, active in civil society

and working more autonomously from the state, is coalescing around an intersectional approach to body politics. Issues such as reproductive rights, domestic violence, health, culture, the economy, and the law are being constructed around a common understanding of women's bodily integrity. Women's organizations are recognizing the linkages between women's rights to be free from violence, to choose when, whether, and how many children to have; to have access to health care and to economic opportunities, and to care for themselves and their families. However, while there seems to be a divergence in terms of the organizing strategies taking place in the contemporary women's movement in each country, there is a convergence in the way feminism is understood in both countries. Feminisms in both Mozambique and Nicaragua, and I would argue, in much of the developing world, are being constructed in ways that challenge the practical/strategic, productive/reproductive, and economics/sex-violence-culture divides often upheld in many American and European feminisms.

Autonomous Women's Organizing in Mozambique

One argument to explain women's increased feminist agency in the postrevolutionary period in Mozambique is that, quite simply, where one corporatist organization once existed for women in the OMM, now several pluralist organizations exist. According to Ana Maria Montero, formerly with the NGO Development Project of UEM, "The NGO process in Mozambique consists mainly of national NGOs taking part in societal activities with the opening, democratizing process in Mozambique."[1] Montero believes that there are many women in Mozambican organizations, associations, and movements today because of the fact that for many years, women could only participate politically, economically, and socially in the OMM:

> Women had to be a member of the OMM to have the opportunity to participate or give their experience. When the country gave the opportunity to all people to organize in associations, the women found the place . . . a place to exchange ideas and discuss their situation in Mozambique. Associations give excluded women the opportunity to show people that they have the capacity to do anything in different sectors.[2]

Today, there are more than fifty women's associations in Mozambique, an increase from 1997 when there were about twenty-five women's associations. Most of the newly created autonomous women's organizations and NGOs in Mozambique are doing work in the areas of women's legal rights, economic development, violence against women, and education. One of the most important accomplishments of the contemporary women's movement in Mozambique is the passage of a new, progressive, and, in many respects, *feminist* family law.

The process of the coordinated efforts of women in civil society and women in parliament that achieved the successful passage of the New Family Law serves as a critical example of the emergence of feminist agency in Mozambique. Forum Mulher, MULEIDE, and WLSA are three of the autonomous women's organizations in Mozambique whose work in the areas of feminist lobbying, research, and activism was essential to the recent passage of the New Family Law.

Forum Mulher

One of the first and most important explicitly feminist organizations established in the postrevolutionary period in Mozambique was Forum Mulher. Forum Mulher, an umbrella organization created in part by the OMM in 1994, consists of organizational and institutional members of the women's movement in Mozambique: national and international NGOs, trade unions, and governmental institutions working in Mozambique. Forum Mulher has historically worked in the following four areas: (1) information dissemination to members, (2) education and training about gender issues, (3) lobbying to influence governmental decision makers, and (4) follow-up on the Beijing Conference and the NGO Forum of 1995. The literature of Forum Mulher stands out in Mozambique for its explicit identification of patriarchy with the systemic oppression of women.

Paulina Mateus, OMM Secretary-General, described the need for the creation of Forum Mulher as twofold: (1) to enable the OMM to work with other women's organizations, and (2) to provide a nonpartisan umbrella organization that would not belong to Frelimo since the OMM was reestablished as a partisan organization. The nonpartisanship of Forum Mulher was an essential component of its identity in light of the OMM's continued affiliation with the Frelimo party. According to Terezinha da Silva, President of the Board of Forum Mulher, "We fought hard to create Forum Mulher. Men also are members. Not every woman is a member of the OMM. The OMM equals Frelimo. It is better to be independent, to follow the objective of reaching out to all women. It is better out of the party. There is freedom of choice."[3] As is discussed later in the chapter, Forum Mulher's efforts to lobby parliament and organize a march at the National Assembly proved extremely successful in the recent passage of the New Family Law.

MULEIDE

The most prominent autonomous women's rights organization in Mozambique is MULEIDE. MULEIDE, the first postrevolutionary women's organization established in Mozambique in 1991, provides the most pervasive analysis of women's rights within the context of economic and political development. According to Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango, former President and Executive Director of MULEIDE, respectively, MULEIDE was the first

organization to question the differential legal treatment of men and women in Mozambique. MULEIDE is a women's organization with different women specialists in history, psychology, law, and economics. The goal of the organization is to give women in suburban and rural areas an "urban knowledge" of women's rights.[4] Muianga and Nobela describe the development of MULEIDE:

> MULEIDE [was] the first organization in Mozambique to defend the rights of women in particular. We deal with women's rights. It was the first organization born after the OMM to deal with the promotion of women and women and men's equal rights. We work as a legal organization to defend human rights. We are always involved as an advocacy organization trying to promote good changes for women.[5]

MULEIDE has done studies on domestic violence, child prostitution and abuse, women in the informal sector, police violence, and women and reproductive health (including sexually transmitted diseases), and family planning. As MULEIDE gathers information on attitudes about abortion, it will be interesting to see the extent to which the country's premier women's rights organization takes on the issue of women's reproductive rights.

WLSA

The most important research being done on women's legal rights and discrimination in Mozambique is that of WLSA, formerly WLSAMOZ, the Women and Law in Southern Africa, Mozambique Research Project. The Women and Law in Southern Africa project began as a network of women's research entities analyzing women in seven countries: Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. Today, WLSA has become an autonomous research entity in Mozambique, conducting studies on *Women and Maintenance* (1992); *Women and Inheritance* (1996); *Families in a Changing Environment* (1997) and *The Justice Delivery System and the Illusion of the Transparency* (2000). According to Eulália Temba, former National Coordinator of the WLSAMOZ Project, "In all of our studies, we found that women are in a disadvantaged position in terms of exercising their rights."[6] After successfully working on the revision and passage of the New Family Law, WLSA's next project is working on laws related to violence against women: "This is one of our big impacts, changing the Penal Code on violence, and categorizing different types of violence, and punishments" from a gendered perspective.[7]

Until very recently, neither legal nor cultural change in the area of reproductive and sexual rights has been a priority in Mozambique. A 1997 WLSAMOZ report, *Changing Families in Mozambique*, makes a very strong statement about the state's unwillingness to link women's reproductive and sexual rights to women's health:

> The State and the current normative systems continue to limit the implementation of a health perspective of reproductive rights and of the exercise of women's sexuality. . . . The State, while it has made important advances at the level of intentions, lacks an objective policy which would favor the basic conditions of women, and enable them to exercise their rights. Women are unable to exercise their rights, so long as education and health systems are inadequate, and socio-cultural diversity is not respected.[8]

The WLSAMOZ document goes on to explicitly state that women must have the decision-making power over the number and spacing of their children and that abortion should be legalized for all women to be used without any declaration of support from a man in her family.[9] WLSA seems to be taking a lead on this issue among women's organizations in civil society.

In 2007, the Mozambican Health Ministry suggested new legislation legalizing abortions in Mozambique, arguing that unsafe abortion is the third leading cause of death among pregnant women in the country: "Botched abortions accounted for an estimated 11 percent of maternal fatalities registered at the central hospital in Maputo, the nation's capital, in the 1990s. More than 40 percent of the cases of serious pregnancy complications treated at the hospital's maternity clinic are said to be the result of clandestine abortions."[10] Mozambique, which has one of the highest maternal death rates in the world, could become one of only a handful of countries in Africa where abortion is available upon demand.[11] Currently, Mozambican law bans abortion except when the mother's life or health is at risk. If the law is changed, it will allow for the expansion of safe abortion services and for foreign donors to fund them.[12] This possible expansion of abortion rights in Mozambique serves as an interesting comparison with Nicaragua, where in 2006, the National Assembly passed a law banning therapeutic abortions, the only kind that had been legal, in part due to an alliance the Sandinista leadership formed with the Catholic Church. In Mozambique, leaders of the Roman Catholic Church have argued that "apart from being a sin, abortion is also a foreign import contrary to African cultural norms."[13] The country's Catholic bishops distributed a pastoral note which said that they "empathised with those wanting to reduce the maternal mortality rate and promote women's rights. Despite that, we affirm that abortion is not the solution for these situations . . . Its liberalisation/legalisation on the one hand vulgarises and objectifies women, and on the other hand corrupts youth and trivialises the sacred power of procreation."[14] As of the time of this writing, Forum Mulher had not yet taken a position on the legislation because of conflicting perspectives among members of the organization. It remains to be seen the extent to which women's organizations in civil society will use this opportunity to lobby the government the way they so successfully did to pass the New Family Law.

Feminist Agency in Civil Society and Parliament: The New Family Law

After years of inaction, a very progressive New Family Law has successfully been passed in Mozambique, establishing women's legal equality and expanding their empowerment in the family.[15] The role of women MPs and autonomous NGOs outside the realm of Frelimo and the OMM, such as Forum Mulher, MULEIDE, and WLSA, has been crucial to such legal achievements within the Assembly of the Republic. The interaction between women MPs and women's organizations in civil society has dramatically increased, shaping the discourse around these issues by setting the terms of the debate and putting women and women's empowerment at the center. Moreover, women's organizations in civil society have influenced women MPs through their research, lobbying efforts, and pressuring of parliament to achieve legal changes for women from a feminist perspective.

In 1998, after almost 20 years in draft form, the Ministry of Justice, under the direction of the president, ordered the Commission for Legal Reform to study, research, and draft a new version of the Family Law in consultation with civil society. Women's organizations, including Forum Mulher, MULEIDE, WLSA, and the Association of Women Lawyers (AMMCJ), not only played a crucial part in drafting the law but also assisted in the process of conducting research throughout the country to determine the attitudes of women and men in various communities about the family and the New Family Law. The draft itself was taken back out into the countryside to assess attitudes toward several key provisions; community discussions were held in every province. From 1998 to 2001, there was a real attempt to identify the attitudes of Mozambican citizens in both urban and rural areas both before and after the new version of the law was drafted.

However, once a new draft was sent to the National Assembly in 2001, it stalled and failed to be debated in parliament. In fact, according to Celeste Nobela and Emanuela Mondlane of Forum Mulher, from 2001 to 2003, parliamentarians made numerous excuses for why the law was not being addressed.[16] It was simply pushed off of the legislative agenda because it was not a priority—or perhaps because it was too controversial to deal with a fundamental restructuring of the Mozambican family. After two years of delay, Forum Mulher organized a women's march to the National Assembly building in November 2003 and demanded that the President of the Assembly of the Republic, Eduardo Joaquim Dinis Erasto Mulembwev, come out and address them.[17] Women leaders in civil society had written a statement that they read to Mulembwev, demanding that the New Family Law be discussed during the current session of parliament. Amazingly, after 20 years of legal inaction, and two years of stalling within parliament, in December 2003, the bill was passed. The passage of the New Family Law in Mozambique and the pressure imposed

by leaders and members of autonomous women's organizations in civil society, both on MPs in general and women MPs in particular, epitomize the transformation for women in Mozambique from mobilization and women's activism to organization and feminist agency.

When asked directly about the role women in civil society and women in parliament played in the struggle to pass the New Family Law, most women MPs and women activists gave women in civil society more credit for putting the pressure on parliament to make it happen. According to Maria Angelina Dique Enoque, Renamo-Electoral Union (Renamo-UE) MP, "I think that very honestly the pressure was from women in civil society. I do not want to say that women MPs were not interested in the law, because we were. [But] the Family Law was one of the moments society used women MPs to help in this project."[18] In other words, despite the necessary efforts of governmental commissions and the national legislature, it was women's organizations in civil society pushing from the outside and pressuring such governmental agencies on the inside that did the most to achieve the successful passage of the New Family Law in the National Assembly in December 2003. Maria José Artur of WLSA summarizes well the influential effects of women's NGOs on the passage of the New Family Law:

> The government had a very important role. Women's organizations also had two important roles. They pressed the government. Forum Mulher asked for an audience to speak with important people in government. And, in terms of media and public opinion, they wrote things in the newspapers to influence people. There was a big contribution of women's organizations all over the country: Forum Mulher, WLSA, MULEIDE. They talked to women about their expectations of what should be in the law.[19]

Today, there are strong connections between women MPs and women leaders in civil society. Often, the same women move in and out of leadership roles in government and civil society. In addition, autonomous NGOs in civil society often have strong ties with the Frelimo party and Frelimo women leaders because of the process of democratization and the recent development of a multiparty system in the posttransition period. All of these factors create an environment in contemporary Mozambique conducive to cooperative state-civil society relations in the push toward greater empowerment for women.

The Future of Women's Organizing in Mozambique

The future of women's organizing in Mozambique will be to further codify connections between women MPs of *all* parties and women activists in civil society through the establishment of greater links, networks, and structures

through which women can come together as women and work for change. Renamo-UE MP Maria Angelina Dique Enoque spoke about the historical development of democracy and the shifting identities of the OMM in Mozambique from an organization for all women to an organization for Frelimo women, expressing her hope for a future bipartisan national women's organization: "With the multiparty system, there are new women's organizations for each political party. I keep saying the OMM is the women's organization of Frelimo. In the future, one day, women from Frelimo, Renamo will all be a part of a national women's organization. I don't know if I'll be alive, but . . ."[20]

One of the most important bipartisan initiatives that has been on the agenda of women MPs in Mozambique since the first multiparty parliament in 1994 to help achieve the goal of more coordinated women's organizing efforts on a national level is the creation of a bi-partisan parliamentary women's caucus. One of the largest impediments has been the extent to which women have been able to make a difference as women with the Mozambican National Assembly. The challenge for women MPs in a multiparty Mozambique, it seems, will be to increase women's focus on their gender identity and not just their party identity. For a country only in its third multiparty parliament, it does not seem unreasonable that party identity is the primary organizing principle. However, the success of future women's organizing in Mozambique will depend upon women MPs further strengthening their gender identities, thinking through the structural issue of organization, and further coordinating their linkages and networks with the many autonomous women's NGOs in civil society, to continue to exercise feminist agency as successfully as they did to pass the New Family Law, toward the continuing implementation of a woman-centered, feminist policy agenda.

While Mozambican women are adopting and attempting to strengthen coordinated state-civil society strategies to further the cause of women's rights and the pursuit of feminist agency, Nicaraguan women have become much more disillusioned with the state since the Liberal-Sandinista Pact of 2000 and have often chosen to pursue feminist agency more through the actions of autonomous organizations separate from and outside the sphere of the state. However, now that Nicaragua is one of only three countries in the Western hemisphere to ban all abortions even in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of a pregnant woman, the relationship between feminists and the state in Nicaragua is bound to change in the future.[21]

The Autonomous Women's and Feminist Movements in Nicaragua

One of the most prominent new movements in civil society in post-Sandinista Nicaragua is the autonomous women's movement. There has been a

push for greater gender consciousness and autonomous women's organizing from within the structure of the FSLN and AMNLAE since the mid-1980s, particularly within the women's secretariats of the worker's associations. The electoral loss of the Sandinistas created the space for autonomous and self-defined feminist organizing in civil society in Nicaragua and, in that sense, has been positive for the vibrant women's movement that has emerged. Moreover, the pact between the Liberal Alliance and the Sandinista parties to establish institutional power-sharing among them at the expense of third-party opposition has created a complicity that has alienated members of the citizenry who desire change in the society.

The Birth of the Autonomous Women's and Feminist Movements in Nicaragua

There has been an explosion of women's organizing around a diversity of interests that were not given attention during the revolutionary period of the 1980s, revealing a new era of freedom, egalitarian organizational structures, and feminist approaches to human rights and civil society. Since the 1990s, there has been a decentralization of the women's movement in Nicaragua, a vast proliferation of women's organizations within the autonomous women's movement, and a declining role for AMNLAE. Throughout Nicaragua, autonomous organizations for women against violence and women and health emerged in the early 1990s. According to Sofía Montenegro, the trajectory of the Nicaraguan women's movement from AMNLAE to autonomy went through three developmental stages of consciousness: (1) antidictatorial; (2) anti-imperialist and nationalist; and (3) "the consciousness of women for themselves."[22] Ana Criquillon argues that by 1991 there were four currents in the Nicaraguan women's movement: (1) AMNLAE; (2) the women's secretariats of the ATC, CST; (3) women's secretariats of UNE, CONAPRO, women's centers, houses, and NGOs, and independent feminist collectives; and (4) many women's groups who did not identify with any of the other three currents, including women's agricultural collectives, women organized around specific themes like religion, disabilities, the environment, and more.[23] As Montenegro summarizes, "Ten years after AMNLAE was hegemonic during the '80s, today it's just one movement more within the broad spectrum of the women's movement."[24]

The birth of the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua, although driven by years of internal dissent within AMNLAE and the FSLN, is traced to two moments of rebellion: (1) the "Festival of the 52%" held by women autonomously from the AMNLAE Congress in 1991; and (2) the National Conference, "Diverse but United," held in 1992. Helen Dixon describes the origin of Grupo Venancia in Matagalpa, within the context of the "Festival of the 52%":

> We went from 2 crazy women working out of their houses in
> 1991 to 18 women working full time in 2000! We were born when
> the lid blew off of the autonomous women's movement. After the
> election loss in 1990, women's organizations began sprouting up
> like mushrooms. In March, 1991, there was an AMNLAE Congress.
> Completely autonomous was the 52%: they said they did not have to
> get permission of the party, the state or the government any more!
> This was a declaration of rebellion.[25]

Sofía Montenegro credits the birth of the autonomous women's movement from
the "Diverse but United" conference in 1992. The reactivation process began
by AMNLAE culminated in the Nicaraguan Women's Conference, or feminist
encuentro, in 1992 attended by more than eight hundred women. AMNLAE
boycotted the meeting and informed women from AMNLAE that they could
not go to the conference and represent AMNLAE. Many feminists from within
AMNLAE still attended the conference; they simply made it clear that they
were representing themselves as individuals, not any particular organization:

> In this whole process during the 1990s, groups of women whose
> identity was originally AMNLAE, they created autonomous small
> groups, establishing their own agenda. This is a process that officially,
> from the women's movement history, began at the 1992 meeting.
> Eight hundred women from all over the country came, which was
> a show of force, from the emerging autonomous movement, because
> that magnitude of mobilization can only be done by a huge organi-
> zation like the party itself. But we were not the Front. This is the birth
> certificate or the independence declaration of the women's movement
> in 1992 from AMNLAE.[26]

The following section examines exactly how the autonomous women's move-
ment has developed in Nicaragua in the postrevolutionary period, what prob-
lems have arisen, and what decisions have been made.

The Development of the Autonomous Women's and Feminist Movements in Nicaragua

The birth and development of the autonomous women's movement represents
a victory for democratization, civil society, and feminism in Nicaragua. This
does not mean, however, that there have not been problems, flaws, and debates
that emerged and ensued throughout the 1990s. Two main questions have been
debated about the autonomous women's movement in the postrevolutionary
period: (1) is it too dispersed, diverse, and decentralized to be powerful? and

(2) does it need a more organized representative structure rather than a loose networking structure to be effective in the national political process?

At the 1992 National "Diverse But United" Conference, a split took place between Sofía Montenegro, María Teresa Blandón, and the Feminist National Committee (CNF), on the one hand, and Ana Criquillon, Vilma Castillo Aramburu, and the Puntos de Encuentro faction, on the other hand, over issues of organizational strategies and structures. The proposal promoted by the Puntos de Encuentro faction was a horizontal, collectivist structure based on networking around issues. The Puntos de Encuentro faction wanted to avoid the kind of verticalist structure that they had just fought to exit (AMNLAE, the FSLN). They argued that they should not implement a formal structure too quickly and instead should identify practical grassroots themes to work on through more informal networks.

The CNF faction wanted the ability to intercede politically with the state and traditional power structures; thus, they felt a more formal structure was necessary on the national level. The CNF faction proposed that the women's movement should have an organization that combined representation, participation, and democratically elected leadership, a structure that is "horizontal enough to be democratic and vertical enough to be efficient," avoiding the "tyranny of structurelessness" in which women leaders emerge within a movement but are not accountable to any constituency because they were not officially elected.[27] Montenegro argued that just because women had had "a bad experience with structures with the Front [Frente—FSLN] and with AMNLAE," they shouldn't "throw the dirty water out with the baby of the organization inside."[28]

Thus, there were two tendencies, which, although according to Helen Dixon were "completely complementary," were constructed as oppositional. The problem raised was the issue of representation and who can represent whom. The women present were very committed to participatory democracy, but they were also afraid of replicating the kind of vertical structures they had experienced for over a decade with the party, the government, and the state. As a result, at the 1992 National Conference the redes (networks) were born. Seven issue-based networks were formulated to coordinate the work of the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua (Economy and Environment, Violence, Sexuality, Health, Education, Social Communicators, and Political Participation). Debates have ensued over the efficacy of the networks, the use of the term *feminist* (which immediately creates the category of women termed *nonfeminists*), and the necessity of organizational autonomy for all of the groups within the autonomous women's movement, which calls into question the role of AMNLAE and the union secretariats.

According to Montenegro, the question of how to organize the Nicaraguan women's movement on a national scale was "the biggest discussion of the whole '90s decade."[29] One of the issues was whether or not to continue with issue-based loose associations or networks, or to create some kind of

organized representative body elected to fight for feminist policy initiatives in the state on behalf of various Nicaraguan women's interests.

> We have not been able to resolve in the whole decade of the '90s this networking crisis. In 1992, we decided that, okay, we won't discuss this thing because there's a bad climate for the discussion of this; we will remain at the level of networking. We will not validate any leadership. Everybody participates horizontally in the networking. We decided to organize loosely eight redes, or networks, of health, sexuality, economy, violence . . . only two have survived by the year 2000. Only two are still alive as we predicted because the model of organization of networking misses a lot of things and creates new problems we foresaw at that time. We knew it was not sufficient, it was not enough to network, but it would have to be accompanied by something else.[30]

By the time of my second interview with Sofía Montenegro in 2005, only one network remained: La Red de Mujeres Contra La Violencia (the Network of Women against Violence). However, this network has been extremely effective in defending women's rights nationally and lobbying for legislative change. Perhaps most impressive was the passage of Law 230 in 1996, making domestic and intrafamilial violence a crime for the first time in Nicaragua.

Montenegro identifies three main problems with networking. First is the loss of political force. Meeting once every two or three months prevents political efficiency and the ability to move quickly and powerfully around a gendered issue on the national level. Second, Montenegro argues that networking is an American invention that may not be appropriate to the conditions of Nicaragua: "This is a model that will have to be revised according to Nicaraguan necessity. Networking is a northern invention because they have communication, they have e-mail, they have telephones, they have whatever, but we need to combine many things in order to create a new sort of structure that we need.[31] The third main problem for Montenegro is that there is no structure or explicit leadership within networks, but there is still power that operates, and that can be very undemocratic:

> It is not as democratic as they proclaim for different reasons. Since they have no structure and everybody's equal, in fact there are de facto leaderships, but they are not accountable. It works like hegemony: they work by commissions and these commissions, in the end, they do whatever they want and they're not accountable because they were not officially elected and are not officially accountable, and this is the problem with this position. A brilliant feminist theoretician, Jo Freeman, wrote "The Tyranny of Structure-lessness," which we could have been able to prove point by point here in Nicaragua that what

she says is true . . . And therefore some of these feminists are in NGOs that are powerful, and all the networks gravitate there. So, in policy, the NGO that is predominant, whose leadership is predominant in that space, it is the policy of the NGO, not the policy of the women's movement.[32]

What Montenegro wants to see in the Nicaraguan women's movement is an organization in which different women representing different specific interests can come together to discuss a political program for the movement, "to make an integral vision and not get ghettoized in a theme." An issue-based approach can serve to dilute a struggle and isolate issues, thus preventing the kind of holistic, integrative, intersectional approach to women's material struggles in the spheres of production and reproduction that many women in Nicaragua are fighting to create. Montenegro describes in detail what this national coordinating representative structure could look like and how it could fight to prevent the marginalization of women into particular issues without an understanding of how each part fits into the larger political, economic, and sociocultural whole. Each coordinated network (women against violence, network for health, those who work on Beijing issues, the rural women's movement, etc.) could elect two representatives to a larger organizational structure that would meet monthly to discuss the situation of the country from a gendered perspective, incorporating the diversity of Nicaraguan women's interests. That way, the leadership of the autonomous women's movement would be both elected and accountable.

It has been difficult to reach consensus within the Nicaraguan women's movement on this issue. One reason is that there is a commitment to autonomy, independence, and alternative leadership structures among many feminists in civil society today given the top-down organizing structures imposed upon them during the revolutionary period. Sofía Montenegro and other former leaders of the CNF faction have been criticized and accused of being vanguardists, undemocratic, and of supporting a feminism that is too abstract. According to Argentina Olivas of the Colectivo de Mujeres in Matagalpa (Matagalpa Women's Collective), "The network way is functioning now. The National Feminist Committee (CNF) existed in the 1990s. It disintegrated in 1995 and reemerged in 1998 as La Corriente—La Malinche headed by María Teresa Blandón. When they disintegrated, we left."[32] She critiques the work of Montenegro and Blandón for being too theoretical: "The original program of La Corriente is incompatible with ours. We have differences. Practical work with women was not identified. Their feminist platform . . . has to come down to reality. We believe you have to make theory from the practice of hunger and violence, and not make theories in the air."[34] Montenegro and her supporters assert that all they want is an organization with a democratically elected leadership and a representative structure that can act politically as a powerful force

of women and feminists, to take on the state and create an agenda for national policy, not simply for particular issues.[35]

María Teresa Blandon, another leader of the CNF, disagrees that the question of structure has been the key question facing the contemporary women's movement in Nicaragua: "I don't believe that the debate about the structures has been the most important discussion in the movement. It was an important subject, and it still is an important subject, but I think that there are other subjects that were maybe not so visible."[36] While Blandon may disagree with Montenegro on the importance of the question of structure, both women agree that one of the most important obstacles the Nicaraguan women's movement has had to face is its relationship and ability to interface with the state:

> The relationship of the women's movement to the state was and still is a relation that is pragmatic . . . In the women's movement, we don't have a clear strategy or strategies about how to relate to the state. But this is a bigger problem. The state is not interested in relating to the women's movement. There are some women who work at the state who understand this need. But that's a very particular phenomenon. In general, the state is not being permeated by feminist ideas. . . . On this level, we face the subject of fundamentalisms, and the women's movement has bigger obstacles in this then any other movement. Religious fundamentalisms have a connection with economic fundamentalisms, and their main victims are women. And these also make relations with the state very weak and very complicated ones.[37]

Blandon's analysis of the connections between religious and economic fundamentalisms reveals an innovative, intersectional analysis between issues of practical materiality and strategic political culture in the way she asserts that feminist ideas need to permeate the state and impact state policies.

The relationship between women's movements and the state has become even more interesting, as the Sandinista party—albeit a very different Sandinista party—was reelected back into power in 2006. One of the most consistent concerns raised during my 2005 interviews, with women and men, many of whom had been long-time members of the FSLN, was that the Sandinistas had been taken over by the "Danielistas." The party, once based on revolutionary principles, however flawed, now seems to be based on the power principle: ensuring the power of an elite *cupula* no matter what concessions might be necessary to neoliberalism and religious fundamentalism. It remains to be seen how the autonomous women's movements will attempt to pursue a national feminist agenda within the new Sandinista-led Nicaraguan state. However, it is important to examine how autonomous women's organizations have been organizing in postrevolutionary Nicaragua and what they have and have not been able to accomplish for women.

"Democracy in the Country, the House and the Bed": Body Politics and the Intersection of Practical Gender Needs and Strategic Gender Interests in Nicaragua

Two of the most often ignored areas of women's emancipation in revolutionary contexts are domestic or family violence and reproductive rights, including contraception and abortion. Both of these issues fall within the parameters of *body politics* and are typically understood as strategic gender interests in the private, "reproductive" sphere of life. However, a full understanding of family violence and reproductive choice reveals that both issues constitute a practical gender need and a strategic gender interest. Organizing around body politics in the areas of domestic violence and reproductive health represents a new direction for women's feminist agency in civil society in Nicaragua that was left largely unaddressed during the Sandinista period. An examination of the issues of domestic violence and reproductive rights in Nicaragua reveals how Nicaraguan women are exercising their feminist agency to create an intersectional, feminist approach to body politics.

Domestic Violence

The divide between production and reproduction, practical and strategic gender interests, and the personal and the political is often perpetuated by the public/private dichotomy, itself a fiction. The issue that perhaps best reveals the intersection between the personal and the political, and women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests, is domestic violence. "Democracy in the Country, the House and the Bed" was the slogan used by the Women Against Violence Network of the Nicaraguan women's movement, which successfully drafted, lobbied, and secured the unanimous passage of a bill to criminalize domestic violence for the first time in Nicaragua in 1996. The bill was passed just one year after its proposal.[38] In her recent social movement analysis of the women's movement in Nicaragua, Katherine Isbester has highlighted the success of the Women Against Violence Network, identifying its innovative approach to male violence:

> The women rejected common explanations for men's violence against women: men were inured to it after the war, they were frustrated with the economy, or they did not realize it was wrong. The women instead defined gender inequality as the root of violence against women. Women's oppression is experienced at the fundamental level, through men's discipline and control over the female body. . . . The solution, therefore, required that men respect women's needs and bodies. This demand evolved to include women's reproductive control, women's right to paid labor, and women's right not to be treated as a financial dependent when not performing paid labor.[39]

This approach epitomizes the intersection between production and repro-
duction, economics and sex-violence-culture, and practical gender needs and
strategic gender interests. Women have the right to perform paid "produc-
tive" labor, to be compensated when performing "reproductive labor," and
to have the *practical* and *strategic* power to live free from violence and to
control their own bodily, sexual, and reproductive choices. When women's
bodies become recognized as the battle grounds for gender, racial, national,
sexual, and class inequality in the productive and reproductive spheres of life,
the practical and the strategic become one in the same, and an intersectional
analysis becomes crucial to envisioning women's emancipation.

Zoilamérica Narváez's account in the late 1990s of child sexual abuse at
the hands of her stepfather, Daniel Ortega, leader of the FSLN and President of
Nicaragua, brought issues of sexual abuse and domestic violence to the surface
in Nicaragua for the first time. Narváez argues that for many, the category
of the 'personal' tends to include the politics of sex and violence, while the
category of the 'political' tends to focus on the politics of economics: "If you
are 'against violence,' it is a personal attitude. There is a double standard of
many of our leaders. NGOs deal with social issues. Political parties address
political and economic issues. We need to introduce the ethical dimension of
social, political, and economic issues."[40] Particularly in the Marxist-Leninist
framework of the Sandinista and Frelimo revolutions, ethical issues were often
reduced to their economic dimensions, with little regard for how economics
is gendered or for how oppression manifests itself in noneconomic ways.
Contemporary women's organizations in Nicaragua are linking strategic,
"cultural" approaches to freedom, equality, and bodily integrity with prac-
tical "material" decisions in everyday life, adopting an integrative approach to
practical gender needs and strategic gender interests.

Reyna Isabel Rodriguez left the FSLN and AMNLAE and formed
her own organization in Sandino City called the Movimiento de Mujeres
Autónomas (Movement of Autonomous Women), a nonprofit organization
with 195 members, directed by seven women and a staff of eleven. Her orga-
nization began when "a good group of women got together from AMNLAE,
working on different projects. We first started organizing people in the
barrios and neighborhoods. The problem of women in Ciudad de Sandino
was the process of identity, organizing ourselves, working."[41] The Movement
of Autonomous Women works in the areas of human development, human
rights, and domestic violence, following cases with lawyers, psychologists,
and social workers, working on the Family and Children's Codes, setting up
debates and forums on the topics, training police people, and providing treat-
ment for women who have suffered violence. Rodriguez spoke in detail about
the connections her organization is trying to make between health, poverty,
economic, political, and social development: "Not having a job impacts having
the proper food, education and health care for your family. We need an inte-

grated understanding of health. For women, empowerment is about identity and self-esteem, but not without employment and economic alternatives."[42]

Mónica Zalaquett is Director of the Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia, whose mission is to transform the culture of social, street, and family violence and attitudes of *authoritarianismo* and *caudilloismo* that permeate Nicaraguan society and to build a different society based on inculcating the values of self-esteem and democracy into all institutions, from the family to the schools to civil society and the state. Zalaquett describes a similarly new, integrated approach to the problem of domestic violence as Rodriguez:

> What we are doing is very new, looking at the psychological aspects of society and gender, across generations, with mixed groups, men and women, young and old. We see the problem as integrated and complex. There are multiple factors: school directors, journalists, teachers. We go everyday to neighborhoods. Our two-day workshops are a key to our success. After all my experience with women victims of violence, I also work with men towards the behavior of men to stop violence. To reflect on behaviors acquired and learned. I am working to explain that these are mechanisms of power . . . to increase their quality of life, to learn the ability to express feelings to their wives and kids. Gender and generationally, we must transform ideas and educate people, children, and women. To teach people to communicate, to improve relations with the self.[43]

When I reinterviewed Zalaquett in 2005, she and her organization were continuing the same work: (1) attempting to understand the relationship between familial, institutional, political, and cultural forms of violence; and (2) struggling to empower people at the community level in order to combat violence in a holistic way.

Alternative Feminist Health Centers and Reproductive Rights: IXCHEN, ISNIN and SI MUJER

In the contemporary women's movements of Nicaragua, many women's organizations are attempting to link issues such as abortion, reproductive rights, women's health, sexual autonomy, economic survival, and violence against women around the common theme of bodily integrity. Two of the most important contributions of the autonomous women's movement in Nicaragua are: (1) the establishment of places for women to go to receive material help in the areas of reproductive health, sexuality, legal issues, and domestic violence; and (2) a new integrated way of thinking about these very issues. The largest three alternative feminist health centers in Nicaragua are IXCHEN, ISNIN, and SI MUJER.

The Centro de Mujeres, IXCHEN, was founded on January 9, 1989, by a group of Nicaraguan women led by María Lourdes Bolaños, a leading doctor, former leader of AMNLAE and the FSLN, and later an FSLN MP, and a group of women from England. Named after the Mayan goddess of fertility and sexual and reproductive health in the indigenous language of Nicaragua, Nahuatl, and conceptualized as "an instrument of struggle," IXCHEN was the first alternative center for women of its kind established in Nicaragua.[44] In 1988, there was a conflict with the AMNLAE office. María Lourdes Bolaños was expelled from the FSLN because she was promoting abortion.[45] She subsequently created her own organization: IXCHEN. The center was established as a response to the needs of women and provides services of sexual and reproductive health, attention to victims of domestic violence, language education, and training around gender issues. María Lourdes Bolaños Ortega has been defending women's rights for two decades. She has focused on family planning, sexual education, and birth control: "Part of self-esteem and women's liberation has to go with control of our own bodies."[46] Mónica Baltodano even goes so far as to say that the actions of Bolaños and other Sandinista feminists "promoted the defeat of the election. Some members of AMNLAE went and left because they were not putting up women's flags . . . After the defeat, they recovered their autonomy . . . From this core came the principal feminist leaders of Nicaragua . . . from the most radical, anti-party to some who want to have a woman's party."[47] Clearly, the interests of Nicaraguan feminists, not always compatible with the interests of the Sandinista party, have changed the face of Nicaraguan politics forever.

The Centro de Mujeres, ISNIN (Women's Center, ISNIN) is another alternative women's health center. The philosophy behind ISNIN is very much a holistic, integrative approach toward women's economic, sexual, cultural, and material needs both in the public sphere of society and the private sphere of the family. ISNIN was founded on January 20, 1990, by a group of women consisting of two from AMNLAE and four with experiences with women's organizations in the FSLN: "We created the Center after making an analysis of women: specifically, the social process of women in the 1980s and the poor development of women. So, we needed a space in which we could work equally for women in the areas of the economy, society, maternity, legal defense of homes and property, violence and sex."[48] Lilleana Salinas, who worked at the center since its founding, was Coordinator of ISNIN for six years: "The work that I do here besides coordinating the Center, is the psychological counseling. I am responsible for the mental health aspects. Ninety percent of the problems are due to sexual or institutional violence."[49]

Salinas argues that the demand for abortion rights has been present throughout the 1980s from the perspective of the people, but not from the vantage point of the leaders:

> The movement of women for abortion rights began in the 80s. Women talked about it behind closed doors . . . because AMNLAE had to have the good check from Bayardo,[50] the real policy maker. This is the people versus the leaders. There's what the people have on their minds, and then what the leaders take on. The political leaders do not want to confront the Catholic Church.[51]

In 1990, Norma Stoltz Chinchilla similarly reported that "the Sandinista leadership was unwilling to risk alienating its anti-abortion Catholic supporters during the early periods of consolidation of the revolution and mobilization for war."[51] It appears that in 2006, the Sandinista leadership has taken their approach one step further, forming an alliance with the Catholic Church in order to ensure their reelection after twenty-six years out of power: "The assembly voted unanimously to pass the [abortion] ban just days before Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega won his presidential election bid on November 5. His leftist Sandinista Front supported the bill in what pro-choice critics saw as a political bargain with Catholic leaders and conservative factions."[53] Salinas points out the inherent difficulty of mobilizing women around an issue that is condemned legally, politically, and morally: "In my experience, four out of ten women have had an abortion, in women's centers, private clinics, hospitals. Our constitution and criminal law condemn abortion. However, it is an everyday practice . . . Take it from us . . . Any woman who has practiced an abortion is not going to come to a march!"[54]

SI MUJER is another alternative feminist health care center in Nicaragua. In 1999, SI MUJER provided education and training for 130,000 women, and medical treatment for 21,000.[55] Approximately 1,500 women are seen per month for clinical, psychological, or judicial counseling. The psychological counseling is primarily violence survival. SI MUJER also provides medical assistance, judicial consultants, obstetric/gynecological care, and AIDS, sexually transmitted disease, and sexual education: "a whole health program including birth control."[56] Ana María Pizarro, Director of SI MUJER since 1991 and previously with the FSLN Ministry of Health for ten years, is a nationalized Nicaraguan. She is a doctor and surgeon from Argentina, specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. It was important for Pizarro to stress during my second interview with her that "SI MUJER was founded not to provide services. Services are a tool. SI MUJER was founded to take political action, to have direct contact with women and their families. . . . For us, our aim when we founded SI MUJER was women's rights, and the provision of services as an expression of solidarity."[57] Certainly, with this kind of founding and operating mission, SI MUJER has integrated at its core the pursuit of practical gender needs and strategic gender interests in a way that cannot be divided.

SI MUJER, IXCHEN, and ISNIN each provide an integrative approach to women's reproductive health that challenges the dichotomies of economics versus sex/violence/culture, class versus gender, and practical versus strategic

gender interests predominant in First World feminist theories. Feminist organizers in Nicaragua are using a holistic, intersectional approach to connect issues by centering them around the body. This is an innovative approach from which both Marxist revolutionaries and First World feminists can learn a lot. However, the real dilemma now for Nicaraguan feminist and autonomous women's movement activists is how they will continue to do the work that they do best within the context of a newly conservative, fundamental Sandinista-Church alliance.

Nicaragua's Abortion Ban and the Patriarchal Attack on Women and Feminists

On October 26, 2006, on the eve of the national presidential elections, the Nicaraguan National Assembly passed one of the most restrictive abortion laws—not only in Latin America—but in the world. The law bans all abortions, including those that have come to be understood as therapeutic abortions: medically necessary abortions, that according to medical professionals, are required to save the life of the mother. The Human Rights watch report, *Over Their Dead Bodies: Denial of Access to Emergency Obsteric Care and Therapeutic Abortion in Nicaragua* released in October 2007, documented cases of individual women such as 24-year old Olga Maria Reyes, who "died in a public hospital in León in April 2007 when she was six to eight weeks pregnant due to the delayed removal of an ectopic pregnancy according to the doctors who spoke to her family."[58] The report also cites doctors who admit to withholding treatment from women, including women who are hemorrhaging, for fear of being accused of performing therapeutic abortions, punishable by one-to-three years in prison.[59] As many as eighty women have already died as a result of the ban, signed into law by President Enrique Bolaños in November of 2006 and reaffirmed under Sandinista leadership in September 2007.[60] Several women's and human rights organizations in civil society petitioned the Nicaraguan Supreme Court in January 2007 to deem the abortion ban unconstitutional.

The Sandinista-supported abortion ban has ushered in a new patriarchal era for Nicaraguan women and a corresponding campaign of intimidation against Nicaraguan feminists. Nine renowned Nicaraguan women's human rights advocates connected to the Women Against Violence Network and the September 28 Campaign for the Decriminilization of Abortion have been accused of criminal violations in the well-known case of "Rosita," a nine-year-old girl who was raped and received a therapeutic abortion. As a result, the Autonomous Women's Movement in Nicaragua issued an open letter for solidarity from women's organizations around the world against what they identify as "an action of political vengeance and repression," in part against the same group of women that supported Zoilamérica Narváez in her case against her stepfather and current FSLN President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega.[61] It is

likely that the autonomous women's and feminist movements in Nicaragua are about to enter a new phase of feminist agency, forced to face a head-on confrontation with a newly repressive Sandinista state. How the movements and the state respond remains to be seen.

Unity Feminism versus Difference Feminism: Constructions of Feminism in Mozambique and Nicaragua

The equality/difference debates within American and European feminisms take on new meanings in Mozambique and Nicaragua. Many of the women that I interviewed identified the concept of feminism with a kind of machismo toward men because of its focus on the differences between women and men. Instead, for some Mozambican and Nicaraguan women, perhaps emerging from the experiences of revolution and underdevelopment, there has been a focus on unity that lends itself to what I call *unity feminism*: a belief that men and women need to work together to achieve the empowerment and development of each, and of the community as a whole. Unity feminism, as it is being formulated, does not appear to be about sameness or difference, but rather about how women and men can (and must) work together to achieve a greater quality of life and development politically, economically, culturally, and socially in all spheres of everyday life.

Women activists in Mozambique and Nicaragua who did not identify with the concept of feminism cited three main reasons: (1) feminism is about women, excluding the needs of men and the larger needs of society; (2) feminism is a kind of female machismo against men; and (3) feminism is less relevant in a context in which basic struggles for development are still taking place, yet women's rights and women's work need to be addressed within the context of development and other systems of oppression. It is important to note that while many women did not identify with the concept of feminism, they did proceed to describe a commitment to the movements of women, equal rights for women, and women's emancipation.

Those activists who did identify with feminism cited two main reasons for the importance of the emergence of feminism in their country: (1) there are *differences* in the developing world that need to be acknowledged within the global discourse of women's rights, particularly the need to link theory and practice; and (2) there are sufficient *similarities* in women's oppression globally to require women's organizing around the world to fight for women's empowerment. In addition, many of the feminisms emerging from the developing world also appear to challenge the divide between practical and strategic gender interests, looking for a holistic way to address issues such as violence, health, reproductive rights, education, and economic opportunities

both inside and outside the home. In pointing out the need for the experiences of Third World women to inform global feminist theories and practices, some Nicaraguan feminists also warned of the danger of "reifying" Third World women. It is also important to note that more women in Nicaragua identified themselves as feminists than in Mozambique, perhaps attributable to both the longer history of women's autonomous organizing there and the greater institutionalization of national (and regional) women's movements in Nicaragua as compared with Mozambique.

Defining Feminism: A Movement for Women Only, or for Men and Society as Well? Avoiding Feminist Machismo

Despite the fact that Paulina Mateus, Secretary-General of the OMM, describes herself as having been a feminist since she entered the revolutionary struggle for national liberation, she does not conclude that the organization she leads, the OMM, is feminist. The reason she provides is noteworthy: "I can't say the OMM is a feminist organization. It is an organization to promote society. The OMM is for the emancipation of women for the whole society, for both men and women."[62] For Mateus, feminism constitutes a movement fighting gender oppression *for women only*, while the OMM is an organization that fights gender oppression *for the whole society*. Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango, formerly of MULEIDE agree. They critique feminism because they feel it is a movement that leaves men out and makes women think they have to be the same as men to be equal to men:

> Feminism for me is not a fair movement or current. They never put the men in. They just give good things to women, they never give good things to men. We must do it together, women and men. . . . Another wrong thing about feminism is that women want to do everything a man does: the way he talks, dresses, acts. Women can preserve themselves as women. You don't have to be the same as men to want equal rights for women.[63]

These sentiments echo those expressed in Nicaragua. Many women expressed their desire to have men and women work together in mixed (gender) organizations, rather than having women work alone and separately from men. These sentiments also support my notion of unity feminism. In Nicaragua and in Mozambique, there is a strong sense of solidarity of women and men that many women feel precludes them from identifying with feminism, which is understood as being only about women. Moreover, some activist women in Nicaragua see feminism as pitting women against women. According to Thelma Espinoza of AMNLAE:

> Feminism should be, in my personal opinion, work or activity encouraging women to analyze their problems and themselves. I think the principle of feminism should be respect and solidarity. We haven't developed that kind of feminism. Some women think they have the right view; they do not respect other views . . . it can become the empowerment of some women on top of others![64]

Espinoza's concerns are similar to those of the *movimientos de mujeres* that a *feministómetro* (feminist yardstick) was being employed by the *históricas/veteranas* during the *encuentros* to determine who was "feminist enough" to participate. María Lourdes Bolaños, former FSLN member of the National Assembly, Founding Coordinator of AMNLAE's Legal Office and Founder of the Women's Center IXCHEN, is also concerned about some women "feminists" pointing their finger at other women "nonfeminists": "Feminism—for me, it is to struggle for women's rights and vindications. What I can do is change the laws. Everyone has their rights of self. Some say I am not feminist because I am in the party, because I say we have to have a position of power, because I stayed married."[65] It is clear from these interviews that there is little interest in Mozambique or Nicaragua in a feminism that pits women against women, promotes women above men, or encourages women to be the same as men.

Some women I interviewed in both Mozambique and Nicaragua identified feminism as a kind of female machismo, associating feminism with women's domination of men. When I asked Ivete Mboa of Associação das Donas de Casa (ADOCA), a grassroots housewives organization in Matola, if she considered herself a feminist, she proceeded to describe a continuum on which feminism and machismo serve as the two extremities of female and male domination: "If machismo is male domination and feminism is female domination, I am for something in between, which I call 'the Gender Movement.'"[66] When I asked her to define the gender movement, she responded by describing what many would define as consonant with feminism: "a movement of equality to see men and women as whole human beings, with the same rights; neither one is superior."[67] In Nicaragua, María Elena Sequeira Rivas of the Women's Secretariat of the ATC also described that machismo and feminism are two ends of a continuum, and that feminism must be about *gender*, about men and women: "They have to be linked to unify the different spaces that isolate ourselves, combine us all together according to the spaces we all are in."[68] Nicaraguan activist Marcia Ramírez similarly describes a conception of feminism that works with men and attacks oppressive systems: "Feminism is the work of women's rights, to have equal rights and equal opportunities with men. Nobody has to dominate anybody! I don't think the principal fight is with men, but rather with oppressive systems, education, and culture."[69]

Embracing the term *feminist* for herself, Irma Ortega of CIPRES shares this affinity for a feminism that does not value women over men:

I am a woman who is for women. Feminist defines myself. I fight and struggle for women's rights but at the same time I believe that women have the same values as men, and have the right to participate. I do not believe in a society dominated by men, but a harmony between women and men. I don't favor women over men. But at the same time, supporting the advancement of women is supporting the advancement of society.[70]

One of the young women I interviewed at Casa Miriam, an organization providing scholarships and housing for women from all over Nicaragua to come to Managua for university study, described how the Nicaraguan women's movement has helped her come to identify with feminism after first thinking feminism was about machismo toward men:

I am a feminist. I am a woman equal to a man. Not above, not below. I don't like feminists who say man is our enemy. It is a privilege to be a mother: a woman can raise a man to respect women because he came from one. In terms of boyfriend/girlfriend relationships, if he is bad and does not respect women, throw him away! The bad point of feminism is seeing men as bad. . . . I remember when my friend came here and asked me, "Are you a feminist?" "No," I said, because the connotation I had was super-feminists—showing machismo toward men. I have changed, developed and seen how feminism has developed in Nicaragua, and how the feminist movement has developed in Nicaragua. It has not left men out—not all men, only machistas! I have had many relations with feminists and the feminist movement here.[71]

It is particularly poignant to hear how a young Nicaraguan woman has been so positively affected by the feminist movements in her country. It is also interesting to hear her make a distinction between leaving men and leaving machistas out of the movement.

"I'm Not a Feminist, but": The Relevance of Feminism in the Developing World

Susan Arndt notes in her interview article with Nigerian literary critic Chikwenye Ogunyemi and Kenyan writer and African feminist activist Wanjira Muthoni that in the course of her work on African feminism and womanism, she has "learned that many Africans shy away from being referred to as feminists. They say 'I am not a feminist' but then go on to say that they are convinced that the situation of women has to be improved drastically, that gender relations in African societies need radical transformations, and that

they are themselves committed to making these changes happen."[72] While this was also my experience in interviewing women in Mozambique and Nicaragua, I have had similar experiences teaching young women in the northeastern and southeastern regions of the United States. As Hannah Britton articulates, "The phenomenon of women actively working for women's rights and liberation but rejecting the label feminism is global in scale, although the reasons differ considerably from place to place."[73]

While the language of feminism may be rejected by some women activists, the actions of women struggling to achieve their rights within organizations and movements are prevalent in both Mozambique and Nicaragua. There is also a large movement of women who do identify as feminists in Nicaragua, and a growing group in Mozambique. I contend that feminist agency operates both with and without a discursive association with the language of feminism. Women realize their struggles and fight against oppressive situations whether or not they identify with feminism as a label.

Paulina Mateus recognizes this occurrence in Mozambique: "I don't think that feminism is not relevant. Those women who say it's not relevant . . . Even those women who are *doing* feminism!"[74] Some Nicaraguan women described never identifying with feminism, while coming to realize, through their local and transnational activism, that what they were actually *doing* was feminism all along. Reyna Isabel Rodriguez of the Movimiento de Mujeres Autónomas describes her eye-opening experience around feminism: "I had a very hard experience around feminism. For me, the feminists were women who had necklaces, earrings, short skirts, make-up. Then, I realized that what I was doing was feminism! I began training with feminists from other places, attending the Dominican Republic Conference with seventy other women. Now I defend feminism."[75]

However, there were some women who I interviewed who argued against the usefulness of feminism in the developing world. Célia Diniz of the Africa-America Institute in Maputo says that feminism is a Western concept that has no relevance in Mozambique: "A 'civilized feminism,' covering women's issues and participation on equal terms, is not as relevant in Mozambican society. When you are concerned with day-to-day life, people don't have the savings or the energy for those liberated concepts."[76] Diniz's sentiments echo the distinctions between practical and strategic gender interests: poor women concerned with meeting their practical gender interests do not have the time, or the energy, or are not yet politicized to the point of understanding, or articulating, their strategic gender interests. Again, I ask, as the *movimientos de mujeres* did in Taxco, why can't women's daily survival strategies be strategic and feminist? The problem seems to me to be with the truism of imposing an elite, First World model of feminism on Third World women and saying it does not fit, rather than creating a model of feminism that *does* fit the local, contextualized, and historical struggles of women in the developing world.

In an interesting discussion of gendered economic power, Hermengilda Thumbo of AMODER (Mozambican Association of Rural Development) identified the diversity of feminisms that must exist globally to accommodate the diversity of women's experiences:

> I may have a wrong definition of feminist. The way I was told or it was described to me is that feminists are people who tend to see things in not a complete way: women are the best, women do everything on their own. I don't agree with this. Women need to change their relationships. Women are already doing everything alone. That is separatist. Since she's the one producing the income and the wealth, she should have the power to decide.[77]

It seems to me that Thumbo hits upon a crucial point for those of us trying to theorize and practice comparative intersectional feminisms. There can be no universal set of policies on the direction women need to move because women are beginning from different places and in different contexts. If a woman has been too dependent upon a man, economically or otherwise, then gaining a sense of independence may be what she needs. If a woman has been too independent from a man and has held a greater material responsibility for the family, then gaining a sense of shared responsibility and interdependence with a man may be what she needs. The problem seems to arise when there is an imbalance between rights and responsibilities. The end point may be a world in which women and men have shared responsibilities and equal rights, but women around the world will need to move in different directions to make that happen because we are each starting from different locations.

Feminisms in the Developing World: Linking Theory and Practice, Commonality and Difference

Sofía Montenegro is a Nicaraguan feminist theorist and activist trying to connect theory and practice, commonality and difference. Montenegro describes feminism as a philosophy, a doctrine, and a practice. Each of these elements is necessary to elaborate the political movement of feminism to ensure that it does not become either absolutely theoretical and abstract or absolutely practical and issue-based.[78] Toward that end, Montenegro asserts the importance of constructing feminist theory from the perspective of Third World women:[79]

> The necessity is to construct a discourse, an intellectual framework, with the theoretical part from the Third World. . . . Theory, for us, is a necessity of survival. Many feminists from the First World forced us to look for answers not written anywhere. . . . Perhaps my experience

as a journalist leads me to believe that activists need to go to the top of the pyramid.[80]

Montenegro also expresses concerns about contemporary trends in postmodern feminist theory and the questioning of subjectivity for women in the developing world. She describes vividly some of the limitations of a postmodern perspective for Third World women who want and need to act collectively to effect political change:

> Someone brought in the speech, which is this postmodernist shit, that the subject doesn't exist, that nobody can represent anybody, you can only represent yourself and your wants, and therefore, long live the difference. With a world of difference and a world of diversity you have to find common points, otherwise you stand no chance in the political arena or to fight for your proposal or for changing the world. And this has been the debate of the '90s. So some of postmodernist thinking which is demobilizing from my point of view, even though some of the critiques of postmodernism are valuable, but from another point of view for the Third World is quite demobilizing. *I always make* the irony or the joke, what a bunch of idiots we are in the Third World? We discover the subject and in the North they declare it's dead! So what we are talking about now is the construction of the subject, and in this case, women as an actor [emphasis mine].[81]

Postmodern notions of 'the death of the subject' are less relevant for identity groups just beginning to organize autonomously and assert their subjectivities around the world. In addition, the focus on difference at the expense of commonality divides the kind of solidarity and political power needed to fight larger systems of economic and cultural oppressions that are systemic in nature. These issues also bring to light divides between First World and Third World feminisms.

Carla Braga, who worked on the Gender Project of the Land Studies Unit of UEM in Mozambique, shared many of the same concerns as Montenegro in Nicaragua. Braga was one of the few women I interviewed in Mozambique who self-identified as a feminist. In fact, she told me she left the OMM because it was not feminist enough for her. Braga celebrated the development of feminism from a narrow First World discourse to a more diverse global one, but she cautioned against the danger of going too far in asserting "the difference of the Third World woman."[82] One of Braga's concerns, similar to Montenegro, is the current fashion within feminism to search for particularity and difference. Both Braga in Mozambique and Montenegro in Nicaragua worry about the dilution of power to assert a common feminist agenda that results from too much focus on the multiplicity of differences that exist in a

diverse, postmodern world. From this perspective as well, there is an appeal of unity feminism: one that not only recognizes the similarities in struggles that woman and men share in the developing world but also unites women around the common struggles they share across their differences.

Challenging the Divide between Practical and Strategic Gender Interests

Challenging women's unequal relations with men both inside and outside the home is a pervasive obstacle for women globally that has not been overcome in revolutionary, postrevolutionary, or nonrevolutionary societies. In fact, that feminist agency is often born of women's activism in the public sphere reveals this contradiction. When I asked Fatima Trinta, secretary in the OMM Provincial Office in Nampula, a rural province in the northern region of Mozambique, about the extent to which women's emancipation had been achieved in the country, she spoke of both the practical issue of freedom of movement and the strategic issue of freedom from violence and oppression, both of which are materially quite practical:

> We are completely emancipated. For example, because of the April 7th party: I arrived home at 4:00 P.M. My husband didn't ask me anything like, "Why did you arrive late?" . . . I understand my husband, he understands me. We understand each other. This is emancipation. It is the freedom to work without a man asking you what you are doing. Living with freedom without feeling oppressed. Not being beaten by a man.

As women's organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua grapple simultaneously with health, violence, reproductive rights, economic development, and education, feminist theorists can learn from them how to incorporate a better understanding of how these issues intersect practically and strategically in the everyday productive and reproductive lives of women located at the intersections of multiple oppressions. As Gilma Yadira Tinoco of the Comisión Interuniversitária de Estudios de Género in Nicaragua summarizes: "I consider feminism a whole and complete vision of the world that you can apply to different aspects of society. I am convinced that unequal gender relations are related to class and ethnic oppression. All kinds of oppressions are inter-related."[83]

Conclusion

The most promising of movements in civil society today, large, autonomous, and diverse in Nicaragua and autonomous, active, and growing in Mozambique, are

the movements of women. In Nicaragua, feminist voices flourish, debating the best form and substance for the future of their movements. In form, they are working within coordinated networks in civil society, disgusted with electoral and party politics yet ever more aware of their need to join forces and take on the powers of the state and the church. In substance, they are integrating issues previously understood as representing either a practical or a strategic nature by using the body as the locus of struggle: violence, health, poverty, and reproductive rights all coalesce, theoretically and materially, around women's bodily integrity. In Mozambique, women's legal rights in the family, particularly concerning women's equality and violence against women, are also receiving particular attention by postrevolutionary feminist and women's rights organizations in civil society. Moreover, autonomous women's organizations in civil society are working with women in parliament to lobby the state for greater legal change for women.

While adopting different strategies of feminist agency, the *conceptions* of feminisms that seem to be emerging in Nicaragua and Mozambique are similarly about gender issues, inclusive of women and men, masculinity and femininity. They are not separatist, essentialist, or exclusive of men. They are about development, the economy, education, reproductive rights, health, domestic violence, and domestic labor. Many feminists, particularly in Nicaragua, are attempting to construct holistic, intersectional approaches to women's practical gender needs and strategic gender interests. While autonomous organizing by women is deemed necessary by many as a critical element in the development of feminist consciousness and the exercise of feminist agency, working in mixed groups with men is also seen as a requirement for the development of underdeveloped societies. The struggle for the autonomous women's and feminist movements in both countries will be to channel the energy, diversity, and analysis of a decentralized movement into an articulation with other movements against oppression to formulate a national vision and agenda for systemic social, political, cultural, and economic change.

I would like to conclude the book with a story that I think reveals, perhaps more than any other, the transformation women have experienced during their participation in socialist revolutionary and postrevolutionary struggles from women's activism to feminist agency. In my travels in Nicaragua, I went to the FSLN party headquarters in Granada, where I was met by Guillermo Galeano López of the FSLN party and Jocqueline Evans of the FSLN Women's League. Due to the nature of my topic, López had decided to ask his colleague from the Women's League to participate with him in the interview.

During the course of our discussion, it became evident that López represented a more traditionally Marxist approach toward women's emancipation as women's participation in the public sphere of economic life, without acknowledging women's participation in the private sphere of home and family. He spoke of feminism as allowing women to keep their femininity as they fight to

participate equally with men in societal responsibilities: "Women can participate without losing their femininity in all the spheres society allows—to struggle around the world to eliminate machismo and give women and men the same rights. . . . *I'm tired of men totally doing everything. We need help from women*" [emphasis mine].[84] In an interesting exchange, his younger female colleague in the FSLN Women's League in Granada, Jocqueline Evans, took issue with some of his assertions, particularly the *lack* of help from women:

> I think, respecting my campañero, I do not have the idea of women substituting for men. Women have the capacity. I always keep a phrase, behind every man is a good woman. I say, next to a man is a good woman because women can substitute for men's work. *Women do the main work for the family. The main structure of the house is kept by women.* Women can go next to men and keep their values . . . Women must see men not as objects but as human beings to be valued also. The legacy we received—the culture, the education—needs to be updated as *partners in the home, at work, and on the street* [emphasis mine].[85]

This was a very poignant moment for me. Watching a younger female colleague take issue with her male Sandinista elder over the work women perform for the family, and as such, for society, revealed how far the revolution of feminism had come in Nicaragua. I do not believe this conversation would have gone the same way if it had taken place during the 1980s. This, perhaps more than anything else, epitomizes the transformation from mobilization and women's activism to organization and feminist agency.

Through an analysis of women's activism and feminist agency in revolutionary and postrevolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua, this book has attempted to make a contribution to the theories and practices of comparative intersectional feminisms. Theorizing from the perspectives and actual struggles of women situated at the intersections of gender, class, race, and national oppressions experiencing neocolonialism, underdevelopment, counterinsurgency, and resistance provides greater insight into the intersections in women's lives between production and reproduction, the practical and the strategic. Intersectionality provides both a mechanism to describe the multiple oppressions experienced by women around the world and a vehicle for feminist theorists and practitioners to seek social justice transformations in the intersecting sites of those oppressions: the state, the market, civil society, and the family. Adopting a standpoint of intersectionality as scholars and activists is not only a more empirically accurate way to understand the struggles of the majority of the world's women, but it is also normatively necessary to envision and enact an emancipatory, anti-oppression politics.

Appendix

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES, MOZAMBIQUE: JUNE 29–JULY 30, 1999, AND JUNE 28–JULY 8, 2004

Current and Former Leaders and Members of Frelimo

André de Castro, Luciano. First Secretary Comitê Provincial da Frelimo em Nampula, Minister for Environment Coordination, Nampula, July 27, 1999

Baltazar da Costa, Filipa. Deputada, Assembleia da República, Frelimo MP, Maputo, July 7, 2004

Casimiro, Isabel. Departamento de Estudos da Mulher e Género and Centro Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Feminist Theorist/Activist, Former Frelimo MP, Maputo, July 8, 2004

Francisca, Palmira. MP, Advisor to Gender Division, Ministry of Environment, Founder of ACTIVA, Maputo, June 30, 1999

Macamo, Veronica. Deputada, Assembleia da República, Frelimo MP, First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Frelimo Political Commission, Maputo, July 1, 2004

Magaia, Lina. Frelimo MP/Writer/Founding Member of African Women's Peace Federation/Freedom Fighter, Maputo, July 6, 1999

Mateus, Paulina. Secretary-General, OMM/Member of Destacamento Feminino/ Ex-Combatant, Frelimo, Maputo, July 5, 1999

Mutemba, Octávio. Frelimo, Tete, Maputo, July 20, 1999

Nguenya, Alcido. Former Frelimo/MP/Member of Permanent Commission of Parliament, Maputo, July 21, 1999

Nkavadeka, Isabel. Deputada, Assembleia da República, Frelimo MP, Minister in the Presidency for Parliamentary Affairs, Maputo, July 8, 2004

Paunde, Felipe. First Secretary Comitê Provincial da Frelimo em Sofala, Governor of Nampula, Secretary-General of Frelimo, Beira, July 26, 1999

Sithole, Ana Rita. MP/Permanent Commission of Parliament/Frelimo/OMM, African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) First Vice Co-Chair, Maputo, July 15, 1999, and July 2, 2004

Sumbana, Amélia Matos. Former Deputada, Assembleia da República, Frelimo MP, Frelimo Secretary of International Relations, Maputo, July 6, 2004

Tomé, Manuel. Head of the Frelimo Parliamentary Group, Former Secretary-General of Frelimo, Maputo, July 29, 1999

Victorino, Gertrudes. OMM/Freedom Fighter, Maputo, July 14, 1999

Vieira, Sérgio. Frelimo Founder/Leader/Freedom Fighter/MP, Maputo, July 15, 1999

Current and Former Leaders and Members of OMM

Alvero, Maria Olívia. Provincial Secretary OMM, Nampula, July 28, 1999

Braga, Carla. Faculdade de Letras e Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Campanha Terra/Former OMM, Feminist Theorist/Activist, Maputo, July 15, 1999

Gamilo, Carmen. OMM, Beira, July 26, 1999

Mateus, Paulina. Secretary-General, OMM/Member of Destacamento Feminino/Ex-Combatant, Frelimo, Maputo, July 5, 1999

Santos, Sabina. Director, OMM National Training Center, Machava, July 20, 1999

Sithole, Ana Rita. MP/Permanent Commission of Parliament/Frelimo/OMM, African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) First Vice Co-Chair, Maputo, Maputo, July 15, 1999 and July 2, 2004

Trinta, Fatima. OMM Provincial Secretary Office, Nampula, July 28, 1999

Victorino, Gertrudes. OMM/Freedom Fighter, Maputo, July 14, 1999

Renamo MPs

Enoque, Maria Angelina Dique. Deputada, Assembleia da República, Renamo Opposition Union MP, Comissão Permanente, Maputo, July 6, 2004

Vasconcelos, Zelma. Deputada, Assembleia da República, Renamo Union MP, Spokesperson for the Renamo Opposition Union, Maputo, June 29, 2004

Leaders and Members of Autonomous Women's Organizations or Civil Society Institutions

Arnfred, Signe. Research Programme Coordinator, Sexuality, Gender, and Society in Africa, Nordic Africa Institute, New York, November 17, 2000 Artur, Maria Jose. Executive Director, Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), July 5, 2004

Augusta, Selma. Muslim Women's Leader, Maputo, July 7, 2004

Baloi, Obede. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), Maputo, July 23, 1999

Muianga, Elisa. President, Women, Law and Development Organization (MULEIDE), Maputo, July 21, 1999

Bango, Celeste Nobela. Executive Director, Women, Law and Development Organization (MULEIDE), Maputo, July 21, 1999

Nobela, Celeste. Training Officer, Forum Mulher, and Vice President of the Board, MULEIDE, Maupto, July 2, 2004

Barnes, Sam. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), ONUMOZ, OXFAM Belgium, Maputo, July 2, 1999

Berg, Nina. Lawyer, DANIDA, Maputo, July 16, 1999

Braga, Carla. Faculdade de Letras e Ciências Sociais, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Campanha Terra/Former OMM, Maputo, July 15, 1999

Capelão, Luisa. USAID, Maputo, July 8, 1999

Cardoso, Carlos. Journalist, former editor of the governmental press agency AIM, founding editor of investigative newspaper *Metical*, Maputo, July 9, 1999

Casimiro, Isabel. Departamento de Estudos da Mulher e Género and Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Feminist Theorist/Activist, Former Frelimo MP, Maputo, July 8, 2004

Cizela, Sandra. Beira, July 26, 1999

Collier, Edda. Gender Specialist, Ministry of Social Action/UN, Maputo, July 30, 1999

Cossa, Celina. President, Union of General Cooperatives (UGC), Maputo, July 19, 1999

Cossa, Generossa. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), President of Núcleo da Mulher Acadêmica (NUMAC), Maputo, July 14, 1999

Costa, Olímpia. PROMUGE, Organização Moçambicana para a Promoção da Mulher e Género, Maputo, June 28, 2004

Cruz e Silva, Teresa. Professor, Social History and Director, Centro Estudos Africanos, Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), July 1, 1999

da Silva, Terezinha. Former Director of Faculty of Social Sciences, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Chairperson of the Board of Forum Mulher, Centro de Formacão Jurídica e Judiciária, Maputo, July 23, 1999 and June 30, 2004

Denga, Maria Nita. Africa-America Institute (AAI) Alumnus, World Bank Economist, Maputo, July 2, 1999

Diniz, Célia. Africa-America Institute (AAI) Country Representative, Mozambique, Maputo, July 1, 1999

Fernanda Farinha, Maria. Africa-America Institute (AAI) Alumnus, AUSTRAL, Maputo, July 8, 1999

Fernandes, Ana. Technical Director/Plant Manager of Rio Pele Textile Factory, Maputo, June 30, 1999

Garvey, Jennifer. Lawyer, Maputo, July 15, 1999

Gastor, Polly. Centro Informática, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Maputo, July 13, 1999

Humberto, Tina. Beira, July 26, 1999

Ibraímo, Dra. Latifa. Associacão das Mulheres Moçambicanas em Carrieras Jurídicas (AMMCJ [Association of Women Lawyers]), Maputo, June 6, 2004

Lalá, Aly Elias. Muslim Community Leader, Maputo, July 7, 2004

Lumbala, Selcia. Student, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, July 8, 2004

Machava, Rafa. Executive Director, Mulheres, Lei e Desenvolvimento (MULEIDE), Maputo, July 1, 2004

Magaia, Américo. General Manager of Mozambican International Trade Fair (FACIM), Former Ministry of Commerce/Freedom Fighter, Maputo, July 24, 1999

Malalane, Guilhermina. Associacão Moçambicana das Mulheres Mineiras (AMMI), Maputo, July 5, 2004

Manuel, Sandra. Student/Interpreter, Maputo, July 12, 1999

Marcelino, Angélica. Beira, July 26, 1999

Marriama, Esteban. Coordinator of School-Based Programs, Sexual and Reproductive Health, AMODEFA, Maputo, June 29, 2004

Matania, Elisa. Organization of Liberal Women (OML), Maputo, July 6, 1999

Mboa, Ivete. Associação das Donas de Casa (ADOCA), Matola, July 7, 1999

McGuire, Harriet. Director, United States Information Service (USIS), Maputo, July 16, 1999

Mondlane, Emanuela. Coordinator of Lobbying and Advocacy, Forum Mulher, Maputo, July 2, 2004

Mondlane, Janet. Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, Maputo, July 29, 1999

Montero, Ana Maria. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), NGO Development Project, Maputo, July 8, 1999

Montero, Cédia. Former Executive Director, Forum Mulher, Maputo, June 29, 1999

Mucance, Lina. Associação Mulheres Communicação Social (Women's Media Association [AMCS]), Maputo, July 7, 2004

Muianga, Elisa. President, Women, Law and Development Organization (MULEIDE), Maputo, July 21, 1999

Negrão, José. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Campanha Terra (Land Campaign), Maputo, July 6, 1999

Ruggiero, Filomena. Gender Focal Point, Secretariat of the UN System in Mozambique, Maputo, July 5, 2004

Taju, Gulamo. Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) NGO Development Project, Maputo, July 8, 1999

Temba, Eulália. WLSAMOZ, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Maputo, July 13, 1999

Thumbo, Hermengilda. Director of Credit Division, Mozambican Association of Rural Development (AMODER), Africa-America Institute (AAI) Alumnus, Maputo, July 23, 1999

Waterhouse. Rachel, Coordinator of Program on Land Rights and Gender Equity, ACTION AID, Maputo, July 21, 1999

West, Harry. Fulbright Scholar, Maputo, Mozambique, July 20, 1999

Zambeze, Amélia. National Coordinator, Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Mulher Rural (AMRU), Maputo, July 6, 2004

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES, NICARAGUA: JAN 3–FEB 5, 2000, AND MAR 13-26, 2005

Current and Former Leaders and Members of the FSLN

Acevedo, Angela Rosa. Centro de Derechos Constitucionales, FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 11, 2000

Baltodano, Mónica. Current MRS National Assembly; Former FSLN National Assembly, Freedom-Fighter, Managua, Jan 26, 2000

Bolaños, María Lourdes. Former FSLN National Assembly, Former Coordinator, AMNLAE Oficina Legal de la Mujer, Founder, IXCHEN, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Criquillon, Ana. ATC, FSLN, Puntos de Encuentro, Jan 20, 2000; Centro Americana Fundacíon, Managua, Mar 18, 2005

Cruz de Cabrera, Esperanza. Comité de Madres de Héroes y Mártires, MRS, Managua, Jan 31, 2000

Davila, Irma. FSLN Department Secretary-General, Matagalpa, Jan 31, 2000

Evans, Jocqueline M. FSLN Women's League, Granada, Jan 28, 2000

Fletes Zamora, Ritha. FSLN National Assembly, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 10, 2000

López, Concepción. AMNLAE and FSLN, León, Feb 4, 2000

López, Guillermo Galeano. FSLN, Granada, Jan 28, 2000

Montenegro, Sofía. Feminist Theorist/Activist, Comité Nacional Feminista, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Barricada Journalist, CINCO, Managua, Jan 25, 2000, and Mar 18, 2005

Narváez, Zoilamérica. CEI, Sandinista, (Stepdaughter of Daniel Ortega), Managua, Jan 14, 2000

Núñez de Escorcia, Vilma. CENIDH, FSLN, Former Vice President of Supreme Court, Commission for Human Rights, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Ortega, Irma. CIPRES, Former Ministry of Agriculture, FSLN, Managua, Jan 18, 2000, and Mar 22, 2005

Pizarro, Ana María. SI MUJER, Former Ministry of Health, FSLN, Managua, Jan 21, 2000, and Mar 16, 2005

Ramírez, Marcía. CANDERA, Former FSLN, (Sister of Sergio Ramírez, former VP and founder of MRS), Managua, Jan 19, 2000

Ramos López, Sandra. Executive Director, Movimiento de Mujeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, CST, Managua, Jan 10, 2000

Rodriguez, Reyna Isabel. Movimiento de Mujeres Autónomas, Ciudad de Sandino, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 13, 2000, and Mar 15, 2005

Sam Qui, Eva María. Centro de Mujeres, IXCHEN, Former Department of the Interior, FSLN, Managua, Jan 17, 2000

Sequeira Rivas, María Elena. Secretariat Nacional de la Mujer, ATC, FSLN, Managua, Jan 27, 2000, and Mar 16, 2005

Suárez García, Xanthis. Centro de Mujer y Familia, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 21, 2000

Tijerino, Doris. FSLN, Former National Assembly, National Directorate, AMNLAE Coordinator, Police Chief, Managua, Jan 27, 2000

Tijerino, Sara. FSLN Municipal Secretary General, Matagalpa, Jan 31, 2000

Tinoco, Victor Hugo. Current MRS National Assembly, Former FSLN National Directorate, National Assembly, Managua, Jan 26, 2000

Wheelock, Jaime. Former FSLN National Directorate, Minister of Agriculture, Managua, Jan 24, 2000

Zalaquett, Mónica. Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia, Sandinista, Managua, Jan 17, 2000 and Mar 15, 2005

Zeledón, Dora. National Coordinator, AMNLAE, National Assembly, FSLN, Managua, Jan 28, 2000

Current and Former Leaders and Members of AMNLAE

Acevedo, Angela Rosa. Centro de Derechos Constitucionales, FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 11, 2000

Bolaños, María Lourdes. FSLN National Assembly, Former Coordinator, AMNLAE Oficina Legal de la Mujer, Founder, IXCHEN, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Espinoza, Thelma. Vice Coordinator, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 6, 2000

López, Concepción. AMNLAE and FSLN, León, Feb 4, 2000

Mejía, María Lidia. AMNLAE Granada, Jan 28, 2000

Montenegro, Sofía. Feminist Theorist/Activist, Comité Nacional Feminista, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Barricada Journalist, CINCO, Managua, Jan 25, 2000 and Mar 18, 2005

Ramos López, Sandra. Executive Director, Movimiento de Mujeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, CST, Managua, Jan 10, 2000

Rodriguez, Reyna Isabel. Movimiento de Mujeres Autónomas, Ciudad de Sandino, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 13, 2000, and Mar 15, 2005

Suárez García, Xanthis. Centro de Mujer y Familia, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Jan 21, 2000

Tijerino, Doris. FSLN, Former National Assembly, National Directorate, AMNLAE Coordinator, Police Chief, Managua, Jan 27, 2000

Zeledón, Dora. National Coordinator, AMNLAE, Former National Assembly, FSLN, Managua, Jan 28, 2000

Leaders and Members of Autonomous Women's
Organizations or Civil Society Institutions

Acevedo, Angela Rosa. Centro de Derechos Constitucionales, FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 11, 2000

Agurto, Sonia. FIDEG, Managua, Jan 10, 2000, Mar 16, 2005

Aramburu, Vilma Castillo. Executive Director, Puntos de Encuentro, Managua, Jan 20, 2000

Argueo, Lea. Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa. Matagalpa, Mar 24, 2005

Blandón, María Teresa. Feminist Theorist/Activist, Comité Nacional Feminista (CNF), Managua, Mar 21, 2005

Bolaños, María Lourdes. FSLN National Assembly, Former Coordinator, AMNLAE Oficina Legal de la Mujer, Founder, IXCHEN, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Caffarena, Leonardo Centeno. Centro de Educación para Democracia, Managua, Jan 13, 2000

Casa de Mujeres Indígenas, León, Roundtable Discussion, Managua, Feb 4, 2000

Casa Miriam, Seven Women Students, Roundtable Discussion, Managua, Feb 3, 2000

Cortez, Priska. Domestic Worker, Managua, Jan 20, 2000

Criquillon, Ana. ATC, FSLN, Puntos de Encuentro, Jan 20, 2000; Centro Americana Fundacíon, Managua, Mar 18, 2005

Cruz de Cabrera, Esperanza. Comité de Madres de Héroes y Mártires, MRS, Managua, Jan 31, 2000

Delgado, Violeta. Former Executive Secretary of the Women's Network Against Violence, Managua, Mar 18, 2005

Dixon, Helen. Grupo Venancia, Matagalpa, Jan 31, 2000, Consultant, Writer, Member of the Autonomous Women's Movements and Women's Network of Matagalpa, Matagalpa, Mar 23, 2005

Dominguez, María Elena. ISNIN, Managua, Mar 22, 2005

Duran, Fatima Millíon. Coordinadora Mujeres Promuven Anticoncepcíon de Emergéncia, Managua, Mar 22, 2005

Espinoza, Argentina. Executive Director, IXCHEN, Managua, Mar 17, 2005

Fernandez, Montserrat. Feminist Scholar/Activist, Managua, Mar 16, 2005

Ferrey, Asusena. FUNIC MUJER Fundación Mujer Nicaragüenses, Christian Democrat, Contra, Managua, Jan 20, 2000

Giacomán, Yalile. CAPRI, Managua, Jan 12, 2000 Mar 17, 2005

Gomez, Geni. Grupo Venancia, Matagalpa, Mar 24, 2005

Granera, Violeta. FUNDEMOS, Anti-Sandinista, Managua, Jan 14, 2000

Lazo, Javier Matus. CENADE, Managua, Jan 19, 2000

Liebl, Justiniano. CAPRI, Managua, Jan 7, 2000 Mar 17, 2005

Mesa, Auxiliadora. Lawyer, Professor, UCA, Centro de Mujer y Familia, Managua, Jan 24, 2000; Comisíon Interuniversitaria de Estudios de Genero, Mar 21, 2005

Montenegro, Sofía. Feminist Theorist/Activist, Comité Nacional Feminista, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Barricada Journalist, CINCO, Managua, Jan 25, 2000 and Mar 18, 2005

Narváez, Zoilamérica. CEI, Sandinista, (Stepdaughter of Daniel Ortega), Managua, Jan 14, 2000

Núñez de Escorcia, Vilma. CENIDH, FSLN, Former Vice President of Supreme Court, Commission for Human Rights, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Olivas, Argentina. Colectivo de Mujeres de Matagalpa, Jan 31, 2000

Ortega, Irma. CIPRES, Former Ministry of Agriculture, FSLN, Managua, Jan 18, 2000 Mar 22, 2005

Pasquier, Rosario. Director, Asociación de Padres de Familia Doris Maria Morales Tijerino, Managua, Jan 6, 2000

Pizarro, Ana María. SI MUJER, Former Ministry of Health, FSLN, Managua, Jan 21, 2000 and Mar 16, 2005

Ramírez, Marcía. CANDERA, Former FSLN, (Sister of Sergio Ramírez, former VP and founder of MRS), Managua, Jan 19, 2000

Ramos López, Sandra. Executive Director, Movimiento de Mujeres Trabajadoras y Desempleadas, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, CST, Managua, Jan 10, 2000

Renzi, María Rosa. UNDP Gender Representative, Managua, Jan 24, 2000

Rodriguez, Reyna Isabel. Movimiento de Mujeres Autónomas, Ciudad de Sandino, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 13, 2000, and Mar 15, 2005

Rostrán, Federico. Lic Political Science, Journalism, Interpreter, Managua, Feb 4, 2000

Salinas, Lilleana. Former Executive Director, Centro de Mujeres, ISNIN, Managua, Jan 13, 2000

Sam Qui, Eva María. Centro de Mujeres, IXCHEN, Former Department of the Interior, FSLN, Managua, Jan 17, 2000

Sandoval, Petrona. Asociacíon de Mujeres Discapacitadas, León, Mar 19, 2005

Silva, Noé. Waiter, Mansion Teodolinda, Managua, Jan 27, 2000

Suárez García, Xanthis. Centro de Mujer y Familia, Former FSLN, AMNLAE, Managua, Jan 21, 2000

Tellez Palacios, Alberto. UCA Bachelor's Student, Managua, Feb 2, 2000

Tinoco, Gilma Yadira. Comisión Interuniversitaria de Estudios de Género, Managua, Jan 17, 2000

Zalaquett, Mónica. Asociación Centro de Prevención de la Violencia, Sandinista, Managua, Jan 17, 2000, and Mar 15, 2005

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. *Postrevolutionary* has been defined differently by scholars based upon context, region, and approach. In the case of Mozambique and Nicaragua, I will refer to the revolutionary periods as the people I interviewed did: the periods 1975–1992 and 1979–1990 in each country, respectively, when, amidst foreign-funded counterinsurgencies, attempts were made to implement the revolutionary agendas. I will use the term *postrevolutionary* to refer to the periods after the revolutionary agendas inspired by Marxism-Leninism were overturned in both countries to pursue multiparty capitalist democracies, from the 1992 Peace Agreement and 1994 elections in Mozambique and the 1990 electoral loss of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, to the present. In her analysis of women and guerrilla movements in Latin America, Kampwirth (in *Women and Guerrilla Movements*) similarly identifies the Latin American use of the term *la revolución* to refer to "the period of political, economic, and social transformation that can only occur after the guerrillas succeed in seizing the state," 5. The electoral victory of FSLN in 2006 is not a problem within these definitional categories, as the current agenda of FSLN remains as postrevolutionary as the other parties in Nicaragua, as will be discussed later.

2. There has been much debate in the literature over the terms *developing* and *Third World* to describe the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, which have historically been incorporated into the global economy as colonies of European powers and producers of raw materials. Each of these terms is flawed, Eurocentric, and based on a linear, hierarchical understanding of world cultural, political, social, and economic development. *Postcolonial* offers an alternative, but this term can be misleading given the continuation of neocolonial relationships globally. Because I have yet to find a satisfactory alternative and cannot argue in favor of using one term over another, I will use each of the three terms interchangeably.

3. A discussion of First World and Third World feminisms will take place in Chapter 2. Briefly, many First World feminisms have constructed women's economic and political (base, practical, equality feminism) interests as separate, distinct, and often opposed to women's sexual and cultural interests (superstructure, strategic, difference feminism). I argue that it is more theoretically sound and empirically accurate to construct such interests as intersectional, complementary, and intricately linked, and I have found that many Third World, African, and Latin American feminisms do so as well.

4. Milanovic, "True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993," 51–92.

5. United Nations Development Programme, 1998 *Human Development Report*, 2.

6. Aguilar and Lacsamana, *Women and Globalization*, 13–14.

7. United Nations Development Programme, 1998 *Human Development Report*, 2.

8. United Nations Development Programme, 1995 *Human Development Report*, 8.

9. See, e.g., Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; Higley and Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*; Huntington, *Third Wave*.

10. See, e.g., Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development*; Beneria and Sen, "Accumulation, Reproduction and Women's Role in Development: Boserup Revisited"; Sen and Grown, *Development, Crises and Alternative Visions;* Young, *Gender and Development Readings*; Braidotti et al., *Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development*; Mies and Shiva, *Ecofeminism*; Visvanathan et al., *Women, Gender and Development Reader*.

11. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html.

16. HDI=Human Development Indicator; GDP=Gross Domestic Product; EEI= Estimated Earned Income; GDI=Gender Development Index.

17. Torp, Denny, and Ray, *Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe*, 12.

18. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 47.

19. Much has been written about the history of the *prazeros* and the various dimensions of what they represent in terms of racial, gender, and class power in colonial Mozambique: (1) the acquisition of political power of Portuguese, Mestizo, or Indian colonists over an African population (Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution*, 17); (2) the unique creation of an Afro-Portuguese institution in which Iberian patriarchal culture mixed with African matrilineality (Newitt, *History of Mozambique*, 230); (3) the establishment of agricultural plantations in which the *prazeros* "forced the local people to pay taxes and encouraged the slave trade" (Torp et al., 12).

20. Torp et al., 14–15.

21. Isaacman, *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty*, 2–3.

22. Eduardo Mondlane's father and uncle participated in anticolonial struggles in the late nineteenth century. Educated in South Africa, Portugal, and the United States and becoming Mozambique's first Ph.D. in 1960, Mondlane returned to Mozambique to fight for his country's national liberation. He is considered the founder of the national liberation struggle. Mondlane was killed by a mail bomb in 1969 at the hands of the Southern African apartheid regimes and thus never lived to see an independent Mozambique.

23. Mondlane, *Struggle for Mozambique*, 33–34.

24. Close, *Nicaragua*, 10.

25. Ibid, 8.

26. Ibid, 6.

27. Ibid, 10–11.

28. Radell, "The Historical Geography of Western Nicaragua," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, University of California. Cited in Close, 11.

29. Walker. *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino*, 2.

30. Close, 15.

31. Ibid, 12.

32. Ibid, 13.

33. Schroeder, "Roots of Current Antagonism," 7.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid, 8.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid, 8–9. The Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctine, as articulated by President Theodore Roosevelt, asserted the exercise of an "international police power" in the Western Hemisphere. According to historian Walter LaFeber, "Of course, that view completely reversed the meaning of the original Doctine [of 1823]. [President] Monroe and [Secretary of State John Quincy] Adams had originally intended it to protect Latin American revolutions from outside (that is, European) interference." Quoted in Kimmens, 9.

38. Ibid, 9.

39. Walker, *Nicaragua*, 6.

40. Close, 20.

41. Ibid.

42. Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, 5.

43. Close, 22.

44. Walker, *Reagan versus the Sandinistas*, 3.

45. Harris and Vilas, *Nicaragua: A Revolution under Seige,* 1.

46. Vines, *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique*, 6.

47. Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique*, 99–100.

48. Addressing the magnitude of human loss, destruction, and tragedy caused by the Contra and Renamo wars is outside the purview of this book. Numerous other sources address the impact of the wars. See, e.g., Harris and Vilas, *Nicaragua*; Walker, *Reagan versus the Sandinistas*; Kornbluh, *Price of Intervention;* Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*; Vines, *RENAMO*; Human Rights Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction*; Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*; Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique*; Hall and Young, *Mozambique since Independence*; Chan and Vanancio, *War and Peace in Mozambique*.

49. The original name for the counterinsurgency force was its English acronym, MNR (Mozambican National Resistance). It eventually became known as Renamo, based on the Portuguese translation, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana.

50. Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique*, 177. See also Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, 117; Vines, *RENAMO*, 15–17; Chan and Venâncio, *War and Peace in Mozambique*, 3.

51. Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, 2.

52. Dinerman, *Revolution, Counter-Revolution, and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa*, 54.

53. Minter, 2.

54. Human Rights Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction*.

55. Ibid, 3; Vines, 17.

56. Abreu, "Mozambican Women Experiencing Violence," 75; see also Sheldon, 196–203.

57. Sheldon, 197.

58. Abreu, 75.

59. Dinerman, 1.

60. For more on this process, see Chan and Vanancio, *War and Peace in Mozambique*.

61. Kornbluh, "The Covert War," 21.

62. Tirado, "The United States and the Sandinista Revolution," 204.

63. Tirado, 206.

64. Tirado, 206–207.

65. Kornbluh, *Price of Intervention*, 213.

66. Walker, *Land of Sandino*, 53; Chinchilla, "Revolutionary Popular Feminism in Nicaragua," 382.

67. Walker, *Land of Sandino*, 53.

68. Close, *Chamorro Years*, 28.

69. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

70. Randall, *Gathering Rage*.

CHAPTER 2

1. Kuhn and Wolpe, *Feminism and Materialism*; Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*.

2. See, e.g., Stichter and Parpart, *Women, Employment and Family*; Schwarzenbach, "On Civic Friendship," 97–128.

3. See, e.g., Benston, "Political Economy," 31–43; Eisenstein, "Constructing a Theory."

4. See, e.g., Mies, Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Von Werlhof, *Women: The Last Colony*.

5. Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*; Mies et al., *Women: The Last Colony*.

6. Dalla Costa and James, "Power of Women"; Mies et al., *Women: The Last Colony*.

7. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," 19–38; Harrison, "Political Economy of Housework"; Smith, "Domestic Labor and Marx's Theory of Value"; Molyneux, "Beyond the Domestic Labor Debates," 3–28.

8. Delphy, *Close to Home*.

9. Beechey, "On Patriarchy," 66–82.

10. Benston, "Political Economy," 33.

11. Benston, 33–34.

12. Hubbard, "Social Effects of Some Contemporary Myths about Women," 3.

13. MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*, 10.

14. Ibid.

15. Dalla Costa and James, "Power of Women," 31.

16. Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation*, 32.

17. Stichter and Parpart, *Women, Employment and the Family*, 9.

18. See, e.g., Frank, "Development of Underdevelopment"; dos Santos, "Structure of Dependence"; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; Ake, *Political Economy of Africa*.

19. Mies, 48.

20. Mies et al., 6.

21. Ibid, xi.

22. Ibid, 41.

23. Ibid, 16.

24. Stichter and Parpart, *Women, Employment and Family*.

25. Jaquette, *Women's Movement in Latin America*.

26. Mikell, *African Feminism*, 6–7.

27. Aguilar and Lacsamana, *Women and Globalization*, 17–18.

28. In *Unthinking Eurocentrism,* Shohat and Stam discuss the adoption of the term *Third World* at the 1955 Bandung Conference of nonaligned African and Asian countries

to express solidarity with the anticolonial struggles in Vietnam and Algeria. It is within the context of the same sense of solidarity with anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles that I continue to use this term in my teaching, research, and scholarship.

29. Cagatay, Grown, and Santiago, "Nairobi Women's Conference," 403.

30. Ibid, 404.

31. Stichter and Parpart, 162.

32. Ibid, 158.

33. McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 384.

34. Mohanty, "Cartographies of Struggle," 12.

35. Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders,* 17.

36. See, e.g., hooks, *Ain't I a Women?* Hull, Scott, and Smith, *All the Women Are White*; Collins, *Black Feminist Thought*; Caraway, *Segregated Sisterhood*.

37. For example, in *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World,* Jayawardena examines the complexities of the successes and failures of women's movements for emancipatory change and the development of feminist consciousness within national liberation struggles in Asia and the Middle East. In *Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism*, Kruks, Rapp, and Young point out that what is so striking about Marxist-Leninist revolutions worldwide is how so many different case studies across different geographical regions and historical time periods put forth the same theories and practices, thus "the very same problems remain unresolved, and the very same questions are left unaddressed" (12).

38. Basu, *Challenge of Local Feminisms*.

39. Frohmann and Valdés, "Democracy in the Country and in the Home," 279.

40. See, e.g., Jaquette, *Women's Movement in Latin America*; Frohmann and Valdés, "Democracy in the Country and in the Home"; Soares et al.

41. Ifi Amadiume, "Gender, Political Systems, and Social Movements," 35.

42. Tripp, "Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa," 101.

43. Tripp, "Rethinking Difference," 673.

44. Tripp, "Politics of Autonomy," 101–102. This argument will be made in Chapters 5 and 6 on the success of the Land Law and the Family Law, respectively, in Mozambique, as well as in Chapter 8 on contemporary women's organizing in both countries.

45. Cochran and Scott, "Class, State, and Popular Organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua," 117.

46. See Oyewumi, *Invention of Women*.

47. See Mikell, *African Feminism*, 4.

48. See Steady, "Black Woman Cross-Culturally"; Steady, "African Feminism."

49. Oyewumi, *Invention of Women*, ix-xii.

50. Ibid.

51. See Oyewumi, *Invention of Women*, chapter 2.

52. Mikell, *African Feminism,* 3.

53. Mikell, 8.

54. Mikell, 4.

55. Mikell, 4.

56. In the next section of this chapter on Latin American feminisms, I discuss both the usefulness and problematic nature of Maxine Molyneux's prominent framework of practical and strategic gender interests. While my own framework of women's activism and feminist agency recognizes that there are differences in the ways and reasons women organize, I do not think the differences are best understood along practical and strategic dimensions.

57. Steady, "African Feminism," 3.

58. Ibid.

59. Molyneux, "Mobilization without Emancipation?" 227–254.

60. Ibid, 233.

61. Ibid.

62. Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*, 10.

63. Ibid.

64. Haynes, *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World*, 127.

65. Ibid.

66. Stephen, *Women and Social Movements in Latin America*, 12.

67. Ibid, 2.

68. Craske, *Women and Politics in Latin America*, 166.

69. Ibid, 19.

70. Ibid, 166.

71. Westwood and Radcliffe, "Gender, Racism, and Politics," 20.

72. Craske, 166–167.

73. Marchand and Parpart, *Feminism, Postmodernism, Development.*

74. Westwood and Radcliffe, 20.

75. Haynes, 130.

76. Molyneux, "Analyzing Women's Movements," 155.

77. For further discussion on needs versus interests, see Molyneux, "Analyzing Women's Movements" 140–162; Jonasdottir, "On the Concept of Interests," 33–65; Moser, "Gender Planning in the Third World," 1799–1825.

78. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

79. *Encuentro* literally means encounter. It comes from the Spanish verb *encontrar* (to meet or to find oneself or another, to confront oneself or another) and refers to "a meeting place where one exchanges ideas, expresses feelings, thoughts, and emotions; listens and is listened to, agrees and disagrees, affirms and contradicts." Cited in Ortega and Sternbach, "Gracias a la vida," 1.

80. Sternbach et al., "Feminisms in Latin America," 394.

81. I have created the following summary chart based upon my readings of the following sources: Nancy Saporta Sternbach et al., "Feminisms in Latin America," 393–434; Craske, *Women and Politics in Latin America,* 180–185; Alvarez et al., 537–579. While the Alvarez et al. article was published in *Signs*, I read it in its entirety as an online pdf file available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/havenscenter/VSP/readings2sort/pdf/alvarez-etal.pdf. Therefore, my page references will match the online version: 1–64.

82. Barrig, "Difficult Equilibrium between Bread and Roses," 159, in Jaquette, *Women's Movement in Latin America.*

83. Sternbach et al., 409.

84. Ibid.

85. Alvarez et al., 10.

86. Sternbach et al., 416.

87. Ibid, 415.

88. Jaquette, *Women's Movement in Latin America*, 6.

89. Ibid.

90. Lind, "Power, Gender and Development," 137, 145.

91. Sternbach et al., 422.

92. Alvarez et al., 13.

93. Sternbach et al., 421.

94. Alvarez et al., 15.

95. Stephen, *Women and Social Movements in Latin America*, 19.

96. Alvarez et al., 25.

97. Ibid, 26–28.

98. Ibid, 29.

99. Sternbach et al., 404.

100. Sternbach et al., 420.

101. See, e.g., Tabb, *Amoral Elephant*; Peet, *Unholy Trinity*.

102. See, e.g., Antrobus, *Global Women's Movement*; Ferree and Tripp, *Global Feminism*; Hawkesworth, *Globalization and Feminist Activism*; Moghadam, *Globalizing Women*.

103. Moghadam, 17–19.

104. Antrobus, 5.

105. Adams, "Regional Women's Activism," 190–191.

106 Africa Action African Policy E Journal. "African Union Adopts Protocal," http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/wom0307.htm.

107. Oyewumi, "*African Women & Feminism,* 1, 3.

108. McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 382.

109. Ibid, 366.

110. Alexander and Mohanty, *Feminist Genealogies,* xxviii.

111. Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins," 378.

112. Hartsock, *Money, Sex and Power,* 232.

113. Mills, *Racial Contract*, 109.

114. Hartsock, 232.

115. Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins," 358.

116. Hancock, "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition," 63–79.

117. See Mohanty, *Feminism Without Borders*, who describes her own antiracist feminist vision as being about "decolonization, anticapitalist critique, and solidarity," 3. I feel a great kinship with her project and owe her a huge intellectual debt. See also Alexander and Mohanty, *Feminist Genealogies*, where the development of this life-long project really reached new heights.

118. Alexander and Mohanty, xx.

119. Sen and Grown, *Development, Crises and Alternative Visions*, 13.

120. hooks, *Ain't I a Woman?* 194–195.

CHAPTER 3

1. Arnfred, "Conceptions of Gender: Case of Mozambique," 1–13.

2. See, e.g., Deighton et al., *Sweet Ramparts*; Urdang, *And Still They Dance*; Kruks et al., *Promissory Notes;* Randall, *Gathering Rage;* Chinchilla, "Feminism, Revolution, and Democratic Transitions in Nicaragua"; Randall, *Sandino's Daughters Revisited*; Criquillon, "Nicaraguan Women's Movement"; West, ed., *Feminist Nationalism*; Chinchilla, "Nationalism, Feminism, and Revolution in Central America"; Metoyer, *Women and the State in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua*; Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*.

3. Chinchilla, "Feminism, Revolution, and Democratic Transitions in Nicaragua," 193.

4. Hassim, " Virtuous Circle of Representation," 175.

5. See Appendix for a complete list of interviewees organized by categories within each country context.

6. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 119.

7. Carlos Cardoso, a long-time respected journalist in Mozambique, was murdered in Maputo in November 2000. *Africa Confidential* (41:24, 2000) reported that some believe Cardoso was assassinated because of his investigation into a US$15 million bank fraud. On November 24, 2000, in a beautiful tribute to Cardoso titled, "His tenacious journalism exposed corruption in Mozambique," Joseph Hanlon wrote in The Guardian, "When I was in his office three weeks ago, he was researching an exposé of the links of senior officials and businessmen

to a £10m bank fraud and subsequent cover-up. His killing is a clear message to journalists and others of the price of asking too many questions" (http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/ Article/0,4273,4095684,00.html). According to a May 11, 2006 Mozambique News Agency (AIM) Report, the Mozambican public prosecutor's office charged businessman Nyimpine Chissano, oldest son of former President Joaquim Chissano, with "joint moral authorship" of the murder.

8. Interview with Carlos Cardoso, 7/9/99.

9. Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*, 91.

10. Women's Section: Mozambique Liberation Front.

11. *Organization of Mozambican Woman (OMM) Informative Bulletin,* 2.

12. Women's Section.

13. Sheldon, 125.

14. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

15. Felipe Magaia was the first Defense Minister for Frelimo.

16. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

17. Women's International Resource Exchange (WIRE), *Resistance, War and Liberation*, 31.

18. Interview with Manuel Tomé, 7/29/99.

19. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.

20. *OMM Informative Bulletin*, 3.

21. Urdang. "Last Transition," 364.

22. WIRE, 31.

23. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

24. WIRE, 31.

25. Ibid.

26. Mullings, "Women and Economic Change in Africa," 259.

27. Ibid.

28. Urdang, *And Still They Dance*, 96.

29. WIRE, 27.

30. Ibid, 31.

31. *OMM Informative Bulletin*, 9.

32. Interview with Signe Arnfred, 11/17/00.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Waterhouse, "Mozambique: From Revolution to Powder Room."

37. Kruks et al., *Promissory Notes.*

38. Urdang, *And Still They Dance*, 97–98.

39. Urdang, " Last Transition," 351.

40. Ibid.

41. Urdang, *And Still They Dance*, 98.

42. *OMM Informative Bulletin*, 10.

43. Bowen, *State against the Peasantry.*

44. *OMM Informative Bulletin*, 14–15.

45. Interview with Polly Gastor, 7/13/99.

46. *Resolutions from the Second Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women*, 4.

47. Ibid, 18.

48. Ibid, 18–19.

49. Ibid, 21–22.

50. Ibid, 14–15.

51. Interview with Célia Diniz, 7/1/99.

52. Interview with Sérgio Vieira, 7/15/99.

53. Interview with Polly Gastor, 7/13/99.

54. Ibid.

55. *Resolutions from the Second Conference*, 10.

56. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

57. *Situation of Women in Mozambique*.

58. Interview with Teresa Cruz e Silva, 7/1/99.

59. Other than the secretary-generals of the OMM and Frelimo, the people who articulated the existence of the greatest degree of autonomy for the OMM were from areas outside of the capital city: Machava, outside of Maputo, Beira, in the central region, and Nampula in the North. However, despite the statements made about the apparent autonomy of the OMM, *all* persons interviewed found it impossible when asked to come up with *any* examples of times when the OMM and Frelimo disagreed on a given issue or policy stance.

60. Interview with Alcido Nguenya, 7/21/99.

61. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

62. Interview with Ana Rita Sithole, 7/15/99.

63. Interview with Celeste Nobela Bango, 7/21/99.

64. Interview with Eulália Temba, 7/13/99.

65. Interview with Ana Fernandes, 6/30/99.

66. Ibid.

67. Interview with Signe Arnfred, 11/17/00.

68. Ibid.

69. Interview with Ana Rita Sithole, 7/15/99.

70. Interview with Generossa Cossa, 7/14/99.

71. Rosset and Vandermeer, *The Nicaragua Reader*, 323.

72. Interview with Dora Zeledón, 1/28/00.

73. Isbester, *Still Fighting*.

74. Ibid, 31.

75. Interview with Thelma Espinoza, 1/6/00.

76. Interview with Gilma Yadira Tinoco, 7/17/00.

77. Deighton et al., *Sweet Ramparts*, 42.

78. Ibid.

79. Interview with Auxiliadora Mesa, 1/24/00.

80. Interview with Thelma Espinoza, 1/6/00.

81. Molyneux, "Mobilization Without Emancipation?" 237.

82. Ibid, 238.

83. Borge, *Women and the Nicaraguan Revolution*, 25.

84. Interview with María Lidia Mejía, 1/28/00.

85. Deighton et al., 47.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid, 44.

88. Criquillon, "The Nicaraguan Women's Movement," 212.

89. LaRamée and Polakoff, "The Evolution of the Popular Organizations in Nicaragua," 182.

90. Chinchilla, "Feminism, Revolution, and Democratic Transitions in Nicaragua," 179.

91. Ibid, 180.

92. Erlick, "Women of Nicaragua," 150.

93. Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*, 142.

94. Ibid.

95. The role of motherhood in the Nicaraguan revolution has been discussed by many. See most extensively, Bayard de Volo, *Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs*. Attempts to mobilize women as mothers are not necessarily intended to mobilize women as women. In fact, the Sandinista appropriation of the symbol of motherhood politicized motherhood without politicizing women as mothers or as women. As Chuchryk, in "Women in the Revolution," states, "This contradiction between politicizing motherhood by glorifying it and not politicizing women outside their role as mothers surfaced many times and in many ways throughout the Nicaraguan revolution. It is probably the key to understanding some of the constraints that limited the ability of the Sandinistas to advance in the area of women's rights and women's emancipation," 146. Women were only encouraged by the FSLN's motherhood campaign to organize around the political issues of motherhood, home, and family within the parameters of traditionally accepted roles for women and mothers.

96. Isbester, 56–57.

97. Chinchilla, 182.

98. Ibid.

99. Collinson, 143.

100. Chinchilla, 184.

101. Collinson, 144; see also Chapter 4 for an extensive discussion of the women's secretariats and the autonomy struggles that emerged within AMNLAE.

102. Collinson, 141.

103. Jayko, "Introduction," 4.

104. Deighton et al., 44.

105. Borge, 11.

106. Ibid, 12.

107. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

108. Borge, 15–16.

109. Ibid, 18.

110. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

111. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

112. Interview with Vilma Castillo Aramburu, 1/20/00.

113. Interview with Gilma Yadira Tinoco, 1/17/00.

114. Ibid.

115. Interview with Argentina Olivas, 1/31/00.

116. Ibid.

117. Interview with Sonia Agurto, 1/10/00.

118. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

119. Ibid.

120. Interview with Ana María Pizarro, 1/21/00. Pizarro went on in this interview to argue how a reproductive model is actually essential to the model of the Nicaraguan revolution, unspoken but inherent in the pro-natalist policies and politicization of motherhood: "In this country, the rural economy needed laborers to take over agriculture. The revolutionary model is pro-life. Women's bodies become a state issue." Women's bodies remain a state issue in the postrevolutionary period, as the reelected Sandinistas passed a law to outlaw therapeutic abortion in the country in 2006.

121. Interview with Victor Hugo Tinoco, 1/26/00.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Interview with Jaime Wheelock, 1/24/00.

125. Ibid.

126. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

127. Interview with Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, 2/2/00.

128. Interview with María Rosa Renzi, 1/24/00.

129. Ibid.

130. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

131. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

132. Interview with María Lidia Mejía, 1/28/00.

133. Interview with Sandra Ramos López, 1/10/00.

134. Interview with Ana María Pizarro, 1/21/00.

135. Interview with Vilma Castillo Aramburu, 1/20/00.

136. Interview with Lilleana Salinas, 1/13/00.

137. Interview with Dora Zeledón, 1/28/00.

138. Ibid.

139. Anonymous Interview.

140. Anonymous Interview.

141. Interview with Xanthis Suárez García, 1/21/00.

142. Interview with Zoilamérica Narváez, 1/14/00.

143. Two prominent Sandinista militants, Dora María Telles and Sergio Ramírez, former Sandinista Vice President under Daniel Ortega, broke off from the FSLN and formed the MRS party, the Sandinista Renovation Movement, in 1994. The MRS represents a faction from within the FSLN that publically expressed discontent over the party's unwillingness to pursue internal democratization after much demand in that direction.

144. Interview with Zoilamérica Narváez, 1/14/00.

145. Intreview with Marcia Ramírez, 1/19/00.

146. Ibid.

147. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

148. Ibid.

149. Interview with Javier Matus Lazo, 1/19/00.

150. While the focus of this section is the historical relationship of patriarchal power between women and the FSLN, new reports are emerging about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the new FSLN-led Nicaraguan government and the targeting of feminist activists after the country's passage of one of the most restrictive abortion bans in Latin America in November 2006, reminding feminist scholar/activists that addressing issues of patriarchal political culture are as much in our present and future as in our past. For more discussion on abortion, see Chapter 8.

151. Interview with Helen Dixon, 1/31/00.

152. Ibid.

153. Interview with Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, 2/2/00.

154. Ibid.

155. Interview with María Lourdes Bolaños, 2/2/00.

156. Interview with Ritha Fletes Zamora, 1/10/00.

157. Anonymous Interview.

CHAPTER 4

1. Interview with Sandra Ramos López, 1/10/00.

2. Ibid.

3. Interview with Sonia Agurto, 1/10/00.

4. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 7/23/99.

5. Kampwirth, "Feminism, Anti-Feminism, and Electoral Politics," 275.

6. Ibid, 276.

7. Beckwith, "Lancashire Women against Pit Closures," 1038.

8. Hassim, "Virtuous Circle of Representation," 174.

9. Ibid.

10. Tripp, "Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa," 110.

11. Interview with Manuel Tomé, 7/29/99.

12. Ibid.

13. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

14. Interview with Obede Baloi, 7/23/99.

15. Afonso Dhlakama is the leader of Renamo.

16. Interview with Generossa Cossa, 7/14/99.

17. Interview with Gertrudes Victorino, 7/14/99.

18. Interview with Maria Olívia Alvero, 7/28/99.

19. Interview with Felipe Paunde, 7/26/99.

20. Ibid.

21. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

22. Interview with Ana Rita Sithole, 7/15/99.

23. Interview with Alcido Nguenya, 7/21/99.

24. Ibid.

25. Interview with Sam Barnes, 7/2/99.

26. Interview with Maria Fernanda Farinha, 7/8/99.

27. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

28. Anonymous interview.

29. Anonymous interview.

30. Interview with Obede Baloi, 7/23/99.

31. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 214.

32. Ibid.

33. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.

34. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

35. Ibid.

36. Interview with Angela Rosa Acevedo, 1/11/00.

37. Deighton et al., *Sweet Ramparts,* 48.

38. Anonymous interview.

39. Interview with Vilma Castillo Aramburu, 1/20/00.

40. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

41. Ibid.

42. Criquillon, "Nicaraguan Women's Movement," 217.

43. Interview with Helen Dixon, 1/31/00.

44. Deighton et al., 47.

45. Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*, 47.

46. Chuchryk, "Women in the Revolution," 150.

47. Collinson, 49.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid, 45.

50. Interview with María Elena Sequeira Rivas, 1/27/00.

51. Criquillion, 217.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid, 218.

54. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

55. Collinson, 46.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid, 48.

59. Interview with Vilma Castillo Aramburu, 1/20/00.

60. Interview with María Elena Sequeira Rivas, 1/27/00.

61. Interview with Vilma Castillo Aramburu, 1/20/00.

62. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

63. Interview with Eva María Sam Qui, 1/17/00.

64. Interview with Mónica Baltodano, 1/26/00.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Interview with Reyna Isabel Rodriguez, 1/13/00.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Interview with Auxiliadora Mesa, 1/24/00.

72. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

73. Ibid.

74. Disney and Gelb, "Feminist Organizational 'Success,'" 74.

75. Anonymous interview.

76. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

77. Ibid.

78. Criquillon, 222–223.

79. Ibid, 223.

80. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

81. Criquillon, 224.

82. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Interview with María Lidia Mejía, 1/28/00.

86. Interview with Dora Zeledón, 1/28/00.

87. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

1. Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, 20–21.

2. Ibid, 20.

3. Ibid, 21.

4. Inter Parliamentary Union, *Women in National Parliaments* (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm), as of February 28, 2008, women's representation in a single or lower house of parliament. Mozambique has a unicameral national legislature. The Assembly of the Republic is also known as the National Assembly and the two terms are used interchangeably in this chapter.

5. Abreu, "Enhancing Women's Participation," 6.

6. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.

7. Casimiro, *A Mulher em Moçambique*.

8. *Situation of Women in Mozambique*, 13.

9. Interview with Obede Baloi, 7/23/1999.

10. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

11. Interview with Sérgio Vieira, 7/15/99.

12. Interview with Gertrudes Victorino, 7/14/99.

13. Luciak, "Gender Equality and Electoral Politics on the Left," 45–46; Ramirez-Horton, "Role of Women in the Nicaraguan Revolution," 152; Chuchryk, "Women in the Revolution," 143.

14. Isbester, *Still Fighting*, 61.

15. Chuchryk, 158.

16. Chinchilla, "Revolutionary Popular Feminism in Nicaragua," 371.

17. Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*.

18. Luciak, 45.

19. Luciak, 46.

20. Ibid.

21. Isbester, 176.

22. Isbester, 176; Luciak, 54.

23. Inter Parliamentary Union, *Women in National Parliaments* (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm) as of February 28, 2008, women's representation in a single or lower house of parliament. Nicaragua also has a unicameral national legislature.

24. See Pitkin, *Concept of Representation*; Goetz and Hassim, "Introduction"; Bauer and Britton, "Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?"

25. Goetz and Hassim, 5.

26. Interview with Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango, 7/21/99.

27. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

28. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.

29. Interview with María Elena Sequeira Rivas, 1/27/00.

30. Ibid. It is well documented that as President, Chamorro represented and supported policies in accordance with traditional views of women (see Isbester, *Still Fighting*; Kampwirth, "Feminism, Anti-Feminism, and Electoral Politics").

31. Interview with María Lourdes Bolaños, 2/2/00.

32. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

33. Berg and Gunderson, "Legal Reforms in Mozambique."

34. *Documento*s *da 2 Conferencia da Organização da Mulher Moçambicana*," 1, 11.

35. Berg and Gundersen, 256.

36. The New Family Law took effect 180 days after its publication in the official gazette, the *Boletim da Republica*, to allow time for changes in other legislation affected by the law, such as the Inheritance Law, and to train registrars and religious and traditional dignitaries in what the law requires of them. *Assembly Passes Revies Family Law*, Maputo, 24 August, 2004. Mozambican Information Agency-AIM.

37. *Assembly Debates Radical Change in the Family Law*.

38. Interview with Maria Jose Artur, 7/5/04.

39. *Assembly Debates Radical Change in the Family Law*.

40. Women's International Resource Exchange (WIRE), *Resistance, War and Liberation*, 30.

41. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Families in a Changing Environment*, 28.

42. Ibid.

43. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

44. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Families in a Changing Environment, 28*.

45. Ibid, 22.

46. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

47. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Families in a Changing Environment, 28*.

48. Ibid, 24.

49. These accounts come from several parliamentarians, women's organization leaders, and community members that I interviewed who were present at debates in the National Assembly and throughout the country.

50. Interview with Zelma Vasconcelos, 6/29/04.

51. Ibid.

52. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 6/30/04.

53. Interview with Isabel Casimiro, 7/8/04.

54. Ibid.

55. Interview with Selma Augusta, 7/7/04.

56. I include this discussion not to take a position on the Koran, but rather to try to adequately represent the diversity of views expressed in debates around the Family Law by Mozambican women and hence to reveal the complicated situations within which Mozambican feminists and women's movement activists found themselves when trying to act as advocates for "women's rights" in the country.

57. Interview with Aly Elias Lalá, 7/7/04.

58. Ibid.

59. Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*, 111–112.

60. Chinchilla, "Revolutionary Popular Feminism in Nicaragua," 380.

61. Interview with Auxiliadora Mesa, 1/24/00.

62. Ibid.

63. Interview with Angela Rosa Acevedo, 1/11/00.

64. Ibid.

65. Interview with Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, 2/2/00.

66. Collinson, 145.

67. Stephens, "Women in Nicaragua," 16.

68. Collinson, 145.

69. Chuchryk, 143.

70. Isbester , 89.

71. Ibid.

72. Stephens, 16–17.

73. Interview with Sam Barnes, 7/2/99.

74. Interview with Jennifer Garvey, 7/15/99.

75. Interview with Manuel Tomé, 7/29/99.

76. Interview with Cédia Montero, 6/29/99.

77. Interview with Ivete Mboa, 7/7/99.

78. WIRE, *Resistance, War and Liberation*, 28.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. *Resolutions from the Second Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women*, 6, 12–13.

82. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

83. Ibid.

84. Interview with Generossa Cossa, 7/14/99.

85. Ibid.

86. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

87. Molyneux, *Women's Movements*, 146.

88. Interview with Angela Rosa Acevedo, 1/11/00.

89. Collinson, 9.

90. Interview with seven women students at *Casa Miriam*, 2/3/00.

91. Interview with Ana María Pizarro, 1/21/00.
92. Interview with Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, 2/2/00.
93. Interview with Concepción López, 2/4/00.
94. Interview with María Rosa Renzi, 1/24/00.
95. Interview with Vilma Núñez de Escorcia, 2/2/00.
96. Interview with Doris Tijerino, 1/27/00.
97. Ibid.
98. Interview with Dora Zeledón, 1/28/00.
99. Interview with Jaime Wheelock, 1/24/00.
100. Berg and Gunderson, 268–269.
101. Interview with Gilma Yadira Tinoco, 1/17/00.

CHAPTER 6

1. Mullings, "Women and Economic Change in Africa," 256.
2. Hafkin and Bay, *Women in Africa*, 17.
3. Mazrui, "Ghandi, Marx, and the Warrior Tradition," 189.
4. Sheldon, *Pounders of Grain*, 129.
5. Quoted in Sheldon, 129.
6. Sheldon, 198.
7. Enloe, *Maneuvers*, 251.
8. Isbester, *Still Fighting*, 55.
9. Ibid, 55.
10. Ibid, 55–56.
11. Interview with Américo Magaia, 7/24/99.
12. Interview with Polly Gastor, 7/13/99.
13. Interview with Eulália Temba, 7/13/99.
14. See Chapter 2 for a description of the origin and history of the Women's Detachment.
15. Interview with Américo Magaia, 7/24/99.
16. Interview with Manuel Tomé, 7/29/99.
17. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.
18. Interview with Ritha Fletes Zamora, 1/10/00.
19. Interview with Eulália Temba, 7/13/99.
20. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 7/23/99.
21. Interview with Thelma Espinoza, 1/6/00.
22. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Maintenance Rights and Women in Mozambique*, xv.
28. Ibid.
29. Sheldon, "A Report on a 'Delicate Problem,'" 576.
30. FAO, United Nations, *Rural Women and Food Security*.
31. Lele, *Design of Rural Development*, 46.
32. Ibid, 50.
33. *Africa Recovery*, 10.
34. Urdang, *And Still They Dance*, 107.

35. Davidson, "Land Redistribution in Mozambique," 228.

36. Urdang, 59.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid, 114.

39. Davidson, 244.

40. Urdang, 26.

41. Bowen, *State against the Peasantry*.

42. Urdang, 27.

43. Ibid, 26.

44. Ibid, 91–104.

45. *Situation of Women in Mozambique*, 29.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Interview with María Rosa Renzi, 1/24/00.

49. Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*, 50.

50. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA), *Mujer y Transformación de la Vida Rural*.

51. Collinson, 51.

52. Ibid.

53. Chavez Metoyer, "Nicaragua's Transition of State Power," 120.

54. Ibid, 123.

55. The position of the IMF and the World Bank in preventing the manufacturing of cashews in Mozambique has been well documented and is discussed in Chapter 7. See also Hanlon, *Peace without Profits*, Hanlon, "*Power without Responsibility*" and the 1999 United Nations Mozambique Country Report.

56. Late development economics professor and civil society activist Dr. José Negrão posthumously won the Southern Africa Trust Civil Society Drivers of Change Award for his work with the Land Campaign and all of his efforts to extend land rights in Mozambique.

57. Interview with José Negrão, 7/6/99.

58. Interview with Rachel Waterhouse, 7/21/99.

59. Interview with José Negrão, 7/6/99.

60. Interview with Carla Braga, 7/15/99.

61. Ibid.

62. Chavez Metoyer, 126–127.

63. Interview with Javier Matus Lazo, 1/19/00.

64. Interview with Irma Ortega, 1/18/00.

65. Interview with Sonia Agurto, 1/10/00.

66. *Situation of Women in Mozambique*, 9.

67. Ibid, 9, 15.

68. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 7/23/99.

69. Interview with Carmen Gamilo, 7/26/99.

70. Ibid.

71. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Maintenance Rights and Women in Mozambique*, 1.

72. Ibid, xvii.

73. Ibid, xx.

74. Ibid.

75. Magaia, *Dumba Nengue*, 2.

76. Ibid.

77. Interview with Maria Olívia Alvero, 7/28/99.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Interview with Ivete Mboa, 7/7/99.

81. Ibid.

82. Interview with Hermengilda Thumbo, 7/23/99.

83. Interview with Ana Maria Montero, 7/8/99.

84. Interview with Sérgio Vieira, 7/15/99.

85. Women's International Resource Exchange (WIRE), *Resistance, War and Liberation*, 28.

86. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

87. Interview with Fatima Trinta, 7/28/99.

88. Ibid.

89. Interview with Ana Maria Montero, 7/8/99.

90. Interview with Edda Collier, 6/30/99.

91. Interview with Ana Rita Sithole, 7/15/99.

92. Chavez Metoyer, 126–127.

93. Ibid.

94. Interview with Hermengilda Thumbo, 7/23/99.

95. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 7/23/99.

96. Interview with Ana Maria Montero, 7/8/99.

97. Interview with Nina Berg, 7/16/99.

98. Interview with Ana Fernandes, 6/30/99.

Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Families in a Changing Environment*, 13.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid, 19.

102. Ibid, 22.

103. Interview with Eulália Temba, 7/13/99.

104. Berg and Gunderson, "Legal Reforms in Mozambique," 251.

105. Ibid.

106. Interview with Lina Magaia, 7/6/99.

107. Interview with Ana Fernandes, 6/30/99.

108. MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*, 10.

CHAPTER 7

1. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Huntington, *Third Wave*; Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

2. Reference to language used in Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*.

3. I am using the concepts of political, economic, and participatory democracy as defined by Hoyt, *Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy*: 1. political or representative democracy establishes a republican form of government based on periodic elections and universal suffrage; 2. participatory or mass democracy incorporates citizen participation through mass organizations in civil society; 3. economic democracy attempts to establish a more equitable distribution of wealth and more democratic control of the people over the resources and economic decision-making of the nation. I define *revolutionary democracy* as a type of democracy that attempts to integrate all of the political, economic and participatory aspects described above.

4. Dahl, *Polyarchy*; Huntington, *Third Wave;* and Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* all adopt a similar procedural definition of democracy.

5. See, e.g., Sklar, "Democracy in Africa"; Petras and Leiva, *Democracy and Poverty in Chile*; Hoyt, *Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy*.

6. The meaning of the term *civil society* has changed dramatically from the seventeenth century to the present: (1) use by the Social Contract theorists as the equivalent of the state and political society and juxtaposed to the state of nature; (2) use by Hegel as a prepolitical sphere, understood to be the realm of the particular as opposed to the State, the realm of the universal; (3) use by Marx as the realm of economic relations between the 'private' family and the 'public' state; (4) use by Gramsci to refer to the complex of ideological/cultural relations and spiritual/intellectual life where the hegemony of dominant groups is exercised. Yet, civil society for Gramsci was also the place where a new kind of struggle could take place against capitalism in the sphere of everyday life: "The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare" (*Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 235). In discourses of democratic consolidation, civil society is understood to be the sphere of autonomous organizing outside the state associated with pluralism, particularly in comparison to the corporatist model of participation adopted by Frelimo and the Sandinistas.

7. See, e.g., Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*; Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*.

8. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 4.

9. Ibid.

10. Markovitz, "Uncivil Society, Capitalism, and the State, in Africa," 25.

11. Markovitz, "Civil Society, Pluralism, Goldilocks and other Fairy Tales in Africa," 117–122.

12. Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*; Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism*, 238.

13. Hoyt, *Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy*.

14. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

15. Interview with Lilleana Salinas, 1/13/00.

16. Interview with Irma Ortega, 1/18/00.

17. UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 2007/2008*.

18. Interview with Justiniano Liebl, 1/7/00.

19. Interview with Yalile Giacomán, 1/12/00.

20. Interview with Ana Fernandes, 6/30/99.

21. Reference to Hanlon, author of *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?* and *Peace without Profit*.

22. Interview with Teresa Cruz e Silva, 7/1/99.

23. Interview with Lilleana Salinas, 1/13/00.

24. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

25. Huffman, "Colonialism, Socialism, and Destabilization in Mozambique," 25.

26. Cliff, "War on Women in Mozambique," 27.

27. Waterhouse, "Mozambique: From Revolution to Powder Room."

28. Babb, "After the Revolution," 31.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. See also "Economic Takeoff: the Little Train That Couldn't," *Envío* 11 (October 1992): 18–20.

31. Perez-Aleman, "Economic Crisis and Women in Nicaragua," 254.

32. Cliff, "War on Women in Mozambique," 26.

33. Interview with Sabina Santos, 7/20/99.

34. Hanlon, "Power without Responsibility."

35. Ibid, 5.

36. Hilmarsson, "Cashew Pricing and Marketing in Mozambique," cited in Hanlon, 6.

37. Hanlon, 6.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid, 7–8.

40. Ibid, 8.

41. Ibid, 8.

42. United Nations Development Programme, *Mozambique National Human Development Report*, 1999, 74–75.

43. Interview with Célia Diniz, 7/1/99.

44. See, e.g., Morgan, "Violence in Mozambique," 616; "'Operation Production' Victims to Go Home," *Mozambique News Agency Aim Reports* No.248, 19th February 2003; and Bulletin, 81, Mozambique Information Agency AIM (Agencia de Informação de Moçambique), 1983.

45. Cochran and Scott, "Class, State, and Popular Organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua," 118; Hanlon, *Revolution under Fire*, 180.

46. Anonymous interview.

47. Interview with Maria Fernanda Farinha, 7/8/99.

48. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

49. Interview with Signe Arnfred, 11/17/00.

50. Interview with Jocqueline M. Evans, 1/28/00.

51. Interview with Dora Zeledón, 1/28/00.

52. Ibid.

53. Interview with Ana María Pizarro, 1/21/00.

54. Interview with María Rosa Renzi, 1/24/00.

55. Interview with Rosario Pasquier, 1/6/00.

56. Interview with Noé Silva, 1/27/00.

57. See List of Acronyms and Appendix. See also Chapter 8, which describes many of the NGOs in the contemporary women's movements in both countries.

58. Interview with Celeste Nobela Bango, 7/21/99.

59. Interview with Carlos Cardoso, 7/9/99.

60. Ibid.

61. Interview with Gulamo Taju, 7/8/99.

62. Interview with Ritha Fletes Zamora, 1/10/00.

63. Interview with Mónica Baltodano, 1/26/00. There is an entire debate about the extent to which political parties are the heart of democracy and, in fact, the best way to collect and represent the interests of the masses (see Schattschneider, *Party Government* and *The Semi-Sovereign People*) or, rather, represent the elite interests of politicians (see Aldrich, *Why Parties?*). Aldrich disagrees with Schattschneider and argues that today's parties are "parties in control" or parties that act as mechanisms for providing ambitious office seekers with the "name recognition" and entire machine for getting elected. The work of Piven and Cloward (see *Poor People's Movements* and *Why Americans Still Don't Vote*) reveals the limitations of contemporary political parties to serve the interests of the poor and thus argues that social movements, political protest, and disruption, often working in conjunction with electoral politics, serve as more effective means of social change. My intention here is simply to raise the issue and set the terms of this debate for future research in postrevolutionary multiparty states.

64. The Pact refers to an alliance made between the party in power, the Liberal Alliance, and the predominant opposition party, the FSLN, to constitutionally define the institutions of government in terms of the two dominant political parties, thus ensuring power-sharing between the parties and preventing any kind of third-party movement. For more information on the Pact, see Kampwirth (1998).

65. Interview with Javier Matus Lazo, 1/19/00.

66. Interview with Yalile Giacomán, 1/12/00.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview with Eva María Sam Qui, 1/17/00.

69. Ibid.

71. Interview with Luisa Capelão, 7/8/99.

72. Plank, "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty," 407; see also Hanlon, *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?* Bowen, "Beyond Reform," 255–279; Hanlon, *Peace without Profit.*

73. "Donor Politics and Mozambique."

74. Plank, 407.

75. See Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique.*

76. Interview with Ana Maria Montero, 7/8/99.

77. Ibid.

78. Interview with Carlos Cardoso, 7/9/99.

79. Interview with Justiniano Liebl, 1/7/00. In 1998, in response to concerns that the money contributed to the Nicaraguan government for Hurricane Mitch relief efforts was squandered by the government rather than used to meet the needs of the victims, more than three hundred NGOs, associations, and social movements in civil society came together to form the Coordinadora Civil. Kampwirth ("Arnoldo Alemán and the New Populism") argued that Alemán's attacks on the spokeswoman of the Coordinadora Civil and on other individual NGO workers and social movement activists have been anti-Sandinista, xenophobic, and misogynist, targeting foreign-born naturalized citizens and women, particularly those connected to the feminist movement.

80. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

81. Interview with Irma Ortega, 1/18/00.

82. Ibid.

83. Interview with María Rosa Renzi, 1/24/00.

84. Sergio Ramírez, former Nicaraguan Vice President under Daniel Ortega, and some other prominent Sandinistas, left the party to express dissent with the lack of internal democratization in the FSLN and formed the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). While the MRS contains many well-respected Sandinista leaders, the party has not been able to establish any significant electoral success.

85. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

86. Interview with Zoilamérica Narváez, 1/14/00.

87. Interview with Ana Criquillon, 1/20/00.

CHAPTER 8

1. Interview with Ana Maria Montero, 7/8/99.

2. Ibid.

3. Interview with Terezinha da Silva, 7/23/99.

4. Interview with Elisa Muianga and Celeste Nobela Bango, 7/21/99.

5. Ibid.

6. Interview with Eulália Temba, 7/13/99.

7. Ibid.

8. Women and Law in Southern Africa Project, *Families in a Changing Environment*, 157.

9. Ibid.

10. IRIN, "Mozambique: Government Considers Legalizing Abortion to Stem Maternal Deaths."

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. For a detailed analysis of the content of the law, see Disney, "Mozambique: Empowering Women through Family Law."

16. Interview with Emanuela Mondlane and Celeste Nobela, 7/2/04.

17. Ibid.

18. Interview with Maria Angelina Dique Enoque, 7/6/04.

19. Interview with Maria Jose Artur, 7/5/04.

20. Interview with Maria Angelina Dique Enoque, 7/6/04.

21. Seelye, "The Cost of Nicaragua's Total Abortion Ban,"1. Nicaragua, Chile and El Salvador have all passed recent legislation eliminating any exceptions to the prohibition of abortion, even in cases of rape, incest, and threat to the life of the mother.

22. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

23. Ana Criquillon, "The Nicaraguan Women's Movement," 233.

24. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

25. Interview with Helen Dixon, 1/31/00.

26 Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. Reference to Jo Freeman (Joreen), "The Tyranny of Structurelessness."

33. Interview with Argentina Olivas, 1/31/00.

34. Ibid.

35. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

36. Interview with Maria Teresa Blandon, 5/21/05.

37. Ibid.

38. For a detailed case study of the successful campaign see Isbester, *Still Fighting*, 156–161.

39. Isbester, 157.

40. Interview with Zoilamérica Narváez, 1/14/00.

41. Interview with Reyna Isabel Rodriguez, 1/13/00.

42. Ibid.

43. Interview with Mónica Zalaquett, 1/17/00.

44. Interview with María Lourdes Bolaños, 2/2/00.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Interview with Mónica Baltodano, 1/26/00.

48. Interview with Lilleana Salinas, 1/13/00.

49. Ibid.

50. Refers to Bayardo Arce, member of the National Directorate with oversight over AMNLAE during the Sandinista period.

51. Ibid.

52. Chinchilla,"Revolutionary Popular Feminism in Nicaragua," 382.

53. Orlandi, "Nicaragua's Abortion Ban Faces Legal Blockade."

54. Ibid.

55. Interview with Ana María Pizarro, 1/21/00.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid, 3/16/05.

58. Human Rights Watch, "Over Their Dead Bodies," 11.

59. Ibid, 5, 3.

60. Reuters UK, "Nicaragua Abortion Ban Killing Women," http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKN0240981920071002

61. PeaceWomen, "Open Letter Asking for Solidarity," http://www.peacewomen.org/campaigns/Nicaragua/Initiatives.html

62. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

63. Interview with Celeste Nobela Bango and Elisa Muianga, 7/21/99.

64. Interview with Thelma Espinoza, 1/6/00.

65. Interview with María Lourdes Bolaños, 2/2/00.

66. Interview with Ivete Mboa, 7/7/99.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview with María Elena Sequeira Rivas, 1/27/00.

69. Interview with Marcía Ramírez, 1/19/00.

70. Interview with Irma Ortega, 1/18/00.

71. Interview with seven women students at Casa Miriam, 2/3/00.

72. Arndt, "African Gender Trouble and African Womanism," 709.

73. Britton, *Women in the South African Parliament*, 21.

74. Interview with Paulina Mateus, 7/5/99.

75. Interview with Reyna Isabel Rodriguez, 1/13/00.

76. Interview with Célia Diniz, 7/1/99.

77. Interview with Hermengilda Thumbo, 7/23/99.

78. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

79. Brooke Ackerly is one of the first feminist theorists I read who explicitly addressed the role of Third World women activists in producing feminist political theory, and for that I want to thank her. See *Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism*.

80. Interview with Sofía Montenegro, 1/25/00.

81. Ibid.

82. Interview with Carla Braga,7/15/99.

83. Interview with Gilma Yadira Tinoco, 1/17/00.

84. Interview with Guillermo Galeano López, 1/28/00.

85. Interview with Jocqueline M. Evans, 1/28/00.

Bibliography

A Nossa Luta, Machel, Samora Moises, Presidente da FRELIMO. Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1975.

Abreu, Alcinda António de, "Mozambican Women Experiencing Violence" in *What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa*, edited by Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya, 73–84. London: Zed Books, 1998.

Abreu, Alcinda. "Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes in Post-Conflict Countries: Experiences from Mozambique." United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI), 2004.

Acevedo, Angela Rosa, et al. *Los Derechos de las Mujeres en Nicaragua: Un Analisis de Genero*. Managua: Asociación de Mujeres Profesionales por la Democracia en el Desarrollo, 1996.

Ackerly, Brooke. *Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Adams, Melinda. "Regional Women's Activism: African Women's Networks and the African Union" in *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights*, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp, 190–191. New York: New York University Press, 2006.

Africa Confidential 41, no. 24, 2000.

Africa Recovery 11, no. 2, Oct 1997.

Africa Action African Policy E Journal. "African Union Adopts Protacol on the Rights of African Women." July 25, 2003, http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/wom0307.htm.

Aguilar, Delia D. and Anne E. Lacsamana. *Women and Globalization*. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2004.

AIM (Mozambique Information Agency), "Nyimpine Chissano charged over Cardoso murder" May 11, 2006.

Ake, Claude. *The Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman, 1981.

Aldrich, John H. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Alexander, M. Jacqui and Chandra Mohanty, eds. *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*. New York: Routledge, 1997.

Alvarez, Sonia. *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Alvarez, Sonia E., Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Ericka Beckman, et al. "Encountering Latin American and Caribbean Feminisms," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 537–579.

Amadiume, Ifi. "Gender, Political Systems, and Social Movements: A West African Experience" in *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*, edited by Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, 35–68. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995.

Analise Sobre a Situacão Social da Mulher. Textos e Documentos da Conferencia Extraordinaria, BIP Mulher, L-35.

Antrobus, Peggy. *The Global Women's Movement: Origins, Issues and Strategies*. London: Zed Books, 2004.

Arndt, Susan. "African Gender Trouble and African Womanism: An Interview with Chikwenye Ogunyemi and Wanjira Muthoni," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 25, no. 3 (2000): 709–725.

Arnfred, Signe. "Notes on Gender and Modernization: Examples from Mozambique," Centros Estudoes Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, no. 118 B.

Arnfred, Signe. "Reflections on Family Forms and Gender Policy in Mozambique," Centros Estudoes Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, no. 118 A.

Arnfred, Signe. "Conceptions of Gender in Colonial and Post-Colonial Discourses: The Case of Mozambique." Paper prepared for CODESRIA's 10th General Assembly on *Africa in the New Millenium*, Kampala, Uganda, 8–12 December, 2002, 1–13. http://www.codesria.org/Archives/ga10/Plenary/gender_arnfred.htm

Assembly Debates Radical Change in the Family Law, Maputo, 29 April, 2003, Mozambican Information Agency (AIM).

Babb, Florence E. "After the Revolution: Neoliberal Policy and Gender in Nicaragua," *Latin American Perspectives* 23, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 27–48.

Basu, Amrita, ed. *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Bauer, Gretchen and Hannah Britton, eds. *Woman and African Parliaments*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

Bauer, Gretchen and Hannah E. Britton. "Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?" in *Women in African Parliaments*, edited by Gretchen Bauer and Hannah E. Britton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

Bauer, Gretchen and Hannah E. Britton, eds. *Women in African Parliaments*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

Bayard de Volo, Lorraine. *Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs: Gender Identity Politics in Nicaragua, 1979–1999*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Beckwith, Karen. "Lancashire Women against Pit Closures: Women's Standing in a Men's Movement," *Signs* 21, no. 4 (2000): 1034–1068.

Beechey, Veronica. "On Patriarchy," Feminist Review, no. 3 (1979): 66–82.

Benería, Lourdes. *Gender, Development, and Globalization: Economics as if All People Mattered*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Benería, Lourdes and Gita Sen. "Accumulation, Reproduction and Women's Role in Development: Boserup Revisited," *Signs* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 279–298.

Benston, Margaret. "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," *Monthly Review* 41, no. 7 (Reprinted, 1989): 31–43.

Berg, Nina and Aase Gunderson. "Legal Reforms in Mozambique: Equality and Emancipation through Popular Justice?" in *Gender and Change in Developing Countries,* edited by Kristi Anne Stolen and Mariken Vaa. Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1992.

Blandón, María Teresa, Lillian Levi, and Sofía Montenegro. "La Situación Nacional desde la Perspectiva Feminista," Managua: Primer Encuentro Nacional Feminista, 1 al 3 de Octubre, 1993.

Boserup, Ester. *Women's Role in Economic Development*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.

Borge, Tomás. *Women and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982.

Borge, Tomás, Carlos Fonseca, Danial Ortega, et al. *Sandinistas Speak: Speeches, Writings and Interviews with Leaders of Nicaragua's Revolution.* New York: Pathfinder Press, 1986.

Bowen, Merle L. "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (June 1992): 255–279.

Bowen, Merle L. *The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000.

Braidotti, Rosi, Ewa Charkiewicz, Sabine Hausler, et al. *Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis*. London: Zed Books, 1994.

Britton, Hannah E. *Women in the South African Parliament: From Resistance to Governance.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005.

Bulbeck, Chilla. *Re-Orienting Western Feminisms: Women's Diversity in a Post-Colonial World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Cagatay, Nilufer, Caren Grown, and Aida Santiago. "The Nairobi Women's Conference: Toward a Global Feminism?" Feminist Studies 12, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 401–412.

Caraway, Nancy, *Segregated Sisterhood; Racism and the Politics of American Feminism*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991.

Casimiro, Isabel. *A Mulher em Moçambique*. Maputo: CEA/NORAD, 1990.

Centro de Derechos Constitucionales Carlos Nuñez Téllez. *Derechos Politicos.* Managua: Julio, 1998.

Centro de Derechos Constitucionales Carlos Nuñez Téllez. *Proyecto Educación y Comunicación de los Derechos de las Mujeres: Resultados de la Consulta del Proyecto Codigo de Familia*. Managua: Agosto, 1999.

Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA). *Mujer y Transformación de la Vida Rural*. Impreso en la Unidad de Producción de Materiales de Divulgación Agropecuaria, 1989.

Chaftez, Janet Saltzman and Anthony Gary Dworkin, with the assistance of Stephanie Swanson. *Female Revolt: Women's Movements in World and Historical Perspective*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986.

Chan, Stephen and Moises Vanancio. *War and Peace in Mozambique*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Charlton, Sue Ellen M. *Women in Third World Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

Chavez Metoyer, Cynthia. "Nicaragua's Transition of State Power: Through Feminist Lenses" in *The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution*, edited by Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden, 114–140. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Chavez Metoyer, Cynthia. *Women and the State in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Chinchilla, Norma Stolz. "Women in Revolutionary Movements," Working Paper no. 27. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1983.

Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz. "Revolutionary Popular Feminism in Nicaragua: Articulating Class, Gender and National Sovereignty." *Gender and Society* 4, no. 3, Special Issue: Women and Development in the Third World (1990): 370–397.

Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz. "Feminism, Revolution, and Democratic Transitions in Nicaragua" in *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Participation and Democracy*, edited by Jane S. Jaquette, 177–197. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz. "Nationalism, Feminism, and Revolution in Central America" in *Feminist Nationalism*, edited by Lois West, 201–219. New York: Routledge, 1997.

Christie, Iain. *Samora Machel: A Biography.* London: PANAF, 1989.

Chuchryk, Patricia. "Women in the Revolution" in *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*, edited by Thomas Walker, 143–166. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Ciment, James. *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa.* New York: Facts on File, 1997.

Cliff, Julie. "The War on Women in Mozambique: Health Consequences of South African Destabilization, Economic Crisis, and Structural Adjustment" in *Women and Health in Africa*, edited by Meredith Turshen, 15-33. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1991.

Close, David. *Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, Society.* London: Pinter, 1988.

Close, David. *The Chamorro Years.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

Cochran, Augustus B. III and Catherine V. Scott. "Class, State, and Popular Organizations in Mozambique and Nicaragua" *Latin American Perspectives* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 105–124.

Cohen, Jean L and Andrew Arato. *Civil Society and Political Theory.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.

Collins, Patricia Hill. *Black Feminist Thought*, New York: Routledge, 1991.

Collinson, Helen, ed. *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua.* London: Zed Books, 1990.

Communication of the Central Committee, FRELIMO Basic Documents, Arquivo Historico de Mocambique, pp. 161–204.

Congreso Extraordinario Departmental del F.S.L.N. "Unidos hacias nuevas Victorias," Consolidado Departamental de *Preciones a Principios y Programas del FSLN.* Matagalpa, 30 de Abril al 1 de Mayo, 1994.

Congreso Extraordinario Departmental del F.S.L.N. "Unidos hacias nuevas Victorias," Consolidado Departamental de *Sobre Reformas a los Estatutos del FSLN.* Matagalpa, 30 de Abril al 1 de Mayo, 1994.

Copelon, Rhonda. "From Privacy to Autonomy: The Conditions for Sexual and Reproductive Freedom" in *From Abortion to Reproductive Freedom: Transforming a Movement*, edited by Marlene Gerber Fried. Boston: South End Press, 1990.

Craske, Nikke. *Women and Politics in Latin America.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics," *The University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989): 139–167.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color" in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement*, edited by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas, 357-383. New York: The New Press, 1995.

Criquillon, Ana. "The Nicaraguan Women's Movement: Feminist Reflections from within" in *The New Politics of Survival: Grassroots Movements in Central America*, edited by Minor Sinclair, 209–237. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995.

Dahl, Robert. *Polyarchy,* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.

Dalla Costa, Mariarosa. "Women and the Subversion of the Community" in "The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community." by Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (Bristol, UK: Falling Wall, 1972).

Dalla Costa, Mariarosa and Giovanna F. Dalla Costa. *Women, Development and Labor of Reproduction: Struggles and Movements.* NJ: Africa World Press, 1999.

Darcy de Oliveira, Rosiska. *In Praise of Difference: The Emergence of a Global Feminism.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998.

Davidson, Jean. "Land Redistribution in Mozambique and Its Effects on Women's Collective Production: Case Studies from Sofala Province" in *Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience,* edited by Jean Davidson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

Datas e Documentos da Historia da FRELIMO. Edição Imprensa Nacional, 1975.

Davies, Miranda. *Third World—Second Sex: Women's Struggles and National Liberation—Third World Women Speak Out.* London: Zed Books, 1983.

Davies, Miranda. *Third World—Second Sex: Volume 2.* London: Zed Books, 1987.

Deighton, Jane, Rossana Horsley, Sarah Stewart, et al. *Sweet Ramparts: Women in Revolutionary Nicaragua.* London: War on Want and the Nicaraguan Solidarity Campaign, 1983.

Delphy, Christine. *Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression.* London: Hutchinson, 1984.

Departamento de Propaganda y Educación Política del FSLN. *Luisa Amanda Espinoza: Mujer de Vanguardia.* Managua, 1981.

Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Dinerman, Alice. *Revolution, Counter-Revolution, and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Mozambique, 1975–1994.* London: Routledge, 2006.

Disney, Jennifer Leigh. "Democratization, Civil Society, and Women's Organizing in Post-Revolutionary Mozambique and Nicaragua," *New Political Science* 25, no. 4 (Dec 2003): 533–560.

Disney, Jennifer Leigh. "Incomplete Revolutions: Gendered Participation in Productive and Reproductive Labor in Mozambique and Nicaragua," *Gender and Globalization: Marxist Feminist Perspectives*, a special edition of *Socialism and Democracy* 18, no. 1 (Jan-June 2004): 7–42.

Disney, Jennifer Leigh. "Mozambique: Empowering Women through Family Law" in *Women in African Parliaments,* edited by Gretchen Bauer and Hannah Britton, 45–83. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

Disney, Jennifer Leigh. "From Mobilization to Organization: Women in Mozambique" in *Women and Politics Around the World*, edited by Joyce Gelb and Marian Lief Palley, forthcoming from ABC-CLIO.

Disney, Jennifer Leigh and Joyce Gelb. "Feminist Organizational 'Success': The State of U.S. Women's Movement Organizations in the 1990s," *Women and Politics* 21, no. 4 (2000): 39–76.

Documentos da 2 Conferencia da Organização da Mulher Moçambicana Realizada em Maputo 10 a 17 de Novembro de 1976. Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1977.

"Donor Politics and Mozambique." Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, no. 15, April 15, 1995, University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center. http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/DC_Mozmbik.html

dos Santos, Theotonio. "The Structure of Dependence," *Economic Review*, 60, 2, 1970.

Eisenstein, Hester. *Contemporary Feminist Thought.* Boston: G. K. Hall, 1983.

Eisenstein, Zillah, ed. *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978.

El FSLN y la Mujer. Managua: Editorial Vanguardia, 1987.

El Movimiento Feminista en Nicaragua. Managua: La Malinche, 1991.

Elson, Diane and Ruth Pearson. "The International Division of Labor and Women's Factory Production" in *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons*, edited by Kate Young, Carol Walkowitz, and Roslyn McCullagh. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.

Engels, Friedrich. "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" in *Marx/Engels Reader,* edited by Robert Tucker. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.

Enloe, Cynthia. *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Envío. "Economic Takeoff: the Little Train That Couldn't," 11 (October 1992): 18-20.

Erlick, June Carolyn. "Women of Nicaragua" *Ms.* (Nov 1984): 66–72, 147–150.

FAO, United Nations. *Rural Women and Food Security: Current Situation and Perspectives,* Rome, 1998.

Ferree, Myra Marx and Aili Mari Tripp. *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights*. New York: New York University Press, 2006.

Frank, Andre Gunder. "The Development of Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review* 18, no 4 (1996): 17-31.

Freeman, Jo. "The Tyranny of Structurelessness," *Ms*. (July 1973): 76–78, 86–69.

Frohmann, Alicia and Teresa Valdés. "Democracy in the Country and in the Home: The Women's Movement in Chile" in *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*, edited by Amrita Basu, 276–301. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Goetz, Anne Marie and Shireen Hassim. "Introduction: Women in Power in Uganda and South Africa" in *No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy-Making*, edited by Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, 1–28. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Goetz, Anne Marie and Shireen Hassim, eds. *No Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy-Making*. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Goody, Jack. *Production and Reproduction: A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domain*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Hafkin, Nancy J. and Edna G. Bay, eds. *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Hall, Margaret and Tom Young. *Mozambique Since Independence.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997.

Hancock, Ange-Marie. "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm." *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 1 (Mar 2007): 63–79.

Hanlon, Joseph. *The Revolution Under Fire*. London: Zed, 1984.

Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambique: *Who Calls the Shots?* London: James Currey, 1991.

Hanlon, Joseph. *Peace without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique*. Oxford: James Currey, 1996.

Hanlon, Joseph. "Power without Responsibility: The World Bank and Mozambican Cashew Nuts," *Review of African Political Economy* 83 (2000): 29–45. Retrieved from Jubilee Research: Jubilee 2000: Policy www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/reports/roape100400.htm, 10/27/05, 1–16.

Hanlon, Joseph. "His tenacious journalism exposed corruption in Mozambique," *The Guardian*, November 24, 2000.

Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambican Government, February 2005, http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/simon/GG3072/Moz-Bull-39-list.pdf.

Harris, Richard L. and Carlos M. Vilas, eds. *Nicaragua: A Revolution under Seige.* London: Zed Books, 1985.

Harrison, John. "Political Economy of Housework," *Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists*, 3, no. 1 (1973).

Hartsock, Nancy. *Money, Sex and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983.

Hassim, Shireen. "The Virtuous Circle of Representation" in *Women in African Parliaments*, edited by Gretchen Bauer and Hannah E. Britton. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

Hawkesworth, Mary. *Globalization and Feminist Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

Haynes, Jeff. *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World: Politics and New Political Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.

Hermele, Kenneth. "Stick and Carrot: Political Alliances and Nascent Capitalism in Mozambique" in *Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa*, edited by Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, and Arve Ofstad. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992.

Higley, John and Richard Gunther, eds. *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Hill, Christopher. "Gender Differences in the Family Agricultural Sector in Moçambique," Departamento de Estatistica, DEA, MAP, 1995.

Hilmarsson, Hilmar T. "Cashew Pricing and Marketing in Mozambique," World Bank Working Paper prepared for seminar in Maputo, June 1995.

Hirschman, Mitu. "Women and Development: A Critique" in *Feminism, Postmodernism, Development*, edited by Marianne Marchand and Jane Parpart. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Hodges, Donald C. *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.

hooks, bell. *Ain't I a Women? Black Women and Feminism*. Boston: South End Press, 1981.

Hoyt, Katherine. *The Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997.

Hubbard, Ruth. "Social Effects of Some Contemporary Myths about Women" in *Woman's Nature: Rationalizations of Inequality*, edited by M. Lowe and R. Hubbard. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.

Huffman, Robert T. "Colonialism, Socialism, and Destabilization in Mozambique," *Africa Today* 39, no. 1–2 (1992): 9–27.

Hull, Gloria, Patricia Scott, and Barbara Smith eds. *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies*. Old Westbury, New York: Feminist Press, 1982.

Human Rights Watch. *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine, and the Reform Process in Mozambique*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992.

Human Rights Watch. *Over Their Dead Bodies: Denial of Access to Emergency Obstetric Care and Therapeutic Abortion in Nicaragua*. Human Rights Watch 19, no.2 (B) October, 2007.

Huntington, Samuel. *Political Order and Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel. *Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Mozambique: Government Considers Legalizing Abortion to Stem Maternal Deaths," May 29, 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72421

Isaacman, Allen. *Cotton Is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, Work and Rural Struggle in Colonial Mozambique, 1938–1961*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996.

Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman. *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.

Isaacman, Allen. *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambesi Prazos 1750-1902*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.

Isbester, Katherine. *Still Fighting: The Nicaraguan Women's Movement, 1977–2000*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.

Jaquette, Jane. *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Participation and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Jayawardena, Kumari. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Jayko, Margaret. "Introduction" in *Women and the Nicaraguan Revolution*, authored by Tomás Borge, 3–9. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1986.

Jonasdottir, A.G. "On the Concept of Interests, Women's Interests and the Limitations of Interest Theory," in *The Political Interests of Gender*, edited by A.G. Jonasdottir and Kathleen B. Jones, 33-65. London: Sage, 1988.

Kampwirth, Karen. "Feminism, Anti-Feminism, and Electoral Politics in Postwar Nicaragua and El Salvador," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 259–279.

Kampwirth, Karen. "Arnoldo Alemán and the New Populism: Taking on the NGOs." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, September 6–8, 2001.

Kampwirth, Karen. *Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Kampwirth, Karen. *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004.

Kaplan, Caren, Norma Alarcón, and Minoo Moallem, eds. *Between Woman and Nation, Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.

Kaplan, Temma. *Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements*. New York: Routledge, 1997.

Kimmens, Andrew C. *Nicaragua and the United States.* New York: H. H. Wilson, 1987.

Kornbluh, Peter. "The Covert War" in *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, edited by Thomas W. Walker, 21–38. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

Kornbluh, Peter. *The Price of Intervention: Reagan's Wars against the Sandinistas*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987.

Kruks, Sonia, Rayna Rapp, and Marilyn B. Young. *Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989.

Kruks, Sonia and Ben Wiser. "The State, the Party and the Female Peasantry in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11 (1984): 105–127.

Kuhn, Annette and AnnMarie Wolpe, eds. *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Laclau, Ernesto. "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," *New Left Review* 67 (May-June 1971): 19–38.

Laclau, Ernesta and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. New York: Verso, 1985.

Lancaster, Roger N. *Life Is Hard: Machismo, Danger and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Larguia, Isabel. "Why Political Feminism?" in *Latin America Faces the 21st Century: Reconstructing a Social Justice Agenda*, edited by Susanne Jonas and Edward McCaughan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

LaRamée, Pierre M. and Erica G. Polakoff. "The Evolution of the Popular Organizations in Nicaragua," in *The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution*, edited by Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden, 141–206. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Lele, Uma. *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa* (World Bank Research Paper). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1975.

Lind, Amy Conger. "Power, Gender and Development: Popular Women's Organizations and the Politics of Needs in Ecuador" in *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy*, edited by Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alverez, 134–149. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

Luciak, Ilja. "Gender Equality and Electoral Politics on the Left: A Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaragua," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 39–66.

Machel, Samora. *Sowing the Seeds of Revolution*. London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné.

MacKinnon, Catherine. *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Magaia, Lina. *Dumba Nengue: Run for Your Life: Peasant Tales of Tragedy in Mozambique*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988.

Mamdani, Mahmood and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, eds. *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, 1995.

Mansbridge, Jane. *Beyond Adversary Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Marchand, Marianne and Jane Parpart, eds. *Feminism, Postmodernism, Development*. London: Routledge, 1995.

Marcus, Bruce, ed. *Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution: Speeches by Sandinista Leaders*. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985.

Markovitz, Irving Leonard. "Uncivil Society, Capitalism, and the State, in Africa" in *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspective*, edited by Nelsom Kasfir, 21–53. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

Markovitz, Irving Leonard. "Civil Society, Pluralism, Goldilocks and other Fairy Tales in Africa" in *Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus*, edited by George Bond and Nigel Gibson, 117–144. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.

Marx, Karl. *Capital, Volume 1*. New York: Penguin Books, 1976.

Marx, Karl. "The German Ideology" in *Marx/Engels Reader* edited by Robert C. Tucker, 146-200. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978.

Mazrui, Ali. "Ghandi, Marx, and the Warrior Tradition: Towards Androgynous Liberation," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 12, 1–4 (Jan-Oct 1977): 179–196.

McClintock, Anne. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York: Routledge, 1997.

Mendez, Jennifer Bickham. *From the Revolution to the Maquiladoras: Gender, Labor, and Globalization in Nicaragua*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.

Mies, Maria. *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labor*. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Mies, Maria, Veronlika Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Claudia Von Werlhof. *Women: The Last Colony*. London: Zed Books, 1988.

Mies, Maria and Vandana Shiva. *Ecofeminism*. London: Zed Books, 1994.

Mikell, Gwendolyn, ed. *African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

Milanovic, Branko. "True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone," *The Economic Journal* 112, no. 476 (Jan 2002): 51–92.

Mills, Charles. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Press, 1997.

Minter, William. *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London: Zed Books, 1994.

Moghadam, Valentine M. *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

Mohanty, Chandra. "Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism" in *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, edited by Chandra Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres, 1–50. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Mohanty, Chandra, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds. *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.

Molyneux, Maxine. "Beyond the Domestic Labor Debates," *New Left Review* 115 (July/Aug 1979): 3–28.

Molyneux, Maxine. "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua," *Feminist Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 227–254.

Molyneux, Maxine. *Women's Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and Beyond*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003.

Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. London: Penguin Books, 1969.

Montenegro, Sofía. "La Mujer, la Politica Economia y el Desarrollo Humano." Managua: Biblioteca Feminista La Malinche, 1992.

Morgan, Glenda. "Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 4 (Dec 1990): 603–619.

Moser, Caroline. "Gender Planning in the Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Needs," *World Development*, vol. 17 no. 11, 1989, 1799-1825.

Mullings, Leith. "Women and Economic Change in Africa" in *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*, edited by Nancy J. Hafkin and Edna G. Bay. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Newitt, Marilyn. *A History of Mozambique*. London: Hurst, 1995.

Nnaemeka, Obioma, ed. *Sisterhood: Feminisms and Power from Africa to the Diaspora*. Trenton:NJ, Africa World Press, 1998.

Normas Constitucionales y Leyes Que Garantizan La Igualdad de la Mujer en Nicaragua. Managua: Asamblea Nacional de la República de Nicaragua, 1987.

Nussbaum, Martha and Jonathan Glover, eds. *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

"'Operation Production' Victims to Go Home," *Mozambique News Agency Aim Reports* No.248, 19th February 2003

Organização da Mulher Moçambicana Secretariado Nacional Semana da Mulher Texto Oreintador: A Mulher na Luta pela Sua Emancipacao. Maputo, 1985.

Organization of Mozambican Woman (OMM) Informative Bulletin. Maputo: OMM, 1980.

Orlandi, Lorraine. "Nicaragua's Abortion Ban Faces Legal Blockade," *Women's eNews*, November 17, 2006. http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2963

Ortega, Eliana and Nancy Sternbach. "Gracias a la vida: Recounting the Third Latin American Feminist Meeting in Bertioga, Brazil, July 31-August 4, 1985,"*off our backs* 16, no. 1, January 1986.

Oyewumi, Oyeronke. *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

Oyewumi, Oyeronke, ed. *African Women & Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003.

Parpart, Jane and Kathleen A. Staudt. *Women and the State in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989.

Pateman, Carol. *The Sexual Contract*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.

PeaceWomen, "Open Letter Asking for Solidarity," Women, Peace, and Security Initiatives, Nicaragua. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, November 22, 2007, http://www.peacewomen.org/campaigns/Nicaragua/Initiatives.html

Peet, Richard. *Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank, and WTO*. London: Zed Books, 2003.

Perez-Aleman, Paola. "Economic Crisis and Women in Nicaragua" in *Unequal Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty and Women's Work*, edited by Lourdes Beneria and Shelley Feldman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

Petras, James and Fernando Leiva. *Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits to Electoral Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Pitcher, Anne. *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Pitkin, Hannah. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward. *Why Americans Still Don't Vote: And Why Politicians Want it That Way*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.

Plank, David N. "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donor," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 3 (Sept 1993): 407–430.

Prevost, Gary and Harry Vanden, eds. *The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Proclama de la Dirección Nacional del FSLN: 8 de Noviembre de 1986. Managua: Editorial Vanguardia, 1986.

Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Radcliffe, Sarah A. and Sallie Westwood, eds. "*Viva*": *Women and Popular Protest in Latin America.* London: Routledge, 1993.

Ramirez-Horton, Susan. "The Role of Women in the Nicaraguan Revolution" in *Nicaragua in Revolution*, edited by Thomas Walker, 147–159. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Randall, Margaret. *Gathering Rage: The Failure of 20th Century Revolutions to Develop a Feminist Agenda*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992.

Randall, Margaret. *Sandino's Daughters Revisited: Feminism in Nicaragua*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994.

Redclift, Nanneke and M. Thea Sinclair, eds. *Working Women: International Perspectives on Labor and Gender Ideology.* New York: Routledge, 1991.

"Reflections on Family Forms and Gender Policy in Mozambique," Resolução Geral. Textos e Documentos da Conferenica Extraordinaria, BIP, Mulher, L-36.

Reilly, Joseph. "FRELIMO: Thirty Years of Fighting for a Free Mozambique," *Monthly Review* 44, no. 5 (Oct 1992): 10–17.

Renzi, Mari Rosa and Sonia Agurto. *La Esperanza Tiene Nombre de Mujer: La Economía Nicaraguense desde una Perspectiva de Género*. Managua: Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global (FIDEG), 1997.

Resolução Geral. Textos e Documentos da Conferenica Extraordinaria, BIP, Mulher, L-36.

Resolutions from the Second Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women.

Reuters UK, "Nicaragua Abortion Ban Killing Women," October 2, 2007. Retrieved from www.uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKN0240981920071002

Robertson, A.F. *Beyond the Family: The Social Organization of Human Reproduction*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Rodgers, Barbara. *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies.* London: Routledge, 1980.

Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.* Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1972.

Rosset, Peter and John Vandermeer. *The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution under Fire.* New York: Grove Press, 1983.

Ruchwarger, Gary. *Struggling for Survival: Workers, Women, and Class on a Nicaraguan State Farm.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. *Capitalist Development and Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Ryan, Phil. *The Rise and Fall of the Market in Sandinista Nicaragua.* London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.

Sargent, Lydia, ed. *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.* Boston: South End Press, 1981.

Saul, John. *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985.

Saul, John. *Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s.* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993.

Saul, John. "Rethinking the FRELIMO State," *Socialist Register* 1993. London: Merlin Press, 1993.

Schattschneider, E. E. *Party Government.* New York: Rinehart, 1942.

Schattschneider, E. E. *Semi-Sovereign People.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

Schroeder, Richard C. "Roots of Current Antagonism" in *Nicaragua and the United States*, edited by Andrew C. Kimmens. New York: H. H. Wilson, 1987.

Schumpeter, Joseph. *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Schwarzenbach, Sibyl. "On Civic Friendship," *Ethics* 107, no. 1 (Oct 1996): 97–128.

Scott, Catherine and Gus Cochran. "Revolution in the Periphery: Angola, Cuba, Mozambique and Nicaragua," in *Revolution in the World System,* edited by Terry Boswell. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Seccombe, Wally. "The Housewife and Her Labor under Capitalism," *New Left Review*, no. 83 (Jan-Feb 1974).

Seelye, Kate. "The Cost of Nicaragua's Total Abortion Ban," Frontline/World Dispatches, March 13, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2008/03/the_cost_of_nic.html

Sen, Gita and Caren Grown. *Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives.* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1987.

7 de Abril: Dia da Mulher Moçambicana. Maputo: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1975.

Sheldon, Kathleen. "A Report on a 'Delicate Problem' Concerning Female Garment Workers in Beira, Mozambique," *Signs* (Spring 1991): 575–586.

Sheldon, Kathleen E. *Pounders of Grain: A History of Women, Work, and Politics in Mozambique.* Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002.

Shiva, Vandana. "Development as a New Project of Western Patriarchy" in *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990.

Shohat, Ella and Robert Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media.* New York: Routledge, 1997.

Simpson, Mark. "Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of FRELIMO," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 1993): 309–337.

Situation of Women in Mozambique. Report by the Women's NGOs to the NGO Forum taking place concurrently with the African Preparatory Conference for Beijing in Dakar, Senegal, 12–15 November, 1994, Forum Mulher.

Sklar, Holly. *Washington's War on Nicaragua*. Boston: South End Press, 1988.

Sklar, Richard. "Democracy in Africa," *African Studies Review* XXV, no. 3/4 (Sept/Dec 1983): 11-24.

Smith, Alan K. "The Peoples of Southern Mozambique: An Historical Survey," *Journal of African History* 14, no. 4 (1973): 565–580.

Smith, Paul. "Domestic Labor and Marx's Theory of Value" in *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*, edited by Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Soares, et al. "Brazilian Feminism and Women's Movements" in *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*, edited by Amrita Basu, 302-323. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

Sokoloff, Natalie. *Between Money and Love: The Dialectics of Women's Home and Market Work*. New York: Praeger Press, 1980.

Spring, Anita and Vicki Wilde. "Women Farmers, Structural Adjustment and FAO's Plan of Action for Integration Women in Development" in *Structural Adjustment and African Women Farmers,* edited by Christina H. Gladwin. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1991.

Steady, Filomina Chioma. "The Black Woman Cross-Culturally: An Overview" in *The Black Woman Cross-Culturally,* edited by Filomina Chioma Steady. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1981.

Steady, Filomina Chioma. "African Feminism: A Worldwide Perspective" in *Women in Africa and the African Diaspora: A Reader, Second Edition*, edited by Rosalyn Terborg-Penn and Andrea Benton Rushing, 3–21. Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1996.

Stephen, Lynn. *Women and Social Movements in Latin America*: *Power from Below.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997.

Stephens, Beth. "Women in Nicaragua," *Monthly Review* (Sept 1988).

Sternbach, Nancy Saporta, Marysa Navarro-Aranguren, Patricia Chuchryk, et al. "Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogotá to San Bernardo," *Signs* 17 no. 2 (1992): 393–434.

Stichter, Sharon and Jane Parpart, eds. *Women, Employment and Family in the International Division of Labor*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.

Tabb, Bill. *The Amoral Elephant*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001.

Terborg-Penn, Rosalyn and Andrea Benton Rushing, eds. *Women in Africa and the African Diaspora: A Reader.* Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1996.

Tetreault, Mary Ann, ed. *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.

III Conferencia Nacional da OMM: *Resolução* Sobre Educacao e Formacao *De Quadros, Maputo, 1980.*

III Conferencia Nacional de 27 a 31 de Marco, 1980: Relatorio de Actividades, Maputo, 1980.

Third National Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM). Doc. Info. CEDIMO Serie E (1) 1979–01–11.

Tirado, Manilo. "The United States and the Sandinista Revolution" in *Nicaragua: A Revolution under Seige,* edited by Richard L. Harris and Carlos M. Vilas, 202–215. London: Zed Books, 1985.

Torp, Jens Erik, L. M. Denny, and Donald I. Ray. *Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe: Politics, Economics, Society.* London: Pinter, 1989.

Transformar a Sociedade para Fazer Triunfar a Revolução. Textos e Documentos da Conferencia Extraordinaria, BIP, Mulher, L-34.

Tripp, Aili Mari. "Rethinking Difference: Comparative Perspectives from Africa," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 25, no. 3 (2000): 649–675.

Tripp, Aili Mari. "The Politics of Autonomy and Cooptation in Africa: The Case of the Ugandan's Women's Movement." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2001): 101–128.

Turshen, Meredith and Clotilde Twagiramariya. *What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa.* London: Zed Books, 1998.

UNICEF. "La Situación de la Mujer en Nicaragua y Políticas de Gobierno," Managua: Primer Seminario Interinstitucional/Mujer, 1989.

United Nations Development Programme. *Peace and Economic Growth: Opportunities for Human Development.* Mozambique National Human Development Report, 1998.

United Nations Development Programme. *Growth Equity, Poverty, and Human Development*: Mozambique National Human Development Report, 1999.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2007/2008.

Urdang, Stephanie. "The Last Transition: Women and Development" in *A Difficult Road: The Transition Socialism in Mozambique*, edited by John Saul. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985.

Urdang, Stephanie. *And Still They Dance: Women, War, and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989.

Vines, Alex. *RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique.* London: Christian Geffray, 1990.

Visvanathan, Nalini, Lynn Duggan, Laurie Nisonoff, and Nan Wiegersma. *The Women, Gender and Development Reader.* London: Zed Books, 1997.

Walker, Thomas W., ed. *Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

Walker, Thomas W. *Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Walker, Thomas W., ed. *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Walker, Thomas W., ed. *Nicaragua without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural Adjustment in the 1990s.* Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997.

Waterhouse, Rachel. "Mozambique: From Revolution to Powder Room," *Women's Feature Service*, Peacenet, August 26, 1991.

Weber, Henri. *Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution*. London: Verso, 1981.

Westwood, Sally and Sarah A. Radcliffe. "Gender, Racism, and the Politics of Identities in Latin America," in *'Viva': Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, edited by Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sally Westwood. New York: Routledge, 1993.

Whisnant, David E. *Rascally Signs in Sacred Places: The Politics of Culture in Nicaragua.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. "Winners, Losers and Also-Rans: Toward a Comparative Sociology of Latin America Guerrilla Movements" in *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements*, edited by Susan Eckstein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Women's International Resource Exchange (WIRE). *Resistance, War and Liberation: Women of Southern Africa.* New York: 1980.

Wood, Ellen Meiksins. *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Women and Law in Southern Africa Project. *Maintenance Rights and Women in Mozambique: Case Studies in the Southern Region*. Department of Women and Gender Studies, Center for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1992.

Women and Law in Southern Africa Project. *Families in a Changing Environment*, Department of Women and Gender Studies, Center for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1997.

Women and Organizations in Mozambique. Netherlands: Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, 1994.

Women's Section: The Mozambique Liberation Front. Dar es Salaam, 1970.

Young, Kate. *Gender and Development Readings*. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 1992.

Young, Kate, Carol Walkowitz, and Roslyn McCullagh, eds. *Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination Internationally and Its Lessons*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.

Zwerling, Philip and Connie Martin. *Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution*. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1985.

Index